Inference Based
Q.No: 1
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Recently I spent several hours sitting under a tree in my garden with the social anthropologist William Ury, a Harvard University professor who specializes in the art of negotiation and wrote the bestselling book, Getting to Yes. He captivated me with his theory that tribalism protects people from their fear of rapid change. He explained that the pillars of tribalism that humans rely on for security would always counter any significant cultural or social change. In this way, he said, change is never allowed to happen too fast. Technology, for example, is a pillar of society. Ury believes that every time technology moves in a new or radical direction, another pillar such as religion or nationalism will grow stronger - in effect, the traditional and familiar will assume greater importance to compensate for the new and untested. In this manner, human tribes avoid rapid change that leaves people insecure and frightened.
But we have all heard that nothing is as permanent as change. Nothing is guaranteed. Pithy expressions, to be sure, but no more than cliches. As Ury says, people dont live that way from day-to-day. On the contrary, they actively seek certainty and stability. They want to know they will be safe.
Even so, we scare ourselves constantly with the idea of change. An IBM CEO once said: We only re-structure for a good reason, and if we havent re-structured in a while, thats a good reason. We are scared that competitors, technology and the consumer will put us out of business so we have to change all the time just to stay alive. But if we asked our fathers and grandfathers, would they have said that they lived in a period of little change? Structure may not have changed much. It may just be the speed with which we do things.
Change is over-rated, anyway. Consider the automobile. Its an especially valuable example, because the auto industry has spent tens of billions or dollars on research and product development in the last 100 years. Henry Fords first car had a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, and four seats, and it could safely do 18 miles per hour. A hundred years and tens of thousands of research hours later, we drive cars with a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, four seats - and the average speed in London in 2001 was 17.5 miles per hour!
Thats not a hell of a lot of return for the money. Ford evidently doesnt have much to teach us about change. The fact that theyre still manufacturing cars is not proof that Ford Motor Co. is a sound organization, just proof that it takes very large companies to make cars in great quantities - making for an almost impregnable entry barrier.
Fifty years after the development of the jet engine, planes are also little changed. Theyve grown bigger, wider and can carry more people. But those are incremental, largely cosmetic changes.
Taken together, this lack of real change has come to mean that in travel - whether driving or flying time and technology have not combined to make things much better. The safety and design have of course accompanied the times and the new volume of cars and flights, but nothing of any significance has changed in the basic assumptions of the final product.
At the same time, moving around in cars or aeroplanes becomes less and less efficient all the time. Not only has there been no great change, but also both forms or transport have deteriorated as more people clamour to use them. The same is true for telephones, which took over hundred years to become mobile, or photographic film, which also required an entire century to change.
The only explanation for this is anthropological. Once established in calcified organizations, humans do two things: sabotage changes that might render people dispensable, and ensure industry-wide emulation. In the 1960s, German auto companies developed plans to scrap the entire combustion engine for an electrical design. (The same existed in the 1970s in Japan, and in the I980s in France.). So for 40 years we might have been free of the wasteful and ludicrous dependence on fossil fuels. Why didnt it go anywhere? Because auto executives understood pistons and carburettors, and would loath to cannibalize their expertise, along with most of their factories.
Recently I spent several hours sitting under a tree in my garden with the social anthropologist William Ury, a Harvard University professor who specializes in the art of negotiation and wrote the bestselling book, Getting to Yes. He captivated me with his theory that tribalism protects people from their fear of rapid change. He explained that the pillars of tribalism that humans rely on for security would always counter any significant cultural or social change. In this way, he said, change is never allowed to happen too fast. Technology, for example, is a pillar of society. Ury believes that every time technology moves in a new or radical direction, another pillar such as religion or nationalism will grow stronger - in effect, the traditional and familiar will assume greater importance to compensate for the new and untested. In this manner, human tribes avoid rapid change that leaves people insecure and frightened.
But we have all heard that nothing is as permanent as change. Nothing is guaranteed. Pithy expressions, to be sure, but no more than cliches. As Ury says, people dont live that way from day-to-day. On the contrary, they actively seek certainty and stability. They want to know they will be safe.
Even so, we scare ourselves constantly with the idea of change. An IBM CEO once said: We only re-structure for a good reason, and if we havent re-structured in a while, thats a good reason. We are scared that competitors, technology and the consumer will put us out of business so we have to change all the time just to stay alive. But if we asked our fathers and grandfathers, would they have said that they lived in a period of little change? Structure may not have changed much. It may just be the speed with which we do things.
Change is over-rated, anyway. Consider the automobile. Its an especially valuable example, because the auto industry has spent tens of billions or dollars on research and product development in the last 100 years. Henry Fords first car had a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, and four seats, and it could safely do 18 miles per hour. A hundred years and tens of thousands of research hours later, we drive cars with a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, four seats - and the average speed in London in 2001 was 17.5 miles per hour!
Thats not a hell of a lot of return for the money. Ford evidently doesnt have much to teach us about change. The fact that theyre still manufacturing cars is not proof that Ford Motor Co. is a sound organization, just proof that it takes very large companies to make cars in great quantities - making for an almost impregnable entry barrier.
Fifty years after the development of the jet engine, planes are also little changed. Theyve grown bigger, wider and can carry more people. But those are incremental, largely cosmetic changes.
Taken together, this lack of real change has come to mean that in travel - whether driving or flying time and technology have not combined to make things much better. The safety and design have of course accompanied the times and the new volume of cars and flights, but nothing of any significance has changed in the basic assumptions of the final product.
At the same time, moving around in cars or aeroplanes becomes less and less efficient all the time. Not only has there been no great change, but also both forms or transport have deteriorated as more people clamour to use them. The same is true for telephones, which took over hundred years to become mobile, or photographic film, which also required an entire century to change.
The only explanation for this is anthropological. Once established in calcified organizations, humans do two things: sabotage changes that might render people dispensable, and ensure industry-wide emulation. In the 1960s, German auto companies developed plans to scrap the entire combustion engine for an electrical design. (The same existed in the 1970s in Japan, and in the I980s in France.). So for 40 years we might have been free of the wasteful and ludicrous dependence on fossil fuels. Why didnt it go anywhere? Because auto executives understood pistons and carburettors, and would loath to cannibalize their expertise, along with most of their factories.
Which of the following best describes one of the main ideas discussed in the passage?
Solution:
This is a main idea question; if you look at the complete passage, the author through examples of aeroplanes and cars and even telephones etc. is trying to show that innovation has not happened as much as it has been made out to be. The changes have been basically incremental and cosmetic.
Q.No: 2
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Recently I spent several hours sitting under a tree in my garden with the social anthropologist William Ury, a Harvard University professor who specializes in the art of negotiation and wrote the bestselling book, Getting to Yes. He captivated me with his theory that tribalism protects people from their fear of rapid change. He explained that the pillars of tribalism that humans rely on for security would always counter any significant cultural or social change. In this way, he said, change is never allowed to happen too fast. Technology, for example, is a pillar of society. Ury believes that every time technology moves in a new or radical direction, another pillar such as religion or nationalism will grow stronger - in effect, the traditional and familiar will assume greater importance to compensate for the new and untested. In this manner, human tribes avoid rapid change that leaves people insecure and frightened.
But we have all heard that nothing is as permanent as change. Nothing is guaranteed. Pithy expressions, to be sure, but no more than cliches. As Ury says, people dont live that way from day-to-day. On the contrary, they actively seek certainty and stability. They want to know they will be safe.
Even so, we scare ourselves constantly with the idea of change. An IBM CEO once said: We only re-structure for a good reason, and if we havent re-structured in a while, thats a good reason. We are scared that competitors, technology and the consumer will put us out of business so we have to change all the time just to stay alive. But if we asked our fathers and grandfathers, would they have said that they lived in a period of little change? Structure may not have changed much. It may just be the speed with which we do things.
Change is over-rated, anyway. Consider the automobile. Its an especially valuable example, because the auto industry has spent tens of billions or dollars on research and product development in the last 100 years. Henry Fords first car had a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, and four seats, and it could safely do 18 miles per hour. A hundred years and tens of thousands of research hours later, we drive cars with a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, four seats - and the average speed in London in 2001 was 17.5 miles per hour!
Thats not a hell of a lot of return for the money. Ford evidently doesnt have much to teach us about change. The fact that theyre still manufacturing cars is not proof that Ford Motor Co. is a sound organization, just proof that it takes very large companies to make cars in great quantities - making for an almost impregnable entry barrier.
Fifty years after the development of the jet engine, planes are also little changed. Theyve grown bigger, wider and can carry more people. But those are incremental, largely cosmetic changes.
Taken together, this lack of real change has come to mean that in travel - whether driving or flying time and technology have not combined to make things much better. The safety and design have of course accompanied the times and the new volume of cars and flights, but nothing of any significance has changed in the basic assumptions of the final product.
At the same time, moving around in cars or aeroplanes becomes less and less efficient all the time. Not only has there been no great change, but also both forms or transport have deteriorated as more people clamour to use them. The same is true for telephones, which took over hundred years to become mobile, or photographic film, which also required an entire century to change.
The only explanation for this is anthropological. Once established in calcified organizations, humans do two things: sabotage changes that might render people dispensable, and ensure industry-wide emulation. In the 1960s, German auto companies developed plans to scrap the entire combustion engine for an electrical design. (The same existed in the 1970s in Japan, and in the I980s in France.). So for 40 years we might have been free of the wasteful and ludicrous dependence on fossil fuels. Why didnt it go anywhere? Because auto executives understood pistons and carburettors, and would loath to cannibalize their expertise, along with most of their factories.
Recently I spent several hours sitting under a tree in my garden with the social anthropologist William Ury, a Harvard University professor who specializes in the art of negotiation and wrote the bestselling book, Getting to Yes. He captivated me with his theory that tribalism protects people from their fear of rapid change. He explained that the pillars of tribalism that humans rely on for security would always counter any significant cultural or social change. In this way, he said, change is never allowed to happen too fast. Technology, for example, is a pillar of society. Ury believes that every time technology moves in a new or radical direction, another pillar such as religion or nationalism will grow stronger - in effect, the traditional and familiar will assume greater importance to compensate for the new and untested. In this manner, human tribes avoid rapid change that leaves people insecure and frightened.
But we have all heard that nothing is as permanent as change. Nothing is guaranteed. Pithy expressions, to be sure, but no more than cliches. As Ury says, people dont live that way from day-to-day. On the contrary, they actively seek certainty and stability. They want to know they will be safe.
Even so, we scare ourselves constantly with the idea of change. An IBM CEO once said: We only re-structure for a good reason, and if we havent re-structured in a while, thats a good reason. We are scared that competitors, technology and the consumer will put us out of business so we have to change all the time just to stay alive. But if we asked our fathers and grandfathers, would they have said that they lived in a period of little change? Structure may not have changed much. It may just be the speed with which we do things.
Change is over-rated, anyway. Consider the automobile. Its an especially valuable example, because the auto industry has spent tens of billions or dollars on research and product development in the last 100 years. Henry Fords first car had a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, and four seats, and it could safely do 18 miles per hour. A hundred years and tens of thousands of research hours later, we drive cars with a metal chassis with an internal combustion, gasoline-powered engine, four wheels with rubber tyres, a foot operated clutch assembly and brake system, a steering wheel, four seats - and the average speed in London in 2001 was 17.5 miles per hour!
Thats not a hell of a lot of return for the money. Ford evidently doesnt have much to teach us about change. The fact that theyre still manufacturing cars is not proof that Ford Motor Co. is a sound organization, just proof that it takes very large companies to make cars in great quantities - making for an almost impregnable entry barrier.
Fifty years after the development of the jet engine, planes are also little changed. Theyve grown bigger, wider and can carry more people. But those are incremental, largely cosmetic changes.
Taken together, this lack of real change has come to mean that in travel - whether driving or flying time and technology have not combined to make things much better. The safety and design have of course accompanied the times and the new volume of cars and flights, but nothing of any significance has changed in the basic assumptions of the final product.
At the same time, moving around in cars or aeroplanes becomes less and less efficient all the time. Not only has there been no great change, but also both forms or transport have deteriorated as more people clamour to use them. The same is true for telephones, which took over hundred years to become mobile, or photographic film, which also required an entire century to change.
The only explanation for this is anthropological. Once established in calcified organizations, humans do two things: sabotage changes that might render people dispensable, and ensure industry-wide emulation. In the 1960s, German auto companies developed plans to scrap the entire combustion engine for an electrical design. (The same existed in the 1970s in Japan, and in the I980s in France.). So for 40 years we might have been free of the wasteful and ludicrous dependence on fossil fuels. Why didnt it go anywhere? Because auto executives understood pistons and carburettors, and would loath to cannibalize their expertise, along with most of their factories.
According to the passage, the reason why we continues to be dependent on fossil fuels is that:
Solution:
Refer to the last two lines of the last paragraph.
Q.No: 3
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
According to the author, the British policy during the New Imperialism period tended to be defensive because
Solution:
The answer is clearly stated in the fifth line.
Q.No: 4
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
Under New Mercantilism, the fervent nationalism of the native middle classes does not create conflict with the multinational corporations because they (the middle classes)
Solution:
The second-last paragraph talks of the various factors that are responsible for this. Answer choice (3) combines all of them.
Q.No: 5
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
In the sentence, They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the center. (fourth paragraph), what is the meaning of center?
Solution:
The centre as can be seen from the first paragraph is the - rival centers of capital on the Continent and in America, therefore none of these is the answer.
Q.No: 6
Test Name : CAT Paper 2004
Directions for questions 98 to 118: Each of the five passages given below is followed by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
The viability of the multinational corporate system depends upon the degree to which people will tolerate the unevenness it creates. It is well to remember that the New Imperialism which began after 1870 in a spirit of Capitalism Triumphant, soon became seriously troubled and after 1914 was characterized by war, depression, breakdown of the international economic system and war again, rather than free Trade, Pax Britannica and Material Improvement. A major reason was Britains inability to cope with the by-products of its own rapid accumulation of capital; i.e., a class-conscious labour force at home; a middle class in the hinterland; and rival centres of capital on the Continent and in America. Britains policy tended to be atavistic and defensive rather than progressive-more concerned with warding off new threats than creating new areas of expansion. Ironically, Edwardian England revived the paraphernalia of the landed aristocracy it had just destroyed. Instead of embarking on a big push to develop the vast hinterland of the Empire, colonial administrators often adopted policies to arrest the development of either a native capitalist class or a native proletariat which could overthrow them.
As time went on, the centre had to devote an increasing share of government activity to military and other unproductive expenditures; they had to rely on alliances with an inefficient class of landlords, officials and soldiers in the hinterland to maintain stability at the cost of development. A great part of the surplus extracted from the population was thus wasted locally.
The New Mercantilism (as the Multinational Corporate System of special alliances and privileges, aid and tariff concessions is sometimes called) faces similar problems of internal and external division. The centre is troubled: excluded groups revolt and even some of the affluent are dissatisfied with the roles. Nationalistic rivalry between major capitalist countries remains an important divisive factor, Finally, there is the threat presented by the middle classes and the excluded groups of the underdeveloped countries. The national middle classes in the underdeveloped countries came to power when the centre weakened but could not, through their policy of import substitution manufacturing, establish a viable basis for sustained growth. They now face a foreign exchange crisis and an unemployment (or population) crisis-the first indicating their inability to function in the international economy and the second indicating their alienation from the people they are supposed to lead. In the immediate future, these national middle classes will gain a new lease of life as they take advantage of the spaces created by the rivalry between American and non-American oligopolists striving to establish global market positions.
The native capitalists will again become the champions of national independence as they bargain with multinational corporations. But the conflict at this level is more apparent than real, for in the end the fervent nationalism of the middle class asks only for promotion within the corporate structure and not for a break with that structure. In the last analysis their power derives from the metropolis and they cannot easily afford to challenge the international system. They do not command the loyalty of their own population and cannot really compete with the large, powerful, aggregate capitals from the centre. They are prisoners of the taste patterns and consumption standards set at the centre.
The main threat comes from the excluded groups. It is not unusual in underdeveloped countries for the top 5 per cent to obtain between 30 and 40 per cent of the total national income, and for the top one-third to obtain anywhere from 60 to 70 per cent. At most, one-third of the population can be said to benefit in some sense from the dualistic growth that characterizes development in the hinterland. The remaining two-thirds, who together get only one-third of the income, are outsiders, not because they do not contribute to the economy, but because they do not share in the benefits. They provide a source of cheap labour which helps keep exports to the developed world at a low price and which has financed the urban-biased growth of recent years. In fact, it is difficult to see how the system in most underdeveloped countries could survive without cheap labour since removing it (e.g. diverting it to public works projects as is done in socialist countries) would raise consumption costs to capitalists and professional elites.
The author is in a position to draw parallels between New Imperialism and New Mercantilism because
Solution:
The answer can be figured out from the first and the third paragraph.
Q.No: 7
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 31 to 34: The passage given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
According to the passage, internal conflicts are psychologically more interesting than external conflicts because
Solution:
Q.No: 8
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 31 to 34: The passage given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
Which, according to the author, would qualify as interesting psychology?
Solution:
Q.No: 9
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 31 to 34: The passage given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
According to the passage, which of the following options about the application of game theory to a conflict-of-interest situation is true?
Solution:
Q.No: 10
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 31 to 34: The passage given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
A game of strategy, as currently conceived in game theory, is a situation in which two or more players make choices among available alternatives (moves). The totality of choices determines the outcomes of the game, and it is assumed that the rank order of preferences for the outcomes is different for different players. Thus the interests of the players are generally in conflict. Whether these interests are diametrically opposed or only partially opposed depends on the type of game.
Psychologically, most interesting situations arise when the interests of the players are partly coincident and partly opposed, because then one can postulate not only a conflict among the players but also inner conflicts within the players. Each is torn between a tendency to cooperate, so as to promote the common interests, and a tendency to compete, so as to enhance his own individual interests.
Internal conflicts are always psychologically interesting. What we vaguely call interesting psychology is in very great measure the psychology of inner conflict. Inner conflict is also held to be an important component of serious literature as distinguished from less serious genres. The classical tragedy, as well as the serious novel reveals the inner conflict of central figures. The superficial adventure story on the other hand, depicts only external conflict; that is, the threats to the person with whom the reader (or viewer) identifies stem in these stories exclusively from external obstacles and from the adversaries who create them. On the most primitive level this sort of external conflict is psychologically empty. In the fisticuffs between the protagonists of good and evil, no psychological problems are involved or, at any rate, none are depicted in juvenile representations of conflict.
The detective story, the adult analogue of a juvenile adventure tale, has at times been described as a glorification of intellectualized conflict. However, a great deal of the interest in the plots of these stories is sustained by withholding the unraveling of a solution to a problem. The effort of solving the problem is in itself not a conflict if the adversary (the unknown criminal) remains passive, like Nature, whose secrets the scientist supposedly unravels by deduction. If the adversary actively puts obstacles in the detectives path toward the solution, there is genuine conflict. But the conflict is psychologically interesting only to the extent that it contains irrational components such as a tactical error on the criminals part or the detectives insight into some psychological quirk of the criminal or something of this sort. Conflict conducted in a perfectly rational manner is psychologically no more interesting than a standard Western. For example, Tic-tac-toe, played perfectly by both players, is completely devoid of psychological interest. Chess may be psychologically interesting but only to the extent that it is played not quite rationally. Played completely rationally, chess would not be different from Tic-tac-toe.
In short, a pure conflict of interest (what is called a zero-sum game) although it offers a wealth of interesting conceptual problems, is not interesting psychologically, except to the extent that its conduct departs from rational norms.
The problem solving process of a scientist is different from that of a detective because
Solution:
Q.No: 11
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 41 to 48: Each of the two passages given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage I
Crinoline and croquet are out. As yet, no political activists have thrown themselves in front of the royal horse on Derby Day. Even so, some historians can spot the parallels. It is a time of rapid technological change. It is a period when the dominance of the worlds superpower is coming under threat. It is an epoch when prosperity masks underlying economic strain. And, crucially, it is a time when policy-makers are confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Welcome to the Edwardian Summer of the second age of globalisation.
Spare a moment to take stock of whats been happening in the past few months. Lets start with the oil price, which has rocketed to more than $65 a barrel, more than double its level 18 months ago. The accepted wisdom is that we shouldnt worry our little heads about that, because the incentives are there for business to build new production and refining capacity, which will effortlessly bring demand and supply back into balance and bring crude prices back to $25 a barrel. As Tommy Copper used to say, just like that.
Then there is the result of the French referendum on the European Constitution, seen as thick-headed luddites railing vainly against the modern world. What the French needed to realize, the argument went, was that there was no alternative to the reforms that would make the country more flexible, more competitive, more dynamic. Just the sort of reforms that allowed Gate Gourmet to sack hundreds of its staff at Heathrow after the sort of ultimatum that used to be handed out by Victorian mill owners. An alternative way of looking at the French non is that our neighbours translate flexibility as youre fired.
Finally, take a squint at the United States. Just like Britian a century ago, a period of unquestioned superiority is drawing to a close. China is still a long way from matching Americas wealth, but it is growing at a stupendous rate and economic strength brings geo-political clout. Already, there is evidence of a new scramble for Africa as Washington and Beijing compete for oil stocks. Moreover, beneath the surface of the US economy, all is not well. Growth looks healthy enough, but the competition from China and elsewhere has meant the worlds biggest economy now imports far more that it exports. The US is living beyond its means, but in this time of studied complacency a current account deficit worth 6 perfect of gross domestic product is seen as a sign of strength, not weakness.
In this new Edwardian summer, comfort is taken from the fact that dearer oil has not had the savage inflationary consequences of 1973-1974, when a fourfold increase in the cost of crude brought an abrupt end to a postwar boom that had gone on uninterrupted for a quarter of a century. True, the cost of living has been affected by higher transport costs, but we are talking of inflation at 2.3 per cent and not 27 per cent. Yet the idea that higher oil prices are of little consequence is fanciful. If people are paying more to fill up their cars it leaves them with less to spend on everything else, but there is a reluctance to consume less. In the 1970s unions were strong and able to negotiate large, compensatory pay deals that served to intensify inflationary pressure. In 2005, that avenue is pretty much closed off, but the abolition of all the controls on credit that existed in the 1970s means that households are invited to borrow more rather than consume less. The knock-on effects of higher oil prices are thus felt in different ways through high levels of indebtedness, in inflated asset prices, and in balance of payments deficits.
There are those who point out, rightly, that modern industrial capitalism has proved mightily resilient these past 250 years, and that a sign of the enduring strength of the system has been the way it apparently shrugged off everything a stock market crash, 9/11, rising oil prices that have been thrown at it in the half decade since the millennium. Even so, there are at least three reasons for concern. First, we have been here before. In terms of political economy, the first era of globalisation mirrored our own. There was a belief in unfettered capital flows, in free migration. Eventually, though, there was a backlash, manifested in a struggle between free traders and protectionists, and in rising labour militancy.
Second, the world is traditionally as its most fragile at times when the global balance of power is in flux. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britains role as the hegemonic power was being challenged by the rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan while the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were clearly in rapid decline. Looking ahead from 2005, it is clear that over the next two or three decades, both China and India which together account for half the worlds population will flex their muscles.
Finally, there is the question of what rising oil prices tell us. The emergence of China and India means global demand for crude is likely to remain high a t a time when experts say production is about to top out. If supply constraints start to bite, any decline in the prices are likely to be short-term cyclical affairs punctuating a long upward trend.
Crinoline and croquet are out. As yet, no political activists have thrown themselves in front of the royal horse on Derby Day. Even so, some historians can spot the parallels. It is a time of rapid technological change. It is a period when the dominance of the worlds superpower is coming under threat. It is an epoch when prosperity masks underlying economic strain. And, crucially, it is a time when policy-makers are confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Welcome to the Edwardian Summer of the second age of globalisation.
Spare a moment to take stock of whats been happening in the past few months. Lets start with the oil price, which has rocketed to more than $65 a barrel, more than double its level 18 months ago. The accepted wisdom is that we shouldnt worry our little heads about that, because the incentives are there for business to build new production and refining capacity, which will effortlessly bring demand and supply back into balance and bring crude prices back to $25 a barrel. As Tommy Copper used to say, just like that.
Then there is the result of the French referendum on the European Constitution, seen as thick-headed luddites railing vainly against the modern world. What the French needed to realize, the argument went, was that there was no alternative to the reforms that would make the country more flexible, more competitive, more dynamic. Just the sort of reforms that allowed Gate Gourmet to sack hundreds of its staff at Heathrow after the sort of ultimatum that used to be handed out by Victorian mill owners. An alternative way of looking at the French non is that our neighbours translate flexibility as youre fired.
Finally, take a squint at the United States. Just like Britian a century ago, a period of unquestioned superiority is drawing to a close. China is still a long way from matching Americas wealth, but it is growing at a stupendous rate and economic strength brings geo-political clout. Already, there is evidence of a new scramble for Africa as Washington and Beijing compete for oil stocks. Moreover, beneath the surface of the US economy, all is not well. Growth looks healthy enough, but the competition from China and elsewhere has meant the worlds biggest economy now imports far more that it exports. The US is living beyond its means, but in this time of studied complacency a current account deficit worth 6 perfect of gross domestic product is seen as a sign of strength, not weakness.
In this new Edwardian summer, comfort is taken from the fact that dearer oil has not had the savage inflationary consequences of 1973-1974, when a fourfold increase in the cost of crude brought an abrupt end to a postwar boom that had gone on uninterrupted for a quarter of a century. True, the cost of living has been affected by higher transport costs, but we are talking of inflation at 2.3 per cent and not 27 per cent. Yet the idea that higher oil prices are of little consequence is fanciful. If people are paying more to fill up their cars it leaves them with less to spend on everything else, but there is a reluctance to consume less. In the 1970s unions were strong and able to negotiate large, compensatory pay deals that served to intensify inflationary pressure. In 2005, that avenue is pretty much closed off, but the abolition of all the controls on credit that existed in the 1970s means that households are invited to borrow more rather than consume less. The knock-on effects of higher oil prices are thus felt in different ways through high levels of indebtedness, in inflated asset prices, and in balance of payments deficits.
There are those who point out, rightly, that modern industrial capitalism has proved mightily resilient these past 250 years, and that a sign of the enduring strength of the system has been the way it apparently shrugged off everything a stock market crash, 9/11, rising oil prices that have been thrown at it in the half decade since the millennium. Even so, there are at least three reasons for concern. First, we have been here before. In terms of political economy, the first era of globalisation mirrored our own. There was a belief in unfettered capital flows, in free migration. Eventually, though, there was a backlash, manifested in a struggle between free traders and protectionists, and in rising labour militancy.
Second, the world is traditionally as its most fragile at times when the global balance of power is in flux. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britains role as the hegemonic power was being challenged by the rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan while the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were clearly in rapid decline. Looking ahead from 2005, it is clear that over the next two or three decades, both China and India which together account for half the worlds population will flex their muscles.
Finally, there is the question of what rising oil prices tell us. The emergence of China and India means global demand for crude is likely to remain high a t a time when experts say production is about to top out. If supply constraints start to bite, any decline in the prices are likely to be short-term cyclical affairs punctuating a long upward trend.
By the expression Edwardian Summer, the author refers to a period in which there is
Solution:
Q.No: 12
Test Name : CAT Paper 2005
Directions for questions 41 to 48: Each of the two passages given below is followed by a set of four questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage I
Crinoline and croquet are out. As yet, no political activists have thrown themselves in front of the royal horse on Derby Day. Even so, some historians can spot the parallels. It is a time of rapid technological change. It is a period when the dominance of the worlds superpower is coming under threat. It is an epoch when prosperity masks underlying economic strain. And, crucially, it is a time when policy-makers are confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Welcome to the Edwardian Summer of the second age of globalisation.
Spare a moment to take stock of whats been happening in the past few months. Lets start with the oil price, which has rocketed to more than $65 a barrel, more than double its level 18 months ago. The accepted wisdom is that we shouldnt worry our little heads about that, because the incentives are there for business to build new production and refining capacity, which will effortlessly bring demand and supply back into balance and bring crude prices back to $25 a barrel. As Tommy Copper used to say, just like that.
Then there is the result of the French referendum on the European Constitution, seen as thick-headed luddites railing vainly against the modern world. What the French needed to realize, the argument went, was that there was no alternative to the reforms that would make the country more flexible, more competitive, more dynamic. Just the sort of reforms that allowed Gate Gourmet to sack hundreds of its staff at Heathrow after the sort of ultimatum that used to be handed out by Victorian mill owners. An alternative way of looking at the French non is that our neighbours translate flexibility as youre fired.
Finally, take a squint at the United States. Just like Britian a century ago, a period of unquestioned superiority is drawing to a close. China is still a long way from matching Americas wealth, but it is growing at a stupendous rate and economic strength brings geo-political clout. Already, there is evidence of a new scramble for Africa as Washington and Beijing compete for oil stocks. Moreover, beneath the surface of the US economy, all is not well. Growth looks healthy enough, but the competition from China and elsewhere has meant the worlds biggest economy now imports far more that it exports. The US is living beyond its means, but in this time of studied complacency a current account deficit worth 6 perfect of gross domestic product is seen as a sign of strength, not weakness.
In this new Edwardian summer, comfort is taken from the fact that dearer oil has not had the savage inflationary consequences of 1973-1974, when a fourfold increase in the cost of crude brought an abrupt end to a postwar boom that had gone on uninterrupted for a quarter of a century. True, the cost of living has been affected by higher transport costs, but we are talking of inflation at 2.3 per cent and not 27 per cent. Yet the idea that higher oil prices are of little consequence is fanciful. If people are paying more to fill up their cars it leaves them with less to spend on everything else, but there is a reluctance to consume less. In the 1970s unions were strong and able to negotiate large, compensatory pay deals that served to intensify inflationary pressure. In 2005, that avenue is pretty much closed off, but the abolition of all the controls on credit that existed in the 1970s means that households are invited to borrow more rather than consume less. The knock-on effects of higher oil prices are thus felt in different ways through high levels of indebtedness, in inflated asset prices, and in balance of payments deficits.
There are those who point out, rightly, that modern industrial capitalism has proved mightily resilient these past 250 years, and that a sign of the enduring strength of the system has been the way it apparently shrugged off everything a stock market crash, 9/11, rising oil prices that have been thrown at it in the half decade since the millennium. Even so, there are at least three reasons for concern. First, we have been here before. In terms of political economy, the first era of globalisation mirrored our own. There was a belief in unfettered capital flows, in free migration. Eventually, though, there was a backlash, manifested in a struggle between free traders and protectionists, and in rising labour militancy.
Second, the world is traditionally as its most fragile at times when the global balance of power is in flux. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britains role as the hegemonic power was being challenged by the rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan while the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were clearly in rapid decline. Looking ahead from 2005, it is clear that over the next two or three decades, both China and India which together account for half the worlds population will flex their muscles.
Finally, there is the question of what rising oil prices tell us. The emergence of China and India means global demand for crude is likely to remain high a t a time when experts say production is about to top out. If supply constraints start to bite, any decline in the prices are likely to be short-term cyclical affairs punctuating a long upward trend.
Crinoline and croquet are out. As yet, no political activists have thrown themselves in front of the royal horse on Derby Day. Even so, some historians can spot the parallels. It is a time of rapid technological change. It is a period when the dominance of the worlds superpower is coming under threat. It is an epoch when prosperity masks underlying economic strain. And, crucially, it is a time when policy-makers are confident that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Welcome to the Edwardian Summer of the second age of globalisation.
Spare a moment to take stock of whats been happening in the past few months. Lets start with the oil price, which has rocketed to more than $65 a barrel, more than double its level 18 months ago. The accepted wisdom is that we shouldnt worry our little heads about that, because the incentives are there for business to build new production and refining capacity, which will effortlessly bring demand and supply back into balance and bring crude prices back to $25 a barrel. As Tommy Copper used to say, just like that.
Then there is the result of the French referendum on the European Constitution, seen as thick-headed luddites railing vainly against the modern world. What the French needed to realize, the argument went, was that there was no alternative to the reforms that would make the country more flexible, more competitive, more dynamic. Just the sort of reforms that allowed Gate Gourmet to sack hundreds of its staff at Heathrow after the sort of ultimatum that used to be handed out by Victorian mill owners. An alternative way of looking at the French non is that our neighbours translate flexibility as youre fired.
Finally, take a squint at the United States. Just like Britian a century ago, a period of unquestioned superiority is drawing to a close. China is still a long way from matching Americas wealth, but it is growing at a stupendous rate and economic strength brings geo-political clout. Already, there is evidence of a new scramble for Africa as Washington and Beijing compete for oil stocks. Moreover, beneath the surface of the US economy, all is not well. Growth looks healthy enough, but the competition from China and elsewhere has meant the worlds biggest economy now imports far more that it exports. The US is living beyond its means, but in this time of studied complacency a current account deficit worth 6 perfect of gross domestic product is seen as a sign of strength, not weakness.
In this new Edwardian summer, comfort is taken from the fact that dearer oil has not had the savage inflationary consequences of 1973-1974, when a fourfold increase in the cost of crude brought an abrupt end to a postwar boom that had gone on uninterrupted for a quarter of a century. True, the cost of living has been affected by higher transport costs, but we are talking of inflation at 2.3 per cent and not 27 per cent. Yet the idea that higher oil prices are of little consequence is fanciful. If people are paying more to fill up their cars it leaves them with less to spend on everything else, but there is a reluctance to consume less. In the 1970s unions were strong and able to negotiate large, compensatory pay deals that served to intensify inflationary pressure. In 2005, that avenue is pretty much closed off, but the abolition of all the controls on credit that existed in the 1970s means that households are invited to borrow more rather than consume less. The knock-on effects of higher oil prices are thus felt in different ways through high levels of indebtedness, in inflated asset prices, and in balance of payments deficits.
There are those who point out, rightly, that modern industrial capitalism has proved mightily resilient these past 250 years, and that a sign of the enduring strength of the system has been the way it apparently shrugged off everything a stock market crash, 9/11, rising oil prices that have been thrown at it in the half decade since the millennium. Even so, there are at least three reasons for concern. First, we have been here before. In terms of political economy, the first era of globalisation mirrored our own. There was a belief in unfettered capital flows, in free migration. Eventually, though, there was a backlash, manifested in a struggle between free traders and protectionists, and in rising labour militancy.
Second, the world is traditionally as its most fragile at times when the global balance of power is in flux. By the end of the nineteenth century, Britains role as the hegemonic power was being challenged by the rise of the United States, Germany, and Japan while the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires were clearly in rapid decline. Looking ahead from 2005, it is clear that over the next two or three decades, both China and India which together account for half the worlds population will flex their muscles.
Finally, there is the question of what rising oil prices tell us. The emergence of China and India means global demand for crude is likely to remain high a t a time when experts say production is about to top out. If supply constraints start to bite, any decline in the prices are likely to be short-term cyclical affairs punctuating a long upward trend.
What, according to the author, has resulted in a widespread belief in the resilence of modern capitalism?
Solution:
Q.No: 13
Test Name : CAT Paper 2007
Directions for Questions 51 to 53: The passage given below is followed by a set of three questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
Which is the thematic highlight of this passage?
Solution:
Reciprocal roles determine normative human behaviour in society.
This is the main idea of the passage that is carried throughout. Note that role of biology is negated and reciprocal roles are affirmed in paragraph 1 and 2.
This is the main idea of the passage that is carried throughout. Note that role of biology is negated and reciprocal roles are affirmed in paragraph 1 and 2.
Q.No: 14
Test Name : CAT Paper 2007
Directions for Questions 51 to 53: The passage given below is followed by a set of three questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
Which of the following would have been true if biological linkages structured human society?
Solution:
We would not have been offended by the father playing his role tongue in cheek.
All the other options would have been false if biological linkages would have structured human society.
All the other options would have been false if biological linkages would have structured human society.
Q.No: 15
Test Name : CAT Paper 2007
Directions for Questions 51 to 53: The passage given below is followed by a set of three questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
Human Biology does nothing to structure human society. Age may enfeeble us all, but cultures vary considerably in the prestige and power they accord to the elderly. Giving birth is a necessary condition for being a mother, but it is not sufficient. We expect mothers to behave in maternal ways and to display appropriately maternal sentiments. We prescribe a clutch of norms or rules that govern the role of a mother. That the social role is independent of the biological base can be demonstrated by going back three sentences. (living birth is certainly not sufficient to be a mother but, as adoption and fostering show, it is not even necessary!
The fine detail of what is expected of a mother or a father or a dutiful son differs from culture to culture, but everywhere behaviour is coordinated by the reciprocal nature of roles. Husbands and wives, parents and children, employers and employees, waiters and customers, teachers and pupils, warlords and followers: each makes sense only in its relation to the other. The term role is an appropriate one. because the metaphor of an actor in a play neatly expresses the rule-governed nature or scripted nature of much of social life and the sense that society is a joint production. Social life occurs only because people play their parts (and that is as true for war and conflicts as for peace and love) and those parts make sense only in the context of the overall show. The drama metaphor also reminds us of the artistic licence available to the players. We can play a part straight or, as the following from J.P. Sartre conveys, we can ham it up.
Let us consider this waiter in the café. His movement is quick and forward, a little too precise, a little too rapid. He comes towards the patrons with a step a little too quick. He bends forward a little too eagerly: his voice, his eyes express an interest a little too solicitous for the order of the customer. Finally there he returns, trying to imitate in his walk the inflexible stiffness of some kind of automation while carrying his tray with the recklessness of a tightropewalker ..All his behaviour seems to us a game .But what is he playing? We need not watch long before we can explain it: he is playing at being a waiter in a café.
The American sociologist Frying Goffman built an influential body of social analysis on elaborations of the metaphor of social life as drama. Perhaps his most telling point was that it is only through acting out a part that we express character. It is not enough to be evil or virtuous: we have to be seen to be evil or virtuous.
There is distinction between the roles we play and some underlying self. Here we might note that some roles are more absorbing than others. We would not be surprised by the waitress who plays the part in such a way as to signal to us that she is much more than her occupation. We would be surprised and offended by the father who played his part tongue in cheek. Some roles are broader and more far-reaching than others. Describing someone as a clergyman or faith healer would say far more about that person than describing someone as a bus driver.
It has been claimed in the passage that some roles are more absorbing than others. According to the passage, which of the following seem(s) appropriate reason(s) for such a claim?
A. Some roles carry great expectations from the society preventing manifestation of the true self.
B. Society ascribes so much importance to some roles that the conception of self may get aligned with the roles being performed.
C. Some roles require development of skill and expertise leaving little time for manifestation of self.
Solution:
The last para where the author mentions the examples of a waitress and clergyman, and driver refers to the alignment of self with the rules being performed and society preventing manifestation of the true self.
Q.No: 16
Test Name : CAT Paper 2007
Directions for Questions 57 to 59: The passage given below is followed by a set of three questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Every civilized society lives and thrives on a silent but profound agreement as to what is to be accepted as the valid mould of experience. Civilization is a complex system of dams, dykes. and canals warding off, directing, and articulating the influx of the surrounding fluid element: a fertile fenland, elaborately drained and protected from the high tides of chaotic, unexercised, and inarticulate experience. In such a culture, stable and sure of itself within the frontiers of naturalized experience, the arts wield their creative power not so much in width as in depth. They do not create new experience, but deepen and purify the old. Their works do not differ from one another like a new horizon from a new horizon, but like a madonna from a madonna.
The periods of art which are most vigorous in creative passion seem to occur when the established pattern of experience loosens its rigidity without as yet losing its force. Such a period was the Renaissance, and Shakespeare its poetic consummation. Then it was as though the discipline of the old order gave depth to the excitement of the breaking away, the depth of job and tragedy, of incomparable conquests and irredeemable losses. Adventurers of experience set out as though in lifeboats to rescue and bring back to the shore treasures of knowing and feeling which the old order had left floating on the high seas. The works of the early Renaissance and the poetry of Shakespeare vibrate with the compassion for live experience in danger of dying from exposure and neglect. In this compassion was the creative genius of the age. Yet, it was a genius of courage, not of desperate audacity. For, however elusively, it still knew of harbours and anchors, of homes to which to return, and of barns in which to store the harvest. The exploring spirit of art was in the depths of its consciousness still aware of a scheme of things into which to fit its exploits and creations.
But the more this scheme of things loses its stability, the more boundless and uncharted appears the ocean of potential exploration. In the blank confusion of infinite potentialities flotsam of significance gets attached to jetsam of experience: for everything is sea, everything is at sea-
The sea is all about us;
The sea is the lands edge also, the granite
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses
Its hints of earlier and other creation
and Rilke tells a story in which, as in T.S. Eliots poem, it is again the sea and the distance of other creation that becomes the image of the poets reality. A rowing boat sets out on a difficult passage. The oarsmen labour in exact rhythm. There is no sign yet of the destination. Suddenly a man. seemingly idle, breaks out into song. And if the labour of the oarsmen meaninglessly defeats the real resistance of the real waves, it is the idle single who magically conquers the despair of apparent aimlessness. While the people next to him try to come to grips with the element that is next to them, his voice seems to bind the boat to the farthest distance so that the farthest distance draws it towards itself. I dont know why and how, is Rilkes conclusion, but suddenly I understood the situation of the poet, his place and function in this age. It does not matter if one denies him every place except this one. There one must tolerate him.
Every civilized society lives and thrives on a silent but profound agreement as to what is to be accepted as the valid mould of experience. Civilization is a complex system of dams, dykes. and canals warding off, directing, and articulating the influx of the surrounding fluid element: a fertile fenland, elaborately drained and protected from the high tides of chaotic, unexercised, and inarticulate experience. In such a culture, stable and sure of itself within the frontiers of naturalized experience, the arts wield their creative power not so much in width as in depth. They do not create new experience, but deepen and purify the old. Their works do not differ from one another like a new horizon from a new horizon, but like a madonna from a madonna.
The periods of art which are most vigorous in creative passion seem to occur when the established pattern of experience loosens its rigidity without as yet losing its force. Such a period was the Renaissance, and Shakespeare its poetic consummation. Then it was as though the discipline of the old order gave depth to the excitement of the breaking away, the depth of job and tragedy, of incomparable conquests and irredeemable losses. Adventurers of experience set out as though in lifeboats to rescue and bring back to the shore treasures of knowing and feeling which the old order had left floating on the high seas. The works of the early Renaissance and the poetry of Shakespeare vibrate with the compassion for live experience in danger of dying from exposure and neglect. In this compassion was the creative genius of the age. Yet, it was a genius of courage, not of desperate audacity. For, however elusively, it still knew of harbours and anchors, of homes to which to return, and of barns in which to store the harvest. The exploring spirit of art was in the depths of its consciousness still aware of a scheme of things into which to fit its exploits and creations.
But the more this scheme of things loses its stability, the more boundless and uncharted appears the ocean of potential exploration. In the blank confusion of infinite potentialities flotsam of significance gets attached to jetsam of experience: for everything is sea, everything is at sea-
The sea is all about us;
The sea is the lands edge also, the granite
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses
Its hints of earlier and other creation
and Rilke tells a story in which, as in T.S. Eliots poem, it is again the sea and the distance of other creation that becomes the image of the poets reality. A rowing boat sets out on a difficult passage. The oarsmen labour in exact rhythm. There is no sign yet of the destination. Suddenly a man. seemingly idle, breaks out into song. And if the labour of the oarsmen meaninglessly defeats the real resistance of the real waves, it is the idle single who magically conquers the despair of apparent aimlessness. While the people next to him try to come to grips with the element that is next to them, his voice seems to bind the boat to the farthest distance so that the farthest distance draws it towards itself. I dont know why and how, is Rilkes conclusion, but suddenly I understood the situation of the poet, his place and function in this age. It does not matter if one denies him every place except this one. There one must tolerate him.
The sea and other creation leads Rilke to
Solution:
Define the place of the poet in his culture.
The lines starting with But suddenly I understood ..define the position of the poet in his culture.
The lines starting with But suddenly I understood ..define the position of the poet in his culture.
Q.No: 17
Test Name : CAT Paper 2007
Directions for Questions 57 to 59: The passage given below is followed by a set of three questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Every civilized society lives and thrives on a silent but profound agreement as to what is to be accepted as the valid mould of experience. Civilization is a complex system of dams, dykes. and canals warding off, directing, and articulating the influx of the surrounding fluid element: a fertile fenland, elaborately drained and protected from the high tides of chaotic, unexercised, and inarticulate experience. In such a culture, stable and sure of itself within the frontiers of naturalized experience, the arts wield their creative power not so much in width as in depth. They do not create new experience, but deepen and purify the old. Their works do not differ from one another like a new horizon from a new horizon, but like a madonna from a madonna.
The periods of art which are most vigorous in creative passion seem to occur when the established pattern of experience loosens its rigidity without as yet losing its force. Such a period was the Renaissance, and Shakespeare its poetic consummation. Then it was as though the discipline of the old order gave depth to the excitement of the breaking away, the depth of job and tragedy, of incomparable conquests and irredeemable losses. Adventurers of experience set out as though in lifeboats to rescue and bring back to the shore treasures of knowing and feeling which the old order had left floating on the high seas. The works of the early Renaissance and the poetry of Shakespeare vibrate with the compassion for live experience in danger of dying from exposure and neglect. In this compassion was the creative genius of the age. Yet, it was a genius of courage, not of desperate audacity. For, however elusively, it still knew of harbours and anchors, of homes to which to return, and of barns in which to store the harvest. The exploring spirit of art was in the depths of its consciousness still aware of a scheme of things into which to fit its exploits and creations.
But the more this scheme of things loses its stability, the more boundless and uncharted appears the ocean of potential exploration. In the blank confusion of infinite potentialities flotsam of significance gets attached to jetsam of experience: for everything is sea, everything is at sea-
The sea is all about us;
The sea is the lands edge also, the granite
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses
Its hints of earlier and other creation
and Rilke tells a story in which, as in T.S. Eliots poem, it is again the sea and the distance of other creation that becomes the image of the poets reality. A rowing boat sets out on a difficult passage. The oarsmen labour in exact rhythm. There is no sign yet of the destination. Suddenly a man. seemingly idle, breaks out into song. And if the labour of the oarsmen meaninglessly defeats the real resistance of the real waves, it is the idle single who magically conquers the despair of apparent aimlessness. While the people next to him try to come to grips with the element that is next to them, his voice seems to bind the boat to the farthest distance so that the farthest distance draws it towards itself. I dont know why and how, is Rilkes conclusion, but suddenly I understood the situation of the poet, his place and function in this age. It does not matter if one denies him every place except this one. There one must tolerate him.
Every civilized society lives and thrives on a silent but profound agreement as to what is to be accepted as the valid mould of experience. Civilization is a complex system of dams, dykes. and canals warding off, directing, and articulating the influx of the surrounding fluid element: a fertile fenland, elaborately drained and protected from the high tides of chaotic, unexercised, and inarticulate experience. In such a culture, stable and sure of itself within the frontiers of naturalized experience, the arts wield their creative power not so much in width as in depth. They do not create new experience, but deepen and purify the old. Their works do not differ from one another like a new horizon from a new horizon, but like a madonna from a madonna.
The periods of art which are most vigorous in creative passion seem to occur when the established pattern of experience loosens its rigidity without as yet losing its force. Such a period was the Renaissance, and Shakespeare its poetic consummation. Then it was as though the discipline of the old order gave depth to the excitement of the breaking away, the depth of job and tragedy, of incomparable conquests and irredeemable losses. Adventurers of experience set out as though in lifeboats to rescue and bring back to the shore treasures of knowing and feeling which the old order had left floating on the high seas. The works of the early Renaissance and the poetry of Shakespeare vibrate with the compassion for live experience in danger of dying from exposure and neglect. In this compassion was the creative genius of the age. Yet, it was a genius of courage, not of desperate audacity. For, however elusively, it still knew of harbours and anchors, of homes to which to return, and of barns in which to store the harvest. The exploring spirit of art was in the depths of its consciousness still aware of a scheme of things into which to fit its exploits and creations.
But the more this scheme of things loses its stability, the more boundless and uncharted appears the ocean of potential exploration. In the blank confusion of infinite potentialities flotsam of significance gets attached to jetsam of experience: for everything is sea, everything is at sea-
The sea is all about us;
The sea is the lands edge also, the granite
Into which it reaches, the beaches where it tosses
Its hints of earlier and other creation
and Rilke tells a story in which, as in T.S. Eliots poem, it is again the sea and the distance of other creation that becomes the image of the poets reality. A rowing boat sets out on a difficult passage. The oarsmen labour in exact rhythm. There is no sign yet of the destination. Suddenly a man. seemingly idle, breaks out into song. And if the labour of the oarsmen meaninglessly defeats the real resistance of the real waves, it is the idle single who magically conquers the despair of apparent aimlessness. While the people next to him try to come to grips with the element that is next to them, his voice seems to bind the boat to the farthest distance so that the farthest distance draws it towards itself. I dont know why and how, is Rilkes conclusion, but suddenly I understood the situation of the poet, his place and function in this age. It does not matter if one denies him every place except this one. There one must tolerate him.
According to the passage, the term adventurers of experience refers to
Solution:
Refer to the 5th line of the 2nd para. Here the term "adventures of experience" refers to the poet & artists who over vitalize and enrich the past for us.
Q.No: 18
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 71 to 75: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
When I was little, children were bought two kinds of ice cream, sold from those white wagons with canopies made of silvery metal: either the two-cent cone or the four-cent ice-cream pie. The two-cent cone was very small, in fact it could fit comfortably into a childs hand, and it was made by taking the ice cream from its container with a special scoop and piling it on the cone. Granny always suggested I eat only a part of the cone, then throw away the pointed end, because it had been touched by the vendors hand (though that was the best part, nice and crunchy, and it was regularly eaten in secret, after a pretence of discarding it).
The four-cent pie was made by a special little machine, also silvery, which pressed two disks of sweet biscuit against a cylindrical section of ice cream. First you had to thrust your tongue into the gap between the biscuits until it touched the central nucleus of ice cream; then, gradually, you ate the whole thing, the biscuit surfaces softening as they became soaked in creamy nectar. Granny had no advice to give here: in theory the pies had been touched only by the machine; in practice, the vendor had held them in his hand while giving them to us, but it was impossible to isolate the contaminated area.
I was fascinated, however, by some of my peers, whose parents bought them not a four-cent pie but two two-cent cones. These privileged children advanced proudly with one cone in their right hand and one in their left; and expertly moving their head from side to side, they licked first one, then the other. This liturgy seemed to me so sumptuously enviable, that many times I asked to be allowed to celebrate it. In vain. My elders were inflexible: a four-cent ice, yes; but two two-cent ones, absolutely no.
As anyone can see, neither mathematics nor economy nor dietetics justified this refusal. Nor did hygiene, assuming that in due course the tips of both cones were discarded. The pathetic, and obviously mendacious, justification was that a boy concerned with turning his eyes from one cone to the other was more inclined to stumble over stones, steps, or cracks in the pavement. I dimly sensed that there was another secret justification, cruelly pedagogical, but I was unable to grasp it.
Today, citizen and victim of a consumer society, a civilization of excess and waste (which the society of the thirties was not), I realize that those dear and now departed elders were right. Two two-cent cones instead of one at four cents did not signify squandering, economically speaking, but symbolically they surely did. It was for this precise reason, that I yearned for them: because two ice creams suggested excess. And this was precisely why they were denied to me: because they looked indecent, an insult to poverty, a display of fictitious privilege, a boast of wealth. Only spoiled children ate two cones at once, those children who in fairy tales were rightly punished, as Pinocchio was when he rejected the skin and the stalk. And parents who encouraged this weakness, appropriate to little parvenus, were bringing up their children in the foolish theatre of Id like to but I cant. They were preparing them to turn up at tourist-class check-in with a fake Gucci bag bought from a street peddler on the beach at Rimini.
Nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality, in a world where the consumer civilization now wants even adults to be spoiled, and promises them always something more, from the wristwatch in the box of detergent to the bonus bangle sheathed, with the magazine it accompanies, in a plastic envelope. Like the parents of those ambidextrous gluttons I so envied, the consumer civilization pretends to give more, but actually gives, for four cents, what is worth four cents. You will throwaway the old transistor radio to purchase the new one, that boasts an alarm clock as well, but some inexplicable defect in the mechanism will guarantee that the radio lasts only a year. The new cheap car will have leather seats, double side mirrors adjustable from inside, and a panelled dashboard, but it will not last nearly so long as the glorious old Fiat 500, which, even when it broke down, could be started again with a kick.
The morality of the old days made Spartans of us all, while todays morality wants all of us to be Sybarites.
When I was little, children were bought two kinds of ice cream, sold from those white wagons with canopies made of silvery metal: either the two-cent cone or the four-cent ice-cream pie. The two-cent cone was very small, in fact it could fit comfortably into a childs hand, and it was made by taking the ice cream from its container with a special scoop and piling it on the cone. Granny always suggested I eat only a part of the cone, then throw away the pointed end, because it had been touched by the vendors hand (though that was the best part, nice and crunchy, and it was regularly eaten in secret, after a pretence of discarding it).
The four-cent pie was made by a special little machine, also silvery, which pressed two disks of sweet biscuit against a cylindrical section of ice cream. First you had to thrust your tongue into the gap between the biscuits until it touched the central nucleus of ice cream; then, gradually, you ate the whole thing, the biscuit surfaces softening as they became soaked in creamy nectar. Granny had no advice to give here: in theory the pies had been touched only by the machine; in practice, the vendor had held them in his hand while giving them to us, but it was impossible to isolate the contaminated area.
I was fascinated, however, by some of my peers, whose parents bought them not a four-cent pie but two two-cent cones. These privileged children advanced proudly with one cone in their right hand and one in their left; and expertly moving their head from side to side, they licked first one, then the other. This liturgy seemed to me so sumptuously enviable, that many times I asked to be allowed to celebrate it. In vain. My elders were inflexible: a four-cent ice, yes; but two two-cent ones, absolutely no.
As anyone can see, neither mathematics nor economy nor dietetics justified this refusal. Nor did hygiene, assuming that in due course the tips of both cones were discarded. The pathetic, and obviously mendacious, justification was that a boy concerned with turning his eyes from one cone to the other was more inclined to stumble over stones, steps, or cracks in the pavement. I dimly sensed that there was another secret justification, cruelly pedagogical, but I was unable to grasp it.
Today, citizen and victim of a consumer society, a civilization of excess and waste (which the society of the thirties was not), I realize that those dear and now departed elders were right. Two two-cent cones instead of one at four cents did not signify squandering, economically speaking, but symbolically they surely did. It was for this precise reason, that I yearned for them: because two ice creams suggested excess. And this was precisely why they were denied to me: because they looked indecent, an insult to poverty, a display of fictitious privilege, a boast of wealth. Only spoiled children ate two cones at once, those children who in fairy tales were rightly punished, as Pinocchio was when he rejected the skin and the stalk. And parents who encouraged this weakness, appropriate to little parvenus, were bringing up their children in the foolish theatre of Id like to but I cant. They were preparing them to turn up at tourist-class check-in with a fake Gucci bag bought from a street peddler on the beach at Rimini.
Nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality, in a world where the consumer civilization now wants even adults to be spoiled, and promises them always something more, from the wristwatch in the box of detergent to the bonus bangle sheathed, with the magazine it accompanies, in a plastic envelope. Like the parents of those ambidextrous gluttons I so envied, the consumer civilization pretends to give more, but actually gives, for four cents, what is worth four cents. You will throwaway the old transistor radio to purchase the new one, that boasts an alarm clock as well, but some inexplicable defect in the mechanism will guarantee that the radio lasts only a year. The new cheap car will have leather seats, double side mirrors adjustable from inside, and a panelled dashboard, but it will not last nearly so long as the glorious old Fiat 500, which, even when it broke down, could be started again with a kick.
The morality of the old days made Spartans of us all, while todays morality wants all of us to be Sybarites.
The author pined for two two-cent cones instead of one four-cent pie because
Solution:
Refer to the 5th paragraph of the passage. The sentence two two-cent
.suggested excess clearly tell us that it was intemperance on part of the author which made him pine for two two-cent ice-cream cones instead of one four-cent pie.
Q.No: 19
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 71 to 75: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
When I was little, children were bought two kinds of ice cream, sold from those white wagons with canopies made of silvery metal: either the two-cent cone or the four-cent ice-cream pie. The two-cent cone was very small, in fact it could fit comfortably into a childs hand, and it was made by taking the ice cream from its container with a special scoop and piling it on the cone. Granny always suggested I eat only a part of the cone, then throw away the pointed end, because it had been touched by the vendors hand (though that was the best part, nice and crunchy, and it was regularly eaten in secret, after a pretence of discarding it).
The four-cent pie was made by a special little machine, also silvery, which pressed two disks of sweet biscuit against a cylindrical section of ice cream. First you had to thrust your tongue into the gap between the biscuits until it touched the central nucleus of ice cream; then, gradually, you ate the whole thing, the biscuit surfaces softening as they became soaked in creamy nectar. Granny had no advice to give here: in theory the pies had been touched only by the machine; in practice, the vendor had held them in his hand while giving them to us, but it was impossible to isolate the contaminated area.
I was fascinated, however, by some of my peers, whose parents bought them not a four-cent pie but two two-cent cones. These privileged children advanced proudly with one cone in their right hand and one in their left; and expertly moving their head from side to side, they licked first one, then the other. This liturgy seemed to me so sumptuously enviable, that many times I asked to be allowed to celebrate it. In vain. My elders were inflexible: a four-cent ice, yes; but two two-cent ones, absolutely no.
As anyone can see, neither mathematics nor economy nor dietetics justified this refusal. Nor did hygiene, assuming that in due course the tips of both cones were discarded. The pathetic, and obviously mendacious, justification was that a boy concerned with turning his eyes from one cone to the other was more inclined to stumble over stones, steps, or cracks in the pavement. I dimly sensed that there was another secret justification, cruelly pedagogical, but I was unable to grasp it.
Today, citizen and victim of a consumer society, a civilization of excess and waste (which the society of the thirties was not), I realize that those dear and now departed elders were right. Two two-cent cones instead of one at four cents did not signify squandering, economically speaking, but symbolically they surely did. It was for this precise reason, that I yearned for them: because two ice creams suggested excess. And this was precisely why they were denied to me: because they looked indecent, an insult to poverty, a display of fictitious privilege, a boast of wealth. Only spoiled children ate two cones at once, those children who in fairy tales were rightly punished, as Pinocchio was when he rejected the skin and the stalk. And parents who encouraged this weakness, appropriate to little parvenus, were bringing up their children in the foolish theatre of Id like to but I cant. They were preparing them to turn up at tourist-class check-in with a fake Gucci bag bought from a street peddler on the beach at Rimini.
Nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality, in a world where the consumer civilization now wants even adults to be spoiled, and promises them always something more, from the wristwatch in the box of detergent to the bonus bangle sheathed, with the magazine it accompanies, in a plastic envelope. Like the parents of those ambidextrous gluttons I so envied, the consumer civilization pretends to give more, but actually gives, for four cents, what is worth four cents. You will throwaway the old transistor radio to purchase the new one, that boasts an alarm clock as well, but some inexplicable defect in the mechanism will guarantee that the radio lasts only a year. The new cheap car will have leather seats, double side mirrors adjustable from inside, and a panelled dashboard, but it will not last nearly so long as the glorious old Fiat 500, which, even when it broke down, could be started again with a kick.
The morality of the old days made Spartans of us all, while todays morality wants all of us to be Sybarites.
When I was little, children were bought two kinds of ice cream, sold from those white wagons with canopies made of silvery metal: either the two-cent cone or the four-cent ice-cream pie. The two-cent cone was very small, in fact it could fit comfortably into a childs hand, and it was made by taking the ice cream from its container with a special scoop and piling it on the cone. Granny always suggested I eat only a part of the cone, then throw away the pointed end, because it had been touched by the vendors hand (though that was the best part, nice and crunchy, and it was regularly eaten in secret, after a pretence of discarding it).
The four-cent pie was made by a special little machine, also silvery, which pressed two disks of sweet biscuit against a cylindrical section of ice cream. First you had to thrust your tongue into the gap between the biscuits until it touched the central nucleus of ice cream; then, gradually, you ate the whole thing, the biscuit surfaces softening as they became soaked in creamy nectar. Granny had no advice to give here: in theory the pies had been touched only by the machine; in practice, the vendor had held them in his hand while giving them to us, but it was impossible to isolate the contaminated area.
I was fascinated, however, by some of my peers, whose parents bought them not a four-cent pie but two two-cent cones. These privileged children advanced proudly with one cone in their right hand and one in their left; and expertly moving their head from side to side, they licked first one, then the other. This liturgy seemed to me so sumptuously enviable, that many times I asked to be allowed to celebrate it. In vain. My elders were inflexible: a four-cent ice, yes; but two two-cent ones, absolutely no.
As anyone can see, neither mathematics nor economy nor dietetics justified this refusal. Nor did hygiene, assuming that in due course the tips of both cones were discarded. The pathetic, and obviously mendacious, justification was that a boy concerned with turning his eyes from one cone to the other was more inclined to stumble over stones, steps, or cracks in the pavement. I dimly sensed that there was another secret justification, cruelly pedagogical, but I was unable to grasp it.
Today, citizen and victim of a consumer society, a civilization of excess and waste (which the society of the thirties was not), I realize that those dear and now departed elders were right. Two two-cent cones instead of one at four cents did not signify squandering, economically speaking, but symbolically they surely did. It was for this precise reason, that I yearned for them: because two ice creams suggested excess. And this was precisely why they were denied to me: because they looked indecent, an insult to poverty, a display of fictitious privilege, a boast of wealth. Only spoiled children ate two cones at once, those children who in fairy tales were rightly punished, as Pinocchio was when he rejected the skin and the stalk. And parents who encouraged this weakness, appropriate to little parvenus, were bringing up their children in the foolish theatre of Id like to but I cant. They were preparing them to turn up at tourist-class check-in with a fake Gucci bag bought from a street peddler on the beach at Rimini.
Nowadays the moralist risks seeming at odds with morality, in a world where the consumer civilization now wants even adults to be spoiled, and promises them always something more, from the wristwatch in the box of detergent to the bonus bangle sheathed, with the magazine it accompanies, in a plastic envelope. Like the parents of those ambidextrous gluttons I so envied, the consumer civilization pretends to give more, but actually gives, for four cents, what is worth four cents. You will throwaway the old transistor radio to purchase the new one, that boasts an alarm clock as well, but some inexplicable defect in the mechanism will guarantee that the radio lasts only a year. The new cheap car will have leather seats, double side mirrors adjustable from inside, and a panelled dashboard, but it will not last nearly so long as the glorious old Fiat 500, which, even when it broke down, could be started again with a kick.
The morality of the old days made Spartans of us all, while todays morality wants all of us to be Sybarites.
According to the author, the justification for refusal to let him eat two cones was plausibly
Solution:
Refer to the last line of the 4th paragraph of the passage. Here the author says that the intentions of his elders in not letting him eat two-cent cones was cruelly pedagogical. This implies that the justification was didactic in nature. This makes option (1) correct. The rest of the options are incorrect in context of the passage. Dietetic refers to anything related with diet or the use of food. Dialectic refers to the nature of logical argumentation. Diatonic refers to using only the seven tones of a standard scale without chromatic alterations. Diastolic refers to the rhythmically occurring relaxation and the dilation of the heart chambers.
Q.No: 20
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 76 to 80: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Which of the following can be used to replace the spiders know how to spin webs analogy as used by the author?
Solution:
Spiders know how to spin webs highlights the inherent qualities of living species. This analogy can be replaced in a similar way by Bees collecting nectar which is also a part of their inane trait. Options(1), (3), (4), (5) mention traits which are acquired over a period of time by putting in some kind of effort in order to be adept at them.
Q.No: 21
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 76 to 80: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
According to the passage, complexity of language cannot be taught by parents or at school to children because
Solution:
Refer to the 3rd paragraph of the passage where the author says that the scientists believe that the complexity of language is part of our biological birthright. He further illustrates the scientists point of view that it cannot be taught. The author strengthens this view by quoting Oscar Wilde, making option(1) as the correct answer option. The rest of the options are not mentioned in the passage.
Q.No: 22
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 76 to 80: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Language is not a cultural artifact that we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead, it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains. Language is a complex, specialized skill, which develops in the child spontaneously, without conscious effort or formal instruction, is deployed without awareness of its underlying logic, is qualitatively the same in every individual, and is distinct from more general abilities to process information or behave intelligently. For these reasons some cognitive scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural system, and a computational module. But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. It conveys the idea that people know how to talk in more or less the sense that spiders know how to spin webs. Web-spinning was not invented by some unsung spider genius and does not depend on having had the right education or on having an aptitude for architecture or the construction trades. Rather, spiders spin spider webs because they have spider brains, which give them the urge to spin and the competence to succeed. Although there are differences between webs and words, I will encourage you to see language in this way, for it helps to make sense of the phenomena we will explore.
Thinking of language as an instinct inverts the popular wisdom, especially as it has been passed down in the canon of the humanities and social sciences. Language is no more a cultural invention than is upright posture. It is not a manifestation of a general capacity to use symbols: a three-year-old, we shall see, is a grammatical genius, but is quite incompetent at the visual arts, religious iconography, traffic signs, and the other staples of the semiotics curriculum. Though language is a magnificent ability unique to Homo sapiens among living species, it does not call for sequestering the study of humans from the domain of biology, for a magnificent ability unique to a particular living species is far from unique in the animal kingdom. Some kinds of bats home in on flying insects using Doppler sonar. Some kinds of migratory birds navigate thousands of miles by calibrating the positions of the constellations against the time of day and year. In natures talent show, we are simply a species of primate with our own act, a knack for communicating information about who did what to whom by modulating the sounds we make when we exhale.
Once you begin to look at language not as the ineffable essence of human uniqueness hut as a biological adaptation to communicate information, it is no longer as tempting to see language as an insidious shaper of thought, and, we shall see, it is not. Moreover, seeing language as one of natures engineering marvels an organ with that perfection of structure and co-adaptation which justly excites our admiration, in Darwins words - gives us a new respect for your ordinary Joe and the much-maligned English language (or any language). The complexity of language, from the scientists point of view, is part of our biological birthright; it is not something that parents teach their children or something that must be elaborated in school as Oscar Wilde said, Education is an admirable thing, but it is well to remember from time to time that nothing that is worth knowing can be taught. A preschoolers tacit knowledge of grammar is more sophisticated than the thickest style manual or the most state-of-the-art computer language system, and the same applies to all healthy human beings, even the notorious syntaxfracturing professional athlete and the, you know, like, inarticulate teenage skateboarder. Finally, since language is the product of a well-engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Which of the following best summarizes the passage?
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author is talking about language as a type of instinct that is existent is human beings and not any specific attribute or skill that is learnt by them over a period of time. In the first paragraph, the author claims But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. Similarly in the last paragraph of the passage, the author concludes by saying that Finally, since language is the product of a well engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Q.No: 23
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 81 to 85: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites; and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests.
With those caveats, it appears to me that one strand consisted of population growth outstripping available resources: a dilemma similar to the one foreseen by Thomas Malthus in 1798 and being played out today in Rwanda, Haiti and elsewhere. As the archaeologist David Webster succinctly puts it, Too many farmers grew too many crops on too much of landscape. Compounding that mismatch between population and resources was the second strand: the effects of deforestation and hillside erosion, which caused a decrease in the amount of useable farmland at a time when more rather than less farmland was needed, and possibly exacerbated by an anthropogenic drought resulting from deforestation, by soil nutrient depletion and other soil problems, and by the struggle to prevent bracken ferns from overrunning the fields.
The third strand consisted of increased fighting, as more and more people fought over fewer resources. Maya warfare, already endemic, peaked just before the collapse. That is not surprising when one reflects that at least five million people, perhaps many more, were crammed into an area smaller than the US state of Colorado (104,000 square miles). That warfare would have decreased further the amount of land available for agriculture, by creating no-mans lands between principalities where it was now unsafe to farm. Bringing matters to a head was the strand of climate change. The drought at the time of the Classic collapse was not the first drought that the Maya had lived through, but it was the most severe. At the time of previous droughts, there were still uninhabited parts of the Maya landscape, and people at a site affected by drought could save themselves by moving to another site. However, by the time of the Classic collapse the landscape was now full, there was no useful unoccupied land in the vicinity on which to begin anew, and the whole population could not be accommodated in the few areas that continued to have reliable water supplies.
As our fifth strand, we have to wonder why the kings and nobles failed to recognize and solve these seemingly obvious problems undermining their society. Their attention was evidently focused on their short-term concerns of enriching themselves, waging wars, erecting monuments, competing with each other, and extracting enough food from the peasants to support all those activities. Like most leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-term problems, insofar as they perceived them.
Finally, while we still have some other past societies to consider before we switch our attention to the modern world, we must already he struck by some parallels between the Maya and the past societies. As on Mangareva, the Maya environmental and population problems led to increasing warfare and civil strife. Similarly, on Easter Island and at Chaco Canyon, the Maya peak population numbers were followed swiftly by political and social collapse. Paralleling the eventual extension of agriculture from Easter Islands coastal lowlands to its uplands, and from the Mimbres floodplain to the hills, Copans inhabitants also expanded from the floodplain to the more fragile hill slopes, leaving them with a larger population to feed when the agricultural boom in the hills went bust. Like Easter Island chiefs erecting ever larger statues, eventually crowned by pukao, and like Anasazi elite treating themselves to necklaces of 2,000 turquoise beads, Maya kings sought to outdo each other with more and more impressive temples, covered with thicker and thicker plaster reminiscent in turn of the extravagant conspicuous consumption by modern American CEOs. The passivity of Easter chiefs and Maya kings in the face of the real big threats to their societies completes our list of disquieting parallels.
To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites; and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests.
With those caveats, it appears to me that one strand consisted of population growth outstripping available resources: a dilemma similar to the one foreseen by Thomas Malthus in 1798 and being played out today in Rwanda, Haiti and elsewhere. As the archaeologist David Webster succinctly puts it, Too many farmers grew too many crops on too much of landscape. Compounding that mismatch between population and resources was the second strand: the effects of deforestation and hillside erosion, which caused a decrease in the amount of useable farmland at a time when more rather than less farmland was needed, and possibly exacerbated by an anthropogenic drought resulting from deforestation, by soil nutrient depletion and other soil problems, and by the struggle to prevent bracken ferns from overrunning the fields.
The third strand consisted of increased fighting, as more and more people fought over fewer resources. Maya warfare, already endemic, peaked just before the collapse. That is not surprising when one reflects that at least five million people, perhaps many more, were crammed into an area smaller than the US state of Colorado (104,000 square miles). That warfare would have decreased further the amount of land available for agriculture, by creating no-mans lands between principalities where it was now unsafe to farm. Bringing matters to a head was the strand of climate change. The drought at the time of the Classic collapse was not the first drought that the Maya had lived through, but it was the most severe. At the time of previous droughts, there were still uninhabited parts of the Maya landscape, and people at a site affected by drought could save themselves by moving to another site. However, by the time of the Classic collapse the landscape was now full, there was no useful unoccupied land in the vicinity on which to begin anew, and the whole population could not be accommodated in the few areas that continued to have reliable water supplies.
As our fifth strand, we have to wonder why the kings and nobles failed to recognize and solve these seemingly obvious problems undermining their society. Their attention was evidently focused on their short-term concerns of enriching themselves, waging wars, erecting monuments, competing with each other, and extracting enough food from the peasants to support all those activities. Like most leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-term problems, insofar as they perceived them.
Finally, while we still have some other past societies to consider before we switch our attention to the modern world, we must already he struck by some parallels between the Maya and the past societies. As on Mangareva, the Maya environmental and population problems led to increasing warfare and civil strife. Similarly, on Easter Island and at Chaco Canyon, the Maya peak population numbers were followed swiftly by political and social collapse. Paralleling the eventual extension of agriculture from Easter Islands coastal lowlands to its uplands, and from the Mimbres floodplain to the hills, Copans inhabitants also expanded from the floodplain to the more fragile hill slopes, leaving them with a larger population to feed when the agricultural boom in the hills went bust. Like Easter Island chiefs erecting ever larger statues, eventually crowned by pukao, and like Anasazi elite treating themselves to necklaces of 2,000 turquoise beads, Maya kings sought to outdo each other with more and more impressive temples, covered with thicker and thicker plaster reminiscent in turn of the extravagant conspicuous consumption by modern American CEOs. The passivity of Easter chiefs and Maya kings in the face of the real big threats to their societies completes our list of disquieting parallels.
According to the passage, the drought at the time of Maya collapse had a different impact compared to the droughts earlier because
Solution:
In the 3rd paragraph, refer to the lines At the time of previous droughts.......to have reliable water supplies. Hence, it is evident that the final drought which caused the collapse of the Maya civilization was different from the previous droughts because man had left no unoccupied land away from agriculture to start life in a new way.
Q.No: 24
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 81 to 85: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites; and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests.
With those caveats, it appears to me that one strand consisted of population growth outstripping available resources: a dilemma similar to the one foreseen by Thomas Malthus in 1798 and being played out today in Rwanda, Haiti and elsewhere. As the archaeologist David Webster succinctly puts it, Too many farmers grew too many crops on too much of landscape. Compounding that mismatch between population and resources was the second strand: the effects of deforestation and hillside erosion, which caused a decrease in the amount of useable farmland at a time when more rather than less farmland was needed, and possibly exacerbated by an anthropogenic drought resulting from deforestation, by soil nutrient depletion and other soil problems, and by the struggle to prevent bracken ferns from overrunning the fields.
The third strand consisted of increased fighting, as more and more people fought over fewer resources. Maya warfare, already endemic, peaked just before the collapse. That is not surprising when one reflects that at least five million people, perhaps many more, were crammed into an area smaller than the US state of Colorado (104,000 square miles). That warfare would have decreased further the amount of land available for agriculture, by creating no-mans lands between principalities where it was now unsafe to farm. Bringing matters to a head was the strand of climate change. The drought at the time of the Classic collapse was not the first drought that the Maya had lived through, but it was the most severe. At the time of previous droughts, there were still uninhabited parts of the Maya landscape, and people at a site affected by drought could save themselves by moving to another site. However, by the time of the Classic collapse the landscape was now full, there was no useful unoccupied land in the vicinity on which to begin anew, and the whole population could not be accommodated in the few areas that continued to have reliable water supplies.
As our fifth strand, we have to wonder why the kings and nobles failed to recognize and solve these seemingly obvious problems undermining their society. Their attention was evidently focused on their short-term concerns of enriching themselves, waging wars, erecting monuments, competing with each other, and extracting enough food from the peasants to support all those activities. Like most leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-term problems, insofar as they perceived them.
Finally, while we still have some other past societies to consider before we switch our attention to the modern world, we must already he struck by some parallels between the Maya and the past societies. As on Mangareva, the Maya environmental and population problems led to increasing warfare and civil strife. Similarly, on Easter Island and at Chaco Canyon, the Maya peak population numbers were followed swiftly by political and social collapse. Paralleling the eventual extension of agriculture from Easter Islands coastal lowlands to its uplands, and from the Mimbres floodplain to the hills, Copans inhabitants also expanded from the floodplain to the more fragile hill slopes, leaving them with a larger population to feed when the agricultural boom in the hills went bust. Like Easter Island chiefs erecting ever larger statues, eventually crowned by pukao, and like Anasazi elite treating themselves to necklaces of 2,000 turquoise beads, Maya kings sought to outdo each other with more and more impressive temples, covered with thicker and thicker plaster reminiscent in turn of the extravagant conspicuous consumption by modern American CEOs. The passivity of Easter chiefs and Maya kings in the face of the real big threats to their societies completes our list of disquieting parallels.
To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites; and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests.
With those caveats, it appears to me that one strand consisted of population growth outstripping available resources: a dilemma similar to the one foreseen by Thomas Malthus in 1798 and being played out today in Rwanda, Haiti and elsewhere. As the archaeologist David Webster succinctly puts it, Too many farmers grew too many crops on too much of landscape. Compounding that mismatch between population and resources was the second strand: the effects of deforestation and hillside erosion, which caused a decrease in the amount of useable farmland at a time when more rather than less farmland was needed, and possibly exacerbated by an anthropogenic drought resulting from deforestation, by soil nutrient depletion and other soil problems, and by the struggle to prevent bracken ferns from overrunning the fields.
The third strand consisted of increased fighting, as more and more people fought over fewer resources. Maya warfare, already endemic, peaked just before the collapse. That is not surprising when one reflects that at least five million people, perhaps many more, were crammed into an area smaller than the US state of Colorado (104,000 square miles). That warfare would have decreased further the amount of land available for agriculture, by creating no-mans lands between principalities where it was now unsafe to farm. Bringing matters to a head was the strand of climate change. The drought at the time of the Classic collapse was not the first drought that the Maya had lived through, but it was the most severe. At the time of previous droughts, there were still uninhabited parts of the Maya landscape, and people at a site affected by drought could save themselves by moving to another site. However, by the time of the Classic collapse the landscape was now full, there was no useful unoccupied land in the vicinity on which to begin anew, and the whole population could not be accommodated in the few areas that continued to have reliable water supplies.
As our fifth strand, we have to wonder why the kings and nobles failed to recognize and solve these seemingly obvious problems undermining their society. Their attention was evidently focused on their short-term concerns of enriching themselves, waging wars, erecting monuments, competing with each other, and extracting enough food from the peasants to support all those activities. Like most leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-term problems, insofar as they perceived them.
Finally, while we still have some other past societies to consider before we switch our attention to the modern world, we must already he struck by some parallels between the Maya and the past societies. As on Mangareva, the Maya environmental and population problems led to increasing warfare and civil strife. Similarly, on Easter Island and at Chaco Canyon, the Maya peak population numbers were followed swiftly by political and social collapse. Paralleling the eventual extension of agriculture from Easter Islands coastal lowlands to its uplands, and from the Mimbres floodplain to the hills, Copans inhabitants also expanded from the floodplain to the more fragile hill slopes, leaving them with a larger population to feed when the agricultural boom in the hills went bust. Like Easter Island chiefs erecting ever larger statues, eventually crowned by pukao, and like Anasazi elite treating themselves to necklaces of 2,000 turquoise beads, Maya kings sought to outdo each other with more and more impressive temples, covered with thicker and thicker plaster reminiscent in turn of the extravagant conspicuous consumption by modern American CEOs. The passivity of Easter chiefs and Maya kings in the face of the real big threats to their societies completes our list of disquieting parallels.
According to the author, why is it difficult to explain the reasons for Maya collapse?
Solution:
The first paragraph of the passage states that To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves-in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites, and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests. Hence, there is not one specific factor that can individually explain the collapse of the Maya civilization. Therefore, the correct answer would be option 4.
Q.No: 25
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 86 to 90: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
A remarkable aspect of art of the present century is the range of concepts and ideologies which it embodies. It is almost tempting to see a pattern emerging within the art field - or alternatively imposed upon it a posteriori - similar to that which exists under the umbrella of science where the general term covers a whole range of separate, though interconnecting, activities. Any parallelism is however - in this instance at least - misleading. A scientific discipline develops systematically once its bare tenets have been established, named and categorized as conventions. Many of the concepts of modern art, by contrast, have resulted from the almost accidental meetings of groups of talented individuals at certain times and certain places. The ideas generated by these chance meetings had twofold consequences. Firstly, a corpus of work would be produced which, in great part, remains as a concrete record of the events. Secondly, the ideas would themselves be disseminated through many different channels of communication - seeds that often bore fruit in contexts far removed from their generation. Not all movements were exclusively concerned with innovation. Surrealism, for instance, claimed to embody a kind of insight which can be present in the art of any period. This claim has been generally accepted so that a sixteenth century painting by Spranger or a mysterious photograph by Atget can legitimately be discussed in surrealist terms. Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of many different (often fundamentally different) kinds and resulted from the exposures of painters, sculptors and thinkers to the more complex phenomena of the twentieth century, including our ever increasing knowledge of the thought and products of earlier centuries. Different groups of artists would collaborate in trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world of visual and spiritual experience. We should hardly be surprised if no one group succeeded completely, but achievements, though relative, have been considerable. Landmarks have been established - concrete statements of position which give a pattern to a situation which could easily have degenerated into total chaos. Beyond this, new language tools have been created for those who follow - semantic systems which can provide a springboard for further explorations.
The codifying of art is often criticized. Certainly one can understand that artists are wary of being pigeon-holed since they are apt to think of themselves as individuals - sometimes with good reason. The notion of self-expression, however, no longer carries quite the weight it once did; objectivity has its defenders. There is good reason to accept the ideas codified by artists and critics, over the past sixty years or so, as having attained the status of independent existence - an independence which is not without its own value. The time factor is important here. As an art movement slips into temporal perspective, it ceases to be a living organism - becoming, rather, a fossil. This is not to say that it becomes useless or uninteresting. Just as a scientist can reconstruct the life of a prehistoric environment from the messages codified into the structure of a fossil, so can an artist decipher whole webs of intellectual and creative possibility from the recorded structure of a dead art movement. The artist can match the creative patterns crystallized into this structure against the potentials and possibilities of his own time. As T.S. Eliot observed, no one starts anything from scratch; however consciously you may try to live in the present, you are still involved with a nexus of behaviour patterns bequeathed from the past. The original and creative person is not someone who ignores these patterns, but someone who is able to translate and develop them so that they conform more exactly to his - and our - present needs.
A remarkable aspect of art of the present century is the range of concepts and ideologies which it embodies. It is almost tempting to see a pattern emerging within the art field - or alternatively imposed upon it a posteriori - similar to that which exists under the umbrella of science where the general term covers a whole range of separate, though interconnecting, activities. Any parallelism is however - in this instance at least - misleading. A scientific discipline develops systematically once its bare tenets have been established, named and categorized as conventions. Many of the concepts of modern art, by contrast, have resulted from the almost accidental meetings of groups of talented individuals at certain times and certain places. The ideas generated by these chance meetings had twofold consequences. Firstly, a corpus of work would be produced which, in great part, remains as a concrete record of the events. Secondly, the ideas would themselves be disseminated through many different channels of communication - seeds that often bore fruit in contexts far removed from their generation. Not all movements were exclusively concerned with innovation. Surrealism, for instance, claimed to embody a kind of insight which can be present in the art of any period. This claim has been generally accepted so that a sixteenth century painting by Spranger or a mysterious photograph by Atget can legitimately be discussed in surrealist terms. Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of many different (often fundamentally different) kinds and resulted from the exposures of painters, sculptors and thinkers to the more complex phenomena of the twentieth century, including our ever increasing knowledge of the thought and products of earlier centuries. Different groups of artists would collaborate in trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world of visual and spiritual experience. We should hardly be surprised if no one group succeeded completely, but achievements, though relative, have been considerable. Landmarks have been established - concrete statements of position which give a pattern to a situation which could easily have degenerated into total chaos. Beyond this, new language tools have been created for those who follow - semantic systems which can provide a springboard for further explorations.
The codifying of art is often criticized. Certainly one can understand that artists are wary of being pigeon-holed since they are apt to think of themselves as individuals - sometimes with good reason. The notion of self-expression, however, no longer carries quite the weight it once did; objectivity has its defenders. There is good reason to accept the ideas codified by artists and critics, over the past sixty years or so, as having attained the status of independent existence - an independence which is not without its own value. The time factor is important here. As an art movement slips into temporal perspective, it ceases to be a living organism - becoming, rather, a fossil. This is not to say that it becomes useless or uninteresting. Just as a scientist can reconstruct the life of a prehistoric environment from the messages codified into the structure of a fossil, so can an artist decipher whole webs of intellectual and creative possibility from the recorded structure of a dead art movement. The artist can match the creative patterns crystallized into this structure against the potentials and possibilities of his own time. As T.S. Eliot observed, no one starts anything from scratch; however consciously you may try to live in the present, you are still involved with a nexus of behaviour patterns bequeathed from the past. The original and creative person is not someone who ignores these patterns, but someone who is able to translate and develop them so that they conform more exactly to his - and our - present needs.
In the passage, which of the following similarities between science and art may lead to erroneous conclusions?
Solution:
Refer to the first sentence of the first paragraph of the passage where science and art have ben stated as similar in including a whole range of separate, though interconnecting activities. Hence, option(1) is the correct answer.
Q.No: 26
Test Name : CAT Paper 2008
Directions for Questions 86 to 90: The passage given below is followed by a set of five questions. Choose the most appropriate answer to each question.
A remarkable aspect of art of the present century is the range of concepts and ideologies which it embodies. It is almost tempting to see a pattern emerging within the art field - or alternatively imposed upon it a posteriori - similar to that which exists under the umbrella of science where the general term covers a whole range of separate, though interconnecting, activities. Any parallelism is however - in this instance at least - misleading. A scientific discipline develops systematically once its bare tenets have been established, named and categorized as conventions. Many of the concepts of modern art, by contrast, have resulted from the almost accidental meetings of groups of talented individuals at certain times and certain places. The ideas generated by these chance meetings had twofold consequences. Firstly, a corpus of work would be produced which, in great part, remains as a concrete record of the events. Secondly, the ideas would themselves be disseminated through many different channels of communication - seeds that often bore fruit in contexts far removed from their generation. Not all movements were exclusively concerned with innovation. Surrealism, for instance, claimed to embody a kind of insight which can be present in the art of any period. This claim has been generally accepted so that a sixteenth century painting by Spranger or a mysterious photograph by Atget can legitimately be discussed in surrealist terms. Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of many different (often fundamentally different) kinds and resulted from the exposures of painters, sculptors and thinkers to the more complex phenomena of the twentieth century, including our ever increasing knowledge of the thought and products of earlier centuries. Different groups of artists would collaborate in trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world of visual and spiritual experience. We should hardly be surprised if no one group succeeded completely, but achievements, though relative, have been considerable. Landmarks have been established - concrete statements of position which give a pattern to a situation which could easily have degenerated into total chaos. Beyond this, new language tools have been created for those who follow - semantic systems which can provide a springboard for further explorations.
The codifying of art is often criticized. Certainly one can understand that artists are wary of being pigeon-holed since they are apt to think of themselves as individuals - sometimes with good reason. The notion of self-expression, however, no longer carries quite the weight it once did; objectivity has its defenders. There is good reason to accept the ideas codified by artists and critics, over the past sixty years or so, as having attained the status of independent existence - an independence which is not without its own value. The time factor is important here. As an art movement slips into temporal perspective, it ceases to be a living organism - becoming, rather, a fossil. This is not to say that it becomes useless or uninteresting. Just as a scientist can reconstruct the life of a prehistoric environment from the messages codified into the structure of a fossil, so can an artist decipher whole webs of intellectual and creative possibility from the recorded structure of a dead art movement. The artist can match the creative patterns crystallized into this structure against the potentials and possibilities of his own time. As T.S. Eliot observed, no one starts anything from scratch; however consciously you may try to live in the present, you are still involved with a nexus of behaviour patterns bequeathed from the past. The original and creative person is not someone who ignores these patterns, but someone who is able to translate and develop them so that they conform more exactly to his - and our - present needs.
A remarkable aspect of art of the present century is the range of concepts and ideologies which it embodies. It is almost tempting to see a pattern emerging within the art field - or alternatively imposed upon it a posteriori - similar to that which exists under the umbrella of science where the general term covers a whole range of separate, though interconnecting, activities. Any parallelism is however - in this instance at least - misleading. A scientific discipline develops systematically once its bare tenets have been established, named and categorized as conventions. Many of the concepts of modern art, by contrast, have resulted from the almost accidental meetings of groups of talented individuals at certain times and certain places. The ideas generated by these chance meetings had twofold consequences. Firstly, a corpus of work would be produced which, in great part, remains as a concrete record of the events. Secondly, the ideas would themselves be disseminated through many different channels of communication - seeds that often bore fruit in contexts far removed from their generation. Not all movements were exclusively concerned with innovation. Surrealism, for instance, claimed to embody a kind of insight which can be present in the art of any period. This claim has been generally accepted so that a sixteenth century painting by Spranger or a mysterious photograph by Atget can legitimately be discussed in surrealist terms. Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of many different (often fundamentally different) kinds and resulted from the exposures of painters, sculptors and thinkers to the more complex phenomena of the twentieth century, including our ever increasing knowledge of the thought and products of earlier centuries. Different groups of artists would collaborate in trying to make sense of a rapidly changing world of visual and spiritual experience. We should hardly be surprised if no one group succeeded completely, but achievements, though relative, have been considerable. Landmarks have been established - concrete statements of position which give a pattern to a situation which could easily have degenerated into total chaos. Beyond this, new language tools have been created for those who follow - semantic systems which can provide a springboard for further explorations.
The codifying of art is often criticized. Certainly one can understand that artists are wary of being pigeon-holed since they are apt to think of themselves as individuals - sometimes with good reason. The notion of self-expression, however, no longer carries quite the weight it once did; objectivity has its defenders. There is good reason to accept the ideas codified by artists and critics, over the past sixty years or so, as having attained the status of independent existence - an independence which is not without its own value. The time factor is important here. As an art movement slips into temporal perspective, it ceases to be a living organism - becoming, rather, a fossil. This is not to say that it becomes useless or uninteresting. Just as a scientist can reconstruct the life of a prehistoric environment from the messages codified into the structure of a fossil, so can an artist decipher whole webs of intellectual and creative possibility from the recorded structure of a dead art movement. The artist can match the creative patterns crystallized into this structure against the potentials and possibilities of his own time. As T.S. Eliot observed, no one starts anything from scratch; however consciously you may try to live in the present, you are still involved with a nexus of behaviour patterns bequeathed from the past. The original and creative person is not someone who ignores these patterns, but someone who is able to translate and develop them so that they conform more exactly to his - and our - present needs.
The range of concepts and ideologies embodied in the art of the twentieth century is explained by
Solution:
In the first paragraph of the passage, refer to the lines Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of legitimately......visual and spiritual experience. Hence, the ideologies of the art of the twentieth century can be better realised by the fast changing world of visual and metaphysical understanding. The rest of the options have no link with the concepts and ideologies of the art of the twentieth century.
Q.No: 27
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
The traditional kinship group provides:
Solution:
A traditional kinship group provides security, identity as well as an entire scheme of things.
Q.No: 28
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Which of the following is indicative of the extent of disintegration of kinship groups?
Solution:
Both the examples have been cited in the passage to show the extent of disintegration of kinship.
Q.No: 29
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Which of the following statements is not true?
Solution:
The passage states that farming led to kinship becoming more important.
Q.No: 30
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
According to the author, what has been sacrificed with the rise in individual self-consciousness?
Solution:
The rise in individual self consciousness has led to the loss of sanity, supportiveness as well as warmth.
Q.No: 31
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
The theme of the passage is which of the following?
Solution:
The passage deals with the changes in kinship patterns over time and their effect on the individuals.
Q.No: 32
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
What does the author mean by serial monogamy?
Solution:
The author says that serial monogamy is a series of marriages and divorces.
Q.No: 33
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Which of the following statements cannot be inferred from the above passage?
Solution:
According to the passage, smaller families are less influential.
Q.No: 34
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
The word genealogy refers to:
Solution:
Genealogy refers to family history.
Q.No: 35
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
According to the passage, the most distressing trend is:
Solution:
The most distressing trend is the decline in the ability to form long term intimate bonding.
Q.No: 36
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
Humans have probably always been surrounded by their kin those to whom they have been related by blood or marriage. But the size, the composition, and the functions of their families and kinship groups have varied tremendously. People have lived not only in the nuclear family, made up of just the parents and their offspring, which is standard in the West and has been found almost everywhere, they have lived in extended families and in formal clans; they have been avunculocal; they have been ultrolateral, they have been conscious of themselves as heirs of lineages hundred of generations deep. However constructed, the traditional kinship group has usually provided those who live in it with security, identity, and indeed with their entire scheme of activities and beliefs. The nameless billions of hunter-gatherers who have lived and died over the past several million years have been embedded in kinship groups, and when people started to farm about ten thousand years ago, their universe remained centered on kinship. Now that there was a durable form of wealth which could be hoarded-grainsome families became more powerful than other; society became stratified, and genealogy became an important means of justifying and perpetuating status.
During the past few centuries, however, in part of the world-in Europe and the countries that have been developing along European lines-a process of fragmentation has been going on. The ties and the demands of kinship have been weakening, the family has been getting smaller and, some say, less influential, as the individual, with a new sense of autonomy and with new obligations to himself (or, especially in the last decade and a half, to herself),has come to the foreground. A radically different mental order-self-centered and traceable not to any single historical development as much as to the entire flow of Western history since at least the Renaissance has taken over. The political and economic effects of this rise in individual self-consciousness have been largely positive: civil rights are better protected and opportunities are greater in the richer, more dynamic countries of the West; but the psychological effects have been mixed , at best. Something has been lost: a warmth, a sanity, and a supportiveness that are apparent among people whose family networks are still intact. Such qualities can be found in most of the Third World and in rural pockets of the U.S., but in the main stream of post-industrial society the individual is increasingly left to himself, to find meaning, stability, and contentment however he can.
An indication of how far the disintegration of traditional kinship has advanced is that a surprising number of Americans are unable to name all four of their grandparents. Such people have usually grown up in stepfamilies, which are dramatically on the rise. So is the single parent family-the mother-child unit, which some anthropologists contend is the real nucleus of kinship, having already contracted to the relatively impoverished nuclear family, partly as an adaptation to industrialization kinship seems to be breaking down even further. With the divorce rate in America at about fifty percent and the remarriage rate at about seventy five, the traditional Judeo-Christian scheme of marriage to one person for life seems to be shading into a pattern of serial monogamy, into a sort of staggered polygamy, which some anthropologists, who believe that we arent naturally monogamous to begin with, see as a return of normality. Still other anthropologists explain what is happening somewhat differently; we are adopting delayed system of marriage, they say, with the length of the marriage chopped off at both ends. But many adults arent getting married at all; they are putting self-fulfillment before marriage and children and are having nothing further to do with kinship after leaving their parents home; their family has become their work associate or their circle of best friends. This is the most distressing trend of all; the decline in the capacity of long-term intimate bonding.
According to the passage, which statement is not true of kinship group fragmentation?
Solution:
The passage states that the political and economic benefits of the rise of the individuals have been positive.
Q.No: 37
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
When the author refers to the marauder within, he is referring to:
Solution:
The marauder within refers to the criminal class.
Q.No: 38
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
According to the passage, the intellectual mentors of Australia could be :
Solution:
The intellectual patrons of Australia in its first colonial years were Hobbes and Sade.
Q.No: 39
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
Which of the following does not describe what the English regarded Australia to be :
Solution:
The English did not regard Australia as a new frontier. It was settled to defend the English property from the criminal class.
Q.No: 40
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
Elsewhere, according to the author, the late eighteenth century saw a plethora of:
Solution:
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness.
Q.No: 41
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
The word sanguine means:
Solution:
Sanguine means confident or hopeful.
Q.No: 42
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
The primary theme of the passage is
Solution:
The passage primarily deals with the settlement of Australia as a penal colony to defend the English property from the criminal class.
Q.No: 43
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
One of the hallmarks of the late Georgian and early Victorian England was the belief in:
Solution:
The existence of the criminal class was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England.
Q.No: 44
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
What is penology?
Solution:
Penology is the study of punishment in relation to crime.
Q.No: 45
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
According to the passage, which of the following statements is not true?
Solution:
For seventeen years no observation was made on the island.
Q.No: 46
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
In 1787, the twenty-eighth year of the reign of King George III, the British Government sent a fleet to colonize Australia. Never had a colony been founded so far from its parent state, or in such ignorance of the land it occupied. There had been no reconnaissance. In 1770 Captain James Cook had made landfall on the unexplored east coast of this utterly enigmatic continent, stopped for a short while at a place named Botany Bay and gone north again. Since then, no ship had called not a word, not an observation, for 17 years, each one of which was exactly like the thousands that had preceded it, locked in its historical immensity of blue heat, blush, sandstone and the measured booming of glassy pacific rollers.
Now, this coast was to witness a new colonial experiment, never tried before, not repeated since. An unexplored continent would become a jail. The space around it, the very air and sea, the whole transparent labyrinth of the South pacific, would become a wall 14,000 miles thick.
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness thrown off by its burgeoning sense of revolution. But here, the process was to be reversed: not utopia, but Dystopia; not Rousseaus natural man moving in moral grace amid free social contract, but man coerced, deracinated, in chains. Other parts of the Pacific, especially Tahiti, might seem to conform Rousseau. But the intellectual patrons of Australia, in its first colonial years, were Hobbes and Sade.
In their most sanguine moments, the authorities hoped that it would eventually swallow a whole class-the criminal class, whose existence was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England. Australia was settled to defend English property not from the frog-eating invader across the Channel but from the marauder within. English lawmakers wished not only to get rid of the Criminal class but if possible to forget about it. Australia was a Cloaca, invisible, its contents filthy and unnamable.
To most Englishmen this place seemed not just a mutant society but another planet-an exiled world, summed up in its popular name, Botany Bay. It was remote and anomalous to its white creators. It was strange but close, as the unconscious to the conscious mind. There was as yet no such thing as Australian history or culture. For its first forty years, everything that happened in the thief-colony was English. In the whole period of convict transportation, the Crown shipped more than 160,000 men, women and children (due to defects in the records, the true number will never be precisely known) in bondage to Australia. This was the largest forced exile of citizens at the behest of a European government in pre-modern history. Nothing in earlier penology compares with it. In Australia, England drew the sketch for our own centurys vaster and more terrible fresco of repression, the Gulag. No other country had such a birth, and its pangs may be said to have begun on the afternoon of January 26, 1788, when a fleet of eleven vessels carrying 1,030 people, including 548 male and 188 female convicts, under the command of captain Arthur Phillip in his flagship Sirius, entered Port Jackson or, as it would presently be called, Sydney Harbor.
Sydney Harbor was earlier known as:
Solution:
Sydney Harbor is the new name for Port Jackson.
Q.No: 47
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The author subtly suggests that
Solution:
The author says that mans emotions are the product of his rational faculty; his emotions cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
Q.No: 48
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The biological basis of choosing efficacy as value
Solution:
The biological basis of choosing efficacy has been said to be the relationship of efficacy to survival.
Q.No: 49
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The author defines value as
Solution:
Nature has left man free in choosing values.
Q.No: 50
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The basic theme of the passage is that
Solution:
The passage clearly states that man chooses his own values, irrespective of their actual effect on his life.
Q.No: 51
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
According to this passage, through which of the following set of experiences, does man first acquire preferences?
A. Good and bad
B. Pleasure and pain
C. Child and adult
D. Efficacy and inefficacy
Solution:
The passage states that man first acquires preferences through pleasure and pain as well as through efficacy and inefficacy.
Q.No: 52
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
Reason has the following basic functions:
Solution:
Reason serves the dual function of cognition as well as of evaluation.
Q.No: 53
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The difference between a childs and adults conceptual identification of issues relating to value is that
Solution:
As a child a human being experiences issues relating to values through physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
Q.No: 54
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
According to the author, while man chooses his own values, it does not mean that
Solution:
Since man must act to live, he is actually forced to select values.
Q.No: 55
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
What man experiences as primary, according to the author,
Solution:
The passage clearly states that man experiences efficacy as well as pleasure as primary, hence the question is not debatable.
Q.No: 56
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
The fact is often obscured by the widespread confusion about the nature and role of emotions in mans life. One frequently hears the statement, Man is not merely a rational being, he is also an emotional being, which implies some sort of dichotomy, as if, in effect, man possessed a dual nature, with one part in opposition to the other. In fact, however, the content of mans emotions is the product of his rational faculty; his emotions are a derivative and a consequence, which, like all of mans other psychological characteristics, cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
As mans tool of survival, reasons has two basic functions: cognition and evaluation. The process of cognition consists of discovering what things are, of identifying their nature, their attributes and properties. The process of evaluation consists of man discovering the relationship of things to himself, of identifying what is beneficial to him and what is harmful, what should be sought and what should be avoided.
A value is that which one acts to gain and/or keep. It is that which one regards as conducive to ones welfare. A value is the object of an action. Since man must act in order to live, and since reality confronts him with many possible goals, many alternative courses of action, he cannot escape the necessity of selecting values and making value judgements.
Value is a concept pertaining to a relation the relation of some aspect of reality to man (or to some other living entity). If a man regards a things (a person, an object, an event, mental state, etc.) as good for him, as beneficial in some way, he values it and, when possible and appropriate, seeks to acquire, retain and use or enjoy it; if a man regards a thing as bad for him, as inimical or harmful in some way, he disvalues it and seeks to avoid or destroy it. If he regards a thing as of no significance to him, as neither beneficial nor harmful, he is indifferent to it and takes no action in regard to it.
Although his life and well-being depend on a man selecting values that are in fact good for him, i.e., consonant with his nature and needs, conducive to his continued efficacious functioning, there are no internal or external forces compelling him to do so. Nature leaves him free in this matter. As a being of volitional consciousness, he is not biologically programmed to make the right value-choices automatically. He may select values that are incompatible with his needs and inimical to his well-being, values that lead him to suffering and destruction. But whether his values are life-serving or life-negating, it is a mans values that direct his actions. Values constitute mans basic motivational tie to reality.
In existential terms, mans basic alternative of for me or against me, which gives rise to the issue of values, is the alternative of life or death. But this is an adult, conceptual identification. As a child, a human being first encounters the issue of values through the experience of physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
To a conscious organism, pleasure is experienced, axiomatically, as a value; pain, as disvalue. The biological reason for this is the fact that pleasure is a life-enhancing state and that pain is a signal of danger, of some disruption of the normal life process.
There is another basic alternative, in the realm of consciousness, through which a child encounters the issue of values, of the desirable and the undesirable. It pertains to his cognitive relations to reality. There are times when a child experiences a sense of cognitive efficacy in grasping reality, a sense of cognitive control, of mental clarity (within the range of awareness possible to his stage of development). There are times when he suffers from a sense of cognitive inefficacy, of cognitive helplessness, of mental chaos, the sense of being out of control and unable to assimilate the date entering his consciousness. To experience a state of efficacy is to experience it as a value; to experience a state of inefficacy is to experience it as a disvalue. The biological basis of this fact is the relationship of efficacy to survival.
The value of sense of efficacy as such, like the value of pleasure as such, is introspectively experienced by man as primary. One does not ask a man: Why do you prefer pleasure to pain? Nor does one ask him: Why do you prefer a state of control to a state of helplessness? It is through these two sets of experiences that man first acquires preferences, i.e. values.
A man may choose, as a consequence of his errors and/or evasions, to pursue pleasure by means of values that in fact can result only in pain; and he can pursue a sense of efficacy by means of values that can only render him impotent. But the value of pleasure and the disvalue of pain, as well as the value of efficacy and the disvalue of helplessness, remain the psychological base of the phenomenon of valuation.
While a man can choose his values
Solution:
As a being of volitional consciousness, man is not biologically programmed to make right value choices automatically.
Q.No: 57
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
Which of the following statements is not true?
Solution:
A heightened roller coaster effect, and not an opportunity for a roller coaster ride, is a characteristic of the stage of small victories.
Q.No: 58
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
Entering new cultures can predominantly help the entrant in
Solution:
Entering a new culture involves an appreciative process, to help members of different cultures value the differences.
Q.No: 59
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
Opening a bank account in a new culture is an example of which stage?
Solution:
Opening a bank account is an example of a small victory as it is preceded by anxiety and information collection.
Q.No: 60
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
According to the passage, entering a culture that is very different from your own is overall
Solution:
Entering a new culture is a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in a culture, while at the same time seeing it as a whole.
Q.No: 61
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
Which of the following statements cannot be inferred from the above passage?
Solution:
The passage states that appreciative inquiry must precede cultural changes in an organization.
Q.No: 62
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
When you first arrive in a new culture, there is a period of confusion that comes from the new situation and from a lack of information. It leaves you quite dependent and in need of help in the form of information and above. The second stage begins as you start to interact with the new culture. It is called the stage of small victories. Each new encounter with the culture is fraught with peril. It is preceded by anxiety and information collection and rehearsal. Then the even occurs and you return home either triumphant or defeated. When successful, the feelings really are very much as though a major victory has been won. A heightened roller coaster effect is particularly characteristic of this stage. The support needed is emotional support, people who appreciate what you are going through and who can cheer you onward. It often happens that once some of the fundamentals of life are mastered, there is time to explore and discover the new culture. This is the honeymoon stage of wonder and infatuation, in it there is a heightened appreciation of the new, the different, the aesthetic. Depending on the degree of cultural immersion and exploration it may continue for a considerable period of time. During this time there is no interest in attending to the less attractive downsides of the culture.
After a while, a self-correction takes place. No honeymoon can last forever. Irritation and anger begin to be experienced. Why in the world would anyone do it that way? Cant these people get their act together? Now the deficits seem glaringly apparent. For some people, they overwhelm the positive characteristics and become predominant.
Finally, if you are lucky enough to chart a course through these stages and not get stuck (and people do get stuck in these stages), there is a rebalance of reality. There is the capacity to understand and enjoy the new culture without ignoring those features that are less desirable.
This cultural entry and engagement process is both cognitive and affective. New information is acquired and remembered; old schema and perceptions are revised and qualified. An active learning process occurs. At the same time, anxiety arises in reaction to uncertainties and the challenges of the learning processes. It must be managed, as must the extremes of feeling that occur in this labile period. Thus, I am describing a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in the culture while at the same time seeing it in its completeness, seeing it whole. The capacity to affirm the whole- including those aspects that are less desirable yet are part of the whole is critically important.
An appreciative process, appreciative inquiry is proposed as a way of helping members of different cultures recognize and value their differences and create a new culture where different values are understood and honoured. Executives - those who must lead this culturechange projects need to understand that equal employment opportunity, affirmative action and sexual harassment policies, as viewed and implemented in organizations, are problem oriented change strategies. They focus on correcting what is wrong rather than creating a valued future. Executives themselves will need to inquire appreciatively into cultures that are not known to them before they are equipped to lead cultural change in their own organizations.
Which of the following is true?
Solution:
The passage emphasizes that affirmation of a new culture involves viewing the whole, including the points that are less desirable.
Q.No: 63
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
The author is making a case for
Solution:
The author does not approve of legal limits on interest charged on money lent to people. The last paragraph shows his support for the free market operations.
Q.No: 64
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
The lament of the author is that the mischief that the law makes is that
Solution:
The author states that though the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms, which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous.
Q.No: 65
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
The author suggests that
Solution:
The author states that he knows of no economist of any standing who has favoured a legal limit on the rate of interest on borrowed money.
Q.No: 66
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
How is usury defined?
Solution:
Usury is defined as charging rates on money that are in excess of the legal limits.
Q.No: 67
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
Bentham was primarily concerned with
Solution:
Bentham was primarily concerned with loans to individuals or business enterprises.
Q.No: 68
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
To reclaim his own money, man becomes an oppressor because
Solution:
The author laments that it is an oppression for a man to claim his money, but not to keep it from him. Thus he implies that a man becomes an oppressor only because the borrower does not return the money.
Q.No: 69
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
Who should be allowed to borrow and lend at any interest rate?
Solution:
The passage states that no man of sound mind and with his eyes open should be hindered from obtaining money.
Q.No: 70
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
The author is
Solution:
The author emphasizes the importance of free market operations throughout the passage, and draws attention to the validity of the mischief of the
anti-usurious laws. He also condemns politicians and so (d) is the most fitting description for the author.
anti-usurious laws. He also condemns politicians and so (d) is the most fitting description for the author.
Q.No: 71
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
In 1787, Jeremy Bentham published a lengthy pamphlet entitled, Defense of Usury: showing the Impolicy of the Present Legal Restraints on the Terms of pecuniary bargains he was concerned with loans between individuals or business enterprises. The legal restraints were limits on interest rates paid or received. Usury was and is the popular term for charging interest rates in excess of legal limits.
Bentham makes an overwhelmingly persuasive case for the proposition he sets forth at the beginning of the pamphlet, viz. that no man of ripe years and sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view of his advantage from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; and nor (what is necessary consequence) nobody is hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.
During the nearly two centuries since Benthams pamphlet was published his arguments have been widely accepted by economists and as widely neglected by politicians. I know of no economist of any standing from that time to this who has favored a legal limit on the rate of interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive though there must have been some. I know of no country that does not limit by law the rates of interest and I doubt that there are any. As Bentham wrote, in great political questions wide indeed is the distance between conviction and practice.
Benthams explanation of the grounds of the prejudices against usury is as valid today as when he wrote: The business of a money lender has no where, nor any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to the future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who dont have their cake to eat are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short time after it has been received, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor: by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning has come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put on the image of the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his money: it is none to keep it from him.
Benthams explanation of the mischief of the anti-usurious laws is also as valid today as when he wrote that these laws preclude many people altogether, from getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. For still others, they render he terms so much the worse While, out of loving kindness, or whatsoever other motive, the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. His conclusion : The sole tendency of the law is to heap distress upon distress.
Developments since Benthams days have increased the mischief done by usury legislation. Economic progress has provided the ordinary man with the means to save. The spread of banks, savings-and-loan associations, and the like has given the ordinary man the facilities for saving. For the first time in history, the working class may well be net lenders rather than net borrowers. They are also the ones who have fewest alternatives, who find it hardest to avoid legal regulations, and who are therefore hardest hit by them.
Under the spur of (Congressman) Wright Patman and his ilk, the Federal Reserve (1970) now limits the interest rate that commercial banks may pay to a maximum of 4 percent for small savers but to 7 percent for deposits of $100,000 or more. And the deposits of small savers have been relatively stable or growing, while those of large depositors have been declining sharply because they have still better alternatives.
That is the way the self-labeled defenders of the people look after their interests by keeping them from receiving the interests they are entitled to. Along with Bentham, I would wish to learn why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other? Why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it than to prevent their getting less? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions: it is more than I can do.
Mischief of usury legislation has increased as
Solution:
The author states that the working class that may be the lender for the first time in history, will be the hardest hit by the legal regulations.
Q.No: 72
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Bickering during the meetings were indicative of the fact that
Solution:
The bickering illustrated that Eagle constituted a collective effort, and now they were having a hard time deciding on the contribution of each individual.
Q.No: 73
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
In this passage, the author seems to suggest that
Solution:
The author seems to suggest that with the launch of the machine everything that preceded it becomes past. Even the team started losing its glue and instead bickering started.
Q.No: 74
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
The afterbirth, a simile expressed by an old hand was with reference to
Solution:
The word after birth was used for the team that was losing its glue, that is the Eclipse Group.
Q.No: 75
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
It appears from Mr. Wests conversation with the author that
Solution:
During the conversation West said that none of it had come out the way he had expected and that he was glad it was all over.
Q.No: 76
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
A telegram by the North Carolina leader
Solution:
The telegram was described as a classy gesture by all.
Q.No: 77
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Apparently, one of the things that the younger computer professionals considered an honour was
Solution:
One of the Microkids exclaimed that he had a great talk with West, showing that it as an honour for him.
Q.No: 78
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
The launching of Eagle in New York was a gala affair
Solution:
The machine had crashed during the programme but no one except the company engineers noticed and the problem was fast corrected. The event was written up at length in both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, the next day.
Q.No: 79
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
According to the passage, even as the premiere of the Eagle launch seemed a grand success among those who appeared incongruous were
Solution:
Some of the engineers seemed to the author to be out of place, being untutored in that sort of a performance.
Q.No: 80
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Just normal flak and protocol refers to
Solution:
It refers to the fact that in front of the Press even those who had not been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had the responsibility for it.
Q.No: 81
Test Name : CAT Paper 1991
Q101 to 155 : Each passage in this part is followed by questions based on its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
Long before I disbanded formally, the Eclipse Group, in order to assist the company in applying for patents on the new machine, had gathered and had tried to figure out which engineers had contributed to Eagles patentable features. Some who attended found those meetings painful. There was bickering. Harsh words were occasionally exchanged. Alsing, who during the project had set aside the shield of technical command, came in for some abuse why should his name go on any patents, what had he done? Someone even asked that question regarding West. Ironically, perhaps, those meetings illustrated that the building of Eagle really did constitute a collective effort, for now that they had finished, they themselves were having a hard time agreeing on what each individual had contributed. But, clearly, the team was losing its glue. It has no function anymore. Its like an afterbirth, said one old hat after the last of the patent meetings. Shortly after those meetings, Wallach, Alsing, Rasala and West received telegrams of congratulations from North-Carolinas leader. That was a classy gesture, all agreed. The next day Eagle finally went out the Companys door.
In New York City, in faded elegance of the Roosevelt Hotel, under gilded chandeliers, on April 29, 1980, Data General announced Eagle to the world. On days immediately following, in other parts of the country and in Canada and Europe, the machine was presented to salesmen and customers, and some members of the Eclipse Group went off on so-called road shows. About dozen of the team attended the big event in New York. There was a slick slide show. There were speeches. Then there was an impressive display in a dining hall-128 terminals hooked up to a single Eagle. The machine crashed during this part of the program, but no one except the company engineers noticed, the problem was corrected so quickly and deftly. Eagle this one consisted of the boards from Gollum looked rather fine in skins of off white and blue, but also unfamiliar.
A surprising large number of reporters attended, and the next day Eagles debut was written up at some length in both the Wall Street Journal and the financial pages of the New York Times. But it wasnt called Eagle anymore. Marketing had rechristened it the Eclipse MV/8000. This also took some getting used to. The people who described the machine to the press had never, of course, had anything to do with making it. Alsing -who was at the premiere and who had seen Marketing present machines before, ones hes worked on directly-said : After Marketing gets through, you go home and say to yourself, Wow! Did I do that? And in front of the press, people who had not even been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had responsibility for it. All of that was to be expected just normal flak and protocol.
As for the machines actual inventors-the engineers, most of whom came, seemed to have a good time, although some did seem to me a little out of place, untutored in this sort of performance. Many of them had brought new suits for the occasion. After the show, there were cocktails and then lunch, they occupied a table all their own. It was a rather formal luncheon, and there was some confusion at the table as to whether it was proper to take first the plate of salad on the right or the one on the left.
West came, too, He did not sit with his old team, but he did talk easily and pleasantly with many of them during the day. I had a great talk with West!. Remarked one of the Microkids. He wore a brown suit, conservatively tailored. He looked as though hed been wearing a suit all his life. He had come to this ceremony with some reluctance, and he was decidedly in the background. At the door to the show, where name tags were handed out, West had been asked what his title was. Business Development hed said. At the cocktail party after the formal presentation, a reporter came up to him: You seem to know something about this machine. What did you have to do with it? West mumbled something, waving a hand, and changed the subject. Alsing overheard this exchange. It offended his sense of reality. He couldnt let the matter stand there. So he took the reporter aside and told him, That guy was the leader of the whole thing. I had the feeling that West was just going through emotions and was not really present at all.
When it was over and we were strolling down a busy street towards Penn Station, his mood altered. Suddenly there was no longer a feeling of forbidden subjects, as there had been around him for many months. I found myself all of a sudden saying to him: Its just a computer. Its really a small thing in the world, you know.
West smiled softly. I know it. None of it, he said later, had come out the way he had imagined it would, but it was over and he was glad. The day after the formal announcement, Data Generals famous sales force had been introduced to the computer in New York and elsewhere. At the end of the presentation for the sales personnel in New York, the regional sales manager got up and gave his troops a pep talk. What motivates people? he asked. He answered his own question, saying, Ego and the money to buy things that they and their families want? It was a different game now. Clearly, the machine no longer belonged to its makers.
The author states that the machine no longer belonged to its makers
Solution:
The author states that ego and money motivates people and clearly the machine no longer belonged to the makers.
Q.No: 82
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the inferences can be drawn if everything said in the passage were assumed to be true?
Solution:
The passage states that speeding up social reforms
implied a risk of revolt, which could be avoided by
maintaining status quo.
Q.No: 83
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
The traditional method for selecting officials was
Solution:
The examination system was the traditional avenue of
selecting the officials.
Q.No: 84
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
A primary objective in the development of Restoration thought was
Solution:
The Restoration statesmen tried to restore the society,
and not create a new one. They tried to stretch the
traditional ideology in order to make the Confucian
system under the new conditions.
Q.No: 85
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
The major similarity between Chinese and western conservatism is
Solution:
The only similarity was their intent to conserve.
Q.No: 86
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
The most significant Chinese philosopher mentioned in the passage is
Solution:
None of these philosophers has been mentioned in
the passage.
Q.No: 87
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
During the Restoration, ancient institutions
Solution:
The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their
original vitality the best of the ancient institutes.
Q.No: 88
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
The western conservatives intended to preserve all the following except
Solution:
Western conservatism distrusted cosmopolitanism.
Q.No: 89
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
In order to better understand conservation in China, it is essential that one has a grasp of what the term Chinese conservatism means. Chinese conservatism is markedly different from the conservatism of the modern West. The political term conservative came about during the French Revolution and inspired men who were determined to preserve Christian and aristocratic elements in European society. Chinese conservatism began around the time of the Taiping Rebellion and had as its primary objectives the preservation of both Confucian society and non-feudal strains of pre-Opium War Chinese society. While western conservatism believes in sacredness of private property and distrust of cosmopolitanism, the Chinese conservatism is the defense of a rational cosmopolitan order. Thus, the only common area of agreement between European and Chinese conservatism is the intent to conserve.
During the Tung-chin Restoration, the great aim was the revival of Confucian values and institutions. But these aims had to be modified so that they might endure. Restoration statesmen had no desire to create a new society they wanted to restore a society that they believed had been based on truth. The statesmen of the Restoration stretched the traditional ideology to its limits in an effort to make the Confucian system under new conditions. They were true conservatives in a great tradition, living in an age when revolutionary change was unavoidable. The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their original vitality the best of the ancient institutions. During the Restoration, the two immediate problems were the suppression of rebellion and the stabilization of foreign relations. In addition, the people were striving for a restoration of the system of government by superior civil officials.
The men in the hierarchy of the Restoration rose to prominence through proven ability in both civil and military affairs. They emphasized human and social training that is, indoctrination, morality, and the art of leadership through the cultivation of character. The great majority of the officials rose through the examination system.
During the chaos of this period, the examination system had lost much of its effectiveness. This is important and must be noted because the examination system was the traditional avenue for selecting officials. The senior official of Restoration realized that their policies would be ineffective unless the quality of the junior official was improved, so it was their duty to weed out the officials who had attained office in irregular ways and to promote the examination system as the only way to high position. But these men of the Restoration had enough foresight to determine that it was impossible to select officials automatically on the basis of objective tests alone. As a result, the system of recommendation was ushered in, whereby; a high official sponsored the career of a promising young man. This acted as an important supplement to the examination system.
The most appropriate title for the passage will be
Solution:
The passage is basically about Chinese Conservatism.
Q.No: 90
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
The lengthiest constitution in the world is that of
Solution:
India has the lengthiest constitution in the world.
Q.No: 91
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
The instance of a country without a written constitution mentioned in the passage is
Solution:
Israel does not have a written constitution.
Q.No: 92
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
The unwritten parts of the US constitution deal with
Solution:
Presidential cabinet is not even mentioned in the
American constitution.
Q.No: 93
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
In the United States
Solution:
The constitutions of new states in the US are very
concise.
Q.No: 94
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
In countries with normative constitutions
Solution:
A normative constitution has the status of supreme
law and is fully activate and effective.
Q.No: 95
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
By normal constitution, the author means
Solution:
Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind
the verbal façade will be found the real constitution
containing the basic principles according to which
power is exercised in actual fact.
Q.No: 96
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
One of the drawbacks of a long constitution is
Solution:
Since a long constitution says too many things, on too
many subjects, it has to be amended often.
Q.No: 97
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
Every state has a constitution, since every state functions on the basis of certain rules and principles. It has often been asserted that the United States has a written constitution, but that the constitution of Great Britain is unwritten. This is true only in the sense that, in the United States, there is a formal document called the Constitution, whereas there is no such document in Great Britain. In fact, however, many parts of the British constitution exist in written form, whereas important aspects of the American constitution are wholly unwritten. The British constitution includes the bill of Rights (1689), the Act of Settlement (1700 01), the Parliament Act of 1911, the successive Representation of the People Acts (which extended the suffrage), the statutes dealing with the structure of the courts, the various local government acts, and many others. These are not ordinary statutes, even though they are adopted in the ordinary legislative way, and they are not codified within the structure of single orderly document. On the other hand, such institutions in the United States as the presidential cabinet and the system of political parties, though not even mentioned in the written constitution, are most certainly of constitutional significance. The presence or absence of a formal written document makes a difference, of course, but only one of degree. A single-document constitution has such advantages as greater precision, simplicity, and consistency. In a newly developing state as Israel, on the other hand, the balance of advantage has been found to lie with an uncodified constitution evolving through the growth of custom and the medium of statutes. Experience suggests that some codified constitutions are much too detailed. An overlong constitution invites disputes and litigation is rarely read or understood by the ordinary citizen and injects too much rigidity in cases in which flexibility is often preferable. Since a very long constitution says to many things on too many subjects, it must be amended often, and this makes it still longer. The United States Constitution of 7,000 words is a model of brevity, whereas many of that countrys state constitutions are much too long - the longest being hat of the sate of Louisiana, whose constitution now has about 255,000 words. The very new, modern constitutions of the recently admitted states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have, significantly, very concise constitutions ranging from 9,000 to 15,000 words. The 1949 constitution of India, with 395 articles, is the wordiest of all national constitutions. In contract, some of the worlds new constitutions, such as those of Japan and Indonesia, are very short indeed.
Some constitutions are buttressed by powerful institutions such as an independent judiciary, whereas other, though committed to lofty principles, are not supported by governmental institutions endowed with the authority to defend these principles in concrete situation. Accordingly, many juristic writers distinguish between normative and normal constitutions. A normative constitution is the one that not only has the status of supreme law but it also fully activated and effective; it is habitually obeyed in the actual life of the state. A nominal constitution may express high aspirations, but it does not, in fact, reflect the political realities of the state. Article 125 of the 1936 constitution of the Soviet Union and the article 87 of the 1954 constitution of the Peoples Republic of China both purport to guarantee freedom of speech, but in those countries even mild expressions of dissent are likely to be swiftly and sternly repressed. Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind the verbal façade will be found the real constitution containing the basic principles according to which power is exercised in actual fact. Thus in the Soviet Union, the rules of the Communist Party describing its organs and functioning are more truly the constitution of that country than are the grand phases of the 1936 Stalin constitution. Every state, in short has a constitution, but in some, real constitution operates behind the façade of a nominal constitution.
According to the author, the difference between a written and an unwritten constitution
Solution:
The presence or absence of a written constitution
makes a difference, but only of a degree.
Q.No: 98
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
The tone of the passage is one of
Solution:
The author is concerned about the books and is also
well informed about the topic.
Q.No: 99
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
The phrase archival quality implies
Solution:
The paper of archival quality refers to a long lasting
paper.
Q.No: 100
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
Wood-pulp as raw material for paper was developed because of
Solution:
Wood pulp helped in producing large quantities of
paper.
Q.No: 101
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
If paper has to last long
Solution:
Paper that is acidic is highly unstable.
Q.No: 102
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
On of the reasons not mentioned in the passage in favour of producing long-lasting paper is
Solution:
This is not a reason mentioned in the passage, for
producing long lasting paper.
Q.No: 103
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
Purchase of new books by libraries are bound to be curtailed because of all the following reasons except
Solution:
Reduction in government funding has not been
mentioned as a reason for curtailing purchase of new
books.
Q.No: 104
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
Continued use of wood-pulp paper in book will affect
I. libraries.
II. General public.
III. the publishing industry.
IV. The governments.
Solution:
The continued use of wood pulp will not have any
effect on the governments.
Q.No: 105
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
An urgent problem is now threatening libraries throughout the world. Their collections, which are crucial for diverse purposes as economic development, educational research and recreational pursuits, are in danger of disintegrating.
The problem is mainly due to one cause the type of paper on which books have been printed for the past one and a half centuries. Until the 1850s, paper was produced from linen or cotton rags and proved to be relatively long-lasting. In the mid-19th century, however, the popular demand for paper and the commercial need for an economic method of production led to the use of mechanically ground wood pulp. Paper manufactured for wood pulp is highly acidic and therefore inherently unstable. It contains lignin a major factor in causing paper to discolour and disintegrate. The useful lifespan of most 20th-century book papers has been estimated to be no more than a few decades.
Libraries comprise an important part of the market for printed books and they are increasingly aware of the fragility of this material. The extent of the deterioration of library collections is alarming. Surveys conducted at various major institutions reveal that 26% to 40% of the books they hold are seriously embrittled and thus unavailable for normal use.
Programmes are now being developed with two main aims in mind on the one hand, to improve the physical condition of library collections, especially by the process called mass de-acidification (which is designed to eliminate acid from the paper of published books and insert a buffer compound that will provide protection against future acid attack from the environment); and on the other, to transfer the contents of existing books to another medium (such as microfilm or optical disk).
Libraries will only be able to carry out these special tasks with the assistance of other experts such as book conservators and high-technology specialists. But here is another group with whom librarians have traditionally enjoyed strong affinities and whose co-operation will be crucial if the problem of decaying collections is to be arrested namely, the printing and publishing industries. The existing problem that of book collections already assembled in libraries is of vast proportions, but it is intensified by the continuing use of acid-based paper in book publishing. The key issue is how to preserve the books of the future, not simply those of the past.
If the future dimensions of the conservation problem are to be curbed, there will need to be widespread adoption of paper which is of archival quality.
This change does not relate to a narrowly perceived need because the long term preservation of library collections is important both for the overall social benefits they bring as well as for the special advantages they bestow on the printing and publishing industries.
In the first place, libraries are of critical importance to the future well-being of citizens since they provide the knowledge base of society. They contain the record of humanity the accumulation of ideas and insights and discoveries on which social effort and progress are possible. The destruction of libraries would represent an immense cultural loss, a form of amnesia which would affect every member of society.
In the second place, printers and publishers have an economic interest in turning to paper of archival quality. So long as the libraries are acquiring books with a short lifespan they will be forced to devote an increasing share of their budgets to conservation. These budgets are severely strained by the combined impact of inflation and currency devaluation, and there is scarcely any prospect of enlarged government funding. As a result, libraries will be compelled to balance the preservation of their collections against the expansion of those collations. In short, the choice will be between conservation and acquisition and the funds for conservation are likely to come from acquisition budgets. This unpalatable choice will damage both libraries and the printing and publishing industries and can only be minimized in its effects by a bold decision to convert to use of permanent paper.
The substance which causes paper to discolour is
Solution:
Lignin is a major factor that causes paper to discolour.
Q.No: 106
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The politician who had been Prime Minister for the longest period since the Second World War was
Solution:
Eisaku Sato was the Prime Minister for eight years.
Q.No: 107
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
When did Hirohito ascend the throne?
Solution:
Hirohito has been said to be on throne for 61 years at
the time of writing of the passage, which was in 1987.
Q.No: 108
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
Mr. Tanaka ceased to be Prime Minister because
Solution:
Mr. Tanaka was involved in a bribe scandal.
Q.No: 109
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The politician who had just recently ceased to be Prime Minister is
Solution:
The passage says that Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone is now
bowing out.
Q.No: 110
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
Mr. Takeshitas success in the Prime Ministerial quest is due to
Solution:
He has proved himself more skillful in the game of
factional politics and thus his hopes are stronger.
Q.No: 111
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The authors assessment of the potential of Mr. Takeshita to be a successful Prime Minister can be summarized as one of
Solution:
The author states that how Mr. Takeshita will fare after
taking over the reins of the government is not certain,
and reasons about this in an objective manner.
Q.No: 112
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
Factionalism in the Liberal Democratic Party is mainly due to
Solution:
The quick turnover of Prime Ministers has led to
factionalism in LDP.
Q.No: 113
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
Most of the erstwhile Prime Ministers of Japan
Solution:
Mr. Takeshita will be the first Prime Minister with humble
rural origins.
Q.No: 114
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The Japanese want their Emperor to reign for long, very long, but their Prime Ministers to have very short tenures. During the 61 years Hirohito has been on the Chrysanthemum throne, 38 Prime Ministers have come and gone (or at least 32, if returns to power are left out of account). Eisaku Satos eight uninterrupted years as Prime Minister in the Sixties and early Seventies provoked fears about the possible ill-effects of one-man leadership on Japanese democracy, and led the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to lay down the norm of a two-year for a party chief and head of Government. Mr.Yasuhiro Nakasone, now bowing out, has served for an unusual five years. His success as Prime Minister was evidenced by the ruling party re-electing him leader more than once. But his plan to push through the Diet a Bill to levy a 5% indirect tax as part of financial reforms failed, in spite of the LDP majority in both the chambers. It was time then for him to go.
The quick turnover of Primate Minister has contributed to the functioning of the LDP through factions. In the party that has ruled Japan for 32 years continuously, factionalism is not something unseemly. The leader is chosen by hard bargaining some foreigners call it horse-trading among the faction leaders, followed, if necessary, by a party election. For the decision in favour of Noboru Takeshita as the next President of the LDP and Primate Minister of Japan, voting was not necessary. His hopes were stronger than those of he other two candidates Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and former Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe if only because he had proved himself more skillful in the game of factional politics. A one-time protégé of Mr. Kakuei Tanaka, he thrust himself forward when the leader was disgraced on a charge of accepting bribes for sale of Lockheed aircraft to Japan and debilitated by physical ailments. Mr. Takeshita took away most of Mr. Tanakas following and now leads the biggest faction in the LDP. Mr. Nakasone persuaded Mr. Miyazawa and Mr. Abe to accept Mr. Takeshitas leadership. An election would most probably have led to the same result. Mr. Takeshita seemed to have forged a firm alliance with at least two other factions and put in his bag the votes necessary for a win.
How Mr. Takeshita will fare after taking over the reins of Government in 1987 is not so certain. He will be Japans first Prime Minister with a humble rural origin. A dichotomy in his nature shows through his record of teaching English in a junior high school and not trying to speak that language in public later. When he was the Minister of Finance, he gave the impression of an extremely cautious man with a reverence for consensus but challengingly titled a book on his ideas Going My Way. Mr. Takeshita says that continuing Mr. Nakasones programmes would be the basis of his policy. This is not saying enough. Japan faces two main issues, tax reforms and relations with United States. Mr. Nakasones plan to impose an indirect tax ran into effective opposition, and the friction with the U.S. over trade continues. Mr. Takeshita cannot be facing an easy future as Japans next leader and there is nothing to show yet that he will be drawing on secret reserves of dynamism.
The number of erstwhile Prime Ministers mentioned by name in the passage is
Solution:
The three Prime Ministers mentioned by name here are
Mr. Nakasone, Mr. Eisaku Sato and Mr. Kakue Tanaka.
Q.No: 115
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
An appropriate title for this passage might be
Solution:
The passage is basically about how ants communicate.
Q.No: 116
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
Attitudes of ants towards strangers of the same species may be categorized as
Solution:
Ants attack strangers who might belong to the same
species.
Q.No: 117
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The authors anecdotes of the inebriated ants would support all the following inductions except the statement that
Solution:
If they did so they would have been unable to
communicate with the drunken ants.
Q.No: 118
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
According to the passage, chloroform was less successful than alcohol for inhibiting communication because of
Solution:
Chloroform killed the ants.
Q.No: 119
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
The communities of ants are sometimes very large, numbering even up to 500, individuals: and it is a lesson to us that no one has ever yet seen quarrel between any two ants belonging to the same community. On the other hand, it must be admitted that they are in hostility not only with most other insects, including ants of different species, but even with those of the same species if belonging to different communities. I have over and over again introduced ants from one of my nests into another nest of the same species; and they were invariably attacked, seized by a leg or an antenna, and dragged out.
It is evident, therefore, that the ants of each community all recognize one another, which is very remarkable. But more than this, I several times divided a nest into two halves and found that even after separation of a year and nine months they recognize one another and were perfectly friendly, while they at once attacked ants from a different nest, although of the same species.
It has been suggested that the ant of each nest have some sign or password by which they recognize one another. To test this I made some of them insensible, first I tried chloroform; but this was fatal to them, and I did not consider the test satisfactory. I decided therefore to intoxicate them. This was less easy than I had expected. None of my ants would voluntarily degrade themselves by getting drunk. However, I got over the difficulty by putting them into whisky for a few moments. I took fifty specimens - - twenty five percent from one nest and twenty five percent from another made them dead drunk, market each with a spot of paint, and put them on a table close to where other ants from one the nests were feeding. The table was surrounded as usual with a moat of water to prevent them from straying. The ants, which were feeding, soon noticed those, which I had made drunk. They seemed quite astonished to find their comrades in such a disgraceful condition, and as much at a loss to know what to do with their drunkards as we were. After a while, however, they carried them all away; the strangers they took to the edge of the moat and dropped into the water, while they bore their friends home into the nest, where by degrees they slept off the effects of the spirits. Thus it is evident that they know their friends even when incapable of giving any sign or password.
Although the author is a scientist, his style of writing also exhibits a quality of
Solution:
The author has a playful, whimsical way of writing.
Q.No: 120
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
One of the type of radiations that cannot pass through the atmospheric windows without distortion is
Solution:
All others can pass through the atmospheric windows
without distortion.
Q.No: 121
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
One of the atmospheric effects earth based experiments that is not mentioned in the passage is
Solution:
Chloroform killed the ants.
Q.No: 122
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
The purpose of telescope mounting is to neutralize
Solution:
Telescope mounting is used to neutralize the Earths
rotation relative to the stars.
Q.No: 123
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
The precession period of Earth is
Solution:
The precession period of the Earth is 26,000 years.
Q.No: 124
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Gravitational action of the Sun and the Moon on Earth causes
I. diurnal spinning
II. Precession
III. Nutation
Solution:
The diurnal spinning is the spinning of the Earth on its
own axis, having no relation to the gravitational force
of the Sun or the Moon.
Q.No: 125
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
The orbital motion of the Earth
Solution:
The last passage states that there can be uncertainty
in the rate of orbital motion of the Earth.
Q.No: 126
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
Compared with other experimental sciences, astronomy has certain limitations. First, apart from meteorites, the Moon, and the nearer planets, the objects of study are inaccessible and cannot be manipulated, although nature sometimes provides special conditions, such as eclipses and other temporary effects. The astronomer must content himself with studying radiation emitted or reflected from celestial bodies.
Second, from the Earths surface these are viewed through a thick atmosphere that completely absorbs most radiation except within certain windows, wavelength regions in which the radiation can pass through the atmosphere relatively freely in the optical, near-infrared, and radio bands of the electromagnetic spectrum; and even in these windows the atmosphere has considerable effects. For light, these atmospheric effects are as follows: (1) some absorption that dims the radiation somewhat, even in a clear sky; (2) refraction, which causes slight shift in the direction so that the object appears in a slightly different place; (3) scintillation (twinkling); i.e., fluctuations in brightness of effectively point like sources such as stars, fluctuations that are, however, averaged out for objects with larger images, such as planets (the ionosphere, an ionized layer high in the atmosphere, and interplanetary medium have similar effects on radio sources); (4) image movement because of atmospheric turbulence (bad seeing) spreads the image of a tiny point over an angle of nearly one arc second or more on the celestial sphere (one arc second equals 1/3, 600 degrees); and (5) background light from the night sky. The obscuring effects of the atmosphere and its clouds are reduced by placing observing stations on mountains, preferably in desert regions (e.g., southern California and Chile), and away from city lights. The effects are eliminated by observing from high-altitude aircraft, balloons, rockets, space probes, and artificial satellites. From stations all or most of the atmosphere, gamma rays and X-rays-that is, high-energy radiation at extremely short wave-lengths and far-ultraviolet rays and far-infrared radiation, all completely absorbed by the atmosphere at ground level observatories can be measured, At radio wave-lengths between about one centimeter and 20 meters, the atmosphere (even when cloudy) has little effect, and man-made radio signals are the chief interference.
Third, the Earth is a spinning, shifting, and wobbling platform. Spin on its axis causes alternation of day and night and an apparent rotation of the celestial sphere with stars moving from east to west. Ground based telescopes use a mounting that makes it possible to neutralize the rotation of Earth relative to the stars; with an equatorial mounting driven at a proper speed, the direction of the telescope tube can be kept constant for hours while the Earth turns under the mounting. Large radio telescopes usually have vertical and horizontal axes (altazimuth mounting), with their pointing continuously controlled by a computer.
In addition to the daily spin, there are much more gradual effects, called precession and nutation. Gravitational action of the Sun and Moon on the Earths equatorial bulge causes the Earths axis to process like a top or gyroscope, gradually tracing out a circle on the celestial sphere in about 26,000 years, and also to nutate or wobble slightly in a period of 18.6 years. The Earths rotation and orbital motion provide the basic standard of directions of stars, so that uncertainties in the rate of these motions can lead to quite small but important uncertainties in measurements of stellar movements.
The man-made radio signals have wave-lengths of
Solution:
Man made signals can interfere with the radio
wavelengths between 1cm. And 20m. implying that
they also fall in the same range.
Q.No: 127
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Following World War II, which problem was the United States most concerned with regarding Latin America?
Solution:
US was more concerned with order than with reforms
of any kind.
Q.No: 128
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
A key reason why Latin Americans rejected the Inter-American development Bank was that
Solution:
Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism.
Q.No: 129
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following is most closely associated with the concept of a Marshall Plan for Latin America?
Solution:
The Act of Bogota was most closely related to the
Marshall Plan or Latin America.
Q.No: 130
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
According to the passage, the fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy directed towards Latin America
Solution:
US preferred dictatorship to the spread of communism
in Latin America.
Q.No: 131
Test Name : CAT Paper 1994
Q101 to 150: Each passage in this part is followed by questions based upon its contents. Read the passage carefully and choose the best answer for each question.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
If American policy towards Europe in the postwar years had been a conspicuous success, and towards Asia a disappointing balance between success and failure, it could be said that the most conspicuous thing about relations with Latin America was the absence of any policy. Franklin Roosevelt, to be sure, had launched a Good Neighbour policy, but being a good neighbour was, it seemed, a negative rather than a positive affair, a matter of keeping hands off, of making the Monroe Doctrine, in form at least, multilateral. All through the postwar years, the states of Latin America - - Mexico and Chile were partial exceptions - - were in the throes of major economic and social crises. Population was growing faster than in any other part of the globe, without a comparable increase in wealth or productivity; the gap between the poor and the rich was widening; and as the rich and powerful turned to the military for the preservation of order and privilege, the poor turned to revolution.
Deeply involved in other quarters of the globe, the United States paid little attention to the fortunes or misfortunes of her neighbours to the south, and when she did intervene, it appeared to be on the side of order and the status quo rather than on the side of reform. So frightened was the United States of Communism in Latin America that it preferred military dictatorship to reformers who might drift too far to the left, and sustained a Batista in Cuba, a Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, a Peron in Argentina, and a Jimenez in Venezuela.
In his last two years, President Eisenhower had tried to mend his Latin American fences. Though rejecting a Brazilian proposal of a Marshall Plan for Latin America, he did take the initiative in setting up an Inter-American development Bank with a capital of one billion dollars, almost half of it supplied by the United States. Other government investments in Latin America ran to some four million dollars, while private investments exceeded nine billion. Yet though to most Americans, all this seemed a form of economic aid, many Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism. In September 1960, came a co-operative plan that could not be regarded as other than enlightened: the Act of Bogota, which authorized a grant of half a billion dollars to subsidize not only economic but social and educational progress in Latin America. We are not saints, said President Eisenhower when he visited Santiago de Chile, We know we make mistakes, but our heart is in the right place.
But was it? President Kennedy was confronted by the same dilemma that had perplexed his predecessors. Clearly it was essential to provide a large-scale aid to the countries south of Rio Grande, but should this aid go to bolster up established regimes and thus help maintain status quo, or should it be used to speed up social reforms, even at the risk of revolt? As early as 1958, the then Senator Kennedy had asserted that the objective of our aid program in Latin America should not be to purchase allies, but to consolidate a free and democratic Western Hemisphere, alleviating those conditions which might foster opportunities for communistic infiltration and uniting our peoples on the basis of constantly increasing living standards.
This conviction that raising the standards of living was the best method of checking Communism now inspired President Kennedys bold proposal for the creation of the alliance for progress - - a ten year plan designed to do for Latin America what Marshall Plan had done for Western Europe. It was to be a peaceful revolution on a hemispheric scale, a vast co-operative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of the American people for homes, work, land, health and schools. To achieve this, the United States pleaded an initial grant of one billion dollars, with the promise of additional billions for the future.
Which of the following statements is not true?
Solution:
The Presidents initiative to present financial economic
aid to Latin America has been presented as an example
of his efforts to mend his Latin Ameriacn fences.
Thus he was not acting to continue to keep communism
from intruding the country.
Q.No: 132
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The Republican Party has lost its mind. To win elections, a party obviously needs votes and constituencies. However first, it needs an idea. In 1994-95, the Republican Party had after a long struggle advanced a coherent, compelling set of political ideas expressed in a specific legislative agenda. The political story of 1996 is that this same party, within the space of six weeks, became totally, shockingly intellectually deranged.
Think back. The singular achievement of the House Speaker Newt Gingrich's 1994 revolution was that it swept into power united behind one comprehensive ideological goal: dismantling the welfare state. Just about anything in the contract with America and the legislative agenda of the 104th Congress is a mere subheading: welfare reform, tax cuts, entitlement reform, returning power to the states, the balanced budget (a supremely powerful means for keeping the growth of government in check).
The central Republican idea was that the individual, the family, the church, the schools civil society were being systematically usurped and strangled by the federal behemoth Republicans who were riding into Washington to slay it.
With this idea they met Clinton head-on in late 1995. And although they were tactically defeated the government shutdown proved a disaster for Republicans they won philosophically. Clinton conceded all their principles. He finally embraced their seven year balanced budget. Then, in a State of the Union speech that might have been delivered by a moderate Republican, he declared, "The era of Big Government is over," the dominant theme of the Gingrich Revolution.
It seems so long ago. Because then, astonishingly, on the very morrow of their philosophical victory, just as the Republicans prepared to carry these ideas into battle in November, came cannon fire from the rear. The first Republican renegade to cry Wrong! and charge was Steve Forbes. With his free-lunch, tax-cutting flat tax, he declared the balanced budget, the centrepiece of the Republican revolution, unnecessary. Then, no sooner had the Forbes mutiny been put down then Pat Buchanan declared a general insurrection. He too declared war on the party's central ideology in the name not supply side theory but of class welfare, the Democratic weapon of choice against Republicanism.
The enemy, according to Buchanan, is not the welfare state. It is that conservative icon, capitalism, with its ruthless captains of industry, greedy financiers and political elite (Republicans included, of course). All three groups collaborate to let foreigners immigrants, traders, parasitic foreign-aid loafers destroy the good life of the ordinary American worker.
Buchananism holds that what is killing the little guy in America is the Big Guy, not Big Government. It blames not an overreaching government that tries to insulate citizens from life's buffeting to the point where it creates deeply destructive dependency, but an uncaring government that does not protect its victim-people enough from that buffeting. Buchanan would protect and wield a mighty government apparatus to do so, government that builds trade walls and immigrant repelling fences, that imposes punitive taxes on imports, that policies the hiring and firing practices of business with the arrogance of the most zealous affirmative action enforcer.
This is Reaganism standing on its head. Republicans have focused too much on the mere technical dangers posed by this assault. Yes, it gives ammunition to the Democrats. Yes, it puts the eventual nominee through a bruising campaign and delivers him tarnished and drained into the ring against Bill Clinton.
But the real danger is philosophical, not tactical. It is axioms, not just policies, that are under fire. The Republican idea of smaller government is being proud to dust by Republicans. In the middle of an election year, when they should be honing their themes against Democratic liberalism, Buchanan's rise is forcing a pointless rearguard battle against a philosophical corpse, the obsolete Palaeo conservatism a mix of nativism, protectionism and isolationism of the 1930s.
As the candidates' debate in Arizona last week showed, the entire primary campaign will be fought on Buchanan's grounds, fending off his Smoot-Hawley-Franco populism. And then what? After the convention, what does the nominee do? Try to resurrect the anti-welfare state themes of the historically successful 1994 congressional campaign? Well, yes, but with a terrible loss of energy and focus and support. Buchanan's constituency, by then convinced by their leader that the working man's issues have been pushed aside, may simply walk on election day or, even worse, defect to the Democrats. After all, Democrats fight class war very well.
Political parties can survive bruising primary battles. They cannot survive ideological meltdown. Dole and Buchanan say they are fighting for the heart and soul of the Republican Party, heart and soul, however, will get you nowhere when you've lost your way and your mind.
The Republican Party has lost its mind. To win elections, a party obviously needs votes and constituencies. However first, it needs an idea. In 1994-95, the Republican Party had after a long struggle advanced a coherent, compelling set of political ideas expressed in a specific legislative agenda. The political story of 1996 is that this same party, within the space of six weeks, became totally, shockingly intellectually deranged.
Think back. The singular achievement of the House Speaker Newt Gingrich's 1994 revolution was that it swept into power united behind one comprehensive ideological goal: dismantling the welfare state. Just about anything in the contract with America and the legislative agenda of the 104th Congress is a mere subheading: welfare reform, tax cuts, entitlement reform, returning power to the states, the balanced budget (a supremely powerful means for keeping the growth of government in check).
The central Republican idea was that the individual, the family, the church, the schools civil society were being systematically usurped and strangled by the federal behemoth Republicans who were riding into Washington to slay it.
With this idea they met Clinton head-on in late 1995. And although they were tactically defeated the government shutdown proved a disaster for Republicans they won philosophically. Clinton conceded all their principles. He finally embraced their seven year balanced budget. Then, in a State of the Union speech that might have been delivered by a moderate Republican, he declared, "The era of Big Government is over," the dominant theme of the Gingrich Revolution.
It seems so long ago. Because then, astonishingly, on the very morrow of their philosophical victory, just as the Republicans prepared to carry these ideas into battle in November, came cannon fire from the rear. The first Republican renegade to cry Wrong! and charge was Steve Forbes. With his free-lunch, tax-cutting flat tax, he declared the balanced budget, the centrepiece of the Republican revolution, unnecessary. Then, no sooner had the Forbes mutiny been put down then Pat Buchanan declared a general insurrection. He too declared war on the party's central ideology in the name not supply side theory but of class welfare, the Democratic weapon of choice against Republicanism.
The enemy, according to Buchanan, is not the welfare state. It is that conservative icon, capitalism, with its ruthless captains of industry, greedy financiers and political elite (Republicans included, of course). All three groups collaborate to let foreigners immigrants, traders, parasitic foreign-aid loafers destroy the good life of the ordinary American worker.
Buchananism holds that what is killing the little guy in America is the Big Guy, not Big Government. It blames not an overreaching government that tries to insulate citizens from life's buffeting to the point where it creates deeply destructive dependency, but an uncaring government that does not protect its victim-people enough from that buffeting. Buchanan would protect and wield a mighty government apparatus to do so, government that builds trade walls and immigrant repelling fences, that imposes punitive taxes on imports, that policies the hiring and firing practices of business with the arrogance of the most zealous affirmative action enforcer.
This is Reaganism standing on its head. Republicans have focused too much on the mere technical dangers posed by this assault. Yes, it gives ammunition to the Democrats. Yes, it puts the eventual nominee through a bruising campaign and delivers him tarnished and drained into the ring against Bill Clinton.
But the real danger is philosophical, not tactical. It is axioms, not just policies, that are under fire. The Republican idea of smaller government is being proud to dust by Republicans. In the middle of an election year, when they should be honing their themes against Democratic liberalism, Buchanan's rise is forcing a pointless rearguard battle against a philosophical corpse, the obsolete Palaeo conservatism a mix of nativism, protectionism and isolationism of the 1930s.
As the candidates' debate in Arizona last week showed, the entire primary campaign will be fought on Buchanan's grounds, fending off his Smoot-Hawley-Franco populism. And then what? After the convention, what does the nominee do? Try to resurrect the anti-welfare state themes of the historically successful 1994 congressional campaign? Well, yes, but with a terrible loss of energy and focus and support. Buchanan's constituency, by then convinced by their leader that the working man's issues have been pushed aside, may simply walk on election day or, even worse, defect to the Democrats. After all, Democrats fight class war very well.
Political parties can survive bruising primary battles. They cannot survive ideological meltdown. Dole and Buchanan say they are fighting for the heart and soul of the Republican Party, heart and soul, however, will get you nowhere when you've lost your way and your mind.
What, according to the author, is the real danger for Republicans?
Solution:
The real danger to the Republicans is the fact that its
axioms, and not its policies, are under fire. Refer ninth
paragraph line 1.
Q.No: 133
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
According to the author, one of the greatest attractions of the weather is that
Solution:
The greatest attractions of weather, for the author, is
that it is apolitical.
Q.No: 134
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
What is most probably the physical position of the author of the passage?
Solution:
The author is watching the weather channel, thus he is
in his house.
Q.No: 135
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
Icicles two metres long and, at their tips, as bright and sharp as needles hang from the caves: wild ice stalactites, dragon's teeth. I peer through them to see the world transformed to abstract. Little snow tornadoes twirl across the blank. The car is out there somewhere, represented by a subtle bump in the snow-field. The old geep truck, a larger beast, is up to its door handles, like a sinking remnant: dinosaur yielding to ice age. The town's behemoth snow-plow passes on the road, dome light twirling, and casts aside a frozen doe that now lies, neck broken, upon the roadside snow-bank, soon to vanish under the snowfall still to come.
There is double-jointed consciousness at work in the dramatics of big weather. Down in the snowstorm, we are as mortal as the deer. I sink to my waist in a drift; I panic, my arms claw for an instant, like a drowning swimmer's, in the powder. Men up and down the storm collapse with coronaries, snow shovels in their hands, cheeks turned into a deathly colour, like frost-bitten plums.
Yet when we go upstairs to consult the Weather Channel, we settle down, as cosy gods do, to hover high above the earth and watch the play with a divine perspective. Moist air labelled L for low rides up the continent from the Gulf of Mexico and collides with the high that has slid down from the North Pole. And thus is whipped up the egg-white fluff on the studio map that, down in the frozen, messy world, buries mortals.
An odd new metaphysics of weather: It is not that weather has necessarily grown more apocalyptic. The famous Winter of the Blue Snow of 1886-87 turned rivers of the American West into glaciers that when they thawed, carried along inundation of dead cattle. President Theodore Roosevelt was virtually ruined as a rancher by the weather that destroyed 65 per cent of his herd. In 1811 Mississippi river flowed briefly because of the New Madrid earthquake.
What's new in America is the theatre of it. Television does not create weather; any more than it creates contemporary politics. However, the ritual ceremonies of televised weather have endowed a subject often previously banal with an amazing life as mass entertainment, nationwide interactive preoccupation and a kind of immense performance art.
What we have is weather as electronic American Shintoism, a casual but almost mystic daily religion, wherein nature is not inert but restless, stirring alive with kinetic fronts and meanings and turbulent expectations (forecasts, variables, prophecies). We have installed an elaborate priesthood and technology of interpretation: acolytes and satellites preside over snow and circuses. At least major snowstorms have about them an innocence and moral neutrality that is more refreshing than the last national television spectacle, the O. J. Simpson trial.
One attraction is the fact that these large gestures of nature are political. The weather in the mirabilis mode can, of course, be dragged onto the opened page to start a macro-argument about global warning or a micro-spat over a mayor's fecklessness in deploying snowplows. Otherwise, traumas of weather do not admit of political interpretation. The snow Shinto reintroduces an element of what is almost charmingly uncontrollable in life. And, as shown last week, surprising, even as the priests predict it. This is welcome a kind of ideological relief- in a rather stupidly politicised society living under the delusion that everything in life (and death) is arguable, political and therefore manipulable from diet to DNA. None of the old earthbound Marxist Who-Whom here in meteorology, but rather sky gods that bang around at higher altitudes and leave the earth in its misery, to submit to the sloppy collateral damage.
The moral difference of weather, even when destructive, is somehow stimulating. Why? The sheer levelling force is pleasing. It overrides routine and organises people into a shared moment that will become a punctuating memory in their lives (Lord, remember the blizzard in 1996?).
Or perhaps one's reaction is no more complicated than a child's delight in dramatic disruption. Anyone loves to stand on the beach with a hurricane coming a darkly lashing Byronism in surf and wind gets the blood up. The God's, or child's, part of the mind welcomes big weather floods and blizzards. The coping, grown-up human part curses it, and sinks.
The paradox of big weather, it makes people feel important even while it, dramatises their insignificance. In some ways, extreme weather is a brief moral equivalent of war as stimulating as war can sometimes be, through without most of the carnage.
The sun rises upon diamond-scattered snow-fields and glistens upon the lucent dragon's teeth. In the distance, three deer, roused from their shelter under pines, venture forth. They struggle and plunge undulously through the opulent white.
Upstairs, I switch on the Shinto Weather Channel and the priests at the map show me the next wave white swirls and eddies over Indiana, heading ominously east.
Which of the following is not true of the weather?
Solution:
The weather is not manipulable.
Q.No: 136
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Which of the following, according to the author, is true?
Solution:
The second form of socialism involves all the difficulties
of the first one and much more.
Q.No: 137
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
According to the author, the difference between the two kinds of socialists is that
Solution:
The difference is in their attitude towards change.
Q.No: 138
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Which of the following were characteristics of St. Just and Robespierre?
Solution:
Both have been mentioned as the characteristics of the
two persons.
Q.No: 139
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Which of the following according to the author, may not be the result of not verifying the desirability of socialism experimentally first?
Solution:
Corruption in high places has not been mentioned in the
passage.
Q.No: 140
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
According to the philosophy of revolutionary socialism,
Solution:
The aim of the revolutionary socialism is to substitute the
new rule for the old one at one stroke.
Q.No: 141
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
Among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. There are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of Owen, of Fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. The other class, which is more a product of the continent than of Great Britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, has people who propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. Their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. And with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody on their behalf, should take possession of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.
Whatever may be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. The former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. It can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. It need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. It is not so with the other; the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. It must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and the recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which Robespierre and St. Just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. Nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do, it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.
It may be inferred from the passage that the author's sympathies are for
Solution:
The author does not symapthize with either of the two
sides.
Q.No: 142
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
A suitable title for the passage would be
Solution:
The author has tried to defend philosophy in the passage.
Q.No: 143
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Which of the following is true, keeping the passage in mind?
Solution:
The passage states that philosophy is politely respected
but secretly despised.
Q.No: 144
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Which of the following is not a charge against philosophy?
Solution:
Philosophy has not been said to be immoral
Q.No: 145
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Which of the following is not mentioned as a function of philosophy in the passage?
Solution:
Philosophy has not been mentioned as being responsible
for making the world a better place to live in.
Q.No: 146
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Why according to the passage, would the politicians be happy if philosophy did not exist?
Solution:
If philosophy did not exist, masses would not think for
themselves, and would thus be easier to manipulate for
the politicians.
Q.No: 147
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
The word 'chairs', in the context of the passage, means
Solution:
'Chairs at the universities' refers to the departments at
the universities.
Q.No: 148
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
Whatever philosophy may be, it is in the world and must relate to it. It breaks through the shell of the world in order to move into the infinite. But it turns back in order to find in the finite its always unique historical foundation. It pushes into the furthest horizons beyond being-in-the-world in order to experience the present in the eternal. But even the profoundest meditation acquires its meaning by relating back to man's existence here and now. Philosophy glimpses the highest criteria, the starry heaven of the possible, and seeks in the light of the seemingly impossible the way to man's dignity in the phenomenon of his empirical existence. Philosophy addresses itself to individuals. It creates a free community of those who rely on each other in their will for truth. Into this community the philosophic man would like to enter. It is there in the world all the time, but cannot become a worldly institution without losing freedom of its truth. He cannot know whether he belongs to it. No authority decides on his acceptance. He wants to live in his thinking in such a way as to make his acceptance possible. But how does the world relate to philosophy? There are chairs of philosophy at the universities. Nowadays they are an embarrassment. Philosophy is politely respected because of tradition, but despised in secret. The general opinion is: it has nothing of importance to say. Neither has it any practical value. It is named in public but does it really exist? Its existence is proved at least by the defence measures it provokes. We can see this in the form of comments like: Philosophy is too complicated. I don't understand it. It's beyond me. It's something for professionals. I have no gift for it. Therefore it doesn't concern me. But that is like saying : I don't need to bother work or scholarship without thinking or questioning its meaning, and, for the rest, have opinions and be content with that. The defence becomes fanatical. A benighted vital instinct hates philosophy. It is dangerous. If I understood it I would have to change my life. I would find myself in another frame of mind, see everything in a different light, have to judge anew. Better now think philosophically! Then come the accusers, who want to replace the obsolete philosophy by something new and totally different. It is mistrusted as the utterly mendacious end product of a bankrupt theology. The meaninglessness of philosophical propositions is made fun of. Philosophy is denounced as the willing handmaiden of political and other powers. For many politicians, their wretched trade would be easier if philosophy did not exist at all. Masses and functionaries are easier to manipulate when they do not think but only have a regimented intelligence. People must be prevented from becoming serious. Therefore, it is better for philosophy to be boring. Let the chairs of philosophy rot. The more piffle is taught, the sooner people will be blinkered against the light of philosophy. Thus philosophy is surrounded by enemies, most of whom are not conscious of being such. Bourgeois complacency, conventionality, the satisfactions of economic prosperity, the appreciation of science only for its technical achievements, the absolute will to power, the bonhomie of politicians, the fanaticism of ideologies, the literary self-assertiveness of talented writers in all these things people parade their anti-philosophy. They do not notice it because they do not realise what they are doing. They are unaware that their anti-philosophy is in itself a philosophy, but a perverted one, and that this anti-philosophy, if elucidated, would annihilate itself.
According to the author, the existence of philosophy is proved by
Solution:
The existence of philosophy is proved by the defence
measures it provokes.
Q.No: 149
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
In which way does the author find the film inferior to the original book?
Solution:
The author says that at least the book had a convincing
villain.
Q.No: 150
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
The passage is most probably
Solution:
The passage is obviously talking about a film review.
Q.No: 151
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Which of the following does the author say of the film?
Solution:
The author praises the film for its technical effects and
sophistication at the technological level, but is
disappointed with its story line.
Q.No: 152
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
The writer's opinion of the film Jurassic Park may be said to be
Solution:
The writer says, one leaves it vaguely disappointed.
Q.No: 153
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Why according to the author, should we thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park, even though they may not be very good aesthetically?
Solution:
He is thankful for such films because they fill the cinemas,
and this leads people to continue financing films.
Q.No: 154
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
According to the author, Jurassic Park
Solution:
The author finds it neither frightening nor amusing.
Q.No: 155
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
Even if we're a bit snooty about them, we should go down on our knees and thank heaven for movies like Jurassic Park and directors like Steven Spielberg who make them. They fill the cinemas, if only because the hype is virtually irresistible. And because they do so, hundreds of maniacs all over the world continue to finance films. But is this is an example of a worldwide jackpot movie? Yes and no. Yes, because it delivers dinosaurs by the dozen, in as weird a fashion as have been seen on the screen before. And no, because the accompanying story, courtesy Michael Crichton, has little of the real imagination that made Spielberg's ET and Close Encounters into the jackpot movies of their time. Technically, it works like a dream but, as a cinematic dream, it's unmemorable. This may be because of its cardboard human characters, dwarfed by the assemblage of their prehistoric ancestors and serviced by a screenplay that makes the abortive mating calls of this weirdly asexual zoo seem eloquent in comparison. What kind of park is this?, enquiries Sam Neil. Oh, it's right up your alley, says Richard Attenborough. More likely, though it has something to do with the development of the story which at no point engages us properly on the human level, except perhaps to hope that the kids and Neil's grumpy scientist who learns to love them will finally escape from the grasp of the velociraptors chasing them. We're looking at nothing but stunts, and they get tiresome laid end to end. Crichton's book was scarcely much better but at least it had a convincing villain in John Hammond, Jurassic Park's billionaire developer, whereas Attenborough's approximation seems merely enthusiastically misguided. And Crichton's warning of what might happen if we muck about with nature becomes weaker in the film. What we actually have in Jurassic Park is a non-animated Disney epic with affiliations to Jaws which seems to amuse and frighten but succeeds in doing neither well enough to count. Its real interest lies in how Spielberg's obsession with childhood now manifests itself in his middle age. It looks like being on automatic pilot gestural rather than totally convinced but determined to remain the subject of analytical study. The whole thing, of course, is perfectly adequate fun once the ludicrously simplistic explanation of DNA has been traversed in Hammond's costly futuristic, computerised den. Even I could understand it. Thereafter, the theme park's creaky inability to deal with an ordinary old typhoon as its VIPs travel around hoping the investment will work, leads to predictable disasters, proficiently worked out but never truly frightening. But then this is a film for children of all ages, except perhaps those under 12, and one shouldn't expect sophistication on other than the technological level. Jurassic Park is more of a roller-coaster ride than a piece of real cinema. It delivers, but only on a certain plane. Even the breaking of the barriers between our civilization and a monstrous past doesnt have the kick it could have had.
Possibly one is asking for a different film which in the end would not have appealed across the box-office spectrum as well as this obviously does. But still one leaves it vaguely disappointed. All that work and just a mouse that roars. It's wonderful story, but told with more efficiency than inspiration possibly a sign of the times, along with the merchandising spree which follows it so readily.
The phrase 'muck about', in the context of the passage, means
Solution:
'Muck about with nature' implies 'interfere with nature'.
Q.No: 156
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The word 'pundit', in the context of the passage, means
Solution:
'Pundit' in the passage means an expert.
Q.No: 157
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
What was the main problem facing the new cabinet?
Solution:
The problem the new cabinet faced was of the foreign
exchange market. Refer first line paragraph fourth.
Q.No: 158
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
Who, according to the passage, is the leader of the Labour Party?
Solution:
Neil Kinnock has been mentioned as being the leader of
the Labour Party. Refer first line paragraph third.
Q.No: 159
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
What, according to the treasury secretary, was the only way out of the exchange problem?
Solution:
The only way out was to raise the interest rates by at
least 2 per cent. Refer fifth paragraph line 6.
Q.No: 160
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
It may be inferred from the passage that
Solution:
We can infer that the Bank of England could exert
enormous pressure on the government in its policy
formulation.
Q.No: 161
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
Why did Kinnock ask Smith to attend the Bank of England meeting without him?
Solution:
He wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and to
consult his own advisors.
Q.No: 162
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
Why, according to the author, was the realignment conference not a viable option for the government?
Solution:
It was not clear if the other countries would follow the
lead, hence realignment was not a viable option.
Q.No: 163
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
Which of the following do not belong to the Labour cabinet?
Solution:
Maastricht has not been mentioned as part of the Labour
cabinet.
Q.No: 164
Test Name : CAT Paper 1995
Direction for questions 101 to 150: This section contains passages followed by questions based upon the content of the passages. Read the passages and select the best option for the answers.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour's lead in the days before the general election which pointed to a hung parliament many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in mind. There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustered.
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound's parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different?
The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion around a sixth of its total reserves to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England led the deputation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith's first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postponed.
Smith listened to Eddie George number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain's reserves would have run out by the following weekend. The markets needed decisive action. And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weekend. Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reversed. The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England's ham fisted intervention almost designed to manufacture a run on the pound. In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister.
In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line.
The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalued. But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weekend. And it was not clear if the pound would be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lead. Not only might Britain have to devalue alone, it might not secure a devaluation large enough to make a difference; and be accompanied by higher interest rates.
What, according to the passage, was not a reason for the defeat of the Conservative Party?
Solution:
The wrong policies have not been mentioned as a reason
for the defeat of the Conservative Party.
Q.No: 165
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
The reason that children have to be taught that stealing a pin is wrong is that
Solution:
Pins are so cheap that a child stealing it would not even
feel that he is actually stealing something.
Q.No: 166
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
A suitable title to the passage would be
Solution:
Pins are so cheap that a child stealing it would not even
feel that he is actually stealing something.
Q.No: 167
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
Why do you think that the author gives the example of Adam Smith?
Solution:
The author feels that Adam Smith boasted about
something that was actually undesirable.
Q.No: 168
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
Which of the following is true as far as pins are concerned?
Solution:
It takes much less time to make pins by machines today.
Q.No: 169
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
It may be inferred from the passage that the author
Solution:
The author is clearly against machines taking the place
of men.
Q.No: 170
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
Which of the following is not against the modern capitalistic system of mass production?
Solution:
Adam Smith was a supporter of mass production.
Q.No: 171
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
Goldsmith's dictum, "wealth accumulates, and men decay," in the context of the passage, probably means
Solution:
The statement means that as people get richer they lose
out on individual abilities.
Q.No: 172
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
When the author says that a woman now is likely to know about any connection between sheep and clothes, he is probably being
Solution:
He is attacking this fact by making fun of it.
Q.No: 173
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
I want to stress this personal helplessness we are all stricken with in the face of a system that has passed beyond our knowledge and control. To bring it nearer home, I propose that we switch off from the big things like empires and their wars to more familiar little things. Take pins for example! I do not know why it is that I so seldom use a pin when my wife cannot get on without boxes of them at hand; but it is so; and I will therefore take pins as being for some reason specially important to women.
There was a time when pinmakers would buy the material; shape it; make the head and the point; ornament it; and take it to the market, and sell it and the making required skill in several operations. They not only knew how the thing was done from beginning to end, but could do it all by themselves. But they could not afford to sell you a paper of pins for the farthing. Pins cost so much that a woman's dress allowance was calling pin money
By the end of the 18th century Adam Smith boasted that it took 18 men to make a pin, each man doing a little bit of the job and passing the pin on to the next, and none of them being able to make a whole pin or to buy the materials or to sell it when it was made. The most you could say for them was that at least they had some idea of how it was made, though they could not make it. Now as this meant that they were clearly less capable and knowledgeable men than the old pin-makers, you may ask why Adam Smith boasted of it as a triumph of civilisation when its effect had so clearly a degrading effect. The reason was that by setting each man to do just one little bit of the work and nothing but that, over and over again, he became very quick at it. The men, it is said, could turn out nearly 5000 pins a day each; and thus pins became plentiful and cheap. The country was supposed to be richer because it had more pins, though it had turned capable men into mere machines doing their work without intelligence and being fed by the spare food of the capitalist just as an engine is fed with coals and oil. That was why the poet Goldsmith, who was a farsighted economist as well as a poet, complained that 'wealth accumulates, and men decay'.
Nowadays Adam Smith's 18 men are as extinct as the diplodocus. The 18 flesh-and-blood men have been replaced by machines of steel which spout out pins by the hundred million. Even sticking them into pink papers is done by machinery. The result is that with the exception of a few people who design the machines, nobody knows how to make a pin or how a pin is made: that is to say, the modern worker in pin manufacture need not be one-tenth so intelligent, skilful and accomplished as the old pinmaker; and the only compensation we have for this deterioration is that pins are so cheap that a single pin has no expressible value at all. Even with a big profit stuck on to the cost-price you can buy dozens for a farthing; and pins are so recklessly thrown away and wasted that verses have to be written to persuade children (without success) that it is a sin to steal, if even its a pin
Many serious thinkers, like John Ruskin and William Morris, have been greatly troubled by this, just as Goldsmith was, and have asked whether we really believe that it is an advance in wealth to lose our skill and degrade our workers for the sake of being able to waste pins by the ton. We shall see later on, when we come Page 10 CAT 1996 Actual Paper to consider the Distribution of Leisure, that the cure for this is not to go back to the old free for higher work than pin-making or the like. But in the meantime the fact remains that the workers are now not able to make anything themselves even in little bits. They are ignorant and helpless, and cannot lift their finger to begin their day's work until it has all been arranged for them by their employer's who themselves do not understand the machines they buy, and simply pay other people to set them going by carrying out the machine maker's directions.
The same is true for clothes. Earlier the whole work of making clothes, from the shearing of the sheep to the turning out of the finished and washed garment ready to put on, had to be done in the country by the men and women of the household, especially the women; so that to this day an unmarried woman is called a spinster. Nowadays nothing is left of all this but the sheep shearing; and even that, like the milking of cows, is being done by machinery, as the sewing is. Give a woman a sheep today and ask her to produce a woollen dress for you; and not only will she be quite unable to do it, but you are likely to find that she is not even aware of any connection between sheep and clothes. When she gets her clothes, which she does by buying them at the shop, she knows that there is a difference between wool and cotton and silk, between flannel and merino, perhaps even between stockinet and other wefts; but as to how they are made, or what they are made of, or how they came to be in the shop ready for her to buy, she knows hardly anything. And the shop assistant from whom she buys is no wiser. The people engaged in the making of them know even less; for many of them are too poor to have much choice of materials when they buy their own clothes.
Thus the capitalist system has produced an almost universal ignorance of how things are made and done, whilst at the same time it has caused them to be made and done on a gigantic scale. We have to buy books and encyclopaedias to find out what it is we are doing all day; and as the books are written by people who are not doing it, and who get their information from other books, what they tell us is twenty to fifty years out of date knowledge and almost impractical today. And of course most of us are too tired of our work when we come home to want to read about it; what we need is cinema to take our minds off it and feel our imagination.
It is a funny place, this word of capitalism, with its astonishing spread of education and enlightenment. There stand the thousands of property owners and the millions of wage workers, none of them able to make anything, none of them knowing what to do until somebody tells them, none of them having the least notion of how it is made that they find people paying them money, and things in the shops to buy with it. And when they travel they are surprised to find that savages and Esquimaux and villagers who have to make everything for themselves are more intelligent and resourceful! The wonder would be if they were anything else. We should die of idiocy through disuse of our mental faculties if we did not fill our heads with romantic nonsense out of illustrated newspapers and novels and plays and films. Such stuff keeps us alive, but it falsifies everything for us so absurdly that it leaves us more or less dangerous lunatics in the real world.
Excuse my going on like this; but as I am a writer of books and plays myself, I know the folly and peril of it better than you do. And when I see that this moment of our utmost ignorance and helplessness, delusion and folly, has been stumbled on by the blind forces of capitalism as the moment for giving votes to everybody, so that the few wise women are hopelessly overruled by the thousands whose political minds, as far as they can be said to have any political minds at all, have been formed in the cinema, I realise that I had better stop writing plays for a while to discuss political and social realities in this book with those who are intelligent enough to listen to me.
Which of the following can be a suitable first line to introduce the hypothetical next paragraph at the end of the passage?
Solution:
None of the given statements continue with what the
author has said in the last paragraph.
Q.No: 174
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
It may be inferred that the passage was written
Solution:
The passage refers to the British Government as the
'Empire', and talks about the way it takes over foreign
territories.
Q.No: 175
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
According to the author, the habit of plundering the strangers
Solution:
The author says that simple tribes are often friendly and
honest.
Q.No: 176
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Which of the following may be called the main complaint of the author?
Solution:
He says that the civilized empire grows at the expense
of the home tax payers, without any intention or approval
on their parts.
Q.No: 177
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Why do the capitalistic traders prefer the uncivilized countries to the civilized ones?
Solution:
Civilized countries practise protection, which means there
is an imposition of heavy taxes on imported goods.
Q.No: 178
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
The word 'officious', in the context of the passage, means
Solution:
'Officious' means 'self-important'.
Q.No: 179
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
Now let us turn back to inquire whether sending our capital abroad, and consenting to be taxed to pay emigration fares to get rid of the women and men who are left without employment in consequence, is all that capitalism can do when our employers, who act for our capitalists in industrial affairs, and are more or less capitalists themselves in the earlier stages of capitalistic development, find that they can sell no more of their goods at a profit, or indeed at all, in their own country.
Clearly they cannot send abroad the capital they have already invested, because it has all been eaten up by the workers, leaving in its place factories and railways and mines and the like; and these cannot be packed into a ship's hold and sent to Africa. It is only the freshly saved capital that can be sent out of the country. This, as we have seen, does go abroad in heaps of finished products. But the British land held by him on long lease, must, when once he has sold all the goods at home that his British customers can afford to buy, either shut up his works until the customers have worn out their stock of what they have bought, which would bankrupt him (for the landlord will not wait), or else sell his superfluous goods somewhere else; that is, he must send them abroad. Now it is not easy to send them to civilized countries, because they practise Protection, which means that they impose heavy taxes (customs duties) on foreign goods. Uncivilized countries, without Protection, and inhabited by natives to whom gaudy calicoes and cheap showy brassware are dazzling and delightful novelties, are the best places to make for at first.
But trade requires a settled government to put down the habit of plundering strangers. This is not a habit of simple tribes, who are often friendly and honest. It is what civilized men do where there is no law to restrain them. Until quite recent times it was extremely dangerous to be wrecked on our own coasts, as wrecking, which meant plundering wrecked ships and refraining from any officious efforts to save the lives of their crews, was a well-established business in many places on our shores. The Chinese still remember some astonishing outbursts of looting perpetrated by English ladies of high position, at moments when law was suspended and priceless works of art were to be had for the grabbing. When trading with aborigines begins with the visit of a single ship, the cannons and cutlasses carried may be quite sufficient to overawe the natives if they are troublesome. The real difficulty begins when so many ships come that a little trading station of white men grows up and attracts the white ne'er-do-wells and violent roughs who are always being squeezed out of civilization by the pressure of law and order. It is these riff-raff who turn the place into a sort of hell in which sooner or later missionaries are murdered and traders plundered. Their home governments are appealed to put a stop to this. A gunboat is sent out and inquiry made. The report after the inquiry is that there is nothing to be done but set up a civilized government, with a post office, police, troops and the navy in the offing. In short, the place is added to some civilized Empire. And the civilized taxpayer pays the bill without getting a farthing of the profits.
Of course the business does not stop there. The riff-raff who have created the emergency move out just beyond the boundary of the annexed territory, and are as great a nuisance as ever to the traders when they have exhausted the purchasing power of the included natives and push on after fresh customers. Again they call on their home government to civilize a further area; and so bit by bit the civilized Empire grows at the expense of the home taxpayers, without any intention or approval on their part, until at last although all their real patriotism is centred on their own people and confined to their own country, their own rulers, and their own religious faith; they find that the centre of their beloved realm has shifted to the other hemisphere. That is how we in the British Islands have found our centre moved from London to the Suez Canal, and are now in the position that out of every hundred of our fellow-subjects, in whose defence we are expected to shed the last drop of our blood, only 11 are whites or even Christians. In our bewilderment some of us declare that the Empire is a burden and a blunder, whilst others glory in it as a triumph. You and I need not argue with them just now, our point for the moment being that, whether blunder or glory, the British Empire was quite unintentional. What should have been undertaken only as a most carefully considered political development has been a series of commercial adventures thrust on us by capitalists forced by their own system to cater to foreign customers before their own country's needs were one-tenth satisfied.
According to the author, the main reason why capitalist go abroad to sell their goods is
Solution:
Though they seem to come with the intention of trade,
soon gun boats follow and a government is set up by the
capitalists in the new land.
Q.No: 180
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
What is most probably the author's opinion of the existing moral principles of the people?
Solution:
He perceives no sign of a revolution in ethical matters.
Q.No: 181
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
According to the author, the doctrines of Mr Darwin
Solution:
The author finds no reason why the doctrines of Darwin
should change our moral ideas.
Q.No: 182
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
What, according to the passage, is the Chief Good?
Solution:
The Chief Good refers to the welfare of the community
realized in its members.
Q.No: 183
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
It is implied in the passage that
Solution:
He advocates a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a
Hellenic ideal.
Q.No: 184
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
That the doctrines connected with the name of Mr Darwin are altering our principles has become a sort of commonplace thing to say. And moral principles are said to share in this general transformation. Now, to pass by other subjects, I do not see why Darwinism need change our ultimate moral ideas. It was not to modify our conception of the end, either for the community, or the individual, unless we have been holding views, which long before Darwin were out of date. As to the principles of ethics I perceive, in short, no sign of revolution. Darwinism has indeed helped many to truer conception of the end, but I cannot admit that it has either originated or modified that conception.
And yet in ethics Darwinism after all perhaps be revolutionary, it may lead not to another view about the end, but to a different way of regarding the relatively importance of the means. For in the ordinary moral creed those means seem estimated on no rational principle. Our creed appears rather to be an irrational mixture of jarring elements. We have the moral code of Christianity, accepted in part; rejected practically by all save a few fanatics. But we do not realise how in its very principle the Christian ideals is false. And when we reject this code for another and in part a sounder morality, we are in the same condition of blindness and of practical confusion. It is here that Darwinism, with all the tendencies we may group under that name, seems destined to intervene. It will make itself felt, I believe, more and more effectually. It may force on us in some points a correction of our moral views, and a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a Hellenic ideal. I propose to illustrate here these general statements by some remarks on Punishment.
Darwinism, I have said, has not even modified our ideas of the Chief Good. We may take that as the welfare of the community realised in its members. There is, of course, a question as to meaning to be given to welfare. We may identify that with mere pleasure, or gain with mere system, or may rather view both as inseparable aspects of perfection and individuality. And the extent and nature of the community would once more be a subject for some discussion. But we are forced to enter on these controversies here. We may leave welfare undefined, and for present purpose need not distinguish the community from the state. The welfare of this whole exists, of course, nowhere outside the individuals, and the individuals again have rights and duties only as members in the whole. This is the revived Hellenism or we may call it in the organic view of things urged by German Idealism early in the present century.
According to the author, the moral code of Christianity
Solution:
The moral code of Christianity has been rejected by all
except fanatics.
Q.No: 185
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Which of the following should not be subsidised now, according to the passage?
Solution:
The passage is obviously against all the subsidies.
Q.No: 186
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
The statement that subsidies are paid for by the rich and go to the poor is
Solution:
The author believes that actually the poor pays for the
subsidies and most subsidies go to the rich.
Q.No: 187
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Why do you think that the author calls the Western social security system Utopian?
Solution:
Utopia is an imaginary perfect world.
Q.No: 188
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
It can be inferred from the passage that the author
Solution:
The author believes that subsidies do more harm than
good.
Q.No: 189
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Which of the following is not a victim of extreme subsidies?
Solution:
All are victims of subsidies.
Q.No: 190
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
What, according to the author, is a saving grace of the Deve Gowda government?
Solution:
Deve Gowdas government has shown some courage
when it came to petroleum prices.
Q.No: 191
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
A suitable title to the passage would be-
Solution:
The passage is about the fact that ultimately subsidies
are not really beneficial.
Q.No: 192
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Governments looking for easy popularity have frequently been tempted into announcing give-aways of all sorts; free electricity, virtually free water, subsidised food, cloth at half price, and so on. The subsidy culture has gone to extremes. The richest farmers in the country get subsidised fertiliser. University education, typically accessed by the wealtier sections, is charged at a fraction of cost. Postal services are subsidised, and so are railway services. Bus fares cannot be raised to economical levels because there will be violent protests, so bus travel is subsidised too. In the past, price control on a variety of items, from steel to cement, meant that industrial consumers of these items got them at less than actual cost, while the losses of the public sector companies that produced them were borne by the taxpayer! A study, done a few years ago, came to the conclusion that subsidies in the Indian economy total as much as 14.5 per cent of gross domestic product. At today's level, that would work out to about Rs. 1,50,000 crore.
And who pays the bill? The theory and the political fiction on the basis of which it is sold to unsuspecting voters is that subsidies go to the poor, and are paid for by the rich. The fact is that most subsidies go to the rich (defined in the Indian context as those who are above the poverty line), and much of the tab goes indirectly to the poor. Because the hefty subsidy bill results in fiscal deficits, which in turn push up rates of inflation which, as everyone knows, hits the poor the hardest of all. Indeed, that is why taxmen call inflation the most regressive form of taxation.
The entire subsidy system is built on the thesis that people cannot help themselves, therefore governments must do so. That people cannot afford to pay for a variety of goods and services, and therefore the government must step in. This thesis has been applied not just in the poor countries but in the rich ones as well; hence the birth of the welfare state in the West, and an almost Utopian social security system; free medical care, food aid, old age security, et al. But with the passage of time, most of the wealthy nations have discovered that their economies cannot sustain this social safety net, which infact reduces the desire among people to pay their own way, and takes away some of the incentive to work. In short, the bill was unaffordable, and their societies were simply not willing to pay. To the regret of many, but because of the laws of economics are harsh, most Western societies have been busy pruning the welfare bill.
In India, the lessons of this experience over several decades, and in many countries do not seem to have been learnt. Or, they are simply ignored in the pursuit of immediate votes. People who are promised cheap food or clothing do not in most cases look beyond the gift horses to the question of who picks up the tab. The uproar over higher petrol, diesel and cooking gas prices ignored this basic question: if the user of cooking gas does not want to pay for its cost, who should pay? Diesel in the country is subsidised, and if the trucker or owner of a diesel generator does not want to pay for its full cost, who does he or she think should pay the balance of the cost? It is a simple question, nevertheless it remains unasked.
The Deve Gowda government has shown some courage in biting the bullet when it comes to the price of petroleum products. But it has been bitten by a much bigger subsidy bug. It wants to offer food at half its cost to everyone below the poverty line, supposedly estimated at some 380 million people. What will be the cost? And, of course, who will pick up the tab? The Andhra Pradesh Government has been bankrupted by selling rice at Rs. 2 per kg. Should the Central Government be bankrupted too, before facing up to the question of what is affordable and what is not? Already, India is perenially short of power because the subsidy on electricity has bankrupted most electricity boards, and made private investment wary unless it gets all manner of state guarantees. Delhis subsidised bus fares have bankrupted the Delhi Transport Corporation., whose buses have slowly disappeared from the capital's streets. It is easy to be soft and sentimental, by looking at programmes that will be popular. After all, who doesn't like a free lunch? But the evidence is surely mounting that the lunch isn't free at all. Somebody is paying the bill. And if you want to know who, take a look at the country's poor economic performance over the years.
Which of the following is not true, in the context of the passage?
Solution:
Experts call inflation and not subsides the most
regressive form of taxation. Refer paragraph second
line 6.
Q.No: 193
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
According to the first paragraph, the contention of Schleiden and Schwann that the nucleus is the most important part of the cell has
Solution:
The contention has been proved to be true.
Q.No: 194
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
It may be inferred from the passage that the vast majority of cells are
Solution:
There is prevalence of uninucleate cells.
Q.No: 195
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
What is definitely a function of the nuclei of the normally binucleate cell?
Solution:
Nuclei of a binucleate cell serve as a source of hereditary
information.
Q.No: 196
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The function of the crystalline layer of the inner membrane of the nucleus is
Solution:
The function of the crystalline layer has not been
mentioned in the passage.
Q.No: 197
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
Why, according to the passage, is the polymorphonucleated leukocyte probably lobed?
Solution:
A lobate form provides a much greater surface area for
nuclear cytoplasmic exchanges.
Q.No: 198
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
The membrane-bound nucleus is the most prominent feature of the eukaryotic cell. Schleiden and Schwann, when setting forth the cell doctrine in the 1830s, considered that it had a central role in growth and development. Their belief has been fully supported even though they had only vague notions as to what that role might be, and how the role was to be expressed in some cellular action. The membraneless nuclear area of the prokaryotic cell, with its tangle of fine threads, is now known to play a similar role.
Some cells, like the sieve tubes of vascular plants and the red blood cells of mammals, do not possess nuclei during the greater part of their existence, although they had nuclei when in a less differentiated state. Such cells can no longer divide and their life span is limited. Other cells are regularly multinucleate. Some, like the cells of striated muscles or the latex vessels of higher plants, become so through cell fusion. Some, like the unicellular protozoan paramecium, are normally binucleate, one of the nuclei serving as a source of hereditary information for the next generation, the other governing the day-to-day metabolic activities of the cell. Still other organisms, such as some fungi, are multinucleate because cross walls, dividing the mycelium into specific cells, are absent or irregularly present. The uninucleate situation, however, is typical for the vast minority of cells, and it would appear that this is the most efficient and most economical manner of partitioning living substance into manageable units. This point of view is given credence not only by the prevalence of uninucleate cells, but because for each kind of cell there is a ratio maintained between the volume of the nucleus and that Page 18 CAT 1996 Actual Paper of the cytoplasm. If we think of the nucleus as the control centre of the cell, this would suggest that for a given kind of cell performing a given kind of work, one nucleus can take care of a specific volume of cytoplasm and keep it in functioning order. In terms of material and energy, this must mean providing the kind of information needed to keep flow of materials and energy moving at the correct rate and in the proper channels. With the multitude of enzymes in the cell, materials and energy can of course be channelled in a multitude of ways; it is the function of some information molecules to make channels of use more preferred than others at any given time. How this regulatory control is exercised is not entirely clear.
The nucleus is generally a rounded body. In plant cells, however, where the centre of the cell is often occupied by a large vacuole, the nucleus may be pushed against the cell wall, causing it to assume a lens shape. In some white blood cells, such as polymorphonucleated leukocytes, and in cells of the spinning gland of some insects and spiders, the nucleus is very much lobed. The reason for this is not clear, but it may relate to the fact that for a given volume of nucleus, a lobate form provides a much greater surface area for nuclear-cytoplasmic exchanges, possibly affecting both the rate and the amount of metabolic reactions. The nucleus, whatever its shape, is segregated from the cytoplasm by a double membrane, the nuclear envelope, with the two membranes separated from each other by a perinuclear space of varying width. The envelope is absent only during the time of cell division, and then just for a brief period. The outer membrane is often continuous with the membranes of the endoplasmic reticulum, a possible retention of an earlier relationship, since the envelope, at least in part, is formed at the end cell division by coalescing fragments of the endoplasmic reticulum. The cytoplasmic side of the nucleus is frequently coated with ribosomes, another fact that stresses the similarity and relation of the nuclear envelope to the endoplasmic reticulum. The inner membrane seems to posses a crystalline layer where it abuts the nucleoplasm, but its function remains to be determined.
Everything that passes between the cytoplasm and the nucleus in the eukaryotic cell must transverse the nuclear envelope. This includes some fairly large molecules as well as bodies such as ribosomes, which measure about 25 mm in diameter. Some passageway is, therefore, obviously necessary since there is no indication of dissolution of the nuclear envelope in order to make such movement possible. The nuclear pores appear to be reasonable candidates for such passageways. In plant cells these are irregularly, rather sparsely distributed over the surface of the nucleus, but in the amphibian oocyte, for example, the pores are numerous, regularly arranged, and octagonal and are formed by the fusion of the outer and inner membrane.
Why, according to the passage, are fungi multinucleate?
Solution:
Fungi are multinucleate because the cross walls are
either absent or irregularly present.
Q.No: 199
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
What, according to the author, do the generous and public spirited people need to become rich?
Solution:
Such people need extraordinary talent to become rich.
Q.No: 200
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
In the passage, which kind of people are not mentioned as likely to get rich quickly?
Solution:
Ambitious people have not been mentioned as the ones
likely to get rich quickly.
Q.No: 201
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
What, according to the author, is the main problem in distributing wealth according to the goodness or badness of human beings?
Solution:
The author says that there is no way by which to judge
the goodness or badness of a person.
Q.No: 202
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
Which of the following about the author's thinking may be inferred from the passage?
Solution:
He rejects the notion that the wealth is distributed
according to merit and feels that it is biased in favour of
the rich.
Q.No: 203
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
This passage most probably is a part of
Solution:
The author refers to someone as ' intelligent lady' implying
that he is probably writing to someone.
Q.No: 204
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The word 'improvidence' in the context of the passage, means
Solution:
'Improvidence' means spending too much of money.
Q.No: 205
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The second plan to have to examine is that of giving to each person what she deserves. Many people, especially those who are comfortably off, think this is what happens at present: that the industrious and sober and thrifty are never in want, and that poverty is due to idleness, improvidence, drinking, betting, dishonesty, and bad character generally. They can point to the fact that a labour whose character is bad finds it more difficult to get employment than one whose character is good; that a farmer or country gentleman who gambles and bets heavily, and mortgages his land to live wastefully and extravagantly, is soon reduced to poverty; and that a man of business who is lazy and does not attend to it becomes bankrupt. But this proves nothing that you cannot eat your cake and have it too; it does not prove that your share of the cake was a fair one. It shows that certain vices make us rich. People who are hard, grasping, selfish, cruel, and always ready to take advantage of their neighbours, become very rich if they are clever enough not to overreach themselves. On the other hand, people who are generous, public spirited, friendly, and not always thinking of the main chance, stay poor when they are born poor unless they have extraordinary talents. Also as things are today, some are born poor and others are born with silver spoons in their mouths: that is to say, they are divided into rich and poor before they are old enough to have any character at all. The notion that our present system distributes wealth according to merit, even roughly, may be dismissed at once as ridiculous. Everyone can see that it generally has the contrary effect; it makes a few idle people very rich, and a great many hardworking people very poor.
On this, intelligent Lady, your first thought may be that if wealth is not distributed according to merit, it ought to be; and that we should at once set to work to alter our laws so that in future the good people shall be rich in Page 20 CAT 1996 Actual Paper proportion to their goodness and the bad people poor in proportion to their badness. There are several objections to this; but the very first one settles the question for good and all. It is, that the proposal is impossible and impractical. How are you going to measure anyone's merit in money? Choose any pair of human beings you like, male or female, and see whether you can decide how much each of them should have on her or his merits. If you live in the country, take the village blacksmith and the village clergyman, or the village washerwoman and the village schoolmistress, to begin with. At present, the clergyman often gets less pay than the blacksmith; it is only in some villages he gets more. But never mind what they get at present: you are trying whether you can set up a new order of things in which each will get what he deserves. You need not fix a sum of money for them: all you have to do is to settle the proportion between them. Is the blacksmith to have as much as the clergyman? Or twice as much as the clergyman? Or half as much as the clergyman? Or how much more or less? It is no use saying that one ought to have more the other less; you must be prepared to say exactly how much more or less in calculable proportion.
Well, think it out. The clergyman has had a college education; but that is not any merit on his part: he owns it to his father; so you cannot allow him anything for that. But through it he is able to read the New Testament in Greek; so that he can do something the blacksmith cannot do. On the other hand, the blacksmith can make a horse-shoe, which the parson cannot. How many verses of the Greek Testament are worth one horse-shoe? You have only to ask the silly question to see that nobody can answer it.
Since measuring their merits is no use, why not try to measure their faults? Suppose the blacksmith swears a good deal, and gets drunk occasionally! Everybody in the village knows this; but the parson has to keep his faults to himself. His wife knows them; but she will not tell you what they are if she knows that you intend to cut off some of his pay for them. You know that as he is only a mortal human being, he must have some faults; but you cannot find them out. However, suppose he has some faults he is a snob; that he cares more for sport and fashionable society than for religion! Does that make him as bad as the blacksmith, or twice as bad, or twice and quarter as bad, or only half as bad? In other words, if the blacksmith is to have a shilling, is the parson to have six pence, or five pence and one-third, or two shillings? Clearly these are fools' questions: the moment they bring us down from moral generalities to business particulars it becomes plain to every sensible person that no relation can be established between human qualities, good or bad, and sums of money, large or small. It may seem scandalous that a prize-fighter, for hitting another prize-fighter so hard at Wembley that he fell down and could not rise within ten seconds, received the same sum that was paid to the Archbishop of Canterbury for acting as Primate of the Church of England for nine months; but none of those who cry out against the scandal can express any better in money the difference between the two. Not one of the persons who think that the prize-fighter should get less than the Archbishop can say how much less. What the prizefighter got for his six or seven months' boxing would pay a judge's salary for two years; and we all agree that nothing could be more ridiculous, and that any system of distributing wealth which leads to such absurdities must be wrong. But to suppose that it could be changed by any possible calculation that an ounce of archbishop of three ounces of judge is worth a pound of prize-fighter would be sillier still. You can find out how many candles are worth a pound of butter in the market on any particular day; but when you try to estimate the worth of human souls the utmost you can say is that they are all of equal value before the throne of God. And that will not help you in the least to settle how much money they should have. You must simply give it up, and admit that distributing money according to merit is beyond mortal measurement and judgement.
The author gives the example of the Archbishop of Canterbury and the prize-fighter to
Solution:
The example proves that might scores over love and
religion.
Q.No: 206
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
Why does the author probably say that the sole personality who stands out in the elections is T.N.Seshan?
Solution:
He has been referred to as the umpire, and the passage
also mentions the assertiveness being shown by the
Election Commission regarding code of conduct during
the elections.
Q.No: 207
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
A suitable title to the passage would be
Solution:
The passage is about an issue-less election, as
highlighted even by the last sentence of the passage.
Q.No: 208
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
Which of the following are not under scrutiny for alleged corruption, according to the passage?
Solution:
Ramakrishna Hegde's involvement in any alleged
corruption case has not been mentioned in the passage.
Q.No: 209
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
Why does the author say that almost all parties have broken the law?
Solution:
All the parties have failed to submit audited returns every
year.
Q.No: 210
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
According to the passage, which of the following has not been responsible for the winds of change blowing throughout the country?
Solution:
The greater awareness among the public has not been
credited with the changes coming in the system.
Q.No: 211
Test Name : CAT Paper 1996
Directions for questions 51 to 100: Read each of the following passages carefully and answer the questions
that follow.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
The conventional wisdom says that this is an issue-less election. There is no central personality of whom voters have to express approval or dislike; no central matter of concern that makes this a one-issue referendum like so many elections in the past; no central party around which everything else revolves the Congress has been displaced from its customary pole position, and no one else has been able to take its place. Indeed, given that all-seeing video cameras of the Election Commission, and the detailed pictures they are putting together on campaign expenditure, there isn't even much electioning: no slogans on the walls, no loudspeakers blaring forth at all hours of the day and night, no cavalcades of cars heralding the arrival of a candidate at the local bazaar. Forget it being an issue-less election, is this an election at all?
Perhaps the fun of an election lies in its featuring someone whom you can love or hate. But Narasimha Rao has managed to reduce even a general election, involving nearly 600 million voters, to the boring non-event that is the trademark of his election rallies, and indeed of everything else that he does. After all, the Nehru-Gandhi clan has disappeared from the political map, and the majority of voters will not even be able to name P.V.Narasimha Rao as India's Prime Minister. There could be as many as a dozen prime ministerial candidates ranging from Jyoti Basu to Ramakrishna Hegde, and from Chandra Shekar to (believe it or not) K.R.Narayanan. The sole personality who stands out, therefore, is none of the players, but the umpire: T.N.Seshan.
As for the parties, they are like the blind men of Hindustan, trying in vain to gauge the contours of the animal they have to confront. But it doesn't look as if it will be the mandir-masjid, nor will it be Hindutva or economic nationalism. The Congress will like it to be stability, but what does that mean for the majority? Economic reform is a non-issue for most people with inflation down to barely 4 per cent, prices are not top of the mind either. In a strange twist, after the hawala scandal, corruption has been pushed off the map too.
But ponder for a moment, isn't this state of affairs astonishing, given the context? Consider that so many ministers have had to resign over the hawala issue; that a governor who was a cabinet minister has also had to quit, in the wake of judicial displeasure; that the prime minister himself is under investigation for his involvement in not one scandal but two; that the main prime ministerial candidate from the opposition has had to bow out because he too has been changed in the hawala case; and that the head of the third force has his own little (or not so little) fodder scandal to face. Why then is corruption not an issue not as a matter of competitive politics, but as an issue on which the contenders for power feel that they have to offer the prospect of genuine change? If all this does not make the parties (almost all of whom have broken the law, in not submitting their audited accounts every year to the income tax authorities) realise that the country both needs and is ready for-change in the Supreme Court; the assertiveness of the Election Commission, giving new life to a model code of conduct that has been ignored for a quarter country; the independence that has been thrust upon the Central Bureau of Investigation; and the fresh zeal on the part of tax collectors out to nab corporate no-gooders. Think also that at no other point since the Emergency of 1975-77 have so many people in power been hounded by the system for their misdeeds.
Is this just a case of a few individuals outside the political system doing the job, or is the country heading for a new era? The seventies saw the collapse of the national consensus that marked the Nehruvian era, and ideology took over in the Indira Gandhi years. That too was buried by Rajiv Gandhi and his technocratic friends. And now, we have these issue-less elections. One possibility is that the country is heading for a period of constitutionalism as the other arms of the state reclaim some of the powers they lost, or yielded, to the political CAT 1996 Actual Paper Page 23 establishment. Economic reform free one part of Indian society from the clutches of the political class. Now, this could spread to other parts of the system. Against such a dramatic backdrop, it should be obvious that people (voters) are looking for accountability, for ways in which to make a corrupted system work again. And the astonishing thing is that no party has sought to ride this particular wave; instead all are on the defensive, desperately evading the real issues. No wonder this is an issue-less election.
According to the passage, which of the following is not mentioned as even having the potential to be an issue in the current elections?
Solution:
The empowerment of women has not been mentioned
as a possible issue of the elections.
Q.No: 212
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
When the author writes globalising our social inequities, the reference is to
Solution:
The reference is to an open discussion of the caste
issue on a global platform.
Q.No: 213
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
According to the author, inverted representations as balm for the forsaken
Solution:
Referring to paragraph 1, lines (7-8) its obvious that
choice (c) is correct. Inverted representations ....
such inversions.
Q.No: 214
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
Based on the passage, which broad areas unambiguously fall under the purview of the UN conference
being discussed?
A. Racial prejudice
B. Racial pride
C. Discrimination, racial or otherwise
D. Caste-related discrimination
E. Race-related discrimination
Solution:
Clearly, the UN conference is looking at discriminations
based on caste, especially looking at paragraph 1.
Choices (A) and (E) mention that choice (B) is a
positive area and is not being addressed and choices
(C) and (D) are too broad. This makes choice (a)
correct.
Q.No: 215
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
According to the author, the sociologist who argued that race is a biological category and caste is a social one,
Solution:
Paragraph 2, line 5 clearly indicates that choice (b) is
correct.
Q.No: 216
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
The Union Governments present position vis-a-vis the upcoming United Nations conference on racial and related discrimination world-wide seems to be the following: discuss race please, not caste; caste is our very own and not at all as bad as you think. The gross hypocrisy of that position has been lucidly underscored by Kancha Ilaiah. Explicitly, the world community is to be cheated out of considering the matter on the technicality that caste is not, as a concept, tantamount to a racial category. Internally, however, allowing the issue to be put on agenda at the said conference would, we are patriotically admonished, damage the countrys image. Somehow, Indias virtual beliefs elbow out concrete actualities. Inverted representations, as we know, have often been deployed in human histories as balm for the forsaken religion being the most persistent of such inversions. Yet, we would humbly submit that if globalising our markets is thought as good for the national pocket, globalising our social inequities might not be so bad for the mass of our people. After all, racism was as uniquely institutionalised in South Africa as caste discrimination has been within our society; why then cant we permit the world community to express itself on the latter with a fraction of the zeal with which, through the years, we pronounced on the former?
As to the technicality about whether or not caste is admissible into an agenda about race (that the conference is also about related discriminations tends to be forgotten), a reputed sociologist has recently argued that where race is a biological category caste is a social one. Having earlier fiercely opposed implementation of the Mandal Commission Report, the said sociologist is at least to be complemented now for admitting, however tangentially, that caste discrimination is a reality, although, in his view, incompatible with racial discrimination. One would like quickly to offer the hypothesis that biology, in important ways that affect the lives of many millions, is in itself perhaps a social construction. But let us look at the matter in another way.
If it is agreed as per the position today at which anthropological and allied scientific determinations rest that the entire race of homo sapiens derived from an originary black African female (called Eve), then one is hard put to understand how, one some subsequent ground, ontological distinctions are to be drawn either between races or castes. Let us also underline the distinction between the supposition that we are all gods children and the rather more substantiated argument about our descent from Eve, lest both positions are thought to be equally diversionary. It then stands to reason that all subsequent distinctions are, in modern parlance, constructed ones, and like all ideological constructions, attributable to changing equations between knowledge and power among human communities through contested histories here, there, and elsewhere.
This line of thought receives, thankfully, extremely consequential buttress from the findings of the Human Genome project. Contrary to earlier (chiefly 19th-century colonial) persuasions on the subject of race, as well as, one might add, the somewhat infamous Jensen offerings in the 20th century from America, those finding deny genetic difference between races. If anything, they suggest that environmental factors impinge on gene-function, as a dialectic seems to unfold between nature and culture. It would thus seem that biology as the constitution of pigmentation enters the picture first only as a part of that dialectic. Taken together, the originary mother stipulation and the Genome findings ought indeed to furnish ground for human equality across the board, as well as yield policy initiatives towards equitable material dispensations aimed at building a global order where, in Hegels stirring formulation, only the rational constitutes the right. Such, sadly, is not the case as everyday fresh arbitrary grounds for discrimination are constructed in the interests of sectional dominance.
An important message in the passage, if one accepts a dialectic between nature and culture, is that
Solution:
The author mentions in paragraph 2, line 3 race is a
biological category and in the last paragraph line 5
It would thus seem ... that dialectic. This means all
biological constructs are social constructs of which
race is one. This makes choice (b) correct.
Q.No: 217
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
From the following statements, pick out the true statement according to the passage.
Solution:
A mono-syllabic word has only one syllable. So it can
have only one onset. A phoneme, according to the
passage, can be initial and final.
Q.No: 218
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Which one of the following is likely to emerge last in the cognitive development of a child?
Solution:
According to second last paragraph, line seven, its
obvious that choice (d) is correct.
Q.No: 219
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
A phonological deficit in which of the following is likely to be classified as dyslexia?
Solution:
The last part of the first paragraph makes it clear that
(d) is correct.
Q.No: 220
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
The Treiman and Zudowski experiment found evidence to support which of the following conclusions?
Solution:
According to the last para, lines 7-10. The Treiman
and Zudowski experiment showed that 4 and 5-yearold
children found the onset-rime version ...
significantly easier ... only the 6-year-old ... were able
to perform both versions ... with an equal level of
success.
Q.No: 221
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
Studies of the factors governing reading development in young children have achieved a remarkable degree of consensus over the past two decades. The consensus concerns the causal role of phonological skills in young childrens reading progress. Children who have good phonological skills, or good phonological awareness become good readers and good spellers. Children with poor phonological skills progress more poorly. In particular, those who have a specific phonological deficit are likely to be classified as dyslexic by the time that they are 9 or 10 years old.
Phonological skills in young children can be measured at a number of different levels. The term phonological awareness is a global one, and refers to a deficit in recognising smaller units of sound within spoken words. Development work has shown that this deficit can be at the level of syllables, of onsets and rimes, or phonemes. For example, a 4-year old child might have difficulty in recognising that a word like valentine has three syllables, suggesting a lack of syllabic awareness. A five-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that the odd work out in the set of words fan, cat, hat, mat is fan. This task requires an awareness of the sub-syllabic units of the onset and the rime. The onset corresponds to any initial consonants in a syllable words, and the rime corresponds to the vowel and to any following consonants. Rimes correspond to rhyme in single-syllable words, and so the rime in fan differs from the rime in cat, hat and mat. In longer words, rime and rhyme may differ. The onsets in val:en:tine are /v/ and /t/, and the rimes correspond to the selling patterns al, en and ine.
A six-year-old might have difficulty in recognising that plea and pray begin with the same initial sound. This is a phonemic judgement. Although the initial phoneme /p/ is shared between the two words, in plea it is part of the onset pl and in pray it is part if the onset pr. Until children can segment the onset (or the rime), such phonemic judgements are difficult for them to make. In fact, a recent survey of different developmental studies has shown that the different levels of phonological awareness appear to emerge sequentially. The awareness of syllables, onsets, and rimes appears to merge at around the ages of 3 and 4, long before most children go to school. The awareness of phonemes, on the other hand, usually emerges at around the age of 5 or 6, when children have been taught to read for about a year. An awareness of onsets and rimes thus appears to be a precursor of reading, whereas an awareness of phonemes at every serial position in a word only appears to develop as reading is taught. The onset-rime and phonemic levels of phonological structure, however, are not distinct. Many onsets in English are single phonemes, and so are some rimes (e.g. sea, go, zoo).
The early availability of onsets and rimes is supported by studies that have compared the development of phonological awareness of onsets, rimes, and phonemes in the same subjects using the same phonological awareness tasks. For example, a study by Treiman and Zudowski used a same/different judgement task based on the beginning or the end sounds of words. In the beginning sound task, the words either began with the same onset, as in plea and plank, or shared only the initial phoneme, as in plea and pray. In the end-sound task, the words either shared the entire rime, as in spit and wit, or shared only the final phoneme, as in rat and wit. Treiman and Zudowski showed that four- and five-year-old children found the onset-rime version of the same/different task significantly easier than the version based on phonemes. Only the sixyear- olds, who had been learning to read for about a year, were able to perform both versions of the tasks with an equal level of success.
The single-syllable words Rhyme and Rime are constituted by the exact same set of
A. rime(s)
B. onset(s)
C. rhyme(s)
D. phonemes(s)
Solution:
Refer to the sentence in paragraph 2 rimes
correspond to rhymes in single-syllabus words.
Q.No: 222
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Why will Billie Holiday survive many who receive longer obituaries?
Solution:
Choice (b) is false because the author says in
paragraph one, line 4 Few people .... Choice (c) is
false because the author says ... Coarse-textured
.... in the fifth last line of the first para. Choice (d) is
also incorrect as revealed in the last part of the
passage. Choice (a) is correct as the authors
appreciation is for her singing though he does pay
attention to other aspects of her life.
Q.No: 223
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
According to the author, if Billie Holiday had not died in her middle age
Solution:
The answer is presented in the fourth last line of the
first para, what middle age ... This makes choice (c)
correct.
Q.No: 224
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Which of the following statements is not representative of the authors opinion?
Solution:
The answer to this is also presented directly in the
last line of the second paragraph suffering was
her .... . This makes choice (d) correct.
Q.No: 225
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
Billie Holiday died a few weeks ago. I have been unable until now to write about her, but since she will survive many who receive longer obituaries, a short delay in one small appreciation will not harm her or us. When she died we the musicians, critics, all who were ever transfixed by the most heart-rending voice of the past generation grieved bitterly. There was no reason to. Few people pursed self-destruction more whole-heartedly than she, and when the pursuit was at an end, at the age of 44, she had turned herself into a physical and artistic wreck. Some of us tried gallantly to pretend otherwise, taking comfort in the occasional moments when she still sounded like a ravaged echo of her greatness. Others had not even the heart to see and listen any more. We preferred to stay home and, if old and lucky enough to own the incomparable records of her heyday from 1937 to 1946, many of which are not even available on British LP, to recreate those coarse-textured, sinuous, sensual and unbearable sad noises which gave her a sure corner of immortality. Her physical death called, if anything, for relief rather than sorrow. What sort of middle age would she have faced without the voice to earn money for her drinks and fixes, without the looks and in her day she was hauntingly beautiful to attract the men she needed, without business sense, without anything but the disinterested worship of ageing men who had heard and seen her in her glory?
And yet, irrational though it is, our grief expressed Billie Holidays art, that of a woman for whom one must be sorry. The great blues singers, to whom she may be justly compared, played their game from strength. Lionesses, though often wounded or at bay (did not Bessie Smith call herself a tiger, ready to jump?), their tragic equivalents were Cleopatra and Phaedra; Holidays was an embittered Ophelia. She was the Puccini heroine among blues singers, or rather among jazz singers, for though she sang a cabaret version of the blues incomparably, her natural idiom was the pop song. Her unique achievement was to have twisted this into a genuine expression of the major passions by means of a total disregard of its sugary tunes, or indeed of any tune other than her own few delicately crying elongated notes, phrased like Bessie Smith or Louis Armstrong in sackcloth, sung in a thin, gritty, haunting voice whose natural mood was an unresigned and voluptuous welcome for the pains of love. Nobody has sung, or will sing, Besss songs from Porgy as she did. It was this combination of bitterness and physical submission, as of someone lying still while watching his legs being amputated, which gives such a blood-curdling quality to her Strange Fruit, the anti-lynching poem which she turned into an unforgettable art song. Suffering was her profession; but she did not accept it.
Little need be said about her horrifying life, which she described with emotional, though hardly with factual, truth in her autobiography Lady Sings the Blues. After an adolescence in which self-respect was measured by a girls insistence on picking up the coins thrown to her by clients with her hands, she was plainly beyond help. She did not lack it, for she had the flair and scrupulous honesty of John Hammond to launch her, the best musicians of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young the boundless devotion of all serious connoisseurs, and much public success. It was too late to arrest a career of systematic embittered self-immolation. To be born with both beauty and selfrespect in the Negro ghetto of Baltimore in 1915 was too much of a handicap, even without rape at the age of 10 and drug-addiction in her teens. But, while she destroyed herself, she sang, unmelodious, profound and heartbreaking. It is impossible not to weep for her, or not to hate the world which made her what she was.
According to the passage, Billie Holiday was fortunate in all but one of which of the following ways?
Solution:
Billie Holiday was fortunate to have the best musicians
of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy
Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young ...
Q.No: 226
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
How is Kurosawa able to show the erosion of Dersus way of life?
Solution:
The author mentions in the first paragraph, lines 3-5,
Each of the ..... This makes choice (c) correct.
Q.No: 227
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
Arsenievs search for Dersus grave
Solution:
Refer to the part The film itself ... opening by Dersus
grave. Besides (a) can be easily inferred from the
second paragraph.
Q.No: 228
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The film celebrates Dersus wisdom
Solution:
The answer is presented directly in lines 2-4 of the
third paragraph. ... nostalgic, melancholy....
Q.No: 229
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
According to the author, the section of the film following the prologue
Solution:
The answer is in lines 4-6 of the third paragraph.
First section of ..... This makes choice (c) is correct.
Q.No: 230
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
In the film, Kurosawa hints at Arsenievs reflective and sensitive nature
Solution:
This aspect is highlighted in the last paragraph and
choice (d) is the answer.
Q.No: 231
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
The narrative of Dersu Uzala is divided into two major sections, set in 1902, and 1907, that deal with separate expeditions which Arseniev conducts into the Ussuri region. In addition, a third time frame forms a prologue to the film. Each of the temporal frames has a different focus, and by shifting them Kurosawa is able to describe the encroachment of settlements upon the wilderness and the consequent erosion of Dersus way of life. As the film opens, that erosion has already begun. The first image is a long shot of a huge forest, the trees piled upon one another by the effects of the telephoto lens so that the landscape becomes an abstraction and appears like a huge curtain of green. A title informs us that the year is 1910. This is as late into the century as Kurosawa will go. After this prologue, the events of the film will transpire even farther back in time and will be presented as Arsenievs recollections. The character of Dersu Uzala is the heart of the film, his life the example that Kurosawa wishes to affirm. Yet the formal organization of the film works to contain, to close, to circumscribe that life by erecting a series of obstacles around it. The film itself is circular, opening and closing by Dersus grave, thus sealing off the character from the modern world to which Kurosawa once so desperately wanted to speak. The multiple time frames also work to maintain a separation between Dersu and the contemporary world. We must go back father even than 1910 to discover who he was. But this narrative structure has yet another implication. It safeguards Dersus example, inoculates it from contamination with history, and protects it from contact with the industrialised, urban world. Time is organised by the narrative into a series of barriers, which enclose Dersu in a kind of vacuum chamber, protecting him from the social and historical dialectics that destroyed the other Kurosawa heroes. Within the film, Dersu does die, but the narrative structure attempts to immortalise him and his example, as Dersu passes from history into myth.
We see all this at work in the enormously evocative prologue. The camera tilts down to reveal felled trees littering the landscape and an abundance of construction. Roads and houses outline the settlement that is being built. Kurosawa cuts to a medium shot of Arseniev standing in the midst of the clearing, looking uncomfortable and disoriented. A man passing in a wagon asks him what he is doing, and the explorer says he is looking for a grave. The driver replies that no one has died here, the settlement is too recent. These words enunciate the temporal rupture that the film studies. It is the beginning of things (industrial society) and the end of things (the forest), the commencement of one world so young that no one has had time yet to die and the eclipse of another, in which Dersu had died. It is his grave for which the explorer searches. His passing symbolises the new order, the development that now surrounds Arseniev. The explorer says he buried his friend three years ago next to huge cedar and fir trees, but now they are all gone. The man on the wagon replies they were probably chopped down when the settlement was built, and he drives off. Arseniev walks to a barren, treeless spot next to a pile of bricks. As he moves, the camera tracks and pans to follow, revealing a line of freshly built houses and a woman hanging her laundry to dry. A distant train whistle is heard, and the sounds of construction in the clearing vie with the cries of birds and the rustle of wind in the trees. Arseniev pauses, looks around for the grave that once was, and murmurs desolately, Dersu. The image now cuts farther into the past, to 1902, and the first section of the film commences, which describes Arsenievs meeting with Dersu and their friendship.
Kurosawa defines the world of the film initially upon a void, a missing presence. The grave is gone, brushed aside by a world rushing into modernism, and now the hunter exists only in Arsenievs memories. The hallucinatory dreams and visions of Dodeskaden are succeeded by nostalgic, melancholy ruminations. Yet by exploring these ruminations, the film celebrates the timelessness of Dersus wisdom. The first section of the film has two purposes: to describe the magnificence and in human vastness of nature and to delineate the code of ethics by which Dersu lives and which permits him to survive in these conditions. When Dersu first appears, the other soldiers treat him with condescension and laughter, but Arseniev watches him closely and does not share their derisive response. Unlike them, he is capable of immediately grasping Dersus extraordinary qualities. In camp, Kurosawa frames Arseniev by himself, sitting on the other side of the fire from his soldiers. While they sleep or joke among themselves, he writes in his diary and Kurosawa cuts in several point-of-view shots from his perspective of trees that appear animated and sinister as the fire light dances across their gnarled, leafless outlines. This reflective dimension, this sensitivity to the spirituality of nature, distinguishes him from the others and forms the basis of his receptivity to Dersu and their friendship. It makes him a fit pupil for the hunter.
According to the author, which of these statements about the film is correct?
Solution:
Refer to the part Kurosawa defines the world of the
film initially upon a void, a missing presence.
Q.No: 232
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Dynamic leaders are needed in democracies because
Solution:
Refer to the seventh paragraph lines 4-5 ... the greater
the urge for change in a society, the stronger the
appeal of a dynamic leadership ... This makes choice
(c) correct.
Q.No: 233
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
What possible factor would a dynamic leader consider a hindrance in achieving the development goals of a nation?
Solution:
The answer to this question is present in the last
paragraph in the second line From the argument....
This makes choice (a) correct.
Q.No: 234
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Which of the following four statements can be inferred from the above passage?
A. Scientific rationality is an essential feature of modernity.
B. Scientific rationality results in the development of impersonal rules.
C. Modernisation and development have been chosen over traditional music, dance and drama.
D. Democracies aspire to achieve substantive equality.
Solution:
Choice (A) is present in paragraph four, line one, choice
(B) is mentioned in the last line of the fourth paragraph
and choice (D) is mentioned in the 3rd last line of the
seventh para. This makes choice (a) correct.
Q.No: 235
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Tocqueville believed that the age of democracy would be an un-heroic age because
Solution:
The answer is presented in lines 1 to 4 of paragraph
2. This makes choice (a) correct.
Q.No: 236
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
A key argument the author is making is that
Solution:
Refer to the first line of the fifth paragraph But a
system governed solely by impersonal rules can at
best ensure order and stability; it cannot ... formal
equality will be replaced by real equality ... This makes
choice (d) correct.
Q.No: 237
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Democracy rests on a tension between two different principles. There is, on the one hand, the principle of equality before the law, or, more generally, of equality, and, on the other, what may be described as the leadership principle. The first gives priority to rules and the second to persons. No matter how skilfully we contrive out schemes, there is a point beyond which the one principle cannot be promoted without some sacrifice of the other.
Alexis do Tocqueville, the great 19th-century writer on democracy, maintained that the age of democracy, whose birth he was witnessing, would also be the age of mediocrity, in saying this he was thinking primarily of a regime of equality governed by impersonal rules. Despite his strong attachment to democracy, he took great pains to point out what he believed to be its negative side: a dead level plane of achievement in practically every sphere of life. The age of democracy would, in his view, be an unheroic age; there would not be room in it for either heroes or hero-worshippers.
But modern democracies have not been able to do without heroes: this too was foreseen, with much misgiving, by Tocqueville. Tocqueville viewed this with misgiving because he believed, rightly or wrongly, that unlike in aristocratic societies there was no proper place in a democracy for heroes and, hence, when they arose they would sooner or later turn into despots. Whether they require heroes or not, democracies certainly require leaders, and, in the contemporary age, breed them in great profusion; the problem is to know what to do with them.
In a world preoccupied with scientific rationality the advantages of a system based on an impersonal rule of law should be a recommendation with everybody. There is something orderly and predictable about such a system. When life is lived mainly in small, self-contained communities, men are able to take finer personal distinctions into account in dealing with their fellow men. They are unable to do this in a large and amorphous society, and organised living would be impossible here without a system of impersonal rules. Above all, such a system guarantees a kind of equality to the extent that everybody, no matter in what station of life, is bound by the same explicit, often written, rules and nobody is above them.
But a system governed solely by impersonal rules can at best ensure order and stability; it cannot create any shining vision of a future in which mere formal equality will be replaced by real equality and fellowship. A world governed by impersonal rules cannot easily change itself, or when it does, the change is so gradual as to make the basic and fundamental feature of society appear unchanges. For any kind of basic or fundamental change, a push is needed from within, a kind of individual initiative which will create new rules, new terms and conditions of life.
The issue of leadership thus acquires crucial significance in the context of change. If the modern age is preoccupied with scientific rationality, it is no less preoccupied with change. To accept what exists on its own terms is traditional, not modern, and it may be all very well to appreciate tradition in music, dance and drama, but for society as a whole the choice has already been made in favour of modernisation and development. Moreover, in some countries the gap between ideal and reality has become so great that the argument for development and change is now irresistible.
In these countries no argument for development has greater appeal or urgency than the one which shows development to be the condition for the mitigation, if not the elimination, of inequality. There is something contradictory about the very presence of large inequalities in a society which profess to be democratic. It does not take people too long to realise that democracy by itself can guarantee only formal equality; beyond this, it can only whet peoples appetite for real or substantive equality. From this arises their continued preoccupation with plans and schemes that will help to bridge the gap between the ideal of equality and the reality which is so contrary to it.
When pre-existing rules give no clear directions of change, leadership comes into its own. Every democracy invests its leadership with a measure of charisma, and expects from it a corresponding measure of energy and vitality. Now, the greater the urge for change in a society the stronger the appeal of a dynamic leadership in it. A dynamic leadership seeks to free itself from the constraints of existing rules: in a sense that is the test of its dynamism. In this process it may take a turn at which it ceases to regard itself as being bound by these rules, placing itself above them. There is always a tension between charisma and discipline in the case of a democratic leadership, and when this leadership puts forward revolutionary claims, the tension tends to be resolved at the expense of discipline.
Characteristically, the legitimacy of such a leadership rests on its claim to be able to abolish or at least substantially reduce the existing inequalities in society. From the argument that formal equality or equality before the law is but a limited good, it is often one short step to the argument that it is a hindrance or an obstacle to the establishment of real or substantive equality. The conflict between a progressive executive and a conservative judiciary is but one aspect of this larger problem. This conflict naturally acquires added piquancy when the executive is elected and the judiciary appointed.
Which of the following four statements can be inferred from the above passage?
A. There is conflict between the pursuit of equality and individuality.
B. The disadvantages of impersonal rules can be overcome in small communities.
C. Despite limitations, impersonal rules are essential in large systems.
D. Inspired leadership, rather than plans and schemes, is more effective in bridging inequality.
Solution:
A can be inferred, refer to the part Democracy
rests on two different principles ... the principle of
equality before the law ... the leadership principle ...
one principle cannot be promoted without some
sacrifice of the other... D can be inferred, refer to the
part their continued preoccupation with plans and
schemes ... to bridge the gap between the ideal of
equality and the reality which is so contrary to it ...
leadership with a measure of charisma ... B and C
venture too far by using the words disadvantages
and limitations respectively which have no contextual
relevance.
Q.No: 238
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
In the passage, the Dark Age refers to
Solution:
The second and third lines of the second paragraph
mention Dark Age... this makes choice (b) correct.
Q.No: 239
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
Astronomers find it difficult to study the Dark Age because
Solution:
Lines one to three of the fourth paragraph mention
The main problem... making choice (b) the answer.
Q.No: 240
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
The four most distant quasars discovered recently
Solution:
Lines three-five of the fifth paragraph Recently, some
members ... makes choice (a) correct.
Q.No: 241
Test Name : CAT Paper 2001
Directions for questions 71 to 100: Each of the six passages given below is followed by questions.
Choose the best answer for each question.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
In the modern scientific story, light was created not once but twice. The first time was in the Big Bang, when the universe began its existence as a glowing, expanding, fireball, which cooled off into darkness after a few million years. The second time was hundreds of millions of years later, when the cold material condensed into dense suggests under the influence of gravity, and ignited to become the first stars.
Sir Martin Rees, Britains astronomer royal, named the long interval between these two enlightements the cosmic Dark Age. The name describes not only the poorly lit conditions, but also the ignorance of astronomers about that period. Nobody knows exactly when the first stars formed, or how they organised themselves into galaxies or even whether stars were the first luminous objects. They may have been preceded by quasars, which are mysterious, bright spots found at the centres of some galaxies.
Now two independent groups of astronomers, one led by Robert Becker of the University of California, Davis, and the other by George Djorgovski of the Caltech, claim to have peered far enough into space with their telescopes (and therefore backwards enough in time) to observe the closing days of the Dark age.
The main problem that plagued previous efforts to study the Dark Age was not the lack of suitable telescopes, but rather the lack of suitable things at which to point them. Because these events took place over 13 billion years ago, if astronomers are to have any hope of unravelling them they must study objects that are at least 13 billion light years away. The best prospects are quasars, because they are so bright and compact that they can be seen across vast stretches of space. The energy source that powers a quasar is unknown, although it is suspected to be the intense gravity of a giant black hole. However, at the distances required for the study of Dark Age, even quasars are extremely rare and faint.
Recently some members of Dr Beckers team announced their discovery of the four most distant quasars known. All the new quasars are terribly faint, a challenge that both teams overcame by peering at them through one of the twin Keck telescopes in Hawaii. These are the worlds largest, and can therefore collect the most light. The new work by Dr Beckers team analysed the light from all four quasars. Three of them appeared to be similar to ordinary, less distant quasars. However, the fourth and most distant, unlike any other quasar ever seen, showed unmistakable signs of being shrouded in a fog because new-born stars and quasars emit mainly ultraviolet light, and hydrogen gas is opaque to ultraviolet. Seeing this fog had been the goal of would-be Dark Age astronomers since 1965, when James Gunn and Bruce Peterson spelled out the technique for using quasars as backlighting beacons to observe the fogs ultraviolet shadow.
The fog prolonged the period of darkness until the heat from the first stars and quasars had the chance to ionise the hydrogen (breaking it into its constituent parts, protons and electrons). Ionised hydrogen is transparent to ultraviolet radiation, so at that moment the fog lifted and the universe became the well-lit place it is today. For this reason, the end of the Dark Age is called the Epoch of Re-ionisation. Because the ultraviolet shadow is visible only in the most distant of the four quasars, Dr Beckers team concluded that the fog had dissipated completely by the time the universe was about 900 million years old, and oneseventh of its current size.
The fog of hydrogen gas seen through the telescopes
Solution:
As revealed in the first line of the last paragraph,
choice (b) is correct.
Q.No: 242
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 1
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
The tone that the author uses while asking what French winemaker will ever admit that? is best described as
Solution:
The writer is using satire to mildly tease the French
winemaker. (1), (3) and (4) are rather extreme choices.
Q.No: 243
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 1
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
What according to the author should the French do to avoid becoming a producer of merely old fashioned wines?
Solution:
Refer to the part some areas
have now produced a
generation of growers using the varietal names on
their labels. The writer says that (1) is probably the
only option left for French winemakers.
Q.No: 244
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 1
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
The development which has created fear among winemakers in the wine heartland of France is the
Solution:
Refer to the part it is on every wine label
the name
of the grape from which the wine is made
acquired
a basic lexicon. (2) well describes that the French
winemakers are scared of this trend.
Q.No: 245
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 1
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
Which one of the following, if true, would provide most support for Dr. Renauds findings about the effect of tannins?
Solution:
Option (4) is the most substantiated reason to support
Dr. Renauds findings. The development in (4) would
support Dr. Renaud's findings that fat-derived
cholesterols can be dispersed by the tannins in wine.
Q.No: 246
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 1
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
At the heart of the enormous boom in wine consumption that has taken place in the English speaking world over the last two decades or so is a fascinating, happy paradox. In the days when wine was exclusively the preserve of a narrow cultural elite, bought either at auctions or from gentleman wine merchants in wing collars and bow-ties, to be stored in rambling cellars and decanted to order by ones butler, the ordinary drinker didnt get a look-in. Wine was considered a highly technical subject, in which anybody without the necessary ability could only fall flat on his or her face in embarrassment. It wasnt just that you needed a refined aesthetic sensibility for the stuff if it wasnt to be hopelessly wasted on you. It required an intimate knowledge of what came from where, and what it was supposed to taste like.
Those were times, however, when wine appreciation essentially meant a familiarity with the great French classics, with perhaps a smattering of other wines like sherry and port. That was what the wine trade dealt in. These days, wine is bought daily in supermarkets and high-street chains to be consumed that evening, hardly anybody has a cellar to store it in and most dont even possess a decanter. Above all, the wines of literally dozens of countries are available in our market. When a supermarket offers its customers a couple of fruity little numbers from Brazil, we scarcely raise an eyebrow.
It seems, in other words, that the commercial jungle that wine has now become has not in the slightest deterred people from plunging adventurously into the thickets in order to taste and see. Consumers are no longer intimidated by the thought of needing to know their Pouilly-Fume from their Pouilly-Fuisse, just at the very moment when there is more to know than ever before.
The reason for this new mood of confidence is not hard to find. It is on every wine label from Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States: the name of the grape from which the wine is made. At one time that might have sounded like a fairly technical approach in itself. Why should native English-speakers know what Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay was? The answer lies in the popularity that wines made from those grape varieties now enjoy. Consumers effectively recognize them as brand names, and have acquired a basic lexicon of wine that can serve them even when confronted with those Brazilian upstarts.
In the wine heartlands of France, they are scared to death of that trendnot because they think their wine isnt as good as the best from California or South Australia (what French winemaker will ever admit that?) but because they dont traditionally call their wines Cabernet Sauvignon or Chardonnay. They call them Chateau Ducru Beaucaillou or Corton-Charlemagne, and they arent about the change. Some areas, in the middle of southern France, have now produced a generation of growers using the varietal names on their labels and are tempting consumers back to French wine. It will be an uphill struggle, but there is probably no other way if France is to avoid simply becoming a specialty source of old-fashioned wines for old fashioned connoisseurs.
Wine consumption was also given a significant boost in the early 1990s by the work of Dr. Serge Renaud, who has spent many years investigating the reasons for the uncannily low incidence of coronary heart disease in the south of France. One of his major findings is that the fat-derived cholesterol that builds up in the arteries and can eventually lead to heart trouble, can be dispersed by the tannins in wine. Tannin is derived from the skins of grapes, and is therefore present in higher levels in red wines, because they have to be infused with their skins to attain the red colour. That news caused a huge upsurge in red wine consumption in the United States. It has not been accorded the prominence it deserves in the UK, largely because the medical profession still sees all alcohol as a menace to health, and is constantly calling for it to be made prohibitively expensive. Certainly, the manufacturers of anticoagulant drugs might have something to lose if we all got the message that we would do just as well by our hearts by taking half a bottle of red wine every day!
Which one of the following CANNOT be reasonably attributed to the labeling strategy followed by wine producers in English speaking countries?
Solution:
(1), (2) and (4) are stated in the 4th paragraph. (3) is
unlikely. A consumer may still not be enough of a
connoisseur to discriminate wine tastes.
Q.No: 247
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Why didnt Britain tax India to finance its World War II efforts?
Solution:
Refer to the part India would resist payment, and
paralyze the war effort. (3) is clearly the answer.
Q.No: 248
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
What was the main lesson the British learned from the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857?
Solution:
Refer to the part it reminded the British vividly. (3) is
clearly the answer. (1) was an outcome, not a cause.
(2) is a minor factor. (4) is far-sighted.
Q.No: 249
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Which of the following was NOT a reason for the emergence of the white mans burden as a new rationale for empire-building in India?
Solution:
(1), (3) and (4) are stated in the third paragraph. (2) is
not a reason for the emergence of the 'white man's
burden'. It is a consequence, not a cause.
Q.No: 250
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Which of the following best captures the meaning of the white mans burden, as it is used by the author?
Solution:
Refer to the part it was supposedly for the good of the
conquered. (1) entirely captures the meaning of the
'white man's burden'.
Q.No: 251
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 2
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Right through history, imperial powers have clung to their possessions to death. Why, then, did Britain in 1947 give up the jewel in its crown, India? For many reasons. The independence struggle exposed the hollowness of the white mans burden. Provincial self-rule since 1935 paved the way for full self-rule. Churchill resisted independence, but the Labour government of Atlee was anti-imperialist by ideology. Finally, the Royal Indian Navy mutiny in 1946 raised fears of a second Sepoy mutiny, and convinced British waverers that it was safer to withdraw gracefully. But politico-military explanations are not enough. The basis of empire was always money. The end of empire had much to do with the fact that British imperialism had ceased to be profitable. World War II left Britain victorious but deeply indebted, needing Marshall Aid and loans from the World Bank. This constituted a strong financial case for ending the no-longer profitable empire.
Empire building is expensive. The US is spending one billion dollars a day in operations in Iraq that fall well short of full scale imperialism. Through the centuries, empire building was costly, yet constantly undertaken because it promised high returns. The investment was in armies and conquest. The returns came through plunder and taxes from the conquered.
No immorality was attached to imperial loot and plunder. The biggest conquerors were typically revered (hence titles like Alexander the Great, Akbar the Great, and Peter the Great). The bigger and richer the empire, the more the plunderer was admired. This mindset gradually changed with the rise of new ideas about equality and governing for the public good, ideas that culminated in the French and American revolutions. Robert Clive was impeached for making a little money on the side, and so was Warren Hastings. The white mans burden came up as a new moral rationale for conquest. It was supposedly for the good of the conquered. This led to much muddled hypocrisy. On the one hand, the empire needed to be profitable. On the other hand, the white mans burden made brazen loot impossible.
An additional factor deterring loot was the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny. Though crushed, it reminded the British vividly that they were a tiny ethnic group who could not rule a gigantic subcontinent without the support of important locals. After 1857, the British stopped annexing one princely state after another, and instead treated the princes as allies. Land revenue was fixed in absolute terms, partly to prevent local unrest and partly to promote the notion of the white mans burden. The empire proclaimed itself to be a protector of the Indian peasant against exploitation by Indian elites. This was denounced as hypocrisy by nationalists like Dadabhoy Naoroji in the 19th century, who complained that land taxes led to an enormous drain from India to Britain. Objective calculations by historians like Angus Maddison suggest a drain of perhaps 1.6 percent of Indian Gross National Product in the 19th century. But land revenue was more or less fixed by the Raj in absolute terms, and so its real value diminished rapidly with inflation in the 20th century. By World War II, India had ceased to be a profit center for the British Empire.
Historically, conquered nations paid taxes to finance fresh wars of the conqueror. India itself was asked to pay a large sum at the end of World War I to help repair Britains finances. But, as shown by historian Indivar Kamtekar, the independence movement led by Gandhiji changed the political landscape, and made mass taxation of India increasingly difficult. By World War II, this had become politically impossible. Far from taxing India to pay for World War II, Britain actually began paying India for its contribution of men and goods. Troops from white dominions like Australia, Canada and New Zealand were paid for entirely by these countries, but Indian costs were shared by the British government. Britain paid in the form of nonconvertible sterling balances, which mounted swiftly. The conqueror was paying the conquered, undercutting the profitability on which all empire is founded. Churchill opposed this, and wanted to tax India rather than owe it money. But he was overruled by Indian hands who said India would resist payment, and paralyze the war effort. Leo Amery, Secretary of State for India, said that when you are driving in a taxi to the station to catch a life-or-death train, you do not loudly announce that you have doubts whether to pay the fare. Thus, World War II converted India from a debtor to a creditor with over one billion pounds in sterling balances. Britain, meanwhile, became the biggest debtor in the world. Its not worth ruling over people you are afraid to tax.
Which one of the following best expresses the main purpose of the author?
Solution:
Refer to the last line of the first paragraph, the second
paragraph and the last line of the passage. They amply
support (4) as the answer. (1) does not touch on the
financial implications. White mans burden is a single
aspect of the passage, not the main idea, so (2) is not
right. (3) can be ruled out straightaway.
Q.No: 252
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The author doubts the anti-GM lobbys contention that MNC control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor because
Solution:
Refer to the part much of biotechnology research is
also funded by governments. (3) is clearly the answer.
Q.No: 253
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
Using the clues in the passage, which of the following countries would you expect to be in the forefront of the anti-GM campaign?
Solution:
Refer to the part anti-GM campaign has been quite
effective in Europe. (3) is clearly the answer.
Q.No: 254
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
Genetic modification makes plants more resistant to killer weeds. However, this can lead to environmental damage by
Solution:
Refer to the part use of ever-stronger herbicides which
are poisonous. The last line specifically supports (2)
as the answer and not (1) which is discussed in a
different context. The passage has no intention of
keeping competing plants standing at all, let alone
keeping them weed-free, so (3) is wrong.
Q.No: 255
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
According to the passage, biotechnology research
Solution:
Refer to the part much of biotechnology research is
also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. (4) is the answer. (1), (2) and
(3) are disputed in the passage.
Q.No: 256
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 3
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
The controversy over genetically modified food continues unabated in the West. Genetic modification (GM) is the science by which the genetic material of a plant is altered, perhaps to make it more resistant to pests or killer weeds, or to enhance its nutritional value. Many food biotechnologists claim that GM will be a major contribution of science to mankind in the 21st century. On the other hand, large numbers of opponents, mainly in Europe, claim that the benefits of GM are a myth propagated by multinational corporations to increase their profits, that they pose a health hazard, and have therefore called for government to ban the sale of genetically-modified food.
The anti-GM campaign has been quite effective in Europe, with several European Union member countries imposing a virtual ban for five years over genetically-modified food imports. Since the genetically-modified food industry is particularly strong in the United States of America, the controversy also constitutes another chapter in the US-Europe skirmishes which have become particularly acerbic after the US invasion of Iraq.
To a large extent, the GM controversy has been ignored in the Indian media, although Indian biotechnologists have been quite active in GM research. Several groups of Indian biotechnologists have been working on various issues connected with crops grown in India. One concrete achievement which has recently figured in the news is that of a team led by the former vice-chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru university, Asis Datta it has successfully added an extra gene to potatoes to enhance the protein content of the tuber by at least 30 percent. It is quite likely that the GM controversy will soon hit the headlines in India since a spokesperson of the Indian Central government has recently announced that the government may use the potato in its midday meal programme for schools as early as next year.
Why should scientific progress, with huge potential benefits to the poor and malnourished, be so controversial? The anti-GM lobby contends that pernicious propaganda has vastly exaggerated the benefits of GM and completely evaded the costs which will have to be incurred if the genetically-modified food industry is allowed to grow unchecked. In particular, they allude to different types of costs.
This group contends that the most important potential cost is that the widespread distribution and growth of genetically-modified food will enable the corporate world (alias the multinational corporations MNCs) to completely capture the food chain. A small group of biotech companies will patent the transferred genes as well as the technology associated with them. They will then buy up the competing seed merchants and seed-breeding centers, thereby controlling the production of food at every possible level. Independent farmers, big and small, will be completely wiped out of the food industry. At best, they will be reduced to the status of being subcontractors.
This line of argument goes on to claim that the control of the food chain will be disastrous for the poor since the MNCs, guided by the profit motive, will only focus on the high-value food items demanded by the affluent. Thus, in the long run, the production of basic staples which constitute the food basket of the poor will taper off. However, this vastly overestimates the power of the MNCs. Even if the research promoted by them does focus on the high-value food items, much of biotechnology research is also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. Indeed, the potato is a by-product of this type of research. If the potato passes the field trials, there is no reason to believe that it cannot be marketed in the global potato market. And this type of success story can be repeated with other basic food items.
The second type of cost associated with the genetically modified food industry is environmental damage. The most common type of genetic engineering involved gene modification in plants designed to make them resistant to applications of weed-killers. This then enables farmers to use massive dosages of weedkillers so as to destroy or wipe out all competing varieties of plants in their field. However, some weeds through genetically-modified pollen contamination may acquire resistance to a variety of weed-killers. The only way to destroy these weeds is through the use of ever-stronger herbicides which are poisonous and linger on in the environment.
Which of the following about the Indian medias coverage of scientific research does the passage seem to suggest?
Solution:
Refer to the part GM controversy will soon hit the
headlines in India
use the protato in its midday
meal program for schools. (1) can be inferred. (2) is,
of course, wrong. (3) is doubtful. (4) is also not true.
Q.No: 257
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 4
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
The word they in the first sentence of the third paragraph refers to
Solution:
The last sentence of the 2nd paragraph states these
large gatherings which continues as they in the 3rd
paragraph. (1) is clearly the answer.
Q.No: 258
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 4
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
In this passage the author is essentially
Solution:
The passage begins with description of social life and
towards the last few paragraphs, moves on to show
drying up of our social life.
(3) is clearly the answer.
(2) and (4) are rather extreme observations. (1) is also
a blunt statement, whereas the passage does have a
subtle tone.
Q.No: 259
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 4
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
The authors conception of social life requires that
Solution:
Refer to the part Interest, wonder
the need of the
first two must not be underrated. (2) is clearly the
answer.
Q.No: 260
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 4
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
The word discriminate in the last sentence of the third paragraph means
Solution:
Discriminate means to recognize passionate attitude,
distinguish is too technical a word to fit the requirement.
(2) and (4) are irrelevant.
Q.No: 261
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 4
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
Social life is an outflow and meeting of personality, which means that its end is the meeting of character, temperament, and sensibility, in which our thoughts and feelings, and sense perceptions are brought into play at their lightest and yet keenest.
This aspect, to my thinking, is realized as much in large parties composed of casual acquaintances or even strangers, as in intimate meetings of old friends. I am not one of those superior persons who hold cocktail parties in contempt, looking upon them as barren or at best as very tryingly kaleidoscopic places for gathering, because of the strangers one has to meet in them; which is no argument, for even our most intimate friends must at one time have been strangers to us. These large gatherings will be only what we make of them if not anything better, they can be as good places to collect new friends from as the slavemarkets of Istanbul were for beautiful slaves or New Market for race horses.
But they do offer more immediate enjoyment. For one thing, in them one can see the external expression of social life in appearance and behaviour at its widest and most varied, where one can admire beauty of body or air, hear voices remarkable either for sweetness of refinement, look on elegance of clothes or deportment. What is more, these parties are schools for training in sociability, for in them we have to treat strangers as friends. So, in them we see social sympathy in widest commonality spread, or at least should. We show an atrophy of the natural human instinct of getting pleasure and happiness out of other human beings if we cannot treat strangers as friends for the moment. And I would go further and paraphrase Pater to say that not to be able to discriminate every moment some passionate attitude in those about us, even when we meet them casually, is on this short day of frost and sun which out life is, to sleep before evening.
So, it will be seen that my conception of social life is modest, for it makes no demands on what we have, though it does make some on what we are. Interest, wonder, sympathy, and love, the first two leading to the last two, are the psychological prerequisites for social life; and the need for the first two must not be underrated. We cannot make the most even of our intimate social life unless we are able to make strangers of our oldest friends everyday by discovering unknown areas in their personality, and transform them into new friends. In sum, social life is a function of vitality.
It is tragic, however, to observe that it is these very natural springs of social life which are drying up among us. It is becoming more and more difficult to come across fellow-feeling for human beings as such in our society and in all its strata. In the poor middle class, in the course of all my life. I have hardly seen any social life properly so-called. Not only has the grinding routine of making a living killed all desire for it in them, it has also generated a standing mood of peevish hostility to other human beings. Increasing economic distress in recent years has infinitely worsened this state of affairs, and has also brought a sinister addition class hatred. This has become the greatest collective emotional enjoyment of the poor middle class, and indeed they feel most social when they form a pack, and snarl or howl at people who are better off than they.
Their most innocent exhibition of sociability is seen when they spill out from their intolerable homes into the streets and bazaars. I was astonished to see the milling crowds in the poor suburbs of Calcutta. But even there a group of flippant young loafers would put on a conspiratorial look if they saw a man in good clothes passing by them either on foot or in a car. I had borrowed a car from a relative to visit a friend in one of these suburbs, and he became very anxious when I had not returned before dusk. Acid and bombs, he said, were thrown at cars almost every evening in that area. I was amazed. But I also know as a fact that my brother was blackmailed to pay five rupees on a trumped up charge when passing in a car through one such locality.
The situation is differently inhuman, but not a whit more human, among the well-to-do. Kindliness for fellow human beings has been smothered in them, taken as a class, by the arrogance of worldly position, which among the Bengalis who show this snobbery is often only a third-class position.
What is the author trying to show through the two incidents in the paragraph beginning, Their most innocent exhibition of sociability ?
Solution:
The correct ans. is (4) as can be seen by the first line
of the second last para. If you read the previous para
also youll find that what the author is actually saying is
that the so called social life is not as per the real
definitions. (1). is not right as the author is nowhere
showing that the crowds in poor Calcutta can turn
violent anytime. He is just giving a couple of instances
to prove his point. We cant generalize like this. (2) is
the opposite of what the author is trying to show. (3)
again is a generalization.
Q.No: 262
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 5
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
According to the author, why did the Greeks NOT conduct experiments to understand the physical world?
Solution:
Refer to the part it remains a fact that the Greeks
never
seem to have realized the importance of experiment.
(1) is clearly the answer. The Greek preference for
geometry is not mentioned in the passage, so (2) and
(4) are out. (3) is a superficial answer.
Q.No: 263
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 5
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
The statement Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty suggests that
Solution:
Refer to the part physical processes of nature would
prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous
mathematical laws. (3) is clearly the answer. (1) is not
true. (2) is also refuted and (4) is irrelevant.
Q.No: 264
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 5
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Newton may be considered one of the greatest scientists of all time because he
Solution:
Refer to the part account be taken of his joint
contributions to mathematics and physics. (2) is
clearly the answer. (1), (3) and (4) are specific aspects.
Q.No: 265
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 5
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Which of the following statements about modern science best captures the theme of the passage?
Solution:
Refer to the part extension of the validity. The writer
states that Einstein's special principle is an extension
of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle. This
being the concluding sentence makes (4) the best
answer. (1) and (2) are not correct observations. (3)
sounds plausible but it is actually a vague observation.
Q.No: 266
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions.
Choose the best answer to each question.
Passage 5
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
Modern science, exclusive of geometry, is a comparatively recent creation and can be said to have originated with Galileo and Newton. Galileo was the first scientist to recognize clearly that the only way to further our understanding of the physical world was to resort to experiment. However obvious Galileos contention may appear in the light of our present knowledge, it remains a fact that the Greeks, in spite of their proficiency in geometry, never seem to have realized the importance of experiment. To a certain extent, this may be attributed to the crudeness of their instruments of measurement. Still an excuse of this sort can scarcely be put forward when the elementary nature of Galileos experiments and observations is recalled. Watching a lamp oscillate in the cathedral of Pisa, dropping bodies from the leaning tower of Pisa, rolling balls down inclined planes, noticing the magnifying effect of water in a spherical glass vase, such was the nature of Galileos experiments and observations. As can be seen, they might just as well have been performed by the Greeks. At any rate, it was thanks to such experiments that Galileo discovered the fundamental law of dynamics, according to which the acceleration imparted to a body is proportional to the force acting upon it.
The next advance was due to Newton, the greatest scientist of all time if account be taken of his joint contributions to mathematics and physics. As a physicist, he was of course an ardent adherent of the empirical method, but his greatest title to fame lies in another direction. Prior to Newton, mathematics, chiefly in the form of geometry, had been studied as a fine art without any view to its physical applications other than in very trivial cases. But with Newton all the resources of mathematics were turned to advantage in the solution of physical problems. Thenceforth, mathematics appeared as an instrument of discovery, the most powerful one known to man, multiplying the power of thought just as in the mechanical domain the lever multiplied our physical action. It is this application of mathematics to the solution of physical problems, this combination of two separate fields of investigation, which constitutes the essential characteristic of the Newtonian method. Thus, problems of physics were metamorphosed into problems of mathematics.
But in Newtons day the mathematical instrument was still in a very backward state of development. In this field again Newton showed the mark of genius by inventing the integral calculus. As a result of this remarkable discovery, problems, which would have baffled Archimedes, were solved with ease. We know that in Newtons hands this new departure in scientific method led to the discovery of the law of gravitation. But here again the real significance of Newtons achievement lay not so much in the exact quantitative formulation of the law of attraction, as in his having established the presence of law and order at least in one important realm of nature, namely, in the motions of heavenly bodies. Nature thus exhibited rationality and was not mere blind chaos and uncertainty. To be sure, Newtons investigations had been concerned with but a small group of natural phenomena, but it appeared unlikely that this mathematical law and order should turn out to be restricted to certain special phenomena; and the feeling was general that all the physical processes of nature would prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous mathematical laws.
When Einstein, in 1905, published his celebrated paper on the electrodynamics of moving bodies, he remarked that the difficulties, which surrounded the equations of electrodynamics, together with the negative experiments of Michelson and others, would be obviated if we extended the validity of the Newtonian principle of the relativity of Galilean motion, which applies solely to mechanical phenomena, so as to include all manner of phenomena: electrodynamics, optical etc. When extended in this way the Newtonian principle of relativity became Einsteins special principle of relativity. Its significance lay in its assertion that absolute Galilean motion or absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental detection. Henceforth absolute velocity should be conceived of as physically meaningless, not only in the particular realm of mechanics, as in Newtons day, but in the entire realm of physical phenomena. Einsteins special principle, by adding increased emphasis to this relativity of velocity, making absolute velocity metaphysically meaningless, created a still more profound distinction between velocity and accelerated or rotational motion. This latter type of motion remained absolute and real as before. It is most important to understand this point and to realize that Einsteins special principle is merely an extension of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle to all classes of phenomena.
The significant implication of Einsteins special principle of relativity is that
Solution:
The correct answer is (3) If you read the 6th line of last
para its given that the principles assertion was that
absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental
detection. Which means that sometimes we cant
experiment. This is very similar to (3). Ans. choice (1)
is a fact and not an implication. (2). Is again a fact and
in (4). The word meaningless is too strong and this
choice is a generalization from a specific point.
Generalizations need not be correct.
Q.No: 267
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 26 to 30: The poem given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
Which of the following best reflects the central theme of this poem?
Solution:
Refer to the part better if it lasts for years
wealthy
with all you have gained on the way. (2) is clearly the
answer. (3) is far-fetched. (1) is an isolated
observation. (4) is totally incorrect.
Q.No: 268
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 26 to 30: The poem given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
The poet recommends a long journey. Which of the following is the most comprehensive reason for it?
Solution:
Refer to the part as many sensual perfumes as you
can
to gather stores of knowledge. (1) is clearly the
answer. (2), (3) and (4) are short-sighted observations.
Q.No: 269
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 26 to 30: The poem given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
In the poem, Ithaka is a symbol of
Solution:
Refer to the part Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for. (4) is
undoubtedly the answer.
Q.No: 270
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 26 to 30: The poem given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
What does the poet mean by Laistrygonians and Cyclops?
Solution:
Refer to the part you bring them along inside your
soul. (3) is undoubtedly the answer.
Q.No: 271
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (L)
DIRECTIONS for Questions 26 to 30: The poem given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
As you set out for Ithaka
hope the journey is a long one,
full of adventure, full of discovery.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
angry Poseidon dont be afraid of them:
youll never find things like that on your way
as long as you keep your thoughts raised high,
as long as a rare excitement
stirs your spirit and your body.
Laistrygonians and Cyclops,
wild Poseidon you wont encounter them
unless you bring them along inside your soul,
unless your soul sets them up in front of you.
Hope the voyage is a long one,
may there be many a summer morning when,
with what pleasure, what joy,
you come into harbours seen for the first time;
may you stop at Phoenician trading stations
to buy fine things,
mother of pearl and coral, amber and ebony,
sensual perfume of every kind
as many sensual perfumes as you can;
and may you visit many Egyptian cities
to gather stores of knowledge from their scholars.
Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for.
But do not hurry the journey at all.
Better if it lasts for years,
so you are old by the time you reach the island,
wealthy with all you have gained on the way,
not expecting Ithaka to make you rich.
Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out.
She has nothing left to give you now.
And if you find her poor, Ithaka wont have fooled you.
Wise as you will have become, so full of experience,
you will have understood by then what these Ithakas mean.
Which of the following best reflects the tone of the poem?
Solution:
Refer to the part Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out. The poem has
a tone of encouragement and promise. (2) is clearly
the answer. (1), (3) and (4) are ridiculous choices.
Q.No: 272
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
PASSAGE 1
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
What is the fourth paragraph of the passage, starting, "How much bigger . . . ", about?
Solution:
Paragraph 4 clearly talks about the increase in size of the aircraft.
Q.No: 273
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
PASSAGE 1
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
Why might radars not be used a decade from now?
Solution:
See third paragraph last two lines. It is clearly mentioned that 'new free-flight concept . . . and other planes'.
Q.No: 274
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
PASSAGE 1
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
According to the author, commercial aeronautics, in contrast to military aeronautics, has declined because, among other things.
Solution:
Paragraph 5, fourth line says that there is 'also a need for . . ., design talents . . .'
Q.No: 275
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
PASSAGE 1
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
According to the first paragraph of the passage, which of the following statements is NOT false?
Solution:
First paragraph fifth line says . . ., happened in less than a decade.
Q.No: 276
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
PASSAGE 1
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
The invention of the gas turbine by Frank Whittle in England and Hans von Ohain in Germany in 1939 signalled the beginning of jet transport. Although the French engineer Lorin had visualized the concept of jet propulsion more than 25 years earlier, it took improved materials and the genius of Whittle and von Ohain to recognize the advantage that a gas turbine offered over a piston engine, including speeds in excess of 350 miles per hour. The progress from the first flights of liquid propellant rocket and jet-propelled aircraft in 1939 to the first faster-than-sound (supersonic) manned airplane (the Bell X-1) in 1947 happened in less than a decade. This then led very rapidly to a series of supersonic fighters and bombers, the first of which became operational in the 1950s. World War II technology foundations and emerging Cold War imperatives then led us into space with the launch of Sputnik in 1957 and the placing of the first man on the moon only 12 years later a mere 24 years after the end of World War II.
Now a hypersonic flight can take you anywhere in the planet in less than four hours. British Royal Air Force and Royal Navy and the air forces of several other countries are going to use a single-engine cousin to the F/A-22, called the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. These planes exhibit stealthy angles and coatings that make it difficult for radar to detect them, among aviations most cutting-edge advances in design. The V-22, known as tilt-rotor, part helicopter, part airplane, takes off vertically, then tilts its engine forward for winged flight. It provides speed, three times the payload, five times the range of the helicopters its meant to replace. The new fighter, F/A-22 Raptor, with more than a million parts, shows a perfect amalgamation of stealth, speed, avionics and agility.
It seems conventional forms, like the Predator and Global Hawk are passé, the stealthier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are in. They are shaped like kites, bats and boomerang, all but invisible to the enemy radar and able to remain over hostile territory without any fear of getting grilled if shot down. Will the UAVs take away pilots jobs permanently? Can a computer-operated machine take a smarter and faster decision in a war-like situation? The new free-flight concept will probably supplement the existing air traffic control system by computers on each plane to map the altitude, route, weather and other planes; and a decade from now, there will be no use of radar any more.
How much bigger can the airplanes get? In the 50s they got speed, in the 80s they became stealthy. Now they are getting smarter thanks to computer automation. The change is quite huge: from the four-seater to the A380 airplane. It seems we are now trading speed for size as we build a new superjumbo jet, the 555 seater A380, which will fly at almost the same speed of the Boeing 707, introduced half a century ago, but with an improved capacity, range, greater fuel economy. A few years down the line will come the truly larger model, to be known as 747X. In the beginning of 2005, the A380, the worlds first fully double-decked superjumbo passenger jet, weighing 1.2 million pounds, may carry a load of about 840 passengers.
Barring the early phase, civil aviation has always lagged behind the military technologies (of jet engines, lightweight composite materials, etc.). There are two fundamental factors behind the decline in commercial aeronautics in comparison to military aeronautics. There is no collective vision of our future such as the one that drove us in the past. There is also a need for a more aggressive pool of airplane design talents to maintain an industry that continues to find a multibillion dollar-a-year market for its product.
Can the history of aviation technology tell us something about the future of aeronautics? Have we reached a final state in our evolution to a mature technology in aeronautics? Are the challenges of coming out with the better, cheaper, faster designs somehow inferior to those that are suited for faster, higher, further? Safety should improve greatly as a result of the forthcoming improvements in airframes, engines, and avionics. Sixty years from now, aircraft will recover on their own if the pilot loses control. Satelites are the key not only to GPS (global positioning system) navigation but also to in-flight communications, uplinked weather, and even in-flight e-mail. Although there is some debate about what type of engines will power future airplanes lightweight turbines, turbocharged diesels, or both there is little debate about how these power plants will be controlled. Pilots of the future can look forward to more and better on-board safety equipment.
What is the most noteworthy difference between V-22 and a standard airplane?
Solution:
Paragraph 2, fourth line talks about the differences and explicitly mentions takes off vertically.
Q.No: 277
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 2
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
According to the passage, what led to the secularisation of the curriculum of the liberal arts in the 12th century?
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 5, line 1 'became . . . more divorced from religion.'
Q.No: 278
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 2
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
According to the author, in the 12th century, individuals were motivated to get higher education because it
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 1, line 10 . . . a means for advancement not only in income but also in status.
Q.No: 279
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 2
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
According to the passage, 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular because
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 3: Let us look at the clerical side first and paragraph 4, line 5 even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals.
Q.No: 280
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 2
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
What does the sentence Christians educate their sons . . . will be ours and the other brothers imply?
Solution:
Refer to para 1, line 7 Christians educate their sons
. . . for gain . . .
Q.No: 281
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 2
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
Pure love of learning, of course, was a less compelling motive for those who became educated for careers other than teaching. Students of law in particular had a reputation for being materialistic careerists in an age when law was becoming known as the lucrative science and its successful practice the best means for rapid advancement in the government of both church and state. Medicine too had its profit-making attractions. Those who did not go on to law or medicine could, if they had been well trained in the arts, gain positions at royal courts or rise in the clergy. Eloquent testimony to the profit motive behind much of 12th-century education was the lament of a student of Abelard around 1150: Christians educate their sons . . . for gain, in order that the one brother, if he be a clerk, may help his father and mother and his other brothers, saying that a clerk will have no heir and whatever he has will be ours and the other brothers. With the opening of positions in law, government and the church, education became a means for advancement not only in income but also in status. Most who were educated were wealthy, but in the 12th century, more often than before, many were not and were able to rise through the ranks by means of their education. The most familiar examples are Thomas Becket, who rose from a humble background to become chancellor of England and then archbishop of Canterbury, and John of Salisbury, who was born a plebeian but because of his reputation for learning died as bishop of Chartres.
The instances of Becket and John of Salisbury bring us to the most difficult question concerning 12th-century education: To what degree was it still a clerical preserve? Despite the fact that throughout the 12th century the clergy had a monopoly of instruction, one of the outstanding medievalists of our day, R. W. Southern, refers with good reason to the institutions staffed by the clergy as secular schools. How can we make sense out of the paradox that 12th-century schools were clerical and yet secular?
Let us look at the clerical side first. Not only were all 12th-century teachers except professionals and craftsmen in church order, but in northern Europe students in schools had clerical status and looked like priests. Not that all really were priests, but by virtue of being students all were awarded the legal privileges accorded to the clergy. Furthermore, the large majority of 12th-century students, outside of the possible exception of Italy, if not already priests became so after their studies were finished. For these reasons, the term cleric was often used to denote a man who was literate and the term layman one who was illiterate. The English word for cleric, clerk, continued for a long time to be a synonym for student or for a man who could write, while the French word clerc even today has the connotation of intellectual.
Despite all this, 12th-century education was taking on many secular qualities in its environment, goals, and curriculum. Student life obviously became more secular when it moved out from the monasteries into the bustling towns. Most students wandered from town to town in search not only of good masters but also of worldly excitement, and as the 12th century progressed they found the best of each in Paris. More important than environment was the fact that most students, even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals. Theology was recognized as the queen of the sciences, but very few went on to it. Instead they used their study of the liberal arts as a preparation for law, medicine, government service, or advancement in the ecclesiastical hierarchy.
This being so, the curriculum of the liberal arts became more sophisticated and more divorced from religion. Teaching was still almost exclusively in Latin, and the first book most often read was the Psalter, but further education was no longer similar to that of a choir school. In particular, the discipline of rhetoric was transformed from a linguistic study into instruction in how to compose letters and documents; there was a new stress on logic; and in all the liberal arts and philosophy texts more advanced than those known in the early Middle Ages were introduced.
Along with the rise of logic came the translation of Greek and Arabic philosophical and scientific works. Most important was the translation of almost all the writings of Aristotle, as well as his sophisticated Arabic commentators, which helped to bring about an intellectual revolution based on Greek rationalism. On a more prosaic level, contact with Arabs resulted in the introduction in the 12th century of the Arabic numeral system and the concept of zero. Though most westerners first resisted this and made crude jokes about the zero as an ambitious number that counts for nothing and yet wants to be counted, the system steadily made its inroads first in Italy and then throughout Europe, thereby vastly simplifying the arts of computation and record-keeping.
According to the passage, which of the following is the most noteworthy trend in education in 12th-century Europe?
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 4, line 1 edu was taking on many secular qualities . . .
Q.No: 282
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question. PASSAGE 3
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
The central theme of the passage can be best summarized as
Solution:
Refer to the part while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of Panchayats
Q.No: 283
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question. PASSAGE 3
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
The sentence in the last paragraph, "And their own volition has been further circumscribed. . ." refers to
Solution:
Refer to the words volition which means preference and circumscribe which means confine
Q.No: 284
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question. PASSAGE 3
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
What is the 'dilemma' at the intra-State level mentioned in the first paragraph of the passage?
Solution:
Refer to the part while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of Panchayats
Q.No: 285
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question. PASSAGE 3
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
Which of the following most closely describes the 'fatal flaw' that the passage refers to?
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Q.No: 286
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question. PASSAGE 3
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
At first sight, it looks as though panchayati raj, the lower layer of federalism in our polity, is as firmly entrenched in our system as is the older and higher layer comprising the Union Government and the State. Like the democratic institutions at the higher level, those at the panchayat level, the panchayati raj institutions (PRIs), are written into and protected by the Constitution. All the essential features, which distinguish a unitary system from a federal one, are as much enshrined at the lower as at the upper level of our federal system. But look closely and you will discover a fatal flaw. The letter of the Constitution as well as the spirit of the present polity have exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free. The flaw has many causes. But all of them are rooted in an historical anomaly, that while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of panchayats.
At both levels of our federal system there is the same tussle between those who have certain rights and those who try to encroach upon them if they believe they can. Thus, the Union Government was able to encroach upon certain rights given to the States by the Constitution. It got away with that because the single dominant party system, which characterised Centre-State relations for close upon two decades, gave the party in power at the Union level many extra-constitutional political levers. Second, the Supreme Court had not yet begun to extend the limits of its power. But all that has changed in recent times. The spurt given to a multi-party democracy by the overthrow of the Emergency in 1977 became a long-term trend later on because of the ways in which a vigorously democratic multi-party system works in a political society which is as assertively pluralistic as Indian society is. It gives political clout to all the various segments which constitute that society. Secondly, because of the linguistic reorganisation of States in the 1950s, many of the most assertive segments have found their most assertive expression as States. Thirdly, with single-party dominance becoming a thing of the past at the Union level, governments can be formed at that level only by multi-party coalitions in which State-level parties are major players. This has made it impossible for the Union Government to do much about anything unless it also carries a sufficient number of State-level parties with it. Indian federalism is now more real than it used to be, but an unfortunate side-effect is that Indias panchayati raj system, inaugurated with such fanfare in the early 1980s, has become less real.
By the time the PRIs came on the scene, most of the political space in our federal system had been occupied by the Centre in the first 30 years of Independence, and most of what was still left after that was occupied by the States in the next 20. PRIs might have hoped to wrest some space from their immediate neighbour, the States, just as the States had wrested some from the Centre. But having at last managed to checkmate the Centres encroachments on their rights, the States were not about to allow the PRIs to do some encroaching of their own.
By the 1980s and early 1990s, the only nationally left, the Congress, had gone deeper into a siege mentality. Finding itself surrounded by State-level parties, it had built walls against them in stead of winning them over. Next, the States retaliated by blocking Congress proposals for panchayati raj in Parliament, suspecting that the Centre would try to use panchayats to by-pass State Governments. The suspicion fed on the fact that the powers proposed by the Congress for panchayats were very similar to many of the more lucrative powers of State Governments. State-level leaders also feared, perhaps, that if panchayat-level leaders captured some of the larger PRIs, such as district-level panchayats, they would exert pressure on State-level leaders through intra-State multi-party federalism.
It soon became obvious to Congress leaders that there was no way the panchayati raj amendments they wanted to write into the Constitution would pass muster unless State-level parties were given their pound of flesh. The amendments were allowed only after it was agreed that the powers of panchayats could be listed in the Constitution. Illustratively, they would be defined and endowed on PRIs by the State Legislature acting at its discretion.
This left the door wide open for the States to exert the power of the new political fact that while the Union and State Governments could afford to ignore panchayats as long as the MLAs were happy, the Union Government had to be sensitive to the demands of State-level parties. This has given State-level actors strong beachheads on the shores of both inter-State and intra-State federalism. By using various administrative devices and non-elected parallel structures, State Governments have subordinated their PRIs to the State administration and given the upper hand to State Government officials against the elected heads of PRIs. Panchayats have become local agencies for implementing schemes drawn up in distant State capitals. And their own volition has been further circumscribed by a plethora of Centrally-sponsored schemes. These are drawn up by even more distant Central authorities but at the same time tie up local staff and resources on pain of the schemes being switched off in the absence of matching local contribution. The foreign aid syndrome can be clearly seen at work behind this kind of grass roots development.
Which of the following best captures the current state of Indian federalism as described in the passage?
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Q.No: 287
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 4
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
According to the passage, which of the following statements about cultural capital is NOT true?
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Q.No: 288
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 4
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
According to the passage, the patterns of socialization of working-class children make them most suited for jobs that require
Solution:
Refer to the part jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders.
Q.No: 289
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 4
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
When Straddlers enter white collar jobs, they get lost because
Solution:
Refer to the part Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values
Q.No: 290
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 4
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
What does the authors statement, "My father wasn't interested in Thucydides, and I wasn't up on arches," illustrate?
Solution:
Refer to the part Were separated by class
Q.No: 291
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 4
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
While I was in class at Columbia, struggling with the esoterica du jour, my father was on a bricklayers scaffold not far up the street, working on a campus building. Once we met up on the subway going home he was with his tools, I with my books. My father wasnt interested in Thucydides, and I wasnt up on arches. My dad has built lots of places in New York City he cant get into: colleges, condos, office towers. He made his living on the outside. Once the walls were up, a place took on a different feel for him, as though he wasnt welcome anymore. Related by blood, were separated by class, my father and I. Being the white-collar child of a blue-collar parent means being the hinge on the door between two ways of life. With one foot in the working-class, the other in the middle class, people like me are Straddlers, at home in neither world, living a limbo life.
What drove me to leave what I knew? Born blue-collar, I still never felt completely at home among the tough guys and anti-intellectual crowd of my neighbourhood in deepest Brooklyn. I never did completely fit in among the preppies and suburban royalty of Columbia, either. Its like that for Straddlers. It was not so smooth jumping from Italian old-world style to US professional in a single generation. Others who were the first in their families to go to college, will tell you the same thing: the academy can render you unrecognisable to the very people who launched you into the world. The ideas and values absorbed in college challenge the mom-and pop orthodoxy that passed for truth for 18 years. Limbo folk may eschew polyester blends for sea-isle cotton, prefer Brie to Kraft slices. They marry outside the neighbourhood and raise their kids differently. They might not be in church on Sunday.
When they pick careers (not jobs), its often a kind of work their parents never heard of or cant understand. But for the white-collar kids of blue-collar parents, the office is not necessarily a sanctuary. In Corporate America, where the rules are based on notions foreign to working-class people, a Straddler can get lost. Social class counts at the office, even though nobody likes to admit it. Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values, business types say. From an early age, middle-class people learn how to get along, using diplomacy, nuance, and politics to grab what they need. It is as though they are following a set of rules laid out in a manual that blue-collar families never have the chance to read.
People born into the middle class to parents with college degrees have lived lives filled with what French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls cultural capital. Growing up in an educated environment, they learn about Picasso and Mozart, stock portfolios and crème brulee. In a home with cultural capital, there are networks: someone always has an aunt or golfing buddy with the inside track for an internship or some entry-level job. Dinner-table talk could involve what happened that day to mom and dad at the law firm, the doctors office, or the executive suite. Middle-class kids can grow up with a sense of entitlement that will carry them through their lives. This belongingness is not just related to having material means, it also has to do with learning and possessing confidence in your place in the world. Such early access and direct exposure to culture in the home is the more organic, legitimate means of appropriating cultural capital, Bourdieu tells us. Those of us possessing ill-gotten Culture can learn it, but never as well. Something is always a little off about us, like an engine with imprecise timing. Theres a greater match between middle-class lives and the institutions in which the middle class works and operates universities or corporations. Children of the middle and upper classes have been speaking the language of the bosses and supervisors forever.
Blue-collar kids are taught by their parents and communities to work hard to achieve, and that merit is rewarded. But no blue-collar parent knows whether such things are true in the middle-class world. Many professionals born to the working-class report feeling out of place and out of place and outmanoeuvred in the office. Soon enough, Straddlers learn that straight talk wont always cut. Resolving conflicts head-on and speaking your mind doesnt always work, no matter how educated the Straddler is.
In the working-class, people perform jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders and instructions. That, in turn, affects how they socialise their children. Children of the working-class are brought up in a home in which conformity, obedience and intolerance for back talk are the norm the same characteristics that make a good factory worker.
Which of the following statements about Straddlers does the passage NOT support explicitly?
Solution:
(1), (2) and (3) are specifically stated in the passage at the end of the first paragraph and the second paragraph.
Q.No: 292
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 5
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
"The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength." Which of the following best captures the 'challenge' that is being referred to?
Solution:
Refer to last paragraph, line 10 they would build what was more beautiful than . . .
Q.No: 293
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 5
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
Which of the following is NOT a characteristic of Greek architecture, according to the passage?
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 1, line 3 Mysticism on the whole was alien and last paragraph lines 6 and 7.
Q.No: 294
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 5
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
From the passage, which of the following combinations can be inferred to be correct?
Solution:
Refer to last paragraph, lines 3 and 4 Simplicity in the Parthenon St. Columns . . .
Q.No: 295
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 5
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
According to the passage, what conception of man can be inferred from Egyptian architecture?
Solution:
Paragraph 4, last line . . . insignificant atom that was man.
Q.No: 296
Test Name : CAT Paper 2003 (R)
Directions for questions 1 to 25: Each of the five passages given below is followed by five questions. Choose the best answer to each question.PASSAGE 5
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
The endless struggle between the flesh and the spirit found an end in Greek art. The Greek artists were unaware of it. They were spiritual materialists, never denying the importance of the body and ever seeing in the body a spiritual significance. Mysticism on the whole was alien to the Greeks, thinkers as they were. Thought and mysticism never go well together and there is little symbolism in Greek art. Athena was not a symbol of wisdom but an embodiment of it and her statues were beautiful grave women, whose seriousness might mark them as wise, but who were marked in no other way. The Apollo Belvedere is not a symbol of the sun, nor the Versailles Artemis of the moon. There could be nothing less akin to the ways of symbolism than their beautiful, normal humanity. Nor did decoration really interest the Greeks. In all their art they were preoccupied with what they wanted to express, not with ways of expressing it, and lovely expression, merely as lovely expression, did not appeal to them at all.
Greek art is intellectual art, the art of men who were clear and lucid thinkers, and it is therefore plain art. Artists than whom the world has never seen greater, men endowed with the spirits best gift, found their natural method of expression in the simplicity and clarity which are the endowment of the unclouded reason. Nothing in excess, the Greek axiom of art, is the dictum of men who would brush aside all obscuring, entangling superfluity, and see clearly, plainly, unadorned, what they wished to express. Structure belongs in an especial degree to the province of the mind in art, and architectonics were pre-eminently a mark of the Greek. The power that made a unified whole of the trilogy of a Greek tragedy, that envisioned the sure, precise, decisive scheme of the Greek statue, found its most conspicuous expression in Greek architecture. The Greek temple is the creation, par excellence, of mind and spirit in equilibrium.
A Hindoo temple is a conglomeration of adornment. The lines of the building are completely hidden by the decorations. Sculptured figures and ornaments crowd its surface, stand out from it in thick masses, break it up into a bewildering series of irregular tiers. It is not a unity but a collection, rich, confused. It looks like something not planned but built this way and that as the ornament required. The conviction underlying it can be perceived: each bit of the exquisitely wrought detail had a mystical meaning and the temples exterior was important only as a means for the artist to inscribe thereon the symbols of the truth. It is decoration, not architecture.
Again, the gigantic temples of Egypt, those massive immensities of granite which look as if only the power that moves in the earthquake were mighty enough to bring them into existence, are something other than the creation of geometry balanced by beauty. The science and the spirit are there, but what is there most of all is force, unhuman force, calm but tremendous, overwhelming. It reduces to nothingness all that belongs to man. He is annihilated. The Egyptian architects were possessed by the consciousness of the awful, irresistible domination of the ways of nature; they had no thought to give to the insignificant atom that was man.
Greek architecture of the great age is the expression of men who were, first of all, intellectual artists, kept firmly within the visible world by their mind, but, only second to that, lovers of the human world. The Greek temple is the perfect expression of the pure intellect illumined by the spirit. No other great buildings anywhere approach its simplicity. In the Parthenon straight columns rise to plain capitals; a pediment is sculptured in bold relief; there is nothing more. And yet here is the Greek miracle this absolute simplicity of structure is alone in majesty of beauty among all the temples and cathedrals and palaces of the world. Majestic but human, truly Greek. No superhuman force as in Egypt; no strange supernatural shapes as in India; the Parthenon is the home of humanity at ease, calm, ordered, sure of itself and the world. The Greeks flung a challenge to nature in the fullness of their joyous strength. They set their temples on the summit of a hill overlooking the wide sea, outlined against the circle of the sky. They would build what was more beautiful than hill and sea and sky and greater than all these. It matters not at all if the temple is large or small; one never thinks of the size. It matters not how much it is in ruins. A few white columns dominate the lofty height at Sunion as securely as the great mass of the Parthenon dominates all the sweep of sea and land around Athens. To the Greek architect man was the master of the world. His mind could understand its laws; his spirit could discover its beauty.
According to the passage, which of the following best explains why there is little symbolism in Greek art?
Solution:
Paragraph 1, line 3 Mysticism on the whole was alien and paragraph 2 line 1 Greek art is intellectual are . . .
Q.No: 297
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
The duty of science, according to the author is :-
Solution:
The author thinks it is the duty of science to study the
means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new
world.
Q.No: 298
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
Archimedes, Leonardo and Galileo have been mentioned to substantiate the statement that
Solution:
The examples of these scientists have been given to
show that scientists have always been associated
with war.
Q.No: 299
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
The ground on which the author suggests that all scientists should join in educating mankind regarding the perils of a great war is that
Solution:
The author says that it is the labour of scientists that
has led to all these dangers so scientists have to
work to save mankind from this madness.
Q.No: 300
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
In modern times, the crux of the matter as far as scientists are concerned is that
Solution:
Till now the scientists felt loyalty to their own state
was paramount. But now the loyalty to human race
should replace it.
Q.No: 301
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
The instance of Kaptiza cited by the author goes to prove that
Solution:
The example has been used to prove how scientists
felt that loyalty to their states, to whatever ends it led
to, was paramount.
Q.No: 302
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
Which among the following statements is not true according to the information provided in the passage?
Solution:
The passage states that scientists have always been
associated with war and always have been respected.
Q.No: 303
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
The duty of the scientist, according to the passage, is
Solution:
The passage states that it is part of the duty of men of
science to see that important knowledge is widely
disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this
or that propaganda.
Q.No: 304
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
The evils which have resulted from knowledge of the physical world can only be overcome by
Solution:
Only an adequate progress in human sciences can
overcome evils that have resulted from the knowledge
of the physical world.
Q.No: 305
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
A difficult readjustment in the scientist’s conception of duty is imperatively necessary. As Lord Adrain said in his address to the British Association, “unless we are ready to give up some of our old loyalties, we may be forced into a fight which might end the human race”. This matter of loyalty is the crux. Hitherto, in the East and in the West alike, most scientists, like most other people, have felt that loyalty to their own state is paramount. They have no longer a right to feel this. Loyalty to the human race must take its place. Everyone in the West will at once admit this as regards Soviet scientists. We are shocked that Kapitza who was Rutherford’s favourite pupil, was willing when the Soviet government refused him permission to return to Cambridge, to place his scientific skill at the disposal of those who wished to spread communism by means of H-bombs. We do not so readily apprehend a similar failure of duty on our own side. I do not wish to be thought to suggest treachery, since that is only a transference of loyalty to another national state. I am suggesting a very different thing; that scientists the world over should join in enlightening mankind as to the perils of a great war and in devising methods for its prevention. I urge with all the emphasis at my disposal that this is the duty of scientists in East and West alike. It is difficult duty, and one likely to entail penalties for those who perform it. Bu after all it is the labours of scientists which have caused the danger and on this account, if on no other, scientists must do everything in their power to save mankind from the madness which they have made possible. Science from the dawn of history, and probably longer, has been intimately associated with war. I imagine that when our ancestors descended from the trees they were victorious over the arboreal conservatives because flints were sharper than coconuts. To come to more recent times, Archimedes was respected for his scientific defense of Syracuse against the Romans; Leonardo obtained employment under the Duke of Milan because of his skill in fortification, though he did mention in a postscript that he could also paint a bit. Galileo similarly derived an income from the Grant Duke of Tuscany because of his skill in calculating the trajectories of projectiles. In the French Revolution those scientists who were not guillotined devoted themselves to making new explosives. There is therefore no departure from tradition in the present day scientist’s manufacture of A-bombs and H-bomb. All that is new is the extent of their destructive skill.
I do not think that men of science can cease to regard the disinterested pursuit of knowledge as their primary duty. It is true that new knowledge and new skills are sometimes harmful in their effects, but scientists cannot profitably take account of this fact since the effects are impossible to foresee. We cannot blame Columbus because the discovery of the Western Hemisphere spread throughout the Eastern Hemisphere an appallingly devastating plague. Nor can we blame James Watt for the Dust Bowl although if there had been no steam engines and no railways the West would not have been so carelessly or so quickly cultivated. To see that knowledge is wisely used in primarily the duty of statesmen, not of science; but it is part of the duty of men of science to see that important knowledge is widely disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this or that propaganda. Scientific knowledge has its dangers; but so has every great thing. And over and beyond the dangers with which it threatens the present, it opens up, as nothing else can, the vision of a possible happy world, a world without poverty, without war, with little illness. And what is perhaps more than all, when science has mastered the forces which mould human character, it will be able to produce populations in which few suffer from destructive fierceness and in which the great majority regard other people, not as competitors, to be feared, but as helpers in a common task. Science has only recently begun to apply itself to human beings except in their purely physical aspect. Such science as exists in psychology and anthropology has hardly begun to affect political behaviour or private ethics. The minds of men remain attuned to a world that is fast disappearing. The changes in our physical environment require, if they are to bring well being, correlative changes in our beliefs and habits. If we cannot effect these changes, we shall suffer the fate of the dinosaurs, who could not live on dry land.
I think it is the duty of science – I do not say of every individual man of science – to study the means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new world. There are certain things that the world quite obviously needs; tentativeness, as opposed to dogmatism in our beliefs: an expectation of co-operation, rather than competition, in social relations, a lessening of envy and collective hatred. These are things which education could produce without much difficulty. They are not things adequately south in the education of the present day.
It is progress in the human sciences that we must look to undo the evils which have resulted from a knowledge of the physical world hastily and superficially acquired by populations unconscious of the changes in themselves that the new knowledge has made imperative. The road to a happier world than any known in the past lies open before us if atavistic destructive passion can be kept in leash while the necessary adaptations are made. Fears are inevitable in our time, but hopes are equally rational and far more likely to bear good fruit. We must learn to think rather less of the dangers to be avoided than of the good that will be within our grasp if we believe in it and let it dominate our thoughts. Science, whatever unpleasant consequences it may have by the way, is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a liberator from the weight of destructive passion. We are on the threshold of utter disaster or unprecedented glorious achievement. No previous age has been fraught with problems so momentous and it is to science that we must look for happy issue.
Science may be considered a liberator in the sense that :-
Solution:
Science is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of
bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a
liberator from the weight of destructive passion.
Q.No: 306
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
We have planned development with a view to raising standard of living of our teeming millions. Hence our economic development is inspired by social justice.
Which of the following will weaken the argument?
Solution:
The whole argument is based on the fact that we are
planning our development with a purpose in mind. If
development cannot be planned, the argument is
weakened.
Q.No: 307
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
We have planned development with a view to raising standard of living of our teeming millions. Hence our economic development is inspired by social justice.
The argument is based on which of the following assumptions?
I. Social justice is our aim and economic development is the means.
II. There is overpopulation in India.
III. Economic development will lead to social justice.
Solution:
The statement that our economic development is
inspired by social justice implies both the assumptions.
Q.No: 308
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
We have planned development with a view to raising standard of living of our teeming millions. Hence our economic development is inspired by social justice.
Which of the following will strengthen the argument?
Solution:
The argument suggests that our economic development
will lead to better standard of living and it will in turn
bring social justice.
Q.No: 309
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
We will have to take more interest in hydro-electric projects. As the prices of oil have increased, it has become vital that such renewable sources of energy are tapped.
The assumption/assumptions of the argument is /are which of the following?
I. Hydro electric power is a renewable source of energy.
II. Hydro electric power is comparatively cheaper.
Solution:
The reasons given for taking interest in hydro electric
projects are that oil prices are increasing and that
renewable sources should be tapped.
Q.No: 310
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
We will have to take more interest in hydro-electric projects. As the prices of oil have increased, it has become vital that such renewable sources of energy are tapped.
Which of the following will weaken the argument?
Solution:
If hydroelectric power is costlier, then such projects
will not help in the face of rising oil prices.
Q.No: 311
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
There can be no civilization without music, dance or art, for one is not fully, vibrantly alive without them.
The assumption/assumptions of the argument is /are which of the following?
I. Civilization and art are closely linked up.
II. If people are not full of life there can be no civilization.
Solution:
The statement suggests that without music, dance or
art one cannot be fully alive; hence there can be no
civilization.
Q.No: 312
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
There can be no civilization without music, dance or art, for one is not fully, vibrantly alive without them.
Which of the following would weaken the argument?
Solution:
If art has no relation with civilization, the whole
argument is nullified.
Q.No: 313
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
There can be no civilization without music, dance or art, for one is not fully, vibrantly alive without them.
Which of the following would strengthen the argument?
Solution:
The statement considers being vibrantly alive as being
a necessary condition for being civilized.
Q.No: 314
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
It is sometimes mooted that there can be democracy in a two party system. That would be correct if politics were a game like cricket or football; but politics is not sports.
Which of the following would strengthen the argument?
Solution:
If two parties limit the choice of the voters, we cannot
have a true democracy.
Q.No: 315
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
It is sometimes mooted that there can be democracy in a two party system. That would be correct if politics were a game like cricket or football; but politics is not sports.
Which of the following would weaken the argument?
Solution:
If politics were also played like any other game then
two parties would be enough to play that game.
Q.No: 316
Test Name : CAT Paper 1990
It is sometimes mooted that there can be democracy in a two party system. That would be correct if politics were a game like cricket or football; but politics is not sports.
The assumption/assumptions of the argument is/are which of the following?
I. Politics is not a game.
II. Two party system is ideal for democracy.
III. Cricket is played by two teams.
Solution:
The author states that democracy would be possible
with just two parties if it were a game like cricket,
thus assuming that cricket is played by two parties,
or teams.
Q.No: 317
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers : (1 to 6) The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each
question.
Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps - the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.
Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."
Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.
Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.
So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top," he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."
Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps - the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.
Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."
Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.
Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.
So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top," he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."
It can be inferred from the passage that European explorers like Columbus and Megellan
Solution:
The last paragraph of the passage tells us that
Columbus was merely ascribing to the medieval
Christian notion of maps.
Q.No: 318
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers : (1 to 6) The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each
question.
Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps - the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.
Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."
Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.
Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.
So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top," he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."
Understanding where you are in the world is a basic survival skill, which is why we, like most species come hard-wired with specialised brain areas to create cognitive maps of our surroundings. Where humans are unique, though, with the possible exception of honeybees, is that we try to communicate this understanding of the world with others. We have a long history of doing this by drawing maps - the earliest versions yet discovered were scrawled on cave walls 14,000 years ago. Human cultures have been drawing them on stone tablets, papyrus, paper and now computer screens ever since.
Given such a long history of human map-making, it is perhaps surprising that it is only within the last few hundred years that north has been consistently considered to be at the top. In fact, for much of human history, north almost never appeared at the top, according to Jerry Brotton, a map historian... "North was rarely put at the top for the simple fact that north is where darkness comes from," he says. "West is also very unlikely to be put at the top because west is where the sun disappears."
Confusingly, early Chinese maps seem to buck this trend. But, Brotton, says, even though they did have compasses at the time, that isn't the reason that they placed north at the top. Early Chinese compasses were actually oriented to point south, which was considered to be more desirable than deepest darkest north. But in Chinese maps, the Emperor, who lived in the north of the country was always put at the top of the map, with everyone else, his loyal subjects, looking up towards him. "In Chinese culture the Emperor looks south because it's where the winds come from, it's a good direction. North is not very good but you are in a position of subjection to the emperor, so you look up to him," says Brotton.
Given that each culture has a very different idea of who, or what, they should look up to it's perhaps not surprising that there is very little consistency in which way early maps pointed. In ancient Egyptian times the top of the world was east, the position of sunrise. Early Islamic maps favoured south at the top because most of the early Muslim cultures were north of Mecca, so they imagined looking up (south) towards it. Christian maps from the same era (called Mappa Mundi) put east at the top, towards the Garden of Eden and with Jerusalem in the centre.
So when did everyone get together and decide that north was the top? It's tempting to put it down to European explorers like Christopher Columbus and Ferdinand Megellan, who were navigating by the North Star. But Brotton argues that these early explorers didn't think of the world like that at all. "When Columbus describes the world it is in accordance with east being at the top," he says. "Columbus says he is going towards paradise, so his mentality is from a medieval mappa mundi." We've got to remember, adds Brotton, that at the time, "no one knows what they are doing and where they are going."
Which one of the following about the northern orientation of modern maps is asserted in the passage?
Solution:
The author does not offer any explanation of his own,
rather he charts the historical positioning of North in
the passage.
Q.No: 319
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers : (7 to 12) The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I used a smartphone GPS to find my way through the coPPlestoned maze of Geneva's Old Town, in search of a handmade machine that changed the world more than any other invention. Near a 13th-century cathedral in this Swiss city on the shores of a lovely lake, I found what I was looking for: a Gutenberg printing press. "This was the Internet of its day - at least as influential as the iPhone," said Gabriel de Montmollin, the director of the Museum of the Reformation, toying with the replica of Johann Gutenberg's great invention.
[Before the invention of the printing press] it used to take four monks...up to a year to produce a single book. With the advance in movable type in 13th-century Europe, one press could crank out 3,000 pages a day. Before long, average people could travel to places that used to be unknown to them - with maps! Medical information passed more freely and quickly, diminishing the sway of quacks...The printing press offered the prospect that tyrants would never be able to kill a book or suppress an idea. Gutenberg's brainchild broke the monopoly that clerics had on scripture. And later, stirred by pamphlets from a version of that same press, the American colonies rose up against a king and gave birth to a nation.
So, a question in the summer of this 10th anniversary of the iPhone: has the device that is perhaps the most revolutionary of all time given us a single magnificent idea? Nearly every advancement of the written word through new technology has also advanced humankind. Sure, you can say the iPhone changed everything. By putting the world's recorded knowledge in the palm of a hand, it revolutionized work, dining, travel and socialising. It made us more narcissistic - here's more of me doing cool stuff! - and it unleashed an army of awful trolls. We no longer have the patience to sit through a baseball game without that reach to the pocket. And one more casualty of Apple selling more than a billion phones in a decade's time: daydreaming has become a lost art.
For all of that, I'm still waiting to see if the iPhone can do what the printing press did for religion and democracy...the Geneva museum makes a strong case that the printing press opened more minds than anything else...it's hard to imagine the French or American revolutions without those enlightened voices in print...
Not long after Steve Jobs introduced his iPhone, he said the bound book was probably headed for history's attic. Not so fast. After a period of rapid growth in e-books, something closer to the medium for Chaucer's volumes has made a great comeback.
The hope of the iPhone, and the Internet in general, was that it would free people in closed societies. But the failure of the Arab Spring, and the continued suppression of ideas in North Korea, China and Iran, has not borne that out...The iPhone is still young. It has certainly been "one of the most important, worldchanging and successful products in history," as Apple C.E.O. Tim Cook said. But I'm not sure if the world changed for the better with the iPhone - as it did with the printing press - or merely changed.
I used a smartphone GPS to find my way through the coPPlestoned maze of Geneva's Old Town, in search of a handmade machine that changed the world more than any other invention. Near a 13th-century cathedral in this Swiss city on the shores of a lovely lake, I found what I was looking for: a Gutenberg printing press. "This was the Internet of its day - at least as influential as the iPhone," said Gabriel de Montmollin, the director of the Museum of the Reformation, toying with the replica of Johann Gutenberg's great invention.
[Before the invention of the printing press] it used to take four monks...up to a year to produce a single book. With the advance in movable type in 13th-century Europe, one press could crank out 3,000 pages a day. Before long, average people could travel to places that used to be unknown to them - with maps! Medical information passed more freely and quickly, diminishing the sway of quacks...The printing press offered the prospect that tyrants would never be able to kill a book or suppress an idea. Gutenberg's brainchild broke the monopoly that clerics had on scripture. And later, stirred by pamphlets from a version of that same press, the American colonies rose up against a king and gave birth to a nation.
So, a question in the summer of this 10th anniversary of the iPhone: has the device that is perhaps the most revolutionary of all time given us a single magnificent idea? Nearly every advancement of the written word through new technology has also advanced humankind. Sure, you can say the iPhone changed everything. By putting the world's recorded knowledge in the palm of a hand, it revolutionized work, dining, travel and socialising. It made us more narcissistic - here's more of me doing cool stuff! - and it unleashed an army of awful trolls. We no longer have the patience to sit through a baseball game without that reach to the pocket. And one more casualty of Apple selling more than a billion phones in a decade's time: daydreaming has become a lost art.
For all of that, I'm still waiting to see if the iPhone can do what the printing press did for religion and democracy...the Geneva museum makes a strong case that the printing press opened more minds than anything else...it's hard to imagine the French or American revolutions without those enlightened voices in print...
Not long after Steve Jobs introduced his iPhone, he said the bound book was probably headed for history's attic. Not so fast. After a period of rapid growth in e-books, something closer to the medium for Chaucer's volumes has made a great comeback.
The hope of the iPhone, and the Internet in general, was that it would free people in closed societies. But the failure of the Arab Spring, and the continued suppression of ideas in North Korea, China and Iran, has not borne that out...The iPhone is still young. It has certainly been "one of the most important, worldchanging and successful products in history," as Apple C.E.O. Tim Cook said. But I'm not sure if the world changed for the better with the iPhone - as it did with the printing press - or merely changed.
The author attributes the French and American revolutions to the invention of the printing press because
Solution:
The passage mentions that it would be hard to envision
the French and American Revolution without the
enlightened voices in print. This helped to expose new
voices to people.
Q.No: 320
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers : (7 to 12) The passage below is accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I used a smartphone GPS to find my way through the coPPlestoned maze of Geneva's Old Town, in search of a handmade machine that changed the world more than any other invention. Near a 13th-century cathedral in this Swiss city on the shores of a lovely lake, I found what I was looking for: a Gutenberg printing press. "This was the Internet of its day - at least as influential as the iPhone," said Gabriel de Montmollin, the director of the Museum of the Reformation, toying with the replica of Johann Gutenberg's great invention.
[Before the invention of the printing press] it used to take four monks...up to a year to produce a single book. With the advance in movable type in 13th-century Europe, one press could crank out 3,000 pages a day. Before long, average people could travel to places that used to be unknown to them - with maps! Medical information passed more freely and quickly, diminishing the sway of quacks...The printing press offered the prospect that tyrants would never be able to kill a book or suppress an idea. Gutenberg's brainchild broke the monopoly that clerics had on scripture. And later, stirred by pamphlets from a version of that same press, the American colonies rose up against a king and gave birth to a nation.
So, a question in the summer of this 10th anniversary of the iPhone: has the device that is perhaps the most revolutionary of all time given us a single magnificent idea? Nearly every advancement of the written word through new technology has also advanced humankind. Sure, you can say the iPhone changed everything. By putting the world's recorded knowledge in the palm of a hand, it revolutionized work, dining, travel and socialising. It made us more narcissistic - here's more of me doing cool stuff! - and it unleashed an army of awful trolls. We no longer have the patience to sit through a baseball game without that reach to the pocket. And one more casualty of Apple selling more than a billion phones in a decade's time: daydreaming has become a lost art.
For all of that, I'm still waiting to see if the iPhone can do what the printing press did for religion and democracy...the Geneva museum makes a strong case that the printing press opened more minds than anything else...it's hard to imagine the French or American revolutions without those enlightened voices in print...
Not long after Steve Jobs introduced his iPhone, he said the bound book was probably headed for history's attic. Not so fast. After a period of rapid growth in e-books, something closer to the medium for Chaucer's volumes has made a great comeback.
The hope of the iPhone, and the Internet in general, was that it would free people in closed societies. But the failure of the Arab Spring, and the continued suppression of ideas in North Korea, China and Iran, has not borne that out...The iPhone is still young. It has certainly been "one of the most important, worldchanging and successful products in history," as Apple C.E.O. Tim Cook said. But I'm not sure if the world changed for the better with the iPhone - as it did with the printing press - or merely changed.
I used a smartphone GPS to find my way through the coPPlestoned maze of Geneva's Old Town, in search of a handmade machine that changed the world more than any other invention. Near a 13th-century cathedral in this Swiss city on the shores of a lovely lake, I found what I was looking for: a Gutenberg printing press. "This was the Internet of its day - at least as influential as the iPhone," said Gabriel de Montmollin, the director of the Museum of the Reformation, toying with the replica of Johann Gutenberg's great invention.
[Before the invention of the printing press] it used to take four monks...up to a year to produce a single book. With the advance in movable type in 13th-century Europe, one press could crank out 3,000 pages a day. Before long, average people could travel to places that used to be unknown to them - with maps! Medical information passed more freely and quickly, diminishing the sway of quacks...The printing press offered the prospect that tyrants would never be able to kill a book or suppress an idea. Gutenberg's brainchild broke the monopoly that clerics had on scripture. And later, stirred by pamphlets from a version of that same press, the American colonies rose up against a king and gave birth to a nation.
So, a question in the summer of this 10th anniversary of the iPhone: has the device that is perhaps the most revolutionary of all time given us a single magnificent idea? Nearly every advancement of the written word through new technology has also advanced humankind. Sure, you can say the iPhone changed everything. By putting the world's recorded knowledge in the palm of a hand, it revolutionized work, dining, travel and socialising. It made us more narcissistic - here's more of me doing cool stuff! - and it unleashed an army of awful trolls. We no longer have the patience to sit through a baseball game without that reach to the pocket. And one more casualty of Apple selling more than a billion phones in a decade's time: daydreaming has become a lost art.
For all of that, I'm still waiting to see if the iPhone can do what the printing press did for religion and democracy...the Geneva museum makes a strong case that the printing press opened more minds than anything else...it's hard to imagine the French or American revolutions without those enlightened voices in print...
Not long after Steve Jobs introduced his iPhone, he said the bound book was probably headed for history's attic. Not so fast. After a period of rapid growth in e-books, something closer to the medium for Chaucer's volumes has made a great comeback.
The hope of the iPhone, and the Internet in general, was that it would free people in closed societies. But the failure of the Arab Spring, and the continued suppression of ideas in North Korea, China and Iran, has not borne that out...The iPhone is still young. It has certainly been "one of the most important, worldchanging and successful products in history," as Apple C.E.O. Tim Cook said. But I'm not sure if the world changed for the better with the iPhone - as it did with the printing press - or merely changed.
The main conclusion of the passage is that the new technology has
Solution:
The entire point of the passage has been that despite
being an advantageous invention, the iPhone has failed
to liberate or cause an impact comparable to
Gutenberg’s invention of the press. This is best
captured in 2.
Q.No: 321
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers : (22 to 24) The passage below is accompanied by a set of three questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Do sports mega events like the summer Olympic Games benefit the host city economically? It depends, but the prospects are less than rosy. The trick is converting...several billion dollars in operating costs during the 17- day fiesta of the Games into a basis for long-term economic returns. These days, the summer Olympic Games themselves generate total revenue of $4 billion to $5 billion, but the lion's share of this goes to the International Olympics Committee, the National Olympics Committees and the International Sports Federations. Any economic benefit would have to flow from the value of the Games as an advertisement for the city, the new transportation and communications infrastructure that was created for the Games, or the ongoing use of the new facilities.
Evidence suggests that the advertising effect is far from certain. The infrastructure benefit depends on the initial condition of the city and the effectiveness of the planning. The facilities benefit is dubious at best for buildings such as velodromes or natatoriums and problematic for 100,000-seat Olympic stadiums. The latter require a conversion plan for future use, the former are usually doomed to near vacancy. Hosting the summer Games generally requires 30-plus sports venues and dozens of training centers. Today, the Bird's Nest in Beijing sits virtually empty, while the Olympic Stadium in Sydney costs some $30 million a year to operate.
Part of the problem is that Olympics planning takes place in a frenzied and time-pressured atmosphere of intense competition with the other prospective host cities - not optimal conditions for contemplating the future shape of an urban landscape. Another part of the problem is that urban land is generally scarce and growing scarcer. The new facilities often stand for decades or longer. Even if they have future use, are they the best use of precious urban real estate?
Further, cities must consider the human cost. Residential areas often are razed and citizens relocated (without adequate preparation or compensation). Life is made more hectic and congested. There are, after all, other productive uses that can be made of vanishing fiscal resources.
Do sports mega events like the summer Olympic Games benefit the host city economically? It depends, but the prospects are less than rosy. The trick is converting...several billion dollars in operating costs during the 17- day fiesta of the Games into a basis for long-term economic returns. These days, the summer Olympic Games themselves generate total revenue of $4 billion to $5 billion, but the lion's share of this goes to the International Olympics Committee, the National Olympics Committees and the International Sports Federations. Any economic benefit would have to flow from the value of the Games as an advertisement for the city, the new transportation and communications infrastructure that was created for the Games, or the ongoing use of the new facilities.
Evidence suggests that the advertising effect is far from certain. The infrastructure benefit depends on the initial condition of the city and the effectiveness of the planning. The facilities benefit is dubious at best for buildings such as velodromes or natatoriums and problematic for 100,000-seat Olympic stadiums. The latter require a conversion plan for future use, the former are usually doomed to near vacancy. Hosting the summer Games generally requires 30-plus sports venues and dozens of training centers. Today, the Bird's Nest in Beijing sits virtually empty, while the Olympic Stadium in Sydney costs some $30 million a year to operate.
Part of the problem is that Olympics planning takes place in a frenzied and time-pressured atmosphere of intense competition with the other prospective host cities - not optimal conditions for contemplating the future shape of an urban landscape. Another part of the problem is that urban land is generally scarce and growing scarcer. The new facilities often stand for decades or longer. Even if they have future use, are they the best use of precious urban real estate?
Further, cities must consider the human cost. Residential areas often are razed and citizens relocated (without adequate preparation or compensation). Life is made more hectic and congested. There are, after all, other productive uses that can be made of vanishing fiscal resources.
The author feels that the Games place a burden on the host city for all of the following reasons EXCEPT that
Solution:
4 has neither been stated in the passage nor has it
been implied. The other options can be directly verified
from the passage.
Q.No: 322
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (1 to 6) : The passage below is
accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Creativity is at once our most precious resource and our most inexhaustible one. As anyone who has ever spent any time with children knows, every single human being is born creative; every human being is innately endowed with the ability to combine and recombine data, perceptions, materials and ideas, and devise new ways of thinking and doing. What fosters creativity? More than anything else: the presence of other creative people. The big myth is that creativity is the province of great individual geniuses. In fact creativity is a social process. Our biggest creative breakthroughs come when people learn from, compete with, and collaborate with other people.
Cities are the true fonts of creativity... With their diverse populations, dense social networks, and public spaces where people can meet spontaneously and serendipitously, they spark and catalyze new ideas. With their infrastructure for finance, organization and trade, they allow those ideas to be swiftly actualized.
As for what staunches creativity, that’s easy, if ironic. It’s the very institutions that we build to manage, exploit and perpetuate the fruits of creativity – our big bureaucracies, and sad to say, too many of our schools. Creativity is disruptive; schools and organizations are regimented, standardized and stultifying.
The education expert Sir Ken Robinson points to a 1968 study reporting on a group of 1,600 children who were tested over time for their ability to think in out-of-thebox ways. When the children were between 3 and 5 years old, 98 percent achieved positive scores. When they were 8 to 10, only 32 percent passed the same test, and only 10 percent at 13 to 15. When 280,000 25- year-olds took the test, just 2 percent passed. By the time we are adults, our creativity has been wrung out of us.
I once asked the great urbanist Jane Jacobs what makes some places more creative than others. She said, essentially, that the question was an easy one. All cities, she said, were filled with creative people; that’s our default state as people. But some cities had more than their shares of leaders, people and institutions that blocked out that creativity. She called them “squelchers.”
Creativity (or the lack of it) follows the same general contours of the great socio-economic divide - our rising inequality - that plagues us. According to my own estimates, roughly a third of us across the United States, and perhaps as much as half of us in our most creative cities - are able to do work which engages our creative faculties to some extent, whether as artists, musicians, writers, techies, innovators, entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, journalists or educators - those of us who work with our minds. That leaves a group that I term “the other 66 percent,” who toil in low-wage rote and rotten jobs - if they have jobs at all - in which their creativity is subjugated, ignored or wasted.
Creativity itself is not in danger. It’s flourishing is all around us - in science and technology, arts and culture, in our rapidly revitalizing cities. But we still have a long way to go if we want to build a truly creative society that supports and rewards the creativity of each and every one of us.
Creativity is at once our most precious resource and our most inexhaustible one. As anyone who has ever spent any time with children knows, every single human being is born creative; every human being is innately endowed with the ability to combine and recombine data, perceptions, materials and ideas, and devise new ways of thinking and doing. What fosters creativity? More than anything else: the presence of other creative people. The big myth is that creativity is the province of great individual geniuses. In fact creativity is a social process. Our biggest creative breakthroughs come when people learn from, compete with, and collaborate with other people.
Cities are the true fonts of creativity... With their diverse populations, dense social networks, and public spaces where people can meet spontaneously and serendipitously, they spark and catalyze new ideas. With their infrastructure for finance, organization and trade, they allow those ideas to be swiftly actualized.
As for what staunches creativity, that’s easy, if ironic. It’s the very institutions that we build to manage, exploit and perpetuate the fruits of creativity – our big bureaucracies, and sad to say, too many of our schools. Creativity is disruptive; schools and organizations are regimented, standardized and stultifying.
The education expert Sir Ken Robinson points to a 1968 study reporting on a group of 1,600 children who were tested over time for their ability to think in out-of-thebox ways. When the children were between 3 and 5 years old, 98 percent achieved positive scores. When they were 8 to 10, only 32 percent passed the same test, and only 10 percent at 13 to 15. When 280,000 25- year-olds took the test, just 2 percent passed. By the time we are adults, our creativity has been wrung out of us.
I once asked the great urbanist Jane Jacobs what makes some places more creative than others. She said, essentially, that the question was an easy one. All cities, she said, were filled with creative people; that’s our default state as people. But some cities had more than their shares of leaders, people and institutions that blocked out that creativity. She called them “squelchers.”
Creativity (or the lack of it) follows the same general contours of the great socio-economic divide - our rising inequality - that plagues us. According to my own estimates, roughly a third of us across the United States, and perhaps as much as half of us in our most creative cities - are able to do work which engages our creative faculties to some extent, whether as artists, musicians, writers, techies, innovators, entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, journalists or educators - those of us who work with our minds. That leaves a group that I term “the other 66 percent,” who toil in low-wage rote and rotten jobs - if they have jobs at all - in which their creativity is subjugated, ignored or wasted.
Creativity itself is not in danger. It’s flourishing is all around us - in science and technology, arts and culture, in our rapidly revitalizing cities. But we still have a long way to go if we want to build a truly creative society that supports and rewards the creativity of each and every one of us.
The 1968 study is used here to show that
Solution:
Option 2 is the correct answer as after talking about
what stifles creativity (in paragraph 3), the author
presents the 1968 report( in order to validate the
previous point). Option 1 states exactly the opposite
of what is stated in the passage. Option 3 is incorrect
because the reduction of creativity cannot be
attributed to learning more. Option 4 is unrelated.
The passage does not talk about technology.
However, the second option is only the best option.
“Schools today” makes it a dicey option.
Q.No: 323
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (1 to 6) : The passage below is
accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Creativity is at once our most precious resource and our most inexhaustible one. As anyone who has ever spent any time with children knows, every single human being is born creative; every human being is innately endowed with the ability to combine and recombine data, perceptions, materials and ideas, and devise new ways of thinking and doing. What fosters creativity? More than anything else: the presence of other creative people. The big myth is that creativity is the province of great individual geniuses. In fact creativity is a social process. Our biggest creative breakthroughs come when people learn from, compete with, and collaborate with other people.
Cities are the true fonts of creativity... With their diverse populations, dense social networks, and public spaces where people can meet spontaneously and serendipitously, they spark and catalyze new ideas. With their infrastructure for finance, organization and trade, they allow those ideas to be swiftly actualized.
As for what staunches creativity, that’s easy, if ironic. It’s the very institutions that we build to manage, exploit and perpetuate the fruits of creativity – our big bureaucracies, and sad to say, too many of our schools. Creativity is disruptive; schools and organizations are regimented, standardized and stultifying.
The education expert Sir Ken Robinson points to a 1968 study reporting on a group of 1,600 children who were tested over time for their ability to think in out-of-thebox ways. When the children were between 3 and 5 years old, 98 percent achieved positive scores. When they were 8 to 10, only 32 percent passed the same test, and only 10 percent at 13 to 15. When 280,000 25- year-olds took the test, just 2 percent passed. By the time we are adults, our creativity has been wrung out of us.
I once asked the great urbanist Jane Jacobs what makes some places more creative than others. She said, essentially, that the question was an easy one. All cities, she said, were filled with creative people; that’s our default state as people. But some cities had more than their shares of leaders, people and institutions that blocked out that creativity. She called them “squelchers.”
Creativity (or the lack of it) follows the same general contours of the great socio-economic divide - our rising inequality - that plagues us. According to my own estimates, roughly a third of us across the United States, and perhaps as much as half of us in our most creative cities - are able to do work which engages our creative faculties to some extent, whether as artists, musicians, writers, techies, innovators, entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, journalists or educators - those of us who work with our minds. That leaves a group that I term “the other 66 percent,” who toil in low-wage rote and rotten jobs - if they have jobs at all - in which their creativity is subjugated, ignored or wasted.
Creativity itself is not in danger. It’s flourishing is all around us - in science and technology, arts and culture, in our rapidly revitalizing cities. But we still have a long way to go if we want to build a truly creative society that supports and rewards the creativity of each and every one of us.
Creativity is at once our most precious resource and our most inexhaustible one. As anyone who has ever spent any time with children knows, every single human being is born creative; every human being is innately endowed with the ability to combine and recombine data, perceptions, materials and ideas, and devise new ways of thinking and doing. What fosters creativity? More than anything else: the presence of other creative people. The big myth is that creativity is the province of great individual geniuses. In fact creativity is a social process. Our biggest creative breakthroughs come when people learn from, compete with, and collaborate with other people.
Cities are the true fonts of creativity... With their diverse populations, dense social networks, and public spaces where people can meet spontaneously and serendipitously, they spark and catalyze new ideas. With their infrastructure for finance, organization and trade, they allow those ideas to be swiftly actualized.
As for what staunches creativity, that’s easy, if ironic. It’s the very institutions that we build to manage, exploit and perpetuate the fruits of creativity – our big bureaucracies, and sad to say, too many of our schools. Creativity is disruptive; schools and organizations are regimented, standardized and stultifying.
The education expert Sir Ken Robinson points to a 1968 study reporting on a group of 1,600 children who were tested over time for their ability to think in out-of-thebox ways. When the children were between 3 and 5 years old, 98 percent achieved positive scores. When they were 8 to 10, only 32 percent passed the same test, and only 10 percent at 13 to 15. When 280,000 25- year-olds took the test, just 2 percent passed. By the time we are adults, our creativity has been wrung out of us.
I once asked the great urbanist Jane Jacobs what makes some places more creative than others. She said, essentially, that the question was an easy one. All cities, she said, were filled with creative people; that’s our default state as people. But some cities had more than their shares of leaders, people and institutions that blocked out that creativity. She called them “squelchers.”
Creativity (or the lack of it) follows the same general contours of the great socio-economic divide - our rising inequality - that plagues us. According to my own estimates, roughly a third of us across the United States, and perhaps as much as half of us in our most creative cities - are able to do work which engages our creative faculties to some extent, whether as artists, musicians, writers, techies, innovators, entrepreneurs, doctors, lawyers, journalists or educators - those of us who work with our minds. That leaves a group that I term “the other 66 percent,” who toil in low-wage rote and rotten jobs - if they have jobs at all - in which their creativity is subjugated, ignored or wasted.
Creativity itself is not in danger. It’s flourishing is all around us - in science and technology, arts and culture, in our rapidly revitalizing cities. But we still have a long way to go if we want to build a truly creative society that supports and rewards the creativity of each and every one of us.
The author’s conclusions about the most ‘creative cities’ in the US (paragraph 6) are based on his assumption that
Solution:
In the 2nd last paragraph of the passage, it is stated
that the creativity of only those people can be
utilized who use their minds to work. This implies
that people who work with their hands are not
creative. Hence, option 1 is the correct answer.
Q.No: 324
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 2
Questions Numbers (7 to 12) : The passage below is
accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
During the frigid season...it’s often necessary to nestle under a blanket to try to stay warm. The temperature difference between the blanket and the air outside is so palpable that we often have trouble leaving our warm refuge. Many plants and animals similarly hunker down, relying on snow cover for safety from winter’s harsh conditions. The small area between the snowpack and the ground, called the subnivium...might be the most important ecosystem that you have never heard of.
The subnivium is so well-insulated and stable that its temperature holds steady at around 32 degree Fahrenheit (0 degree Celsius). Although that might still sound cold, a constant temperature of 32 degree Fahrenheit can often be 30 to 40 degrees warmer than the air temperature during the peak of winter. Because of this large temperature difference, a wide variety of species...depend on the subnivium for winter protection.
For many organisms living in temperate and Arctic regions, the difference between being under the snow or outside it is a matter of life and death. Consequently, disruptions to the subnivium brought about by climate change will affect everything from population dynamics to nutrient cycling through the ecosystem.
The formation and stability of the subnivium requires more than a few flurries. Winter ecologists have suggested that eight inches of snow is necessary to develop a stable layer of insulation. Depth is not the only factor, however. More accurately, the stability of the subnivium depends on the interaction between snow depth and snow density. Imagine being under a stack of blankets that are all flattened and pressed together. When compressed, the blankets essentially form one compacted layer. In contrast, when they are lightly placed on top of one another, their insulative capacity increases because the air pockets between them trap heat. Greater depths of low-density snow are therefore better at insulating the ground.
Both depth and density of snow are sensitive to temperature. Scientists are now beginning to explore how climate change will affect the subnivium, as well as the species that depend on it. At first glance, warmer winters seem beneficial for species that have difficulty surviving subzero temperatures; however, as with most ecological phenomena, the consequences are not so straightforward. Research has shown that the snow season (the period when snow is more likely than rain) has become shorter since 1970. When rain falls on snow, it increases the density of the snow and reduces its insulative capacity. Therefore, even though winters are expected to become warmer overall from future climate change, the subnivium will tend to become colder and more variable with less protection from the aboveground temperatures.
The effects of a colder subnivium are complex...For example, shrubs such as crowberry and alpine azalea that grow along the forest floor tend to block the wind and so retain higher depths of snow around them. This captured snow helps to keep soils insulated and in turn increases plant decomposition and nutrient release. In field experiments, researchers removed a portion of the snow cover to investigate the importance of the subnivium’s insulation. They found that soil frost in the snow-free area resulted in damage to plant roots and sometimes even the death of the plant.
During the frigid season...it’s often necessary to nestle under a blanket to try to stay warm. The temperature difference between the blanket and the air outside is so palpable that we often have trouble leaving our warm refuge. Many plants and animals similarly hunker down, relying on snow cover for safety from winter’s harsh conditions. The small area between the snowpack and the ground, called the subnivium...might be the most important ecosystem that you have never heard of.
The subnivium is so well-insulated and stable that its temperature holds steady at around 32 degree Fahrenheit (0 degree Celsius). Although that might still sound cold, a constant temperature of 32 degree Fahrenheit can often be 30 to 40 degrees warmer than the air temperature during the peak of winter. Because of this large temperature difference, a wide variety of species...depend on the subnivium for winter protection.
For many organisms living in temperate and Arctic regions, the difference between being under the snow or outside it is a matter of life and death. Consequently, disruptions to the subnivium brought about by climate change will affect everything from population dynamics to nutrient cycling through the ecosystem.
The formation and stability of the subnivium requires more than a few flurries. Winter ecologists have suggested that eight inches of snow is necessary to develop a stable layer of insulation. Depth is not the only factor, however. More accurately, the stability of the subnivium depends on the interaction between snow depth and snow density. Imagine being under a stack of blankets that are all flattened and pressed together. When compressed, the blankets essentially form one compacted layer. In contrast, when they are lightly placed on top of one another, their insulative capacity increases because the air pockets between them trap heat. Greater depths of low-density snow are therefore better at insulating the ground.
Both depth and density of snow are sensitive to temperature. Scientists are now beginning to explore how climate change will affect the subnivium, as well as the species that depend on it. At first glance, warmer winters seem beneficial for species that have difficulty surviving subzero temperatures; however, as with most ecological phenomena, the consequences are not so straightforward. Research has shown that the snow season (the period when snow is more likely than rain) has become shorter since 1970. When rain falls on snow, it increases the density of the snow and reduces its insulative capacity. Therefore, even though winters are expected to become warmer overall from future climate change, the subnivium will tend to become colder and more variable with less protection from the aboveground temperatures.
The effects of a colder subnivium are complex...For example, shrubs such as crowberry and alpine azalea that grow along the forest floor tend to block the wind and so retain higher depths of snow around them. This captured snow helps to keep soils insulated and in turn increases plant decomposition and nutrient release. In field experiments, researchers removed a portion of the snow cover to investigate the importance of the subnivium’s insulation. They found that soil frost in the snow-free area resulted in damage to plant roots and sometimes even the death of the plant.
Based on this extract, the author would support which one of the following actions?
Solution:
All options 1, 3 and 4 address the symptoms of
climate change. They fail to attack the main cause,
let alone providing a solution to that cause. Option
2 addresses the cause and even provides a
solution to the issue of climate change. Hence it
is the correct answer.
Q.No: 325
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 2
Questions Numbers (7 to 12) : The passage below is
accompanied by a set of six questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
During the frigid season...it’s often necessary to nestle under a blanket to try to stay warm. The temperature difference between the blanket and the air outside is so palpable that we often have trouble leaving our warm refuge. Many plants and animals similarly hunker down, relying on snow cover for safety from winter’s harsh conditions. The small area between the snowpack and the ground, called the subnivium...might be the most important ecosystem that you have never heard of.
The subnivium is so well-insulated and stable that its temperature holds steady at around 32 degree Fahrenheit (0 degree Celsius). Although that might still sound cold, a constant temperature of 32 degree Fahrenheit can often be 30 to 40 degrees warmer than the air temperature during the peak of winter. Because of this large temperature difference, a wide variety of species...depend on the subnivium for winter protection.
For many organisms living in temperate and Arctic regions, the difference between being under the snow or outside it is a matter of life and death. Consequently, disruptions to the subnivium brought about by climate change will affect everything from population dynamics to nutrient cycling through the ecosystem.
The formation and stability of the subnivium requires more than a few flurries. Winter ecologists have suggested that eight inches of snow is necessary to develop a stable layer of insulation. Depth is not the only factor, however. More accurately, the stability of the subnivium depends on the interaction between snow depth and snow density. Imagine being under a stack of blankets that are all flattened and pressed together. When compressed, the blankets essentially form one compacted layer. In contrast, when they are lightly placed on top of one another, their insulative capacity increases because the air pockets between them trap heat. Greater depths of low-density snow are therefore better at insulating the ground.
Both depth and density of snow are sensitive to temperature. Scientists are now beginning to explore how climate change will affect the subnivium, as well as the species that depend on it. At first glance, warmer winters seem beneficial for species that have difficulty surviving subzero temperatures; however, as with most ecological phenomena, the consequences are not so straightforward. Research has shown that the snow season (the period when snow is more likely than rain) has become shorter since 1970. When rain falls on snow, it increases the density of the snow and reduces its insulative capacity. Therefore, even though winters are expected to become warmer overall from future climate change, the subnivium will tend to become colder and more variable with less protection from the aboveground temperatures.
The effects of a colder subnivium are complex...For example, shrubs such as crowberry and alpine azalea that grow along the forest floor tend to block the wind and so retain higher depths of snow around them. This captured snow helps to keep soils insulated and in turn increases plant decomposition and nutrient release. In field experiments, researchers removed a portion of the snow cover to investigate the importance of the subnivium’s insulation. They found that soil frost in the snow-free area resulted in damage to plant roots and sometimes even the death of the plant.
During the frigid season...it’s often necessary to nestle under a blanket to try to stay warm. The temperature difference between the blanket and the air outside is so palpable that we often have trouble leaving our warm refuge. Many plants and animals similarly hunker down, relying on snow cover for safety from winter’s harsh conditions. The small area between the snowpack and the ground, called the subnivium...might be the most important ecosystem that you have never heard of.
The subnivium is so well-insulated and stable that its temperature holds steady at around 32 degree Fahrenheit (0 degree Celsius). Although that might still sound cold, a constant temperature of 32 degree Fahrenheit can often be 30 to 40 degrees warmer than the air temperature during the peak of winter. Because of this large temperature difference, a wide variety of species...depend on the subnivium for winter protection.
For many organisms living in temperate and Arctic regions, the difference between being under the snow or outside it is a matter of life and death. Consequently, disruptions to the subnivium brought about by climate change will affect everything from population dynamics to nutrient cycling through the ecosystem.
The formation and stability of the subnivium requires more than a few flurries. Winter ecologists have suggested that eight inches of snow is necessary to develop a stable layer of insulation. Depth is not the only factor, however. More accurately, the stability of the subnivium depends on the interaction between snow depth and snow density. Imagine being under a stack of blankets that are all flattened and pressed together. When compressed, the blankets essentially form one compacted layer. In contrast, when they are lightly placed on top of one another, their insulative capacity increases because the air pockets between them trap heat. Greater depths of low-density snow are therefore better at insulating the ground.
Both depth and density of snow are sensitive to temperature. Scientists are now beginning to explore how climate change will affect the subnivium, as well as the species that depend on it. At first glance, warmer winters seem beneficial for species that have difficulty surviving subzero temperatures; however, as with most ecological phenomena, the consequences are not so straightforward. Research has shown that the snow season (the period when snow is more likely than rain) has become shorter since 1970. When rain falls on snow, it increases the density of the snow and reduces its insulative capacity. Therefore, even though winters are expected to become warmer overall from future climate change, the subnivium will tend to become colder and more variable with less protection from the aboveground temperatures.
The effects of a colder subnivium are complex...For example, shrubs such as crowberry and alpine azalea that grow along the forest floor tend to block the wind and so retain higher depths of snow around them. This captured snow helps to keep soils insulated and in turn increases plant decomposition and nutrient release. In field experiments, researchers removed a portion of the snow cover to investigate the importance of the subnivium’s insulation. They found that soil frost in the snow-free area resulted in damage to plant roots and sometimes even the death of the plant.
Which one of the following statements can be inferred from the passage?
Solution:
Option 1 is correct as the entire passage is about
how the effects of climate change are interrelated.
Options 2, 3 and 4 are incorrect because the
passage does not give us enough information to
claim them.
Q.No: 326
Test Name : CAT 2017 Actual Paper Slot 2
Questions Numbers (13 to 18):The end of the age of the internal
combustion engine is in sight. There are small signs
everywhere: the shift to hybrid vehicles is already under
way among manufacturers. Volvo has announced it will
make no purely petrol-engined cars after 2019 ... and
Tesla has just started selling its first electric car aimed
squarely at the middle classes: the Tesla 3 sells for
$35,000 in the US, and 400,000 people have put down
a small, refundable deposit towards one. Several
thousand have already taken delivery, and the company
hopes to sell half a million more next year. This is a
remarkable figure for a machine with a fairly short range
and a very limited number of specialised charging
stations.
Some of it reflects the remarkable abilities of Elon Musk, the company’s founder, as a salesman, engineer, and a man able to get the most out his factory workers and the governments he deals with ... Mr Musk is selling a dream that the world wants to believe in.
This last may be the most important factor in the story. The private car is ... a device of immense practical help and economic significance, but at the same time a theatre for myths of unattainable self-fulfilment. The one thing you will never see in a car advertisement is traffic, even though that is the element in which drivers spend their lives. Every single driver in a traffic jam is trying to escape from it, yet it is the inevitable consequence of mass car ownership.
The sleek and swift electric car is at one level merely the most contemporary fantasy of autonomy and power. But it might also disrupt our exterior landscapes nearly as much as the fossil fuel-engined car did in the last century. Electrical cars would of course pollute far less than fossil fuel-driven ones; instead of oil reserves, the rarest materials for batteries would make undeserving despots and their dynasties fantastically rich. Petrol stations would disappear. The air in cities would once more be breathable and their streets as quiet as those of Venice. This isn’t an unmixed good. Cars that were as silent as bicycles would still be as dangerous as they are now to anyone they hit without audible warning.
The dream goes further than that. The electric cars of the future will be so thoroughly equipped with sensors and reaction mechanisms that they will never hit anyone. Just as brakes don’t let you skid today, the steering wheel of tomorrow will serve you away from danger before you have even noticed it...
This is where the fantasy of autonomy comes full circle. The logical outcome of cars which need no driver is that they will become cars which need no owner either. Instead, they will work as taxis do, summoned at will but only for the journeys we actually need. This the future towards which Ubem.is working. The ultimate development of the private car will be to reinvent public transport. Traffic jams will be abolished only when the private car becomes a public utility. What then will happen to our fantasies of independence? We’ll all have to take to electrically powered bicycles.
Some of it reflects the remarkable abilities of Elon Musk, the company’s founder, as a salesman, engineer, and a man able to get the most out his factory workers and the governments he deals with ... Mr Musk is selling a dream that the world wants to believe in.
This last may be the most important factor in the story. The private car is ... a device of immense practical help and economic significance, but at the same time a theatre for myths of unattainable self-fulfilment. The one thing you will never see in a car advertisement is traffic, even though that is the element in which drivers spend their lives. Every single driver in a traffic jam is trying to escape from it, yet it is the inevitable consequence of mass car ownership.
The sleek and swift electric car is at one level merely the most contemporary fantasy of autonomy and power. But it might also disrupt our exterior landscapes nearly as much as the fossil fuel-engined car did in the last century. Electrical cars would of course pollute far less than fossil fuel-driven ones; instead of oil reserves, the rarest materials for batteries would make undeserving despots and their dynasties fantastically rich. Petrol stations would disappear. The air in cities would once more be breathable and their streets as quiet as those of Venice. This isn’t an unmixed good. Cars that were as silent as bicycles would still be as dangerous as they are now to anyone they hit without audible warning.
The dream goes further than that. The electric cars of the future will be so thoroughly equipped with sensors and reaction mechanisms that they will never hit anyone. Just as brakes don’t let you skid today, the steering wheel of tomorrow will serve you away from danger before you have even noticed it...
This is where the fantasy of autonomy comes full circle. The logical outcome of cars which need no driver is that they will become cars which need no owner either. Instead, they will work as taxis do, summoned at will but only for the journeys we actually need. This the future towards which Ubem.is working. The ultimate development of the private car will be to reinvent public transport. Traffic jams will be abolished only when the private car becomes a public utility. What then will happen to our fantasies of independence? We’ll all have to take to electrically powered bicycles.
The author comes to the conclusion that
Solution:
Towards the end of the passage, the author states
that though car drivers want autonomy, public
transport will be the future as this is the only
solution to traffic problem. This makes option 3
correct. Options 1 and 4 are beyond the scope of
the passage. Option 2 is ambiguous.
Q.No: 327
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 1
Directions for questions 1 to 5:
Economists have spent most of the 20th century ignoring psychology, positive or otherwise. But today there is a great deal of emphasis on how happiness can shape global economies, or — on a smaller scale — successful business practice. This is driven, in part, by a trend in "measuring" positive emotions, mostly so they can be optimized. Neuroscientists, for example, claim to be able to locate specific emotions, such as happiness or disappointment, in particular areas of the brain. Wearable technologies, such as Spire, offer data-driven advice on how to reduce stress.
We are no longer just dealing with "happiness" in a philosophical or romantic sense — it has become something that can be monitored and measured, including by our behavior, use of social media and bodily indicators such as pulse rate and facial expressions.
There is nothing automatically sinister about this trend. But it is disquieting that the businesses and experts driving the quantification of happiness claim to have our best interests at heart, often concealing their own agendas in the process. In the workplace, happy workers are viewed as a "win-win." Work becomes more pleasant, and employees, more productive. But this is now being pursued through the use of performance-evaluating wearable technology, such as Humanyze or Virgin Pulse, both of which monitor physical signs of stress and activity toward the goal of increasing productivity.
Cities such as Dubai, which has pledged to become the "happiest city in the world," dream up ever-more elaborate and intrusive ways of collecting data on well-being — to the point where there is now talk of using CCTV cameras to monitor facial expressions in public spaces. New ways of detecting emotions are hitting the market all the time: One company, Beyond Verbal, aims to calculate moods conveyed in a phone conversation, potentially without the knowledge of at least one of the participants. And Facebook [has] demonstrated . . . that it could influence our emotions through tweaking our news feeds — opening the door to ever-more targeted manipulation in advertising and influence.
As the science grows more sophisticated and technologies become more intimate with our thoughts and bodies, a clear trend is emerging. Where happiness indicators were once used as a basis to reform society, challenging the obsession with money that G.D.P. measurement entrenches, they are increasingly used as a basis to transform or discipline individuals.
Happiness becomes a personal project, that each of us must now work on, like going to the gym. Since the 1970s, depression has come to be viewed as a cognitive or neurological defect in the individual, and never a consequence of circumstances. All of this simply escalates the sense of responsibility each of us feels for our own feelings, and with it, the sense of failure when things go badly. A society that deliberately removed certain sources of misery, such as precarious and exploitative employment, may well be a happier one. But we won't get there by making this single, often fleeting emotion, the over-arching goal.
Economists have spent most of the 20th century ignoring psychology, positive or otherwise. But today there is a great deal of emphasis on how happiness can shape global economies, or — on a smaller scale — successful business practice. This is driven, in part, by a trend in "measuring" positive emotions, mostly so they can be optimized. Neuroscientists, for example, claim to be able to locate specific emotions, such as happiness or disappointment, in particular areas of the brain. Wearable technologies, such as Spire, offer data-driven advice on how to reduce stress.
We are no longer just dealing with "happiness" in a philosophical or romantic sense — it has become something that can be monitored and measured, including by our behavior, use of social media and bodily indicators such as pulse rate and facial expressions.
There is nothing automatically sinister about this trend. But it is disquieting that the businesses and experts driving the quantification of happiness claim to have our best interests at heart, often concealing their own agendas in the process. In the workplace, happy workers are viewed as a "win-win." Work becomes more pleasant, and employees, more productive. But this is now being pursued through the use of performance-evaluating wearable technology, such as Humanyze or Virgin Pulse, both of which monitor physical signs of stress and activity toward the goal of increasing productivity.
Cities such as Dubai, which has pledged to become the "happiest city in the world," dream up ever-more elaborate and intrusive ways of collecting data on well-being — to the point where there is now talk of using CCTV cameras to monitor facial expressions in public spaces. New ways of detecting emotions are hitting the market all the time: One company, Beyond Verbal, aims to calculate moods conveyed in a phone conversation, potentially without the knowledge of at least one of the participants. And Facebook [has] demonstrated . . . that it could influence our emotions through tweaking our news feeds — opening the door to ever-more targeted manipulation in advertising and influence.
As the science grows more sophisticated and technologies become more intimate with our thoughts and bodies, a clear trend is emerging. Where happiness indicators were once used as a basis to reform society, challenging the obsession with money that G.D.P. measurement entrenches, they are increasingly used as a basis to transform or discipline individuals.
Happiness becomes a personal project, that each of us must now work on, like going to the gym. Since the 1970s, depression has come to be viewed as a cognitive or neurological defect in the individual, and never a consequence of circumstances. All of this simply escalates the sense of responsibility each of us feels for our own feelings, and with it, the sense of failure when things go badly. A society that deliberately removed certain sources of misery, such as precarious and exploitative employment, may well be a happier one. But we won't get there by making this single, often fleeting emotion, the over-arching goal.
From the passage we can infer that the author would like economists to:
Solution:
Refer to the main idea of the passage. This question is very close to question number 4. The author would definitely support any step that relieves the common man of the pressure of ‘being happy’. So, option 3 will be supported by the author.
Q.No: 328
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 1
Directions for questions 6 to 9:
When researchers at Emory University in Atlanta trained mice to fear the smell of almonds (by pairing it with electric shocks), they found, to their consternation, that both the children and grandchildren of these mice were spontaneously afraid of the same smell. That is not supposed to happen. Generations of schoolchildren have been taught that the inheritance of acquired characteristics is impossible. A mouse should not be born with something its parents have learned during their lifetimes, any more than a mouse that loses its tail in an accident should give birth to tailless mice. . . .
Modern evolutionary biology dates back to a synthesis that emerged around the 1940s-60s, which married Charles Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection with Gregor Mendel’s discoveries of how genes are inherited. The traditional, and still dominant, view is that adaptations – from the human brain to the peacock’s tail – are fully and satisfactorily explained by natural selection (and subsequent inheritance). Yet [new evidence] from genomics, epigenetics and developmental biology [indicates] that evolution is more complex than we once assumed. . . .
In his book On Human Nature (1978), the evolutionary biologist Edward O Wilson claimed that human culture is held on a genetic leash. The metaphor [needs revision]. . . . Imagine a dog-walker (the genes) struggling to retain control of a brawny mastiff (human culture). The pair’s trajectory (the pathway of evolution) reflects the outcome of the struggle. Now imagine the same dog-walker struggling with multiple dogs, on leashes of varied lengths, with each dog tugging in different directions. All these tugs represent the influence of developmental factors, including epigenetics, antibodies and hormones passed on by parents, as well as the ecological legacies and culture they bequeath. . . .
The received wisdom is that parental experiences can’t affect the characters of their offspring. Except they do. The way that genes are expressed to produce an organism’s phenotype – the actual characteristics it ends up with – is affected by chemicals that attach to them. Everything from diet to air pollution to parental behaviour can influence the addition or removal of these chemical marks, which switches genes on or off. Usually these so-called ‘epigenetic’ attachments are removed during the production of sperm and eggs cells, but it turns out that some escape the resetting process and are passed on to the next generation, along with the genes. This is known as ‘epigenetic inheritance’, and more and more studies are confirming that it really happens. Let’s return to the almond-fearing mice. The inheritance of an epigenetic mark transmitted in the sperm is what led the mice’s offspring to acquire an inherited fear. . . .
Epigenetics is only part of the story. Through culture and society, [humans and other animals] inherit knowledge and skills acquired by [their] parents. . . . All this complexity . . . points to an evolutionary process in which genomes (over hundreds to thousands of generations), epigenetic modifications and inherited cultural factors (over several, perhaps tens or hundreds of generations), and parental effects (over single-generation timespans) collectively inform how organisms adapt. These extra-genetic kinds of inheritance give organisms the flexibility to make rapid adjustments to environmental challenges, dragging genetic change in their wake – much like a rowdy pack of dogs.
When researchers at Emory University in Atlanta trained mice to fear the smell of almonds (by pairing it with electric shocks), they found, to their consternation, that both the children and grandchildren of these mice were spontaneously afraid of the same smell. That is not supposed to happen. Generations of schoolchildren have been taught that the inheritance of acquired characteristics is impossible. A mouse should not be born with something its parents have learned during their lifetimes, any more than a mouse that loses its tail in an accident should give birth to tailless mice. . . .
Modern evolutionary biology dates back to a synthesis that emerged around the 1940s-60s, which married Charles Darwin’s mechanism of natural selection with Gregor Mendel’s discoveries of how genes are inherited. The traditional, and still dominant, view is that adaptations – from the human brain to the peacock’s tail – are fully and satisfactorily explained by natural selection (and subsequent inheritance). Yet [new evidence] from genomics, epigenetics and developmental biology [indicates] that evolution is more complex than we once assumed. . . .
In his book On Human Nature (1978), the evolutionary biologist Edward O Wilson claimed that human culture is held on a genetic leash. The metaphor [needs revision]. . . . Imagine a dog-walker (the genes) struggling to retain control of a brawny mastiff (human culture). The pair’s trajectory (the pathway of evolution) reflects the outcome of the struggle. Now imagine the same dog-walker struggling with multiple dogs, on leashes of varied lengths, with each dog tugging in different directions. All these tugs represent the influence of developmental factors, including epigenetics, antibodies and hormones passed on by parents, as well as the ecological legacies and culture they bequeath. . . .
The received wisdom is that parental experiences can’t affect the characters of their offspring. Except they do. The way that genes are expressed to produce an organism’s phenotype – the actual characteristics it ends up with – is affected by chemicals that attach to them. Everything from diet to air pollution to parental behaviour can influence the addition or removal of these chemical marks, which switches genes on or off. Usually these so-called ‘epigenetic’ attachments are removed during the production of sperm and eggs cells, but it turns out that some escape the resetting process and are passed on to the next generation, along with the genes. This is known as ‘epigenetic inheritance’, and more and more studies are confirming that it really happens. Let’s return to the almond-fearing mice. The inheritance of an epigenetic mark transmitted in the sperm is what led the mice’s offspring to acquire an inherited fear. . . .
Epigenetics is only part of the story. Through culture and society, [humans and other animals] inherit knowledge and skills acquired by [their] parents. . . . All this complexity . . . points to an evolutionary process in which genomes (over hundreds to thousands of generations), epigenetic modifications and inherited cultural factors (over several, perhaps tens or hundreds of generations), and parental effects (over single-generation timespans) collectively inform how organisms adapt. These extra-genetic kinds of inheritance give organisms the flexibility to make rapid adjustments to environmental challenges, dragging genetic change in their wake – much like a rowdy pack of dogs.
Which of the following, if found to be true, would negate the main message of the passage?
Solution:
The main message of the passage is that the current theory of natural selection doesn’t look adequate to explain the process of evolution. So, option 3 would challenge this notion. Hence, option 4 is the answer.
Q.No: 329
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 1
Directions for questions 10 to 14:
The only thing worse than being lied to is not knowing you’re being lied to. It’s true that plastic pollution is a huge problem, of planetary proportions. And it’s true we could all do more to reduce our plastic footprint. The lie is that blame for the plastic problem is wasteful consumers and that changing our individual habits will fix it.
Recycling plastic is to saving the Earth what hammering a nail is to halting a falling skyscraper. You struggle to find a place to do it and feel pleased when you succeed. But your effort is wholly inadequate and distracts from the real problem of why the building is collapsing in the first place. The real problem is that single-use plastic—the very idea of producing plastic items like grocery bags, which we use for an average of 12 minutes but can persist in the environment for half a millennium—is an incredibly reckless abuse of technology. Encouraging individuals to recycle more will never solve the problem of a massive production of single-use plastic that should have been avoided in the first place.
As an ecologist and evolutionary biologist, I have had a disturbing window into the accumulating literature on the hazards of plastic pollution. Scientists have long recognized that plastics biodegrade slowly, if at all, and pose multiple threats to wildlife through entanglement and consumption. More recent reports highlight dangers posed by absorption of toxic chemicals in the water and by plastic odors that mimic some species’ natural food. Plastics also accumulate up the food chain, and studies now show that we are likely ingesting it ourselves in seafood. . . .
Beginning in the 1950s, big beverage companies like Coca-Cola and Anheuser-Busch, along with Phillip Morris and others, formed a non-profit called Keep America Beautiful. Its mission is/was to educate and encourage environmental stewardship in the public. . . . At face value, these efforts seem benevolent, but they obscure the real problem, which is the role that corporate polluters play in the plastic problem. This clever misdirection has led journalist and author Heather Rogers to describe Keep America Beautiful as the first corporate greenwashing front, as it has helped shift the public focus to consumer recycling behavior and actively thwarted legislation that would increase extended producer responsibility for waste management. . . . [T]he greatest success of Keep America Beautiful has been to shift the onus of environmental responsibility onto the public while simultaneously becoming a trusted name in the environmental movement. . . .
So what can we do to make responsible use of plastic a reality? First: reject the lie. Litterbugs are not responsible for the global ecological disaster of plastic. Humans can only function to the best of their abilities, given time, mental bandwidth and systemic constraints. Our huge problem with plastic is the result of a permissive legal framework that has allowed the uncontrolled rise of plastic pollution, despite clear evidence of the harm it causes to local communities and the world’s oceans. Recycling is also too hard in most parts of the U.S. and lacks the proper incentives to make it work well.
The only thing worse than being lied to is not knowing you’re being lied to. It’s true that plastic pollution is a huge problem, of planetary proportions. And it’s true we could all do more to reduce our plastic footprint. The lie is that blame for the plastic problem is wasteful consumers and that changing our individual habits will fix it.
Recycling plastic is to saving the Earth what hammering a nail is to halting a falling skyscraper. You struggle to find a place to do it and feel pleased when you succeed. But your effort is wholly inadequate and distracts from the real problem of why the building is collapsing in the first place. The real problem is that single-use plastic—the very idea of producing plastic items like grocery bags, which we use for an average of 12 minutes but can persist in the environment for half a millennium—is an incredibly reckless abuse of technology. Encouraging individuals to recycle more will never solve the problem of a massive production of single-use plastic that should have been avoided in the first place.
As an ecologist and evolutionary biologist, I have had a disturbing window into the accumulating literature on the hazards of plastic pollution. Scientists have long recognized that plastics biodegrade slowly, if at all, and pose multiple threats to wildlife through entanglement and consumption. More recent reports highlight dangers posed by absorption of toxic chemicals in the water and by plastic odors that mimic some species’ natural food. Plastics also accumulate up the food chain, and studies now show that we are likely ingesting it ourselves in seafood. . . .
Beginning in the 1950s, big beverage companies like Coca-Cola and Anheuser-Busch, along with Phillip Morris and others, formed a non-profit called Keep America Beautiful. Its mission is/was to educate and encourage environmental stewardship in the public. . . . At face value, these efforts seem benevolent, but they obscure the real problem, which is the role that corporate polluters play in the plastic problem. This clever misdirection has led journalist and author Heather Rogers to describe Keep America Beautiful as the first corporate greenwashing front, as it has helped shift the public focus to consumer recycling behavior and actively thwarted legislation that would increase extended producer responsibility for waste management. . . . [T]he greatest success of Keep America Beautiful has been to shift the onus of environmental responsibility onto the public while simultaneously becoming a trusted name in the environmental movement. . . .
So what can we do to make responsible use of plastic a reality? First: reject the lie. Litterbugs are not responsible for the global ecological disaster of plastic. Humans can only function to the best of their abilities, given time, mental bandwidth and systemic constraints. Our huge problem with plastic is the result of a permissive legal framework that has allowed the uncontrolled rise of plastic pollution, despite clear evidence of the harm it causes to local communities and the world’s oceans. Recycling is also too hard in most parts of the U.S. and lacks the proper incentives to make it work well.
Which of the following interventions would the author most strongly support:
Solution:
Refer to the first paragraph. The author says that consumers are wrongly blamed and held responsible for the rise in plastic pollution. According to the author, companies that manufacture plastic unnecessarily are to be held responsible. So, he will support option 4 the most.
Q.No: 330
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 1
Directions for questions 20 to 24:
. . . “Everybody pretty much agrees that the relationship between elephants and people has dramatically changed,” [says psychologist Gay] Bradshaw. . . . “Where for centuries humans and elephants lived in relatively peaceful coexistence, there is now hostility and violence. Now, I use the term ‘violence’ because of the intentionality associated with it, both in the aggression of humans and, at times, the recently observed behavior of elephants.” . . .
Typically, elephant researchers have cited, as a cause of aggression, the high levels of testosterone in newly matured male elephants or the competition for land and resources between elephants and humans. But. . . Bradshaw and several colleagues argue. . . that today’s elephant populations are suffering from a form of chronic stress, a kind of species-wide trauma. Decades of poaching and culling and habitat loss, they claim, have so disrupted the intricate web of familial and societal relations by which young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which established elephant herds are governed, that what we are now witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse of elephant culture. . . .
Elephants, when left to their own devices, are profoundly social creatures. . . . Young elephants are raised within an extended, multitiered network of doting female caregivers that includes the birth mother, grandmothers, aunts and friends. These relations are maintained over a life span as long as 70 years. Studies of established herds have shown that young elephants stay within 15 feet of their mothers for nearly all of their first eight years of life, after which young females are socialized into the matriarchal network, while young males go off for a time into an all-male social group before coming back into the fold as mature adults. . . .
This fabric of elephant society, Bradshaw and her colleagues [demonstrate], ha[s] effectively been frayed by years of habitat loss and poaching, along with systematic culling by government agencies to control elephant numbers and translocations of herds to different habitats. . . . As a result of such social upheaval, calves are now being born to and raised by ever younger and inexperienced mothers. Young orphaned elephants, meanwhile, that have witnessed the death of a parent at the hands of poachers are coming of age in the absence of the support system that defines traditional elephant life. “The loss of elephant elders,” [says] Bradshaw . . . "and the traumatic experience of witnessing the massacres of their family, impairs normal brain and behavior development in young elephants.”
What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling. The elephants of decimated herds, especially orphans who’ve watched the death of their parents and elders from poaching and culling, exhibit behavior typically associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and other trauma-related disorders in humans: abnormal startle response, unpredictable asocial behavior, inattentive mothering and hyperaggression. . . .
[According to Bradshaw], “Elephants are suffering and behaving in the same ways that we recognize in ourselves as a result of violence. . . . Except perhaps for a few specific features, brain organization and early development of elephants and humans are extremely similar.”
. . . “Everybody pretty much agrees that the relationship between elephants and people has dramatically changed,” [says psychologist Gay] Bradshaw. . . . “Where for centuries humans and elephants lived in relatively peaceful coexistence, there is now hostility and violence. Now, I use the term ‘violence’ because of the intentionality associated with it, both in the aggression of humans and, at times, the recently observed behavior of elephants.” . . .
Typically, elephant researchers have cited, as a cause of aggression, the high levels of testosterone in newly matured male elephants or the competition for land and resources between elephants and humans. But. . . Bradshaw and several colleagues argue. . . that today’s elephant populations are suffering from a form of chronic stress, a kind of species-wide trauma. Decades of poaching and culling and habitat loss, they claim, have so disrupted the intricate web of familial and societal relations by which young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which established elephant herds are governed, that what we are now witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse of elephant culture. . . .
Elephants, when left to their own devices, are profoundly social creatures. . . . Young elephants are raised within an extended, multitiered network of doting female caregivers that includes the birth mother, grandmothers, aunts and friends. These relations are maintained over a life span as long as 70 years. Studies of established herds have shown that young elephants stay within 15 feet of their mothers for nearly all of their first eight years of life, after which young females are socialized into the matriarchal network, while young males go off for a time into an all-male social group before coming back into the fold as mature adults. . . .
This fabric of elephant society, Bradshaw and her colleagues [demonstrate], ha[s] effectively been frayed by years of habitat loss and poaching, along with systematic culling by government agencies to control elephant numbers and translocations of herds to different habitats. . . . As a result of such social upheaval, calves are now being born to and raised by ever younger and inexperienced mothers. Young orphaned elephants, meanwhile, that have witnessed the death of a parent at the hands of poachers are coming of age in the absence of the support system that defines traditional elephant life. “The loss of elephant elders,” [says] Bradshaw . . . "and the traumatic experience of witnessing the massacres of their family, impairs normal brain and behavior development in young elephants.”
What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling. The elephants of decimated herds, especially orphans who’ve watched the death of their parents and elders from poaching and culling, exhibit behavior typically associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and other trauma-related disorders in humans: abnormal startle response, unpredictable asocial behavior, inattentive mothering and hyperaggression. . . .
[According to Bradshaw], “Elephants are suffering and behaving in the same ways that we recognize in ourselves as a result of violence. . . . Except perhaps for a few specific features, brain organization and early development of elephants and humans are extremely similar.”
Which of the following measures is Bradshaw most likely to support to address the problem of elephant aggression?
Solution:
It is an easy answer. Option 3 talks about the main idea of the passage. As PTSD like symptoms in elephants is the main focus of the passage, option 3 is the best answer. Option 2 is irrelevant. Option 4 goes beyond the scope of the passage. Option 1 is close but it talks about ‘all animals’. So, it is too broad.
Q.No: 331
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 1
Directions for questions 20 to 24:
. . . “Everybody pretty much agrees that the relationship between elephants and people has dramatically changed,” [says psychologist Gay] Bradshaw. . . . “Where for centuries humans and elephants lived in relatively peaceful coexistence, there is now hostility and violence. Now, I use the term ‘violence’ because of the intentionality associated with it, both in the aggression of humans and, at times, the recently observed behavior of elephants.” . . .
Typically, elephant researchers have cited, as a cause of aggression, the high levels of testosterone in newly matured male elephants or the competition for land and resources between elephants and humans. But. . . Bradshaw and several colleagues argue. . . that today’s elephant populations are suffering from a form of chronic stress, a kind of species-wide trauma. Decades of poaching and culling and habitat loss, they claim, have so disrupted the intricate web of familial and societal relations by which young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which established elephant herds are governed, that what we are now witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse of elephant culture. . . .
Elephants, when left to their own devices, are profoundly social creatures. . . . Young elephants are raised within an extended, multitiered network of doting female caregivers that includes the birth mother, grandmothers, aunts and friends. These relations are maintained over a life span as long as 70 years. Studies of established herds have shown that young elephants stay within 15 feet of their mothers for nearly all of their first eight years of life, after which young females are socialized into the matriarchal network, while young males go off for a time into an all-male social group before coming back into the fold as mature adults. . . .
This fabric of elephant society, Bradshaw and her colleagues [demonstrate], ha[s] effectively been frayed by years of habitat loss and poaching, along with systematic culling by government agencies to control elephant numbers and translocations of herds to different habitats. . . . As a result of such social upheaval, calves are now being born to and raised by ever younger and inexperienced mothers. Young orphaned elephants, meanwhile, that have witnessed the death of a parent at the hands of poachers are coming of age in the absence of the support system that defines traditional elephant life. “The loss of elephant elders,” [says] Bradshaw . . . "and the traumatic experience of witnessing the massacres of their family, impairs normal brain and behavior development in young elephants.”
What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling. The elephants of decimated herds, especially orphans who’ve watched the death of their parents and elders from poaching and culling, exhibit behavior typically associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and other trauma-related disorders in humans: abnormal startle response, unpredictable asocial behavior, inattentive mothering and hyperaggression. . . .
[According to Bradshaw], “Elephants are suffering and behaving in the same ways that we recognize in ourselves as a result of violence. . . . Except perhaps for a few specific features, brain organization and early development of elephants and humans are extremely similar.”
. . . “Everybody pretty much agrees that the relationship between elephants and people has dramatically changed,” [says psychologist Gay] Bradshaw. . . . “Where for centuries humans and elephants lived in relatively peaceful coexistence, there is now hostility and violence. Now, I use the term ‘violence’ because of the intentionality associated with it, both in the aggression of humans and, at times, the recently observed behavior of elephants.” . . .
Typically, elephant researchers have cited, as a cause of aggression, the high levels of testosterone in newly matured male elephants or the competition for land and resources between elephants and humans. But. . . Bradshaw and several colleagues argue. . . that today’s elephant populations are suffering from a form of chronic stress, a kind of species-wide trauma. Decades of poaching and culling and habitat loss, they claim, have so disrupted the intricate web of familial and societal relations by which young elephants have traditionally been raised in the wild, and by which established elephant herds are governed, that what we are now witnessing is nothing less than a precipitous collapse of elephant culture. . . .
Elephants, when left to their own devices, are profoundly social creatures. . . . Young elephants are raised within an extended, multitiered network of doting female caregivers that includes the birth mother, grandmothers, aunts and friends. These relations are maintained over a life span as long as 70 years. Studies of established herds have shown that young elephants stay within 15 feet of their mothers for nearly all of their first eight years of life, after which young females are socialized into the matriarchal network, while young males go off for a time into an all-male social group before coming back into the fold as mature adults. . . .
This fabric of elephant society, Bradshaw and her colleagues [demonstrate], ha[s] effectively been frayed by years of habitat loss and poaching, along with systematic culling by government agencies to control elephant numbers and translocations of herds to different habitats. . . . As a result of such social upheaval, calves are now being born to and raised by ever younger and inexperienced mothers. Young orphaned elephants, meanwhile, that have witnessed the death of a parent at the hands of poachers are coming of age in the absence of the support system that defines traditional elephant life. “The loss of elephant elders,” [says] Bradshaw . . . "and the traumatic experience of witnessing the massacres of their family, impairs normal brain and behavior development in young elephants.”
What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling. The elephants of decimated herds, especially orphans who’ve watched the death of their parents and elders from poaching and culling, exhibit behavior typically associated with post-traumatic stress disorder and other trauma-related disorders in humans: abnormal startle response, unpredictable asocial behavior, inattentive mothering and hyperaggression. . . .
[According to Bradshaw], “Elephants are suffering and behaving in the same ways that we recognize in ourselves as a result of violence. . . . Except perhaps for a few specific features, brain organization and early development of elephants and humans are extremely similar.”
In paragraph 4, the phrase, “The fabric of elephant society . . . has[s] effectively been frayed by . . .” is:
Solution:
This answer given by CAT is dicey. A metaphor is an indirect reference. The given line is neither a metaphor nor an ode. It is also not an exaggeration. Refer to the first line of the penultimate paragraph. Refer to the line: "What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling." Option 2 is a close answer and may appear to be a better choice too. However, CAT has given option 1 as the answer.
Q.No: 332
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 1 to 5: Will a day come when India’s poor can access government services as easily as drawing cash from an ATM? . . . [N]o country in the world has made accessing education or health or policing or dispute resolution as easy as an ATM, because the nature of these activities requires individuals to use their discretion in a positive way. Technology can certainly facilitate this in a variety of ways if it is seen as one part of an overall approach, but the evidence so far in education, for instance, is that just adding computers alone doesn’t make education any better. . . .
The dangerous illusion of technology is that it can create stronger, top down accountability of service providers in implementation-intensive services within existing public sector organisations. One notion is that electronic management information systems (EMIS) keep better track of inputs and those aspects of personnel that are ‘EMIS visible’ can lead to better services. A recent study examined attempts to increase attendance of Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANMs) at clinics in Rajasthan, which involved high-tech time clocks to monitor attendance. The study’s title says it all: Band-Aids on a Corpse . . . e-governance can be just as bad as any other governance when the real issue is people and their motivation. For services to improve, the people providing the services have to want to do a better job with the skills they have. A study of medical care in Delhi found that even though providers, in the public sector had much better skills than private sector providers their provision of care in actual practice was much worse.
In implementation-intensive services the key to success is face-to-face interactions between a teacher, a nurse, a policeman, an extension agent and a citizen. This relationship is about power. Amartya Sen’s . . . report on education in West Bengal had a supremely telling anecdote in which the villagers forced the teacher to attend school, but then, when the parents went off to work, the teacher did not teach, but forced the children to massage his feet. . . . As long as the system empowers providers over citizens, technology is irrelevant.
The answer to successfully providing basic services is to create systems that provide both autonomy and accountability. In basic education for instance, the answer to poor teaching is not controlling teachers more . . . The key . . . is to hire teachers who want to teach and let them teach, expressing their professionalism and vocation as a teacher through autonomy in the classroom. This autonomy has to be matched with accountability for results—not just narrowly measured through test scores, but broadly for the quality of the education they provide.
A recent study in Uttar Pradesh showed that if, somehow, all civil service teachers could be replaced with contract teachers, the state could save a billion dollars a year in revenue and double student learning. Just the additional autonomy and accountability of contracts through local groups—even without complementary system changes in information and empowerment—led to that much improvement. The first step to being part of the solution is to create performance information accessible to those outside of the government. . . .
The dangerous illusion of technology is that it can create stronger, top down accountability of service providers in implementation-intensive services within existing public sector organisations. One notion is that electronic management information systems (EMIS) keep better track of inputs and those aspects of personnel that are ‘EMIS visible’ can lead to better services. A recent study examined attempts to increase attendance of Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANMs) at clinics in Rajasthan, which involved high-tech time clocks to monitor attendance. The study’s title says it all: Band-Aids on a Corpse . . . e-governance can be just as bad as any other governance when the real issue is people and their motivation. For services to improve, the people providing the services have to want to do a better job with the skills they have. A study of medical care in Delhi found that even though providers, in the public sector had much better skills than private sector providers their provision of care in actual practice was much worse.
In implementation-intensive services the key to success is face-to-face interactions between a teacher, a nurse, a policeman, an extension agent and a citizen. This relationship is about power. Amartya Sen’s . . . report on education in West Bengal had a supremely telling anecdote in which the villagers forced the teacher to attend school, but then, when the parents went off to work, the teacher did not teach, but forced the children to massage his feet. . . . As long as the system empowers providers over citizens, technology is irrelevant.
The answer to successfully providing basic services is to create systems that provide both autonomy and accountability. In basic education for instance, the answer to poor teaching is not controlling teachers more . . . The key . . . is to hire teachers who want to teach and let them teach, expressing their professionalism and vocation as a teacher through autonomy in the classroom. This autonomy has to be matched with accountability for results—not just narrowly measured through test scores, but broadly for the quality of the education they provide.
A recent study in Uttar Pradesh showed that if, somehow, all civil service teachers could be replaced with contract teachers, the state could save a billion dollars a year in revenue and double student learning. Just the additional autonomy and accountability of contracts through local groups—even without complementary system changes in information and empowerment—led to that much improvement. The first step to being part of the solution is to create performance information accessible to those outside of the government. . . .
In the context of the passage, we can infer that the title “Band Aids on a Corpse” (in paragraph 2) suggests that:
Solution:
Refer to the 2nd paragraph, "...e-governance can be just as bad
as any other…".From this line it can be inferred that
the electronic monitoring system was a superficial
solution to a serious problem. The right answer is
option (1).
Q.No: 333
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 1 to 5: Will a day come when India’s poor can access government services as easily as drawing cash from an ATM? . . . [N]o country in the world has made accessing education or health or policing or dispute resolution as easy as an ATM, because the nature of these activities requires individuals to use their discretion in a positive way. Technology can certainly facilitate this in a variety of ways if it is seen as one part of an overall approach, but the evidence so far in education, for instance, is that just adding computers alone doesn’t make education any better. . . .
The dangerous illusion of technology is that it can create stronger, top down accountability of service providers in implementation-intensive services within existing public sector organisations. One notion is that electronic management information systems (EMIS) keep better track of inputs and those aspects of personnel that are ‘EMIS visible’ can lead to better services. A recent study examined attempts to increase attendance of Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANMs) at clinics in Rajasthan, which involved high-tech time clocks to monitor attendance. The study’s title says it all: Band-Aids on a Corpse . . . e-governance can be just as bad as any other governance when the real issue is people and their motivation. For services to improve, the people providing the services have to want to do a better job with the skills they have. A study of medical care in Delhi found that even though providers, in the public sector had much better skills than private sector providers their provision of care in actual practice was much worse.
In implementation-intensive services the key to success is face-to-face interactions between a teacher, a nurse, a policeman, an extension agent and a citizen. This relationship is about power. Amartya Sen’s . . . report on education in West Bengal had a supremely telling anecdote in which the villagers forced the teacher to attend school, but then, when the parents went off to work, the teacher did not teach, but forced the children to massage his feet. . . . As long as the system empowers providers over citizens, technology is irrelevant.
The answer to successfully providing basic services is to create systems that provide both autonomy and accountability. In basic education for instance, the answer to poor teaching is not controlling teachers more . . . The key . . . is to hire teachers who want to teach and let them teach, expressing their professionalism and vocation as a teacher through autonomy in the classroom. This autonomy has to be matched with accountability for results—not just narrowly measured through test scores, but broadly for the quality of the education they provide.
A recent study in Uttar Pradesh showed that if, somehow, all civil service teachers could be replaced with contract teachers, the state could save a billion dollars a year in revenue and double student learning. Just the additional autonomy and accountability of contracts through local groups—even without complementary system changes in information and empowerment—led to that much improvement. The first step to being part of the solution is to create performance information accessible to those outside of the government. . . .
The dangerous illusion of technology is that it can create stronger, top down accountability of service providers in implementation-intensive services within existing public sector organisations. One notion is that electronic management information systems (EMIS) keep better track of inputs and those aspects of personnel that are ‘EMIS visible’ can lead to better services. A recent study examined attempts to increase attendance of Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANMs) at clinics in Rajasthan, which involved high-tech time clocks to monitor attendance. The study’s title says it all: Band-Aids on a Corpse . . . e-governance can be just as bad as any other governance when the real issue is people and their motivation. For services to improve, the people providing the services have to want to do a better job with the skills they have. A study of medical care in Delhi found that even though providers, in the public sector had much better skills than private sector providers their provision of care in actual practice was much worse.
In implementation-intensive services the key to success is face-to-face interactions between a teacher, a nurse, a policeman, an extension agent and a citizen. This relationship is about power. Amartya Sen’s . . . report on education in West Bengal had a supremely telling anecdote in which the villagers forced the teacher to attend school, but then, when the parents went off to work, the teacher did not teach, but forced the children to massage his feet. . . . As long as the system empowers providers over citizens, technology is irrelevant.
The answer to successfully providing basic services is to create systems that provide both autonomy and accountability. In basic education for instance, the answer to poor teaching is not controlling teachers more . . . The key . . . is to hire teachers who want to teach and let them teach, expressing their professionalism and vocation as a teacher through autonomy in the classroom. This autonomy has to be matched with accountability for results—not just narrowly measured through test scores, but broadly for the quality of the education they provide.
A recent study in Uttar Pradesh showed that if, somehow, all civil service teachers could be replaced with contract teachers, the state could save a billion dollars a year in revenue and double student learning. Just the additional autonomy and accountability of contracts through local groups—even without complementary system changes in information and empowerment—led to that much improvement. The first step to being part of the solution is to create performance information accessible to those outside of the government. . . .
Which of the following, IF TRUE, would undermine the passage’s main argument?
Solution:
The overall passage talks about the complacency
with the service providers. The instances given
make option (1) the right answer.
Q.No: 334
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 6 to 10: More and more companies, government agencies, educational institutions and philanthropic organisations are today in the grip of a new phenomenon: ‘metric fixation’. The key components of metric fixation are the belief that it is possible – and desirable – to replace professional judgment (acquired through personal experience and talent) with numerical indicators of comparative performance based upon standardised data (metrics); and that the best way to motivate people within these organisations is by attaching rewards and penalties to their measured performance.
The rewards can be monetary, in the form of pay for performance, say, or reputational, in the form of college rankings, hospital ratings, surgical report cards and so on. But the most dramatic negative effect of metric fixation is its propensity to incentivise gaming: that is, encouraging professionals to maximise the metrics in ways that are at odds with the larger purpose of the organisation. If the rate of major crimes in a district becomes the metric according to which police officers are promoted, then some officers will respond by simply not recording crimes or downgrading them from major offences to misdemeanours. Or take the case of surgeons. When the metrics of success and failure are made public – affecting their reputation and income – some surgeons will improve their metric scores by refusing to operate on patients with more complex problems, whose surgical outcomes are more likely to be negative. Who suffers? The patients who don’t get operated upon.
When reward is tied to measured performance, metric fixation invites just this sort of gaming. But metric fixation also leads to a variety of more subtle unintended negative consequences. These include goal displacement, which comes in many varieties: when performance is judged by a few measures, and the stakes are high (keeping one’s job, getting a pay rise or raising the stock price at the time that stock options are vested), people focus on satisfying those measures – often at the expense of other, more important organisational goals that are not measured. The best-known example is ‘teaching to the test’, a widespread phenomenon that has distorted primary and secondary education in the United States since the adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
Short-termism is another negative. Measured performance encourages what the US sociologist Robert K Merton in 1936 called ‘the imperious immediacy of interests … where the actor’s paramount concern with the foreseen immediate consequences excludes consideration of further or other consequences’. In short, advancing short-term goals at the expense of long-range considerations. This problem is endemic to publicly traded corporations that sacrifice long-term research and development, and the development of their staff, to the perceived imperatives of the quarterly report.
To the debit side of the ledger must also be added the transactional costs of metrics: the expenditure of employee time by those tasked with compiling and processing the metrics in the first place – not to mention the time required to actually read them. . . .
The rewards can be monetary, in the form of pay for performance, say, or reputational, in the form of college rankings, hospital ratings, surgical report cards and so on. But the most dramatic negative effect of metric fixation is its propensity to incentivise gaming: that is, encouraging professionals to maximise the metrics in ways that are at odds with the larger purpose of the organisation. If the rate of major crimes in a district becomes the metric according to which police officers are promoted, then some officers will respond by simply not recording crimes or downgrading them from major offences to misdemeanours. Or take the case of surgeons. When the metrics of success and failure are made public – affecting their reputation and income – some surgeons will improve their metric scores by refusing to operate on patients with more complex problems, whose surgical outcomes are more likely to be negative. Who suffers? The patients who don’t get operated upon.
When reward is tied to measured performance, metric fixation invites just this sort of gaming. But metric fixation also leads to a variety of more subtle unintended negative consequences. These include goal displacement, which comes in many varieties: when performance is judged by a few measures, and the stakes are high (keeping one’s job, getting a pay rise or raising the stock price at the time that stock options are vested), people focus on satisfying those measures – often at the expense of other, more important organisational goals that are not measured. The best-known example is ‘teaching to the test’, a widespread phenomenon that has distorted primary and secondary education in the United States since the adoption of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001.
Short-termism is another negative. Measured performance encourages what the US sociologist Robert K Merton in 1936 called ‘the imperious immediacy of interests … where the actor’s paramount concern with the foreseen immediate consequences excludes consideration of further or other consequences’. In short, advancing short-term goals at the expense of long-range considerations. This problem is endemic to publicly traded corporations that sacrifice long-term research and development, and the development of their staff, to the perceived imperatives of the quarterly report.
To the debit side of the ledger must also be added the transactional costs of metrics: the expenditure of employee time by those tasked with compiling and processing the metrics in the first place – not to mention the time required to actually read them. . . .
Of the following, which would have added the least depth to the author’s argument?
Solution:
The author isn’t protesting about the cause but in
general talking about the pros and cons of the
matter. The right answer is option (4).
Q.No: 335
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 11 to 14: . . . Grove snails as a whole are distributed all over Europe, but a specific variety of the snail, with a distinctive white-lipped shell, is found exclusively in Ireland and in the Pyrenees mountains that lie on the border between France and Spain. The researchers sampled a total of 423 snail specimens from 36 sites distributed across Europe, with an emphasis on gathering large numbers of the white-lipped variety. When they sequenced genes from the mitochondrial DNA of each of these snails and used algorithms to analyze the genetic diversity between them, they found that. . . a distinct lineage (the snails with the white-lipped shells) was indeed endemic to the two very specific and distant places in question.
Explaining this is tricky. Previously, some had speculated that the strange distributions of creatures such as the white-lipped grove snails could be explained by convergent evolution—in which two populations evolve the same trait by coincidence—but the underlying genetic similarities between the two groups rules that out. Alternately, some scientists had suggested that the white-lipped variety had simply spread over the whole continent, then been wiped out everywhere besides Ireland and the Pyrenees, but the researchers say their sampling and subsequent DNA analysis eliminate that possibility too. “If the snails naturally colonized Ireland, you would expect to find some of the same genetic type in other areas of Europe, especially Britain. We just don’t find them,” Davidson, the lead author, said in a press statement.
Moreover, if they’d gradually spread across the continent, there would be some genetic variation within the white-lipped type, because evolution would introduce variety over the thousands of years it would have taken them to spread from the Pyrenees to Ireland. That variation doesn’t exist, at least in the genes sampled. This means that rather than the organism gradually expanding its range, large populations instead were somehow moved en mass to the other location within the space of a few dozen generations, ensuring a lack of genetic variety.
“There is a very clear pattern, which is difficult to explain except by involving humans,” Davidson said. Humans, after all, colonized Ireland roughly 9,000 years ago, and the oldest fossil evidence of grove snails in Ireland dates to roughly the same era. Additionally, there is archaeological evidence of early sea trade between the ancient peoples of Spain and Ireland via the Atlantic and even evidence that humans routinely ate these types of snails before the advent of agriculture, as their burnt shells have been found in Stone Age trash heaps.
The simplest explanation, then? Boats. These snails may have inadvertently traveled on the floor of the small, coast-hugging skiffs these early humans used for travel, or they may have been intentionally carried to Ireland by the seafarers as a food source. “The highways of the past were rivers and the ocean–as the river that flanks the Pyrenees was an ancient trade route to the Atlantic, what we’re actually seeing might be the long lasting legacy of snails that hitched a ride…as humans travelled from the South of France to Ireland 8,000 years ago,” Davidson said.
Explaining this is tricky. Previously, some had speculated that the strange distributions of creatures such as the white-lipped grove snails could be explained by convergent evolution—in which two populations evolve the same trait by coincidence—but the underlying genetic similarities between the two groups rules that out. Alternately, some scientists had suggested that the white-lipped variety had simply spread over the whole continent, then been wiped out everywhere besides Ireland and the Pyrenees, but the researchers say their sampling and subsequent DNA analysis eliminate that possibility too. “If the snails naturally colonized Ireland, you would expect to find some of the same genetic type in other areas of Europe, especially Britain. We just don’t find them,” Davidson, the lead author, said in a press statement.
Moreover, if they’d gradually spread across the continent, there would be some genetic variation within the white-lipped type, because evolution would introduce variety over the thousands of years it would have taken them to spread from the Pyrenees to Ireland. That variation doesn’t exist, at least in the genes sampled. This means that rather than the organism gradually expanding its range, large populations instead were somehow moved en mass to the other location within the space of a few dozen generations, ensuring a lack of genetic variety.
“There is a very clear pattern, which is difficult to explain except by involving humans,” Davidson said. Humans, after all, colonized Ireland roughly 9,000 years ago, and the oldest fossil evidence of grove snails in Ireland dates to roughly the same era. Additionally, there is archaeological evidence of early sea trade between the ancient peoples of Spain and Ireland via the Atlantic and even evidence that humans routinely ate these types of snails before the advent of agriculture, as their burnt shells have been found in Stone Age trash heaps.
The simplest explanation, then? Boats. These snails may have inadvertently traveled on the floor of the small, coast-hugging skiffs these early humans used for travel, or they may have been intentionally carried to Ireland by the seafarers as a food source. “The highways of the past were rivers and the ocean–as the river that flanks the Pyrenees was an ancient trade route to the Atlantic, what we’re actually seeing might be the long lasting legacy of snails that hitched a ride…as humans travelled from the South of France to Ireland 8,000 years ago,” Davidson said.
All of the following evidence supports the passage’s explanation of sea travel/trade EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option (2) isn’t mentioned in the passage therefore
being the right answer.
Q.No: 336
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 11 to 14: . . . Grove snails as a whole are distributed all over Europe, but a specific variety of the snail, with a distinctive white-lipped shell, is found exclusively in Ireland and in the Pyrenees mountains that lie on the border between France and Spain. The researchers sampled a total of 423 snail specimens from 36 sites distributed across Europe, with an emphasis on gathering large numbers of the white-lipped variety. When they sequenced genes from the mitochondrial DNA of each of these snails and used algorithms to analyze the genetic diversity between them, they found that. . . a distinct lineage (the snails with the white-lipped shells) was indeed endemic to the two very specific and distant places in question.
Explaining this is tricky. Previously, some had speculated that the strange distributions of creatures such as the white-lipped grove snails could be explained by convergent evolution—in which two populations evolve the same trait by coincidence—but the underlying genetic similarities between the two groups rules that out. Alternately, some scientists had suggested that the white-lipped variety had simply spread over the whole continent, then been wiped out everywhere besides Ireland and the Pyrenees, but the researchers say their sampling and subsequent DNA analysis eliminate that possibility too. “If the snails naturally colonized Ireland, you would expect to find some of the same genetic type in other areas of Europe, especially Britain. We just don’t find them,” Davidson, the lead author, said in a press statement.
Moreover, if they’d gradually spread across the continent, there would be some genetic variation within the white-lipped type, because evolution would introduce variety over the thousands of years it would have taken them to spread from the Pyrenees to Ireland. That variation doesn’t exist, at least in the genes sampled. This means that rather than the organism gradually expanding its range, large populations instead were somehow moved en mass to the other location within the space of a few dozen generations, ensuring a lack of genetic variety.
“There is a very clear pattern, which is difficult to explain except by involving humans,” Davidson said. Humans, after all, colonized Ireland roughly 9,000 years ago, and the oldest fossil evidence of grove snails in Ireland dates to roughly the same era. Additionally, there is archaeological evidence of early sea trade between the ancient peoples of Spain and Ireland via the Atlantic and even evidence that humans routinely ate these types of snails before the advent of agriculture, as their burnt shells have been found in Stone Age trash heaps.
The simplest explanation, then? Boats. These snails may have inadvertently traveled on the floor of the small, coast-hugging skiffs these early humans used for travel, or they may have been intentionally carried to Ireland by the seafarers as a food source. “The highways of the past were rivers and the ocean–as the river that flanks the Pyrenees was an ancient trade route to the Atlantic, what we’re actually seeing might be the long lasting legacy of snails that hitched a ride…as humans travelled from the South of France to Ireland 8,000 years ago,” Davidson said.
Explaining this is tricky. Previously, some had speculated that the strange distributions of creatures such as the white-lipped grove snails could be explained by convergent evolution—in which two populations evolve the same trait by coincidence—but the underlying genetic similarities between the two groups rules that out. Alternately, some scientists had suggested that the white-lipped variety had simply spread over the whole continent, then been wiped out everywhere besides Ireland and the Pyrenees, but the researchers say their sampling and subsequent DNA analysis eliminate that possibility too. “If the snails naturally colonized Ireland, you would expect to find some of the same genetic type in other areas of Europe, especially Britain. We just don’t find them,” Davidson, the lead author, said in a press statement.
Moreover, if they’d gradually spread across the continent, there would be some genetic variation within the white-lipped type, because evolution would introduce variety over the thousands of years it would have taken them to spread from the Pyrenees to Ireland. That variation doesn’t exist, at least in the genes sampled. This means that rather than the organism gradually expanding its range, large populations instead were somehow moved en mass to the other location within the space of a few dozen generations, ensuring a lack of genetic variety.
“There is a very clear pattern, which is difficult to explain except by involving humans,” Davidson said. Humans, after all, colonized Ireland roughly 9,000 years ago, and the oldest fossil evidence of grove snails in Ireland dates to roughly the same era. Additionally, there is archaeological evidence of early sea trade between the ancient peoples of Spain and Ireland via the Atlantic and even evidence that humans routinely ate these types of snails before the advent of agriculture, as their burnt shells have been found in Stone Age trash heaps.
The simplest explanation, then? Boats. These snails may have inadvertently traveled on the floor of the small, coast-hugging skiffs these early humans used for travel, or they may have been intentionally carried to Ireland by the seafarers as a food source. “The highways of the past were rivers and the ocean–as the river that flanks the Pyrenees was an ancient trade route to the Atlantic, what we’re actually seeing might be the long lasting legacy of snails that hitched a ride…as humans travelled from the South of France to Ireland 8,000 years ago,” Davidson said.
In paragraph 4, the evidence that “humans routinely ate these types of snails before the advent of agriculture” can be used to conclude that:
Solution:
Since the time period mentioned in the passage
belong to an ancient time, one can infer from the
paragraph that snails were edible. The right answer
is option (2).
Q.No: 337
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 15 to 19: NOT everything looks lovelier the longer and closer its inspection. But Saturn does. It is gorgeous through Earthly telescopes. However, the 13 years of close observation provided by Cassini, an American spacecraft, showed the planet, its moons and its remarkable rings off better and better, revealing finer structures, striking novelties and greater drama. . . .
By and large the big things in the solar system—planets and moons—are thought of as having been around since the beginning. The suggestion that rings and moons are new is, though, made even more interesting by the fact that one of those moons, Enceladus, is widely considered the most promising site in the solar system on which to look for alien life. If Enceladus is both young and bears life, that life must have come into being quickly. This is also believed to have been the case on Earth. Were it true on Enceladus, that would encourage the idea that life evolves easily when conditions are right.
One reason for thinking Saturn’s rings are young is that they are bright. The solar system is suffused with comet dust, and comet dust is dark. Leaving Saturn’s ring system (which Cassini has shown to be more than 90% water ice) out in such a mist is like leaving laundry hanging on a line downwind from a smokestack: it will get dirty. The lighter the rings are, the faster this will happen, for the less mass they contain, the less celestial pollution they can absorb before they start to discolour. . . . Jeff Cuzzi, a scientist at America’s space agency, NASA, who helped run Cassini, told the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston that combining the mass estimates with Cassini’s measurements of the density of comet-dust near Saturn suggests the rings are no older than the first dinosaurs, nor younger than the last of them—that is, they are somewhere between 200m and 70m years old.
That timing fits well with a theory put forward in 2016, by Matija Cuk of the SETI Institute, in California and his colleagues. They suggest that at around the same time as the rings came into being an old set of moons orbiting Saturn destroyed themselves, and from their remains emerged not only the rings but also the planet’s current suite of inner moons—Rhea, Dione, Tethys, Enceladus and Mimas. . . .
Dr Cuk and his colleagues used computer simulations of Saturn’s moons’ orbits as a sort of time machine. Looking at the rate at which tidal friction is causing these orbits to lengthen they extrapolated backwards to find out what those orbits would have looked like in the past. They discovered that about 100m years ago the orbits of two of them, Tethys and Dione, would have interacted in a way that left the planes in which they orbit markedly tilted. But their orbits are untilted. The obvious, if unsettling, conclusion was that this interaction never happened—and thus that at the time when it should have happened, Dione and Tethys were simply not there. They must have come into being later. . . .
By and large the big things in the solar system—planets and moons—are thought of as having been around since the beginning. The suggestion that rings and moons are new is, though, made even more interesting by the fact that one of those moons, Enceladus, is widely considered the most promising site in the solar system on which to look for alien life. If Enceladus is both young and bears life, that life must have come into being quickly. This is also believed to have been the case on Earth. Were it true on Enceladus, that would encourage the idea that life evolves easily when conditions are right.
One reason for thinking Saturn’s rings are young is that they are bright. The solar system is suffused with comet dust, and comet dust is dark. Leaving Saturn’s ring system (which Cassini has shown to be more than 90% water ice) out in such a mist is like leaving laundry hanging on a line downwind from a smokestack: it will get dirty. The lighter the rings are, the faster this will happen, for the less mass they contain, the less celestial pollution they can absorb before they start to discolour. . . . Jeff Cuzzi, a scientist at America’s space agency, NASA, who helped run Cassini, told the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston that combining the mass estimates with Cassini’s measurements of the density of comet-dust near Saturn suggests the rings are no older than the first dinosaurs, nor younger than the last of them—that is, they are somewhere between 200m and 70m years old.
That timing fits well with a theory put forward in 2016, by Matija Cuk of the SETI Institute, in California and his colleagues. They suggest that at around the same time as the rings came into being an old set of moons orbiting Saturn destroyed themselves, and from their remains emerged not only the rings but also the planet’s current suite of inner moons—Rhea, Dione, Tethys, Enceladus and Mimas. . . .
Dr Cuk and his colleagues used computer simulations of Saturn’s moons’ orbits as a sort of time machine. Looking at the rate at which tidal friction is causing these orbits to lengthen they extrapolated backwards to find out what those orbits would have looked like in the past. They discovered that about 100m years ago the orbits of two of them, Tethys and Dione, would have interacted in a way that left the planes in which they orbit markedly tilted. But their orbits are untilted. The obvious, if unsettling, conclusion was that this interaction never happened—and thus that at the time when it should have happened, Dione and Tethys were simply not there. They must have come into being later. . . .
Based on information provided in the passage, we can infer that, in addition to water ice, Saturn’s rings might also have small amounts of:
Solution:
There is no mention of the methane and helium in
the passage, therefore it can be inferred that the
close option and answer is option (1).
Q.No: 338
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 15 to 19: NOT everything looks lovelier the longer and closer its inspection. But Saturn does. It is gorgeous through Earthly telescopes. However, the 13 years of close observation provided by Cassini, an American spacecraft, showed the planet, its moons and its remarkable rings off better and better, revealing finer structures, striking novelties and greater drama. . . .
By and large the big things in the solar system—planets and moons—are thought of as having been around since the beginning. The suggestion that rings and moons are new is, though, made even more interesting by the fact that one of those moons, Enceladus, is widely considered the most promising site in the solar system on which to look for alien life. If Enceladus is both young and bears life, that life must have come into being quickly. This is also believed to have been the case on Earth. Were it true on Enceladus, that would encourage the idea that life evolves easily when conditions are right.
One reason for thinking Saturn’s rings are young is that they are bright. The solar system is suffused with comet dust, and comet dust is dark. Leaving Saturn’s ring system (which Cassini has shown to be more than 90% water ice) out in such a mist is like leaving laundry hanging on a line downwind from a smokestack: it will get dirty. The lighter the rings are, the faster this will happen, for the less mass they contain, the less celestial pollution they can absorb before they start to discolour. . . . Jeff Cuzzi, a scientist at America’s space agency, NASA, who helped run Cassini, told the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston that combining the mass estimates with Cassini’s measurements of the density of comet-dust near Saturn suggests the rings are no older than the first dinosaurs, nor younger than the last of them—that is, they are somewhere between 200m and 70m years old.
That timing fits well with a theory put forward in 2016, by Matija Cuk of the SETI Institute, in California and his colleagues. They suggest that at around the same time as the rings came into being an old set of moons orbiting Saturn destroyed themselves, and from their remains emerged not only the rings but also the planet’s current suite of inner moons—Rhea, Dione, Tethys, Enceladus and Mimas. . . .
Dr Cuk and his colleagues used computer simulations of Saturn’s moons’ orbits as a sort of time machine. Looking at the rate at which tidal friction is causing these orbits to lengthen they extrapolated backwards to find out what those orbits would have looked like in the past. They discovered that about 100m years ago the orbits of two of them, Tethys and Dione, would have interacted in a way that left the planes in which they orbit markedly tilted. But their orbits are untilted. The obvious, if unsettling, conclusion was that this interaction never happened—and thus that at the time when it should have happened, Dione and Tethys were simply not there. They must have come into being later. . . .
By and large the big things in the solar system—planets and moons—are thought of as having been around since the beginning. The suggestion that rings and moons are new is, though, made even more interesting by the fact that one of those moons, Enceladus, is widely considered the most promising site in the solar system on which to look for alien life. If Enceladus is both young and bears life, that life must have come into being quickly. This is also believed to have been the case on Earth. Were it true on Enceladus, that would encourage the idea that life evolves easily when conditions are right.
One reason for thinking Saturn’s rings are young is that they are bright. The solar system is suffused with comet dust, and comet dust is dark. Leaving Saturn’s ring system (which Cassini has shown to be more than 90% water ice) out in such a mist is like leaving laundry hanging on a line downwind from a smokestack: it will get dirty. The lighter the rings are, the faster this will happen, for the less mass they contain, the less celestial pollution they can absorb before they start to discolour. . . . Jeff Cuzzi, a scientist at America’s space agency, NASA, who helped run Cassini, told the Lunar and Planetary Science Conference in Houston that combining the mass estimates with Cassini’s measurements of the density of comet-dust near Saturn suggests the rings are no older than the first dinosaurs, nor younger than the last of them—that is, they are somewhere between 200m and 70m years old.
That timing fits well with a theory put forward in 2016, by Matija Cuk of the SETI Institute, in California and his colleagues. They suggest that at around the same time as the rings came into being an old set of moons orbiting Saturn destroyed themselves, and from their remains emerged not only the rings but also the planet’s current suite of inner moons—Rhea, Dione, Tethys, Enceladus and Mimas. . . .
Dr Cuk and his colleagues used computer simulations of Saturn’s moons’ orbits as a sort of time machine. Looking at the rate at which tidal friction is causing these orbits to lengthen they extrapolated backwards to find out what those orbits would have looked like in the past. They discovered that about 100m years ago the orbits of two of them, Tethys and Dione, would have interacted in a way that left the planes in which they orbit markedly tilted. But their orbits are untilted. The obvious, if unsettling, conclusion was that this interaction never happened—and thus that at the time when it should have happened, Dione and Tethys were simply not there. They must have come into being later. . . .
Based on information provided in the passage, we can conclude all of the following EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option 1, 2 and 3 are mentioned in the passage while
option 4 isn’t. The right answer is option (4).
Q.No: 339
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 20 to 24: . . . The complexity of modern problems often precludes any one person from fully understanding them. Factors contributing to rising obesity levels, for example, include transportation systems and infrastructure, media, convenience foods, changing social norms, human biology and psychological factors. . . . The multidimensional or layered character of complex problems also undermines the principle of meritocracy: the idea that the ‘best person’ should be hired. There is no best person. When putting together an oncological research team, a biotech company such as Gilead or Genentech would not construct a multiple-choice test and hire the top scorers, or hire people whose resumes score highest according to some performance criteria. Instead, they would seek diversity. They would build a team of people who bring diverse knowledge bases, tools and analytic skills. . . .
Believers in a meritocracy might grant that teams ought to be diverse but then argue that meritocratic principles should apply within each category. Thus the team should consist of the ‘best’ mathematicians, the ‘best’ oncologists, and the ‘best’ biostatisticians from within the pool. That position suffers from a similar flaw. Even with a knowledge domain, no test or criteria applied to individuals will produce the best team. Each of these domains possesses such depth and breadth, that no test can exist. Consider the field of neuroscience. Upwards of 50,000 papers were published last year covering various techniques, domains of enquiry and levels of analysis, ranging from molecules and synapses up through networks of neurons. Given that complexity, any attempt to rank a collection of neuroscientists from best to worst, as if they were competitors in the 50-metre butterfly, must fail. What could be true is that given a specific task and the composition of a particular team, one scientist would be more likely to contribute than another. Optimal hiring depends on context. Optimal teams will be diverse.
Evidence for this claim can be seen in the way that papers and patents that combine diverse ideas tend to rank as high-impact. It can also be found in the structure of the so-called random decision forest, a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm. Random forests consist of ensembles of decision trees. If classifying pictures, each tree makes a vote: is that a picture of a fox or a dog? A weighted majority rules. Random forests can serve many ends. They can identify bank fraud and diseases, recommend ceiling fans and predict online dating behaviour. When building a forest, you do not select the best trees as they tend to make similar classifications. You want diversity. Programmers achieve that diversity by training each tree on different data, a technique known as bagging. They also boost the forest ‘cognitively’ by training trees on the hardest cases – those that the current forest gets wrong. This ensures even more diversity and accurate forests.
Yet the fallacy of meritocracy persists. Corporations, non-profits, governments, universities and even preschools test, score and hire the ‘best’. This all but guarantees not creating the best team. Ranking people by common criteria produces homogeneity. . . . That’s not likely to lead to breakthroughs.
Believers in a meritocracy might grant that teams ought to be diverse but then argue that meritocratic principles should apply within each category. Thus the team should consist of the ‘best’ mathematicians, the ‘best’ oncologists, and the ‘best’ biostatisticians from within the pool. That position suffers from a similar flaw. Even with a knowledge domain, no test or criteria applied to individuals will produce the best team. Each of these domains possesses such depth and breadth, that no test can exist. Consider the field of neuroscience. Upwards of 50,000 papers were published last year covering various techniques, domains of enquiry and levels of analysis, ranging from molecules and synapses up through networks of neurons. Given that complexity, any attempt to rank a collection of neuroscientists from best to worst, as if they were competitors in the 50-metre butterfly, must fail. What could be true is that given a specific task and the composition of a particular team, one scientist would be more likely to contribute than another. Optimal hiring depends on context. Optimal teams will be diverse.
Evidence for this claim can be seen in the way that papers and patents that combine diverse ideas tend to rank as high-impact. It can also be found in the structure of the so-called random decision forest, a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm. Random forests consist of ensembles of decision trees. If classifying pictures, each tree makes a vote: is that a picture of a fox or a dog? A weighted majority rules. Random forests can serve many ends. They can identify bank fraud and diseases, recommend ceiling fans and predict online dating behaviour. When building a forest, you do not select the best trees as they tend to make similar classifications. You want diversity. Programmers achieve that diversity by training each tree on different data, a technique known as bagging. They also boost the forest ‘cognitively’ by training trees on the hardest cases – those that the current forest gets wrong. This ensures even more diversity and accurate forests.
Yet the fallacy of meritocracy persists. Corporations, non-profits, governments, universities and even preschools test, score and hire the ‘best’. This all but guarantees not creating the best team. Ranking people by common criteria produces homogeneity. . . . That’s not likely to lead to breakthroughs.
Which of the following conditions, if true, would invalidate the passage’s main argument?
Solution:
The main idea of the passage is to find the best
person for a job, thus option (4) is the right answer.
Q.No: 340
Test Name : CAT 2018 Actual Paper Slot 2
Directions for questions 20 to 24: . . . The complexity of modern problems often precludes any one person from fully understanding them. Factors contributing to rising obesity levels, for example, include transportation systems and infrastructure, media, convenience foods, changing social norms, human biology and psychological factors. . . . The multidimensional or layered character of complex problems also undermines the principle of meritocracy: the idea that the ‘best person’ should be hired. There is no best person. When putting together an oncological research team, a biotech company such as Gilead or Genentech would not construct a multiple-choice test and hire the top scorers, or hire people whose resumes score highest according to some performance criteria. Instead, they would seek diversity. They would build a team of people who bring diverse knowledge bases, tools and analytic skills. . . .
Believers in a meritocracy might grant that teams ought to be diverse but then argue that meritocratic principles should apply within each category. Thus the team should consist of the ‘best’ mathematicians, the ‘best’ oncologists, and the ‘best’ biostatisticians from within the pool. That position suffers from a similar flaw. Even with a knowledge domain, no test or criteria applied to individuals will produce the best team. Each of these domains possesses such depth and breadth, that no test can exist. Consider the field of neuroscience. Upwards of 50,000 papers were published last year covering various techniques, domains of enquiry and levels of analysis, ranging from molecules and synapses up through networks of neurons. Given that complexity, any attempt to rank a collection of neuroscientists from best to worst, as if they were competitors in the 50-metre butterfly, must fail. What could be true is that given a specific task and the composition of a particular team, one scientist would be more likely to contribute than another. Optimal hiring depends on context. Optimal teams will be diverse.
Evidence for this claim can be seen in the way that papers and patents that combine diverse ideas tend to rank as high-impact. It can also be found in the structure of the so-called random decision forest, a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm. Random forests consist of ensembles of decision trees. If classifying pictures, each tree makes a vote: is that a picture of a fox or a dog? A weighted majority rules. Random forests can serve many ends. They can identify bank fraud and diseases, recommend ceiling fans and predict online dating behaviour. When building a forest, you do not select the best trees as they tend to make similar classifications. You want diversity. Programmers achieve that diversity by training each tree on different data, a technique known as bagging. They also boost the forest ‘cognitively’ by training trees on the hardest cases – those that the current forest gets wrong. This ensures even more diversity and accurate forests.
Yet the fallacy of meritocracy persists. Corporations, non-profits, governments, universities and even preschools test, score and hire the ‘best’. This all but guarantees not creating the best team. Ranking people by common criteria produces homogeneity. . . . That’s not likely to lead to breakthroughs.
Believers in a meritocracy might grant that teams ought to be diverse but then argue that meritocratic principles should apply within each category. Thus the team should consist of the ‘best’ mathematicians, the ‘best’ oncologists, and the ‘best’ biostatisticians from within the pool. That position suffers from a similar flaw. Even with a knowledge domain, no test or criteria applied to individuals will produce the best team. Each of these domains possesses such depth and breadth, that no test can exist. Consider the field of neuroscience. Upwards of 50,000 papers were published last year covering various techniques, domains of enquiry and levels of analysis, ranging from molecules and synapses up through networks of neurons. Given that complexity, any attempt to rank a collection of neuroscientists from best to worst, as if they were competitors in the 50-metre butterfly, must fail. What could be true is that given a specific task and the composition of a particular team, one scientist would be more likely to contribute than another. Optimal hiring depends on context. Optimal teams will be diverse.
Evidence for this claim can be seen in the way that papers and patents that combine diverse ideas tend to rank as high-impact. It can also be found in the structure of the so-called random decision forest, a state-of-the-art machine-learning algorithm. Random forests consist of ensembles of decision trees. If classifying pictures, each tree makes a vote: is that a picture of a fox or a dog? A weighted majority rules. Random forests can serve many ends. They can identify bank fraud and diseases, recommend ceiling fans and predict online dating behaviour. When building a forest, you do not select the best trees as they tend to make similar classifications. You want diversity. Programmers achieve that diversity by training each tree on different data, a technique known as bagging. They also boost the forest ‘cognitively’ by training trees on the hardest cases – those that the current forest gets wrong. This ensures even more diversity and accurate forests.
Yet the fallacy of meritocracy persists. Corporations, non-profits, governments, universities and even preschools test, score and hire the ‘best’. This all but guarantees not creating the best team. Ranking people by common criteria produces homogeneity. . . . That’s not likely to lead to breakthroughs.
On the basis of the passage, which of the following teams is likely to be most effective in solving the problem of rising obesity levels?
Solution:
2nd passage, 1-8 lines, it can be referred from the
lines that the option (1) is the right answer.
Q.No: 341
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
Which one of the following best sums up the overall purpose of the examples of Casper and Glossier in the passage?
Solution:
In order to answer this question, we need to refer
to the last paragraph of the passage. Consider the
lines, ‘For start-ups that promise accessible
simplicity, their very structure still might eventually
push them toward overwhelming variety……’ Thus,
the fourth option provides the right answer. While
option 1 is only partially correct, options 2 and 3
are factually inconsistent with the information
provided in the passage.
Q.No: 342
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
Based on the passage, all of the following can be inferred about consumer behaviour EXCEPT that:
Solution:
In this question we need to identify the inference
that can’t be made based on the information
provided in the passage. The statement having too
many product options can be overwhelming for
consumers can be easily inferred from the initial
lines of the passage.
Similarly, consumers are susceptible to marketing images that they see on social media can be inferred from the lines, ‘Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram….’
The statement too many options have made it difficult for consumers to trust products can be inferred from ‘They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .’.
Thus, the only statement that can’t be inferred is ‘consumers tend to prefer products by start-ups over those by established companies.’
Similarly, consumers are susceptible to marketing images that they see on social media can be inferred from the lines, ‘Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram….’
The statement too many options have made it difficult for consumers to trust products can be inferred from ‘They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .’.
Thus, the only statement that can’t be inferred is ‘consumers tend to prefer products by start-ups over those by established companies.’
Q.No: 343
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
Contemporary internet shopping conjures a perfect storm of choice anxiety. Research has consistently held that people who are presented with a few options make better, easier decisions than those presented with many. . . .
Helping consumers figure out what to buy amid an endless sea of choice online has become a cottage industry unto itself. Many brands and retailers now wield marketing buzzwords such as curation, differentiation, and discovery as they attempt to sell an assortment of stuff targeted to their ideal customer. Companies find such shoppers through the data gold mine of digital advertising, which can catalog people by gender, income level, personal interests, and more. Since Americans have lost the ability to sort through the sheer volume of the consumer choices available to them, a ghost now has to be in the retail machine, whether it’s an algorithm, an influencer, or some snazzy ad tech to help a product follow you around the internet. Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram—the relentlessly chic young moms and perpetually vacationing 20-somethings—who present an aspirational worldview, and then recommend the products and services that help achieve it. . . .
For a relatively new class of consumer-products startups, there’s another method entirely. Instead of making sense of a sea of existing stuff, these companies claim to disrupt stuff as Americans know it. Casper (mattresses), Glossier (makeup), Away (suitcases), and many others have sprouted up to offer consumers freedom from choice: The companies have a few aesthetically pleasing and supposedly highly functional options, usually at mid-range prices. They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .
One-thousand-dollar mattresses and $300 suitcases might solve choice anxiety for a certain tier of consumer, but the companies that sell them, along with those that attempt to massage the larger stuff economy into something navigable, are still just working within a consumer market that’s broken in systemic ways. The presence of so much stuff in America might be more valuable if it were more evenly distributed, but stuff’s creators tend to focus their energy on those who already have plenty. As options have expanded for people with disposable income, the opportunity to buy even basic things such as fresh food or quality diapers has contracted for much of America’s lower classes.
For start-ups that promise accessible simplicity, their very structure still might eventually push them toward overwhelming variety. Most of these companies are based on hundreds of millions of dollars of venture capital, the investors of which tend to expect a steep growth rate that can’t be achieved by selling one great mattress or one great sneaker. Casper has expanded into bedroom furniture and bed linens. Glossier, after years of marketing itself as no-makeup makeup that requires little skill to apply, recently launched a full line of glittering color cosmetics. There may be no way to opt out of stuff by buying into the right thing.
All of the following, IF TRUE, would weaken the author’s claims EXCEPT:
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author is in favor of
offering limited choices to customers. This particular
option demonstrates that offering fewer products
can bring positive results. Thus, it strengthens the
author’s content and is the right answer.
The other options directly contradict the information provided in the passage and weaken the author’s claims.
The other options directly contradict the information provided in the passage and weaken the author’s claims.
Q.No: 344
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
In the past, credit for telling the tale of Aladdin has often gone to Antoine Galland . . . the first European translator of . . . Arabian Nights [which] started as a series of translations of an incomplete manuscript of a medieval Arabic story collection. . . But, though those tales were of medieval origin, Aladdin may be a more recent invention. Scholars have not found a manuscript of the story that predates the version published in 1712 by Galland, who wrote in his diary that he first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from Aleppo named Hanna Diyab . . .
Despite the fantastical elements of the story, scholars now think the main character may actually be based on a real person’s real experiences. . . . Though Galland never credited Diyab in his published translations of the Arabian Nights stories, Diyab wrote something of his own: a travelogue penned in the mid-18th century. In it, he recalls telling Galland the story of Aladdin [and] describes his own hard-knocks upbringing and the way he marveled at the extravagance of Versailles. The descriptions he uses were very similar to the descriptions of the lavish palace that ended up in Galland’s version of the Aladdin story. [Therefore, author Paulo Lemos] Horta believes that “Aladdin might be the young Arab Maronite from Aleppo, marveling at the jewels and riches of Versailles.” . . .
For 300 years, scholars thought that the rags-to-riches story of Aladdin might have been inspired by the plots of French fairy tales that came out around the same time, or that the story was invented in that 18th century period as a byproduct of French Orientalism, a fascination with stereotypical exotic Middle Eastern luxuries that was prevalent then. The idea that Diyab might have based it on his own life — the experiences of a Middle Eastern man encountering the French, not vice-versa — flips the script. [According to Horta,] “Diyab was ideally placed to embody the overlapping world of East and West, blending the storytelling traditions of his homeland with his youthful observations of the wonder of 18thcentury France.” . . .
To the scholars who study the tale, its narrative drama isn’t the only reason storytellers keep finding reason to return to Aladdin. It reflects not only “a history of the French and the Middle East, but also [a story about] Middle Easterners coming to Paris and that speaks to our world today,” as Horta puts it. “The day Diyab told the story of Aladdin to Galland, there were riots due to food shortages during the winter and spring of 1708 to 1709, and Diyab was sensitive to those people in a way that Galland is not. When you read this diary, you see this solidarity among the Arabs who were in Paris at the time. . . .
There is little in the writings of Galland that would suggest that he was capable of developing a character like Aladdin with sympathy, but Diyab’s memoir reveals a narrator adept at capturing the distinctive psychology of a young protagonist, as well as recognizing the kinds of injustices and opportunities that can transform the path of any youthful adventurer.”
In the past, credit for telling the tale of Aladdin has often gone to Antoine Galland . . . the first European translator of . . . Arabian Nights [which] started as a series of translations of an incomplete manuscript of a medieval Arabic story collection. . . But, though those tales were of medieval origin, Aladdin may be a more recent invention. Scholars have not found a manuscript of the story that predates the version published in 1712 by Galland, who wrote in his diary that he first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from Aleppo named Hanna Diyab . . .
Despite the fantastical elements of the story, scholars now think the main character may actually be based on a real person’s real experiences. . . . Though Galland never credited Diyab in his published translations of the Arabian Nights stories, Diyab wrote something of his own: a travelogue penned in the mid-18th century. In it, he recalls telling Galland the story of Aladdin [and] describes his own hard-knocks upbringing and the way he marveled at the extravagance of Versailles. The descriptions he uses were very similar to the descriptions of the lavish palace that ended up in Galland’s version of the Aladdin story. [Therefore, author Paulo Lemos] Horta believes that “Aladdin might be the young Arab Maronite from Aleppo, marveling at the jewels and riches of Versailles.” . . .
For 300 years, scholars thought that the rags-to-riches story of Aladdin might have been inspired by the plots of French fairy tales that came out around the same time, or that the story was invented in that 18th century period as a byproduct of French Orientalism, a fascination with stereotypical exotic Middle Eastern luxuries that was prevalent then. The idea that Diyab might have based it on his own life — the experiences of a Middle Eastern man encountering the French, not vice-versa — flips the script. [According to Horta,] “Diyab was ideally placed to embody the overlapping world of East and West, blending the storytelling traditions of his homeland with his youthful observations of the wonder of 18thcentury France.” . . .
To the scholars who study the tale, its narrative drama isn’t the only reason storytellers keep finding reason to return to Aladdin. It reflects not only “a history of the French and the Middle East, but also [a story about] Middle Easterners coming to Paris and that speaks to our world today,” as Horta puts it. “The day Diyab told the story of Aladdin to Galland, there were riots due to food shortages during the winter and spring of 1708 to 1709, and Diyab was sensitive to those people in a way that Galland is not. When you read this diary, you see this solidarity among the Arabs who were in Paris at the time. . . .
There is little in the writings of Galland that would suggest that he was capable of developing a character like Aladdin with sympathy, but Diyab’s memoir reveals a narrator adept at capturing the distinctive psychology of a young protagonist, as well as recognizing the kinds of injustices and opportunities that can transform the path of any youthful adventurer.”
The author of the passage is most likely to agree with which of the following explanations for the origins of the story of Aladdin?
Solution:
Options 1, 3 and 4 are out of scope and cannot be
considered. The origin of the story of Aladdin was
based on Diyab’s life experiences. He transmitted
this story to Galland who made it a part of Arabian
Nights. Therefore, the correct answer is option 2.
Q.No: 345
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
In the past, credit for telling the tale of Aladdin has often gone to Antoine Galland . . . the first European translator of . . . Arabian Nights [which] started as a series of translations of an incomplete manuscript of a medieval Arabic story collection. . . But, though those tales were of medieval origin, Aladdin may be a more recent invention. Scholars have not found a manuscript of the story that predates the version published in 1712 by Galland, who wrote in his diary that he first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from Aleppo named Hanna Diyab . . .
Despite the fantastical elements of the story, scholars now think the main character may actually be based on a real person’s real experiences. . . . Though Galland never credited Diyab in his published translations of the Arabian Nights stories, Diyab wrote something of his own: a travelogue penned in the mid-18th century. In it, he recalls telling Galland the story of Aladdin [and] describes his own hard-knocks upbringing and the way he marveled at the extravagance of Versailles. The descriptions he uses were very similar to the descriptions of the lavish palace that ended up in Galland’s version of the Aladdin story. [Therefore, author Paulo Lemos] Horta believes that “Aladdin might be the young Arab Maronite from Aleppo, marveling at the jewels and riches of Versailles.” . . .
For 300 years, scholars thought that the rags-to-riches story of Aladdin might have been inspired by the plots of French fairy tales that came out around the same time, or that the story was invented in that 18th century period as a byproduct of French Orientalism, a fascination with stereotypical exotic Middle Eastern luxuries that was prevalent then. The idea that Diyab might have based it on his own life — the experiences of a Middle Eastern man encountering the French, not vice-versa — flips the script. [According to Horta,] “Diyab was ideally placed to embody the overlapping world of East and West, blending the storytelling traditions of his homeland with his youthful observations of the wonder of 18thcentury France.” . . .
To the scholars who study the tale, its narrative drama isn’t the only reason storytellers keep finding reason to return to Aladdin. It reflects not only “a history of the French and the Middle East, but also [a story about] Middle Easterners coming to Paris and that speaks to our world today,” as Horta puts it. “The day Diyab told the story of Aladdin to Galland, there were riots due to food shortages during the winter and spring of 1708 to 1709, and Diyab was sensitive to those people in a way that Galland is not. When you read this diary, you see this solidarity among the Arabs who were in Paris at the time. . . .
There is little in the writings of Galland that would suggest that he was capable of developing a character like Aladdin with sympathy, but Diyab’s memoir reveals a narrator adept at capturing the distinctive psychology of a young protagonist, as well as recognizing the kinds of injustices and opportunities that can transform the path of any youthful adventurer.”
In the past, credit for telling the tale of Aladdin has often gone to Antoine Galland . . . the first European translator of . . . Arabian Nights [which] started as a series of translations of an incomplete manuscript of a medieval Arabic story collection. . . But, though those tales were of medieval origin, Aladdin may be a more recent invention. Scholars have not found a manuscript of the story that predates the version published in 1712 by Galland, who wrote in his diary that he first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from Aleppo named Hanna Diyab . . .
Despite the fantastical elements of the story, scholars now think the main character may actually be based on a real person’s real experiences. . . . Though Galland never credited Diyab in his published translations of the Arabian Nights stories, Diyab wrote something of his own: a travelogue penned in the mid-18th century. In it, he recalls telling Galland the story of Aladdin [and] describes his own hard-knocks upbringing and the way he marveled at the extravagance of Versailles. The descriptions he uses were very similar to the descriptions of the lavish palace that ended up in Galland’s version of the Aladdin story. [Therefore, author Paulo Lemos] Horta believes that “Aladdin might be the young Arab Maronite from Aleppo, marveling at the jewels and riches of Versailles.” . . .
For 300 years, scholars thought that the rags-to-riches story of Aladdin might have been inspired by the plots of French fairy tales that came out around the same time, or that the story was invented in that 18th century period as a byproduct of French Orientalism, a fascination with stereotypical exotic Middle Eastern luxuries that was prevalent then. The idea that Diyab might have based it on his own life — the experiences of a Middle Eastern man encountering the French, not vice-versa — flips the script. [According to Horta,] “Diyab was ideally placed to embody the overlapping world of East and West, blending the storytelling traditions of his homeland with his youthful observations of the wonder of 18thcentury France.” . . .
To the scholars who study the tale, its narrative drama isn’t the only reason storytellers keep finding reason to return to Aladdin. It reflects not only “a history of the French and the Middle East, but also [a story about] Middle Easterners coming to Paris and that speaks to our world today,” as Horta puts it. “The day Diyab told the story of Aladdin to Galland, there were riots due to food shortages during the winter and spring of 1708 to 1709, and Diyab was sensitive to those people in a way that Galland is not. When you read this diary, you see this solidarity among the Arabs who were in Paris at the time. . . .
There is little in the writings of Galland that would suggest that he was capable of developing a character like Aladdin with sympathy, but Diyab’s memoir reveals a narrator adept at capturing the distinctive psychology of a young protagonist, as well as recognizing the kinds of injustices and opportunities that can transform the path of any youthful adventurer.”
All of the following serve as evidence for the character of Aladdin being based on Hanna Diyab EXCEPT:
Solution:
Diyab’s travelogue serves as evidence for the
character of Aladdin being based on him. This
negates options 2 and 4. Moreover, the secondlast
paragraph of the passage is suggestive of
Diyab’s cosmopolitanism and cross-cultural
experience. So, option 3 is also negated. Refer to
the following lines from the first paragraph of the
passage, “Galland, who wrote in his diary that he
first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from
Aleppo named Hanna Diyab”. There is no evidence
of Diyab’s narration of the story to Galland. This
makes option 1 the correct answer.
Q.No: 346
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (11 to 15): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
Which one of the following best captures the meaning of the statement, “Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify . . .”?
Solution:
Refer the lines Topophilia is difficult to design for
and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate
interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers
such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a
marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden
Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for
the desert. Thus, there is an element of
subjectiveness that underlies all topophilic
expression. Hence, option 2 is the right answer.
Q.No: 347
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (11 to 15): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
Which of the following statements, if true, could be seen as not contradicting the arguments in the passage?
Solution:
This is a slightly difficult question. We have to read
the options carefully and look for the one that is
not against what the author has to say.
Option 1 is contradictory because the author says that olfactory response is the third most important factor, while the option says that it is the most important factor.
Option 3 can be ruled out because the author says in the first paragraph: the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. The author says, ‘vary greatly’, while the option says, ‘vary little’.
Refer the lines - “As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify…” However, the option says that New Urbanism succeeded in those designs where architects collaborated with their clients. Thus, option 4 can also be negated.
Option 2 can be seen in the last paragraph and is parallel to what the author has to say. This is not contradicting the author’s argument, and hence it is the right choice.
Option 1 is contradictory because the author says that olfactory response is the third most important factor, while the option says that it is the most important factor.
Option 3 can be ruled out because the author says in the first paragraph: the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. The author says, ‘vary greatly’, while the option says, ‘vary little’.
Refer the lines - “As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify…” However, the option says that New Urbanism succeeded in those designs where architects collaborated with their clients. Thus, option 4 can also be negated.
Option 2 can be seen in the last paragraph and is parallel to what the author has to say. This is not contradicting the author’s argument, and hence it is the right choice.
Q.No: 348
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (11 to 15): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
In the last paragraph, the author uses the example of “Residents of upscale residential developments” to illustrate the:
Solution:
This example has been discussed in the last
paragraph of the passage where the author is
talking about the darker applications of topophilia
while exploring the affiliations between people and
places. This immediately negates statements 3
and 4 - manner in which environments are designed
to minimize the social exclusion of their clientele
and sensitive response to race and class problems
in upscale residential developments. There is no
discussion regarding nationalist projects of the
elites. Hence, option 1 is the right answer.
Q.No: 349
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (11 to 15): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
As defined by the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, topophilia is the affective bond between people and place. His 1974 book set forth a wide-ranging exploration of how the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. Factors influencing one’s depth of response to the environment include cultural background, gender, race, and historical circumstance, and Tuan also argued that there is a biological and sensory element. Topophilia might not be the strongest of human emotions—indeed, many people feel utterly indifferent toward the environments that shape their lives—but when activated it has the power to elevate a place to become the carrier of emotionally charged events or to be perceived as a symbol.
Aesthetic appreciation is one way in which people respond to the environment. A brilliantly colored rainbow after gloomy afternoon showers, a busy city street alive with human interaction—one might experience the beauty of such landscapes that had seemed quite ordinary only moments before or that are being newly discovered. This is quite the opposite of a second topophilic bond, namely that of the acquired taste for certain landscapes and places that one knows well. When a place is home, or when a space has become the locus of memories or the means of gaining a livelihood, it frequently evokes a deeper set of attachments than those predicated purely on the visual. A third response to the environment also depends on the human senses but may be tactile and olfactory, namely a delight in the feel and smell of air, water, and the earth.
Topophilia—and its very close conceptual twin, sense of place—is an experience that, however elusive, has inspired recent architects and planners. Most notably, new urbanism seeks to counter the perceived placelessness of modern suburbs and the decline of central cities through neo-traditional design motifs. Although motivated by good intentions, such attempts to create places rich in meaning are perhaps bound to disappoint. As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for the desert.
Topophilia connotes a positive relationship, but it often is useful to explore the darker affiliations between people and place. Patriotism, literally meaning the love of one’s terra patria or homeland, has long been cultivated by governing elites for a range of nationalist projects, including war preparation and ethnic cleansing. Residents of upscale residential developments have disclosed how important it is to maintain their community’s distinct identity, often by casting themselves in a superior social position and by reinforcing class and racial differences. And just as a beloved landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—or topophobia.
The word “topophobia” in the passage is used:
Solution:
The answer to this question can be found in the
last lines of the passage - And just as a beloved
landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may
landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place
that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—
or topophobia.
Q.No: 350
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
Which of the following statements about folk revivalism of the 1940s and 1960s cannot be inferred from the passage?
Solution:
The question asks us to select an option that
cannot be inferred from the passage. The statement
that is made in the passage is: “In the late 1960s,
purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock
idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many
forms.” In other words, electrification need not
always come through rock alone. It might come
from any other form of music as well. Thus, this
option surely cannot be inferred.
“…the lyrical freedom of Bob Dylan…” this phrase supports option 1.
Option 2 can be inferred because Cecil Sharp talks about folk music’s ability to adapt. The music of 40s and 60s demonstrates that adaptation.
The passage says that in the late 1960s, Purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms, this suggests that it had critics. Thus, option 4 can be inferred.
“…the lyrical freedom of Bob Dylan…” this phrase supports option 1.
Option 2 can be inferred because Cecil Sharp talks about folk music’s ability to adapt. The music of 40s and 60s demonstrates that adaptation.
The passage says that in the late 1960s, Purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms, this suggests that it had critics. Thus, option 4 can be inferred.
Q.No: 351
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
The author says that folk “may often appear a cosy, fossilised form” because:
Solution:
Fossilized refers to something belonging to/
associated with the past. Out of the options given,
only the second option comes close in meaning.
The other options don’t correlate with the word
fossilized.
Q.No: 352
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 1
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
"Free of the taint of manufacture" – that phrase, in particular, is heavily loaded with the ideology of what the Victorian socialist William Morris called the "antiscrape", or an anti-capitalist conservationism (not conservatism) that solaced itself with the vision of a pre-industrial golden age. In Britain, folk may often appear a cosy, fossilised form, but when you look more closely, the idea of folk – who has the right to sing it, dance it, invoke it, collect it, belong to it or appropriate it for political or cultural ends – has always been contested territory. . . .
In our own time, though, the word "folk" . . . has achieved the rare distinction of occupying fashionable and unfashionable status simultaneously. Just as the effusive floral prints of the radical William Morris now cover genteel sofas, so the revolutionary intentions of many folk historians and revivalists have led to music that is commonly regarded as parochial and conservative. And yet – as newspaper columns periodically rejoice – folk is hip again, influencing artists, clothing and furniture designers, celebrated at music festivals, awards ceremonies and on TV, reissued on countless record labels. Folk is a sonic "shabby chic", containing elements of the uncanny and eerie, as well as an antique veneer, a whiff of Britain's heathen dark ages. The very obscurity and anonymity of folk music's origins open up space for rampant imaginative fancies. . . .
[Cecil Sharp, who wrote about this subject, believed that] folk songs existed in constant transformation, a living example of an art form in a perpetual state of renewal. "One man sings a song, and then others sing it after him, changing what they do not like" is the most concise summary of his conclusions on its origins. He compared each rendition of a ballad to an acorn falling from an oak tree; every subsequent iteration sows the song anew. But there is tension in newness. In the late 1960s, purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many forms. For the early-20th-century composers such as Vaughan Williams and Holst, there were thunderbolts of inspiration from oriental mysticism, angular modernism and the body blow of the first world war, as well as input from the rediscovered folk tradition itself.
For the second wave of folk revivalists, such as Ewan MacColl and AL Lloyd, starting in the 40s, the vital spark was communism's dream of a post-revolutionary New Jerusalem. For their younger successors in the 60s, who thronged the folk clubs set up by the old guard, the lyrical freedom of Dylan and the unchained melodies of psychedelia created the conditions for folk-rock's own golden age, a brief Indian summer that lasted from about 1969 to 1971. . . . Four decades on, even that progressive period has become just one more era ripe for fashionable emulation and pastiche. The idea of a folk tradition being exclusively confined to oral transmission has become a much looser, less severely guarded concept. Recorded music and television, for today's metropolitan generation, are where the equivalent of folk memories are seeded. . . .
At a conference on folk forms, the author of the passage is least likely to agree with which one of the following views?
Solution:
The author appreciates how folk forms have been
used by modern musicians and the fusion of folk
with other forms of music throughout the passage.
Hence, he is likely to agree with all options except
4 because it says that folk music exhibits unusual
homogeneity.
If there is homogeneity, then the idea of adapting and infusing with other kinds of music is not valid. Thus, the author will not agree with this.
If there is homogeneity, then the idea of adapting and infusing with other kinds of music is not valid. Thus, the author will not agree with this.
Q.No: 353
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (11 to 14): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of four questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
For two years, I tracked down dozens of . . . Chinese in Upper Egypt [who were] selling lingerie. In a deeply conservative region, where Egyptian families rarely allow women to work or own businesses, the Chinese flourished because of their status as outsiders. They didn’t gossip, and they kept their opinions to themselves. In a New Yorker article entitled “Learning to Speak Lingerie,” I described the Chinese use of Arabic as another non-threatening characteristic. I wrote, “Unlike Mandarin, Arabic is inflected for gender, and Chinese dealers, who learn the language strictly by ear, often pick up speech patterns from female customers. I’ve come to think of it as the lingerie dialect, and there’s something disarming about these Chinese men speaking in the feminine voice.” . . .
When I wrote about the Chinese in the New Yorker, most readers seemed to appreciate the unusual perspective. But as I often find with topics that involve the Middle East, some people had trouble getting past the black-and-white quality of a byline. “This piece is so orientalist I don’t know what to do,” Aisha Gani, a reporter who worked at The Guardian, tweeted. Another colleague at the British paper, Iman Amrani, agreed: “I wouldn’t have minded an article on the subject written by an Egyptian woman—probably would have had better insight.” . . .
As an MOL (man of language), I also take issue with this kind of essentialism. Empathy and understanding are not inherited traits, and they are not strictly tied to gender and race. An individual who wrestles with a difficult language can learn to be more sympathetic to outsiders and open to different experiences of the world. This learning process—the embarrassments, the frustrations, the gradual sense of understanding and connection—is invariably transformative. In Upper Egypt, the Chinese experience of struggling to learn Arabic and local culture had made them much more thoughtful. In the same way, I was interested in their lives not because of some kind of voyeurism, but because I had also experienced Egypt and Arabic as an outsider. And both the Chinese and the Egyptians welcomed me because I spoke their languages. My identity as a white male was far less important than my ability to communicate.
And that easily lobbed word—“Orientalist”—hardly captures the complexity of our interactions. What exactly is the dynamic when a man from Missouri observes a Zhejiang native selling lingerie to an Upper Egyptian woman? . . . If all of us now stand beside the same river, speaking in ways we all understand, who’s looking east and who’s looking west? Which way is Oriental?
For all of our current interest in identity politics, there’s no corresponding sense of identity linguistics. You are what you speak—the words that run throughout your mind are at least as fundamental to your selfhood as is your ethnicity or your gender. And sometimes it’s healthy to consider human characteristics that are not inborn, rigid, and outwardly defined. After all, you can always learn another language and change who you are.
For two years, I tracked down dozens of . . . Chinese in Upper Egypt [who were] selling lingerie. In a deeply conservative region, where Egyptian families rarely allow women to work or own businesses, the Chinese flourished because of their status as outsiders. They didn’t gossip, and they kept their opinions to themselves. In a New Yorker article entitled “Learning to Speak Lingerie,” I described the Chinese use of Arabic as another non-threatening characteristic. I wrote, “Unlike Mandarin, Arabic is inflected for gender, and Chinese dealers, who learn the language strictly by ear, often pick up speech patterns from female customers. I’ve come to think of it as the lingerie dialect, and there’s something disarming about these Chinese men speaking in the feminine voice.” . . .
When I wrote about the Chinese in the New Yorker, most readers seemed to appreciate the unusual perspective. But as I often find with topics that involve the Middle East, some people had trouble getting past the black-and-white quality of a byline. “This piece is so orientalist I don’t know what to do,” Aisha Gani, a reporter who worked at The Guardian, tweeted. Another colleague at the British paper, Iman Amrani, agreed: “I wouldn’t have minded an article on the subject written by an Egyptian woman—probably would have had better insight.” . . .
As an MOL (man of language), I also take issue with this kind of essentialism. Empathy and understanding are not inherited traits, and they are not strictly tied to gender and race. An individual who wrestles with a difficult language can learn to be more sympathetic to outsiders and open to different experiences of the world. This learning process—the embarrassments, the frustrations, the gradual sense of understanding and connection—is invariably transformative. In Upper Egypt, the Chinese experience of struggling to learn Arabic and local culture had made them much more thoughtful. In the same way, I was interested in their lives not because of some kind of voyeurism, but because I had also experienced Egypt and Arabic as an outsider. And both the Chinese and the Egyptians welcomed me because I spoke their languages. My identity as a white male was far less important than my ability to communicate.
And that easily lobbed word—“Orientalist”—hardly captures the complexity of our interactions. What exactly is the dynamic when a man from Missouri observes a Zhejiang native selling lingerie to an Upper Egyptian woman? . . . If all of us now stand beside the same river, speaking in ways we all understand, who’s looking east and who’s looking west? Which way is Oriental?
For all of our current interest in identity politics, there’s no corresponding sense of identity linguistics. You are what you speak—the words that run throughout your mind are at least as fundamental to your selfhood as is your ethnicity or your gender. And sometimes it’s healthy to consider human characteristics that are not inborn, rigid, and outwardly defined. After all, you can always learn another language and change who you are.
The author’s critics would argue that:
Solution:
The fact that the author speaks Arabic but still
considers the Arabic as outsiders would clearly
make the author’s critics argue that language is
insufficient to bridge the cultural barriers. So, option
1 is the answer.
Q.No: 354
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (15 to 19): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
All of the following statements, if true, could be seen as supporting the arguments in the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 4 support the argument as they
are mentioned in the passage. Option 1 is
mentioned in the first paragraph. Option 2 is
mentioned in the second paragraph. Option 4 is
mentioned towards the end concluding part of the
passage where it says that modernity was an
external thing that was imposed on the Indian
society which eventually led to underdevelopment.
Option 3 is the correct answer because it was not
the modernity that caused the change in the colonial
policy but the other way round.
Q.No: 355
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (15 to 19): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
Which of the following observations is a valid conclusion to draw from the author’s statement that “the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force”?
Solution:
‘Here’ in the given context refers to India. This is
supported by the parts of the passage which
precede it. ‘Endogenous change’ means internal
change and according to the quoted lines such
change is not something which happens in India.
Rather it is forced upon the Indians by the colonial
policies. So, option 3 is the answer. Options 1 and
4 do not specifically talk about India.
Q.No: 356
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (15 to 19): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
“Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society.” Which of the following best captures the sense of this statement?
Solution:
Option 2 is the answer. Options 1, 3 and 4 do not
make sense according to the given passage. The
only reason why modernity was introduced to
change the Indian society was to address the
marginalization that the colonial state felt as it was
already modern and the Indian society was not at
that time.
Q.No: 357
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (15 to 19): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
Which one of the following 5-word sequences best captures the flow of the arguments in the passage?
Solution:
The following sequence captures the flow of the
arguments in the given passage: 1st line of the 1st
paragraph, “British colonial policy…”, 3rd sentence
of the 1st paragraph, “…Enlightenment…”, 6th
sentence of the 1st paragraph, “…modernity…”, 2nd
sentence of the second paragraph, “…with
subjection.” and the last sentence of the last
paragraph. In other words, the colonial policy
included Enlightenment of the colonized people
and modernity was forced upon them only to
dominate them which eventually led to
underdevelopment and dependency. So, option 3
is the answer.
Q.No: 358
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (15 to 19): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
British colonial policy . . . went through two policy phases, or at least there were two strategies between which its policies actually oscillated, sometimes to its great advantage. At first, the new colonial apparatus exercised caution, and occupied India by a mix of military power and subtle diplomacy, the high ground in the middle of the circle of circles. This, however, pushed them into contradictions. For, whatever their sense of the strangeness of the country and the thinness of colonial presence, the British colonial state represented the great conquering discourse of Enlightenment rationalism, entering India precisely at the moment of its greatest unchecked arrogance. As inheritors and representatives of this discourse, which carried everything before it, this colonial state could hardly adopt for long such a self-denying attitude. It had restructured everything in Europe—the productive system, the political regimes, the moral and cognitive orders—and would do the same in India, particularly as some empirically inclined theorists of that generation considered the colonies a massive laboratory of utilitarian or other theoretical experiments. Consequently, the colonial state could not settle simply for eminence at the cost of its marginality; it began to take initiatives to introduce the logic of modernity into Indian society. But this modernity did not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural forms. At times, there was a more direct form of collective resistance. Therefore the map of continuity and discontinuity that this state left behind at the time of independence was rather complex and has to be traced with care.
Most significantly, of course, initiatives for . . . modernity came to assume an external character. The acceptance of modernity came to be connected, ineradicably, with subjection. This again points to two different problems, one theoretical, the other political. Theoretically, because modernity was externally introduced, it is explanatorily unhelpful to apply the logical format of the ‘transition process’ to this pattern of change. Such a logical format would be wrong on two counts. First, however subtly, it would imply that what was proposed to be built was something like European capitalism. (And, in any case, historians have forcefully argued that what it was to replace was not like feudalism, with or without modificatory adjectives.) But, more fundamentally, the logical structure of endogenous change does not apply here. Here transformation agendas attack as an external force. This externality is not something that can be casually mentioned and forgotten. It is inscribed on every move, every object, every proposal, every legislative act, each line of causality. It comes to be marked on the epoch itself. This repetitive emphasis on externality should not be seen as a nationalist initiative that is so well rehearsed in Indian social science. . . .
Quite apart from the externality of the entire historical proposal of modernity, some of its contents were remarkable. . . . Economic reforms, or rather alterations . . . did not foreshadow the construction of a classical capitalist economy, with its necessary emphasis on extractive and transport sectors. What happened was the creation of a degenerate version of capitalism—what early dependency theorists called the ‘development of underdevelopment’.
All of the following statements about British colonialism can be inferred from the first paragraph, EXCEPT that it:
Solution:
Option 2 is directly mentioned in the given passage.
Refer to the sentences, “But this modernity did
not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its
initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural
forms. At times, there was a more direct form of
collective resistance.”
Q.No: 359
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
In the context of the passage, the author refers to Manaus in order to:
Solution:
Refer to the 5th paragraph of the given passage.
The reason why the city of Manus is mentioned in
the passage is to emphasize the fact that
subsidised city like Manaus could stop
deforestation and this serves as an example that
urban areas can help in protecting the environment.
So, option 4 is the answer.
Q.No: 360
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
From the passage it can be inferred that cities are good places to live in for all of the following reasons EXCEPT that they:
Solution:
Options 1 and 4 are mentioned in the last paragraph
and option 3 is mentioned in the fifth paragraph.
Option 2 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
Q.No: 361
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Question Numbers (20 to 24): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of five questions. Choose the
best answer to each question.
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
The magic of squatter cities is that they are improved steadily and gradually by their residents. To a planner’s eye, these cities look chaotic. I trained as a biologist and to my eye, they look organic. Squatter cities are also unexpectedly green. They have maximum density—1 million people per square mile in some areas of Mumbai—and have minimum energy and material use. People get around by foot, bicycle, rickshaw, or the universal shared taxi.
Not everything is efficient in the slums, though. In the Brazilian favelas where electricity is stolen and therefore free, people leave their lights on all day. But in most slums recycling is literally a way of life. The Dharavi slum in Mumbai has 400 recycling units and 30,000 ragpickers. Six thousand tons of rubbish are sorted every day. In 2007, the Economist reported that in Vietnam and Mozambique, “Waves of gleaners sift the sweepings of Hanoi’s streets, just as Mozambiquan children pick over the rubbish of Maputo’s main tip. Every city in Asia and Latin America has an industry based on gathering up old cardboard boxes.” . . .
In his 1985 article, Calthorpe made a statement that still jars with most people: “The city is the most environmentally benign form of human settlement. Each city dweller consumes less land, less energy, less water, and produces less pollution than his counterpart in settlements of lower densities.” “Green Manhattan” was the inflammatory title of a 2004 New Yorker article by David Owen. “By the most significant measures,” he wrote, “New York is the greenest community in the United States, and one of the greenest cities in the world . . . The key to New York’s relative environmental benignity is its extreme compactness. . . . Placing one and a half million people on a twenty-three-square-mile island sharply reduces their opportunities to be wasteful.” He went on to note that this very compactness forces people to live in the world’s most energy-efficient apartment buildings. . . .
Urban density allows half of humanity to live on 2.8 per cent of the land. . . . Consider just the infrastructure efficiencies. According to a 2004 UN report: “The concentration of population and enterprises in urban areas greatly reduces the unit cost of piped water, sewers, drains, roads, electricity, garbage collection, transport, health care, and schools.” . . .
[T]he nationally subsidised city of Manaus in northern Brazil “answers the question” of how to stop deforestation: give people decent jobs. Then they can afford houses, and gain security. One hundred thousand people who would otherwise be deforesting the jungle around Manaus are now prospering in town making such things as mobile phones and televisions. . . .
Of course, fast-growing cities are far from an unmitigated good. They concentrate crime, pollution, disease and injustice as much as business, innovation, education and entertainment. . . . But if they are overall a net good for those who move there, it is because cities offer more than just jobs. They are transformative: in the slums, as well as the office towers and leafy suburbs, the progress is from hick to metropolitan to cosmopolitan . . .
We can infer that Calthorpe’s statement “still jars” with most people because most people:
Solution:
‘Jars’ in the phrase “still jars” is used as a verb; it
means ‘to bear unpleasant effect on’ or ‘annoy’.
Calthorpe’s statements: “The city is the most
environmentally benign form of human settlement.
Each city dweller consumes less land, less
energy, less water, and produces less pollution
than his counterpart in settlements of lower
densities.” still bear an unpleasant effect on the
people as his statements contradict what people
think about cities.
Q.No: 362
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Five sentences related to a topic are given below in
a jumbled order. Four of them form a coherent and
unified paragraph. Identify the odd sentence that does
not go with the four. Key in the number of the option
that you choose.
(1) Socrates told us that ‘the unexamined life is not
worth living’ and that to ‘know thyself’ is the path
to true wisdom
(2) It suggests that you should adopt an ancient
rhetorical method favored by the likes of Julius
Caesar and known as ‘illeism’ – or speaking about
yourself in the third person.
(3) Research has shown that people who are prone
to rumination also often suffer from impaired
decision making under pressure and are at a
substantially increased risk of depression.
(4) Simple rumination – the process of churning your
concerns around in your head – is not the way to
achieve self-realization.
(5) The idea is that this small change in perspective
can clear your emotional fog, allowing you to see
past your biases.
Solution:
Sentences 2 and 5 can be clubbed together.
Sentence 2 talks about speaking from the third
person’s point of view while sentence 5 mentions
a change in perspective. Sentences 3 and 4 can
be clubbed together as well because both explain
rumination. Therefore, sentence 1 is the odd
sentence.
Q.No: 363
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, 4) given below,
when properly sequenced would yield a coherent
paragraph. Decide on the proper sequence of the
order of the sentences and key in the sequence of
the four numbers as your answer.
(1) Such a belief in the harmony of nature requires a
purpose presumably imposed by the goodness
and wisdom of a deity.
(2) These parts, all fit together into an integrated,
well-ordered system that was created by design.
(3) Historically, the notion of a balance of nature is
part observational, part metaphysical, and not
scientific in any way.
(4) It is an example of an ancient belief system called
teleology, the notion that what we call nature has
a predetermined destiny associated with its
component parts.
Solution:
Sentence 4 explains sentence 3. Hence, 3 and 4
can be defined as a mandatory pair. 2 and 1 also
form a mandatory pair because sentence 1 talks
about harmony of nature which is an explanation
of ‘integrated, well-ordered system’ mentioned in
sentence 2.
Q.No: 364
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Five sentences related to a topic are given below.
Four of them can be put together to form a meaningful
and coherent short paragraph. Identify the odd one
out. Choose its number as your answer and key it
in.
(1) A particularly interesting example of inference
occurs in many single panel comics.
(2) It’s the creator’s participation and imagination that
makes the single-panel comic so engaging and
so rewarding.
(3) Often, the humor requires you to imagine what
happened in the instant immediately before or
immediately after the panel you’re being shown.
(4) To get the joke, you actually have to figure out
what some of these missing panels must be.
(5) It is as though the cartoonist devised a series of
panels to tell the story and has chosen to show
you only one – and typically not even the funniest.
Solution:
Except sentence 2, the other sentences talk about
single panel comics and the characteristic feature
of being interesting, humorous, funny and
possessing an element of joke. Thus, all the
sentences, except sentence 2, can be clubbed
together.
Q.No: 365
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, 4) given below,
when properly sequenced would yield a coherent
paragraph. Decide on the proper sequence of the
order of the sentences and key in the sequence of
the four numbers as your answer.
(1) To the uninitiated listener, atonal music can sound
like chaotic, random noise.
(2) Atonality is a condition of music in which the
constructs of the music do not ‘live’ within the
confines of a particular key signature, scale, or
mode.
(3) After you realize the amount of knowledge, skill,
and technical expertise required to compose or
perform it, your tune may change, so to speak.
(4) However, atonality is one of the most important
movements in 20th century music.
Solution:
Sentence 2 mentions atonality and it is further
explained in sentence 1. Sentence 4 follows and
sentence 3 mentions how to compose or perform
atonal music. Hence, sentence 3 closes the
paragraph effectively.
Q.No: 366
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
Five sentences related to a topic are given below.
Four of them can be put together to form a meaningful
and coherent short paragraph. Identify the odd one
out. Choose its number as your answer and key it
in.
(1) Ocean plastic is problematic for a number of
reasons, but primarily because marine animals
eat it.
(2) The largest numerical proportion of ocean plastic
falls in small size fractions.
(3) Aside from clogging up the digestive tracts of
marine life, plastic also tends to adsorb pollutants
from the water column.
(4) Plastic in the oceans is arguably one of the most
important and pervasive environmental problems
today.
(5) Eating plastic has a number of negative
consequences such as the retention of plastic
particles in the gut for longer periods than normal
food particles.
Solution:
Except sentence 2, the other sentences talk about
the problem of plastic pollution and how marine
animals eat plastic. Sentence 2 doesn’t talk about
the consumption of plastic. Hence, it is the odd
sentence.
Q.No: 367
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, 4) given below,
when properly sequenced would yield a coherent
paragraph. Decide on the proper sequence of the
order of the sentences and key in the sequence of
the four numbers as your answer.
(1) Living things—animals and plants—typically
exhibit correlational structure.
(2) Adaptive behaviour depends on cognitive
economy, treating objects as equivalent.
(3) The information we receive from our senses, from
the world, typically has structure and order, and
is not arbitrary.
(4) To categorize an object means to consider it
equivalent to other things in that category, and
different—along some salient dimension—from
things that are not.
Solution:
2 and 4 form a mandatory pair. In sentence 2, there
is the mention of ‘treating objects as equivalent.’
The same idea is explained further in sentence 4.
Sentence 3 talks about structure and order and
sentence 1 explains the word ‘structure’ further.’
Q.No: 368
Test Name : CAT 2019 Actual Paper Slot 2
The four sentences (labelled 1, 2, 3, 4) given below,
when properly sequenced would yield a coherent
paragraph. Decide on the proper sequence of the
order of the sentences and key in the sequence of
the four numbers as your answer.
(1) Conceptualisations of ‘women’s time’ as contrary
to clock-time and clock-time as synonymous with
economic rationalism are two of the deleterious
results of this representation.
(2) While dichotomies of ‘men’s time’, ‘women’s
time’, clock-time, and caring time can be
analytically useful, this article argues that
everyday caring practices incorporate a
multiplicity of times; and both men and women
can engage in these multiple-times
(3) When the everyday practices of working sole
fathers and working sole mothers are carefully
examined to explore conceptualisations of
gendered time, it is found that caring time is often
more focused on the clock than generally
theorised.
(4) Clock-time has been consistently represented
in feminist literature as a masculine artefact
representative of a ‘time is money’ perspective.
Solution:
Sentence 1 talks about a certain representation
and this representation is given in sentence 4.
Hence, 4 and 1 form a mandatory pair. Sentence 3
talks about caring practices and time that is further
elaborated in sentence 2.
Q.No: 369
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Which one of the following statements, if false, could be seen as supporting the arguments in the passage?
Solution:
Refer to the first sentence of the last paragraph.
The author reiterates that a complete sentence
needs a noun and verb. Hence, option (2), if false,
will support the author’s belief. Option (4), if true,
will support the author’s belief and hence, it is
wrong. Option (3) is out of scope. Option (1) is a
statement that is mentioned in the passage. It
doesn’t support the author’s belief.
Q.No: 370
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Inferring from the passage, the author could be most supportive of which one of the following practices?
Solution:
The author swears by the rules of grammar. Refer
to paragraphs 1 and 5. Hence, option (3), if true,
will most probably be supported by the author.
Option (1) is wrong because the author is not
critiquing the rules of grammar. He wants that the
rules of grammar be followed. Option (2) is exactly
the opposite of what the author says in the
passage. Option (4) is incorrect because is out of
scope.
Q.No: 371
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Which one of the following quotes best captures the main concern of the passage?
Solution:
The passage talks about the importance of
grammar. Not knowing the fundamentals of
grammar can impact framing a sentence. Refer to
the last paragraph where the author sums up the
main idea in the passage. The remaining options
are narrow in scope.
Q.No: 372
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
“Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float.” None of the following statements can be seen as similar EXCEPT:
Solution:
Nouns and verbs are separate parts of speech.
The quoted sentence implies juxtaposing 2
disparate things and the result is something that
is coherent and meaningful. Hence, option (4)
comes closest to the idea that is there in the quoted
sentence.
Q.No: 373
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
Vocabulary used in speech or writing organizes itself in seven parts of speech (eight, if you count interjections such as Oh! and Gosh! and Fuhgeddaboudit!). Communication composed of these parts of speech must be organized by rules of grammar upon which we agree. When these rules break down, confusion and misunderstanding result. Bad grammar produces bad sentences. My favorite example from Strunk and White is this one: “As a mother of five, with another one on the way, my ironing board is always up.”
Nouns and verbs are the two indispensable parts of writing. Without one of each, no group of words can be a sentence, since a sentence is, by definition, a group of words containing a subject (noun) and a predicate (verb); these strings of words begin with a capital letter, end with a period, and combine to make a complete thought which starts in the writer’s head and then leaps to the reader’s.
Must you write complete sentences each time, every time? Perish the thought. If your work consists only of fragments and floating clauses, the Grammar Police aren’t going to come and take you away. Even William Strunk, that Mussolini of rhetoric, recognized the delicious pliability of language. “It is an old observation,” he writes, “that the best writers sometimes disregard the rules of rhetoric.” Yet he goes on to add this thought, which I urge you to consider: “Unless he is certain of doing well, [the writer] will probably do best to follow the rules.”
The telling clause here is Unless he is certain of doing well. If you don’t have a rudimentary grasp of how the parts of speech translate into coherent sentences, how can you be certain that you are doing well? How will you know if you’re doing ill, for that matter? The answer, of course, is that you can’t, you won’t. One who does grasp the rudiments of grammar finds a comforting simplicity at its heart, where there need be only nouns, the words that name, and verbs, the words that act.
Take any noun, put it with any verb, and you have a sentence. It never fails. Rocks explode. Jane transmits. Mountains float. These are all perfect sentences. Many such thoughts make little rational sense, but even the stranger ones (Plums deify!) have a kind of poetic weight that’s nice. The simplicity of noun-verb construction is useful—at the very least it can provide a safety net for your writing. Strunk and White caution against too many simple sentences in a row, but simple sentences provide a path you can follow when you fear getting lost in the tangles of rhetoric—all those restrictive and nonrestrictive clauses, those modifying phrases, those appositives and compound-complex sentences. If you start to freak out at the sight of such unmapped territory (unmapped by you, at least), just remind yourself that rocks explode, Jane transmits, mountains float, and plums deify. Grammar is . . . the pole you grab to get your thoughts up on their feet and walking.
All of the following statements can be inferred from the passage EXCEPT that:
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred from the first paragraph.
Option (3) can be inferred from the second
paragraph. Option (4) can be inferred from the third
last paragraph. Option (2) is not stated and so, is
the answer.
Q.No: 374
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (6 to 9): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Few realise that the government of China, governing an empire of some 60 million people during the Tang dynasty (618–907), implemented a complex financial system that recognised grain, coins and textiles as money. . . . Coins did have certain advantages: they were durable, recognisable and provided a convenient medium of exchange, especially for smaller transactions. However, there were also disadvantages. A continuing shortage of copper meant that government mints could not produce enough coins for the entire empire, to the extent that for most of the dynasty’s history, coins constituted only a tenth of the money supply. One of the main objections to calls for taxes to be paid in coin was that peasant producers who could weave cloth or grow grain – the other two major currencies of the Tang – would not be able to produce coins, and therefore would not be able to pay their taxes. . . .
As coins had advantages and disadvantages, so too did textiles. If in circulation for a long period of time, they could show signs of wear and tear. Stained, faded and torn bolts of textiles had less value than a brand new bolt. Furthermore, a full bolt had a particular value. If consumers cut textiles into smaller pieces to buy or sell something worth less than a full bolt, that, too, greatly lessened the value of the textiles. Unlike coins, textiles could not be used for small transactions; as [an official] noted, textiles could not “be exchanged by the foot and the inch” . . .
But textiles had some advantages over coins. For a start, textile production was widespread and there were fewer problems with the supply of textiles. For large transactions, textiles weighed less than their equivalent in coins since a string of coins . . . could weigh as much as 4 kg. Furthermore, the dimensions of a bolt of silk held remarkably steady from the third to the tenth century: 56 cm wide and 12 m long . . . The values of different textiles were also more stable than the fluctuating values of coins. . . .
The government also required the use of textiles for large transactions. Coins, on the other hand, were better suited for smaller transactions, and possibly, given the costs of transporting coins, for a more local usage. Grain, because it rotted easily, was not used nearly as much as coins and textiles, but taxpayers were required to pay grain to the government as a share of their annual tax obligations, and official salaries were expressed in weights of grain. . . .
In actuality, our own currency system today has some similarities even as it is changing in front of our eyes. . . . We have cash – coins for small transactions like paying for parking at a meter, and banknotes for other items; cheques and debit/credit cards for other, often larger, types of payments. At the same time, we are shifting to electronic banking and making payments online. Some young people never use cash [and] do not know how to write a cheque . . .
Few realise that the government of China, governing an empire of some 60 million people during the Tang dynasty (618–907), implemented a complex financial system that recognised grain, coins and textiles as money. . . . Coins did have certain advantages: they were durable, recognisable and provided a convenient medium of exchange, especially for smaller transactions. However, there were also disadvantages. A continuing shortage of copper meant that government mints could not produce enough coins for the entire empire, to the extent that for most of the dynasty’s history, coins constituted only a tenth of the money supply. One of the main objections to calls for taxes to be paid in coin was that peasant producers who could weave cloth or grow grain – the other two major currencies of the Tang – would not be able to produce coins, and therefore would not be able to pay their taxes. . . .
As coins had advantages and disadvantages, so too did textiles. If in circulation for a long period of time, they could show signs of wear and tear. Stained, faded and torn bolts of textiles had less value than a brand new bolt. Furthermore, a full bolt had a particular value. If consumers cut textiles into smaller pieces to buy or sell something worth less than a full bolt, that, too, greatly lessened the value of the textiles. Unlike coins, textiles could not be used for small transactions; as [an official] noted, textiles could not “be exchanged by the foot and the inch” . . .
But textiles had some advantages over coins. For a start, textile production was widespread and there were fewer problems with the supply of textiles. For large transactions, textiles weighed less than their equivalent in coins since a string of coins . . . could weigh as much as 4 kg. Furthermore, the dimensions of a bolt of silk held remarkably steady from the third to the tenth century: 56 cm wide and 12 m long . . . The values of different textiles were also more stable than the fluctuating values of coins. . . .
The government also required the use of textiles for large transactions. Coins, on the other hand, were better suited for smaller transactions, and possibly, given the costs of transporting coins, for a more local usage. Grain, because it rotted easily, was not used nearly as much as coins and textiles, but taxpayers were required to pay grain to the government as a share of their annual tax obligations, and official salaries were expressed in weights of grain. . . .
In actuality, our own currency system today has some similarities even as it is changing in front of our eyes. . . . We have cash – coins for small transactions like paying for parking at a meter, and banknotes for other items; cheques and debit/credit cards for other, often larger, types of payments. At the same time, we are shifting to electronic banking and making payments online. Some young people never use cash [and] do not know how to write a cheque . . .
In the context of the passage, which one of the following can be inferred with regard to the use of currency during the Tang era?
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph where the author
mentions the similarities between the modern times
and the currency usage during the Tang period.
The other 3 options are incorrect in the light of the
passage. We don’t know if grains were the most
used currency.
Q.No: 375
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (10 to 13): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
From the passage it can be inferred that the call pulse rate of male northern elephant seals in the southern rookeries was faster because:
Solution:
Option (3) can be inferred from the second and
third paragraphs of the passage. Also, refer to the
4th paragraph where the author mentions the factor
of immigration. Option (1) is not the reason behind
the faster call pulse rate Option (2) is wrong
because the elephant seals that have sophisticated
structures containing doublets and triplets have
migrated to the islands from the southern rookeries.
Option (4) is out of scope.
Q.No: 376
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (10 to 13): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
Which one of the following best sums up the overall history of transformation of male northern elephant seal calls?
Solution:
This is a fact based question and the answer has
been clearly given in the last paragraph. Refer to
the last three sentences of the passage for the
answer where the transition from simple to
complex composition has been mentioned. Option
(2) states exactly the opposite of what the passage
says. Option (4) is factually incorrect. These days,
modern males exhibit more individual diversity.
Option (1) is out of scope.
Q.No: 377
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (10 to 13): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
In the late 1960s, while studying the northern-elephantseal population along the coasts of Mexico and California, Burney Le Boeuf and his colleagues couldn’t help but notice that the threat calls of males at some sites sounded different from those of males at other sites. . . . That was the first time dialects were documented in a nonhuman mammal. . . .
All the northern elephant seals that exist today are descendants of the small herd that survived on Isla Guadalupe [after the near extinction of the species in the nineteenth century]. As that tiny population grew, northern elephant seals started to recolonize former breeding locations. It was precisely on the more recently colonized islands where Le Boeuf found that the tempos of the male vocal displays showed stronger differences to the ones from Isla Guadalupe, the founder colony.
In order to test the reliability of these dialects over time, Le Boeuf and other researchers visited Año Nuevo Island in California—the island where males showed the slowest pulse rates in their calls—every winter from 1968 to 1972. “What we found is that the pulse rate increased, but it still remained relatively slow compared to the other colonies we had measured in the past” Le Boeuf told me.
At the individual level, the pulse of the calls stayed the same: A male would maintain his vocal signature throughout his lifetime. But the average pulse rate was changing. Immigration could have been responsible for this increase, as in the early 1970s, 43 percent of the males on Año Nuevo had come from southern rookeries that had a faster pulse rate. This led Le Boeuf and his collaborator, Lewis Petrinovich, to deduce that the dialects were, perhaps, a result of isolation over time, after the breeding sites had been recolonized. For instance, the first settlers of Año Nuevo could have had, by chance, calls with low pulse rates. At other sites, where the scientists found faster pulse rates, the opposite would have happened—seals with faster rates would have happened to arrive first.
As the population continued to expand and the islands kept on receiving immigrants from the original population, the calls in all locations would have eventually regressed to the average pulse rate of the founder colony. In the decades that followed, scientists noticed that the geographical variations reported in 1969 were not obvious anymore. . . . In the early 2010s, while studying northern elephant seals on Año Nuevo Island, [researcher Caroline] Casey noticed, too, that what Le Boeuf had heard decades ago was not what she heard now. . . . By performing more sophisticated statistical analyses on both sets of data, [Casey and Le Boeuf] confirmed that dialects existed back then but had vanished. Yet there are other differences between the males from the late 1960s and their great-great-grandsons: Modern males exhibit more individual diversity, and their calls are more complex. While 50 years ago the drumming pattern was quite simple and the dialects denoted just a change in tempo, Casey explained, the calls recorded today have more complex structures, sometimes featuring doublets or triplets. . . .
All of the following can be inferred from Le Boeuf’s study as described in the passage EXCEPT that:
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred in the light of the first
sentence of the last paragraph. Option (2) can be
inferred in the last 4 sentences of the passage.
Option (4) can be inferred in the light of the third
sentence of the 4th paragraph.
Q.No: 378
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek anarkhia, meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.
Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.
The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.
For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.
The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist-communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchistcommunism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .
There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806–56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.
The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek anarkhia, meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.
Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.
The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.
For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.
The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist-communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchistcommunism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .
There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806–56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.
The author believes that the new ruling class of politicians betrayed the principles of the French Revolution, but does not specify in what way. In the context of the passage, which statement below is the likeliest explanation of that betrayal?
Solution:
Note the word ‘strutting’ in the second paragraph.
Strutting refers to an arrogant behaviour.
Furthermore, the French Revolution ended with a
reign of terror. Hence, option (3) is the most
plausible explanation. The other options cannot
be inferred in the light of the passage.
Q.No: 379
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-1
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek anarkhia, meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.
Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.
The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.
For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.
The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist-communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchistcommunism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .
There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806–56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.
The word ‘anarchy’ comes from the Greek anarkhia, meaning contrary to authority or without a ruler, and was used in a derogatory sense until 1840, when it was adopted by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to describe his political and social ideology. Proudhon argued that organization without government was both possible and desirable. In the evolution of political ideas, anarchism can be seen as an ultimate projection of both liberalism and socialism, and the differing strands of anarchist thought can be related to their emphasis on one or the other of these.
Historically, anarchism arose not only as an explanation of the gulf between the rich and the poor in any community, and of the reason why the poor have been obliged to fight for their share of a common inheritance, but as a radical answer to the question ‘What went wrong?’ that followed the ultimate outcome of the French Revolution. It had ended not only with a reign of terror and the emergence of a newly rich ruling caste, but with a new adored emperor, Napoleon Bonaparte, strutting through his conquered territories.
The anarchists and their precursors were unique on the political Left in affirming that workers and peasants, grasping the chance that arose to bring an end to centuries of exploitation and tyranny, were inevitably betrayed by the new class of politicians, whose first priority was to re-establish a centralized state power. After every revolutionary uprising, usually won at a heavy cost for ordinary populations, the new rulers had no hesitation in applying violence and terror, a secret police, and a professional army to maintain their control.
For anarchists the state itself is the enemy, and they have applied the same interpretation to the outcome of every revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. This is not merely because every state keeps a watchful and sometimes punitive eye on its dissidents, but because every state protects the privileges of the powerful.
The mainstream of anarchist propaganda for more than a century has been anarchist-communism, which argues that property in land, natural resources, and the means of production should be held in mutual control by local communities, federating for innumerable joint purposes with other communes. It differs from state socialism in opposing the concept of any central authority. Some anarchists prefer to distinguish between anarchistcommunism and collectivist anarchism in order to stress the obviously desirable freedom of an individual or family to possess the resources needed for living, while not implying the right to own the resources needed by others. . . .
There are, unsurprisingly, several traditions of individualist anarchism, one of them deriving from the ‘conscious egoism’ of the German writer Max Stirner (1806–56), and another from a remarkable series of 19th-century American figures who argued that in protecting our own autonomy and associating with others for common advantages, we are promoting the good of all. These thinkers differed from free-market liberals in their absolute mistrust of American capitalism, and in their emphasis on mutualism.
Which one of the following best expresses the similarity between American individualist anarchists and free-market liberals as well as the difference between the former and the latter?
Solution:
This is again a fact based question. Refer to the
last sentence of the last paragraph for the answer
where the relationship between American
individualist anarchists and free-market liberals has
been mentioned. The remaining options are not
stated in the passage.
Q.No: 380
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
All of the following statements, if true, could be seen as supporting the arguments in the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option 1 is mentioned in the second paragraph of
the given passage. Option 2 is found in the first
and second sentences of the fourth paragraph,
“While renewable energy is a more recent addition
to financial portfolios, investments in the sector
must be considered in light of our understanding
of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance
reveals, the concentration of control of corporate
activity facilitates profit generation.” The passage
says that the renewable energy is already a hot or
lucrative business and talks about looking at the
social and environmental impact it would have,
however, it does not say that the possible negative
impacts of renewable energy need to be studied
before it can be offered as a financial investment
opportunity. Hence, option 3 is the answer. Option
4 is mentioned in the last sentence of the paragraph
of the given passage, “The disposal of toxic waste
has long perpetuated social injustice through the
flows of waste to the Global South and to
marginalized communities in the Global North…”
Q.No: 381
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
Which one of the following statements, if false, could be seen as best supporting the arguments in the passage?
Solution:
Refer to “As renewable energy production requires
land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it
imposes costs on people and the environment.
Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to
community dispossession and exclusion…”
Hence, option 2 is correct as it is false according
to the given passage. Option 1 is true because a
lot of money needs to be invested in order to get
high returns. Option 3 is true as non-renewable
energy system is more profitable. Option 4 is also
true. Refer to, “Renewable energy can be produced
at the household or neighborhood level. However,
such small-scale, localized production is unlikely
to generate high returns for investors.”
Q.No: 382
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
Based on the passage, we can infer that the author would be most supportive of which one of the following practices?
Solution:
The passage talks about renewable energy. So,
option 1 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
The passage does not talk about the need for the
study of the coexistence of marginalised people
with their environments. It cannot be inferred from
the given passage either. So, option is incorrect.
The passage does not suggest the localised, smallscale
development of renewable energy systems.
Thus, option 2 is also incorrect. Option 4 can be
inferred from “The disposal of toxic waste has long
perpetuated social injustice through the flows of
waste to the Global South and to marginalized
communities in the Global North…”
Q.No: 383
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
In a low-carbon world, renewable energy technologies are hot business. For investors looking to redirect funds, wind turbines and solar panels, among other technologies, seem a straightforward choice. But renewables need to be further scrutinized before being championed as forging a path toward a low-carbon future. Both the direct and indirect impacts of renewable energy must be examined to ensure that a climate-smart future does not intensify social and environmental harm. As renewable energy production requires land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it imposes costs on people and the environment. Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to community dispossession and exclusion . . . Renewable energy supply chains are also intertwined with mining, and their technologies contribute to growing levels of electronic waste . . . Furthermore, although renewable energy can be produced and distributed through small-scale, local systems, such an approach might not generate the high returns on investment needed to attract capital.
Although an emerging sector, renewables are enmeshed in long-standing resource extraction through their dependence on minerals and metals . . . Scholars document the negative consequences of mining . . . even for mining operations that commit to socially responsible practices[:] “many of the world’s largest reservoirs of minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, [and] rare earth minerals”—the ones needed for renewable technologies—“are found in fragile states and under communities of marginalized peoples in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.” Since the demand for metals and minerals will increase substantially in a renewablepowered future . . . this intensification could exacerbate the existing consequences of extractive activities.
Among the connections between climate change and waste, O’Neill . . . highlights that “devices developed to reduce our carbon footprint, such as lithium batteries for hybrid and electric cars or solar panels [,] become potentially dangerous electronic waste at the end of their productive life.” The disposal of toxic waste has long perpetuated social injustice through the flows of waste to the Global South and to marginalized communities in the Global North . . .
While renewable energy is a more recent addition to financial portfolios, investments in the sector must be considered in light of our understanding of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance reveals, the concentration of control of corporate activity facilitates profit generation. For some climate activists, the promise of renewables rests on their ability not only to reduce emissions but also to provide distributed, democratized access to energy . . . But Burke and Stephens . . . caution that “renewable energy systems offer a possibility but not a certainty for more democratic energy futures.” Small-scale, distributed forms of energy are only highly profitable to institutional investors if control is consolidated somewhere in the financial chain. Renewable energy can be produced at the household or neighborhood level. However, such small-scale, localized production is unlikely to generate high returns for investors. For financial growth to be sustained and expanded by the renewable sector, production and trade in renewable energy technologies will need to be highly concentrated, and large asset management firms will likely drive those developments.
Which one of the following statements, if true, could be an accurate inference from the first paragraph of the passage?
Solution:
The author does not suggest any thing about the
non-renewable energy in the first paragraph of the
given passage. So, option 1 cannot be inferred from
it. Profitability of renewable energy was not the
author’s only reservation. In fact, the author’s
concern is whether renewable energy system would
work without causing any harm to the environment.
So, option 2 is incorrect. However, this very concern
of the author makes option 3 the correct option.
Option 4 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
Q.No: 384
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
All of the following statements may be considered valid inferences from the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from “The task is to
understand how artifacts contribute to the
construction of a world…” Option 2 can be inferred
from “visual culture is what images, acts of seeing,
and attendant intellectual, emotional, and
perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or
transform the worlds in which people live.” Option
3 can be inferred from the fourth paragraph of the
given passage. However, option 4 cannot be inferred
from the given passage.
Q.No: 385
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
Which one of the following best describes the word “epiphenomena” in the last sentence of the passage?
Solution:
‘Epiphenomena’ means phenomena which is a
supplementary to something else. Hence, option
4 is an obvious answer. The other options are
incorrect.
Q.No: 386
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
“No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo.” In light of the passage, which one of the following interpretations of this sentence is the most accurate?
Solution:
The quoted sentence says that no amount of social
analysis can explain the existence of Michelangelo
and Leonardo. So, options 1, 2 and 4 are incorrect.
Only option 3 is the most accurate interpretation
of the given sentence.
Q.No: 387
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (6 to 10): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
The claims advanced here may be condensed into two assertions: [first, that visual] culture is what images, acts of seeing, and attendant intellectual, emotional, and perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or transform the worlds in which people live. [And second, that the] study of visual culture is the analysis and interpretation of images and the ways of seeing (or gazes) that configure the agents, practices, conceptualities, and institutions that put images to work. . . .
Accordingly, the study of visual culture should be characterized by several concerns. First, scholars of visual culture need to examine any and all imagery – high and low, art and nonart. . . . They must not restrict themselves to objects of a particular beauty or aesthetic value. Indeed, any kind of imagery may be found to offer up evidence of the visual construction of reality. . . .
Second, the study of visual culture must scrutinize visual practice as much as images themselves, asking what images do when they are put to use. If scholars engaged in this enterprise inquire what makes an image beautiful or why this image or that constitutes a masterpiece or a work of genius, they should do so with the purpose of investigating an artist’s or a work’s contribution to the experience of beauty, taste, value, or genius. No amount of social analysis can account fully for the existence of Michelangelo or Leonardo. They were unique creators of images that changed the way their contemporaries thought and felt and have continued to shape the history of art, artists, museums, feeling, and aesthetic value. But study of the critical, artistic, and popular reception of works by such artists as Michelangelo and Leonardo can shed important light on the meaning of these artists and their works for many different people. And the history of meaning-making has a great deal to do with how scholars as well as lay audiences today understand these artists and their achievements.
Third, scholars studying visual culture might properly focus their interpretative work on lifeworlds by examining images, practices, visual technologies, taste, and artistic style as constitutive of social relations. The task is to understand how artifacts contribute to the construction of a world. . . . Important methodological implications follow: ethnography and reception studies become productive forms of gathering information, since these move beyond the image as a closed and fixed meaning event. . . .
Fourth, scholars may learn a great deal when they scrutinize the constituents of vision, that is, the structures of perception as a physiological process as well as the epistemological frameworks informing a system of visual representation. Vision is a socially and a biologically constructed operation, depending on the design of the human body and how it engages the interpretive devices developed by a culture in order to see intelligibly. . . . Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.
Finally, the scholar of visual culture seeks to regard images as evidence for explanation, not as epiphenomena.
“Seeing . . . operates on the foundation of covenants with images that establish the conditions for meaningful visual experience.” In light of the passage, which one of the following statements best conveys the meaning of this sentence?
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 3 fail to convey the meaning of
the given statement. The given statement says that
seeing becomes meaningful visual experience
because of agreements of meaningfulness we
establish with images that we perceive. Hence,
option 4 is the answer.
Q.No: 388
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (11 to 14): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
All of the following statements can be seen as logically implied by the arguments of the passage EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from the first two sentences
of the passage, “Aggression is any behavior that
is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting
pain on another living being or group of beings.
Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish
to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered
true aggression.” Options 2 and 4 are implied in
the sentence, “Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed
that all individuals are born with a death instinct
that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive
behaviors, including suicide (self directed
aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to
an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of
aggressive urges).” Option 3 is not logically implied
by the passage as neural inhibition and
testosterone are discussed separately. Hence,
option 3 is the answer.
Q.No: 389
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (11 to 14): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
The author identifies three essential factors according to which theories of aggression are most commonly categorised. Which of the following options is closest to the factors identified by the author?
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 3 are incorrect. Option 4 is found
in the sentences, “The first variable is the aggressor
him/herself. The second is the social situation or
circumstance in which the aggressive act(s)
occur(s). The third variable is the target or victim
of aggression.”
Q.No: 390
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (11 to 14): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
Aggression is any behavior that is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting pain on another living being or group of beings. Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered true aggression. Aggression is also categorized according to its ultimate intent. Hostile aggression is an aggressive act that results from anger, and is intended to inflict pain or injury because of that anger. Instrumental aggression is an aggressive act that is regarded as a means to an end other than pain or injury. For example, an enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject. The concept of aggression is very broad, and includes many categories of behavior (e.g., verbal aggression, street crime, child abuse, spouse abuse, group conflict, war, etc.). A number of theories and models of aggression have arisen to explain these diverse forms of behavior, and these theories/models tend to be categorized according to their specific focus. The most common system of categorization groups the various approaches to aggression into three separate areas, based upon the three key variables that are present whenever any aggressive act or set of acts is committed. The first variable is the aggressor him/herself. The second is the social situation or circumstance in which the aggressive act(s) occur. The third variable is the target or victim of aggression.
Regarding theories and research on the aggressor, the fundamental focus is on the factors that lead an individual (or group) to commit aggressive acts. At the most basic level, some argue that aggressive urges and actions are the result of inborn, biological factors. Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed that all individuals are born with a death instinct that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive behaviors, including suicide (self directed aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of aggressive urges). Other influential perspectives supporting a biological basis for aggression conclude that humans evolved with an abnormally low neural inhibition of aggressive impulses (in comparison to other species), and that humans possess a powerful instinct for property accumulation and territorialism. It is proposed that this instinct accounts for hostile behaviors ranging from minor street crime to world wars. Hormonal factors also appear to play a significant role in fostering aggressive tendencies. For example, the hormone testosterone has been shown to increase aggressive behaviors when injected into animals. Men and women convicted of violent crimes also possess significantly higher levels of testosterone than men and women convicted of non violent crimes. Numerous studies comparing different age groups, racial/ ethnic groups, and cultures also indicate that men, overall, are more likely to engage in a variety of aggressive behaviors (e.g., sexual assault, aggravated assault, etc.) than women. One explanation for higher levels of aggression in men is based on the assumption that, on average, men have higher levels of testosterone than women.
“[A]n enemy combatant may be subjected to torture in order to extract useful intelligence, though those inflicting the torture may have no real feelings of anger or animosity toward their subject.” Which one of the following best explicates the larger point being made by the author here?
Solution:
Option 1 subverts the meaning of the quoted
sentence. It is not mentioned that the use of torture
to extract information is most effective when the
torturer is not emotionally involved in the torture.
So, option 2 can be eliminated. Option 3 best
explains the quoted sentence in the question. It is
said in the quoted sentence that no feelings are
involved, so option 4 is incorrect.
Q.No: 391
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-2
Question Numbers (15 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
174 incidents of piracy were reported to the International Maritime Bureau last year, with Somali pirates responsible for only three. The rest ranged from the discreet theft of coils of rope in the Yellow Sea to the notoriously ferocious Nigerian gunmen attacking and hijacking oil tankers in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as armed robbery off Singapore and the Venezuelan coast and kidnapping in the Sundarbans in the Bay of Bengal. For [Dr. Peter] Lehr, an expert on modern-day piracy, the phenomenon’s history should be a source of instruction rather than entertainment, piracy past offering lessons for piracy present. . . .
But . . . where does piracy begin or end? According to St Augustine, a corsair captain once told Alexander the Great that in the forceful acquisition of power and wealth at sea, the difference between an emperor and a pirate was simply one of scale. By this logic, European empire-builders were the most successful pirates of all time. A more eclectic history might have included the conquistadors, Vasco da Gama and the East India Company. But Lehr sticks to the disorganised small fry, making comparisons with the renegades of today possible.
The main motive for piracy has always been a combination of need and greed. Why toil away as a starving peasant in the 16th century when a successful pirate made up to £4,000 on each raid? Anyone could turn to freebooting if the rewards were worth the risk . . . .
Increased globalisation has done more to encourage piracy than suppress it. European colonialism weakened delicate balances of power, leading to an influx of opportunists on the high seas. A rise in global shipping has meant rich pickings for freebooters. Lehr writes: “It quickly becomes clear that in those parts of the world that have not profited from globalisation and modernisation, and where abject poverty and the daily struggle for survival are still a reality, the root causes of piracy are still the same as they were a couple of hundred years ago.” . . .
Modern pirate prevention has failed. After the French yacht Le Gonant was ransomed for $2 million in 2008, opportunists from all over Somalia flocked to the coast for a piece of the action. . . . A consistent rule, even today, is there are never enough warships to patrol pirate-infested waters. Such ships are costly and only solve the problem temporarily; Somali piracy is bound to return as soon as the warships are withdrawn. Robot shipping, eliminating hostages, has been proposed as a possible solution; but as Lehr points out, this will only make pirates switch their targets to smaller carriers unable to afford the technology.
His advice isn’t new. Proposals to end illegal fishing are often advanced but they are difficult to enforce. Investment in local welfare put a halt to Malaysian piracy in the 1970s, but was dependent on money somehow filtering through a corrupt bureaucracy to the poor on the periphery. Diplomatic initiatives against piracy are plagued by mutual distrust: the Russians execute pirates, while the EU and US are reluctant to capture them for fear they’ll claim asylum.
174 incidents of piracy were reported to the International Maritime Bureau last year, with Somali pirates responsible for only three. The rest ranged from the discreet theft of coils of rope in the Yellow Sea to the notoriously ferocious Nigerian gunmen attacking and hijacking oil tankers in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as armed robbery off Singapore and the Venezuelan coast and kidnapping in the Sundarbans in the Bay of Bengal. For [Dr. Peter] Lehr, an expert on modern-day piracy, the phenomenon’s history should be a source of instruction rather than entertainment, piracy past offering lessons for piracy present. . . .
But . . . where does piracy begin or end? According to St Augustine, a corsair captain once told Alexander the Great that in the forceful acquisition of power and wealth at sea, the difference between an emperor and a pirate was simply one of scale. By this logic, European empire-builders were the most successful pirates of all time. A more eclectic history might have included the conquistadors, Vasco da Gama and the East India Company. But Lehr sticks to the disorganised small fry, making comparisons with the renegades of today possible.
The main motive for piracy has always been a combination of need and greed. Why toil away as a starving peasant in the 16th century when a successful pirate made up to £4,000 on each raid? Anyone could turn to freebooting if the rewards were worth the risk . . . .
Increased globalisation has done more to encourage piracy than suppress it. European colonialism weakened delicate balances of power, leading to an influx of opportunists on the high seas. A rise in global shipping has meant rich pickings for freebooters. Lehr writes: “It quickly becomes clear that in those parts of the world that have not profited from globalisation and modernisation, and where abject poverty and the daily struggle for survival are still a reality, the root causes of piracy are still the same as they were a couple of hundred years ago.” . . .
Modern pirate prevention has failed. After the French yacht Le Gonant was ransomed for $2 million in 2008, opportunists from all over Somalia flocked to the coast for a piece of the action. . . . A consistent rule, even today, is there are never enough warships to patrol pirate-infested waters. Such ships are costly and only solve the problem temporarily; Somali piracy is bound to return as soon as the warships are withdrawn. Robot shipping, eliminating hostages, has been proposed as a possible solution; but as Lehr points out, this will only make pirates switch their targets to smaller carriers unable to afford the technology.
His advice isn’t new. Proposals to end illegal fishing are often advanced but they are difficult to enforce. Investment in local welfare put a halt to Malaysian piracy in the 1970s, but was dependent on money somehow filtering through a corrupt bureaucracy to the poor on the periphery. Diplomatic initiatives against piracy are plagued by mutual distrust: the Russians execute pirates, while the EU and US are reluctant to capture them for fear they’ll claim asylum.
“A more eclectic history might have included the conquistadors, Vasco da Gama and the East India Company. But Lehr sticks to the disorganised small fry . . .” From this statement we can infer that the author believes that:
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 4 cannot be inferred. Since
conquistadors, Vasco da Gama and the East India
Company were colonisers and if the scope of
looting were to be widened colonialism should be
regarded as an organised form of looting. Thus,
from the given statement we can infer that the
author believes that colonialism should be
considered an organised form of piracy. Hence,
option 3 is the answer.
Q.No: 392
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Mode of transportation affects the travel experience and thus can produce new types of travel writing and perhaps even new “identities.” Modes of transportation determine the types and duration of social encounters; affect the organization and passage of space and time; . . . and also affect perception and knowledge—how and what the traveler comes to know and write about. The completion of the first U.S. transcontinental highway during the 1920s . . . for example, inaugurated a new genre of travel literature about the United States—the automotive or road narrative. Such narratives highlight the experiences of mostly male protagonists “discovering themselves” on their journeys, emphasizing the independence of road travel and the value of rural folk traditions.
Travel writing’s relationship to empire building— as a type of “colonialist discourse”—has drawn the most attention from academicians. Close connections have been observed between European (and American) political, economic, and administrative goals for the colonies and their manifestations in the cultural practice of writing travel books. Travel writers’ descriptions of foreign places have been analyzed as attempts to validate, promote, or challenge the ideologies and practices of colonial or imperial domination and expansion. Mary Louise Pratt’s study of the genres and conventions of 18th- and 19th-century exploration narratives about South America and Africa (e.g., the “monarch of all I survey” trope) offered ways of thinking about travel writing as embedded within relations of power between metropole and periphery, as did Edward Said’s theories of representation and cultural imperialism. Particularly Said’s book, Orientalism, helped scholars understand ways in which representations of people in travel texts were intimately bound up with notions of self, in this case, that the Occident defined itself through essentialist, ethnocentric, and racist representations of the Orient. Said’s work became a model for demonstrating cultural forms of imperialism in travel texts, showing how the political, economic, or administrative fact of dominance relies on legitimating discourses such as those articulated through travel writing. . . .
Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing challenge the masculinist history of geography by questioning who and what are relevant subjects of geographic study and, indeed, what counts as geographic knowledge itself. Such questions are worked through ideological constructs that posit men as explorers and women as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and women as tied to the home. Studies of Victorian women who were professional travel writers, tourists, wives of colonial administrators, and other (mostly) elite women who wrote narratives about their experiences abroad during the 19th century have been particularly revealing. From a “liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one means toward female liberation for middle- and upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s gendered identities were negotiated differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby showing women’s self-development through travel. The more recent poststructural turn in studies of Victorian travel writing has focused attention on women’s diverse and fragmented identities as they narrated their travel experiences, emphasizing women’s sense of themselves as women in new locations, but only as they worked through their ties to nation, class, whiteness, and colonial and imperial power structures.
Mode of transportation affects the travel experience and thus can produce new types of travel writing and perhaps even new “identities.” Modes of transportation determine the types and duration of social encounters; affect the organization and passage of space and time; . . . and also affect perception and knowledge—how and what the traveler comes to know and write about. The completion of the first U.S. transcontinental highway during the 1920s . . . for example, inaugurated a new genre of travel literature about the United States—the automotive or road narrative. Such narratives highlight the experiences of mostly male protagonists “discovering themselves” on their journeys, emphasizing the independence of road travel and the value of rural folk traditions.
Travel writing’s relationship to empire building— as a type of “colonialist discourse”—has drawn the most attention from academicians. Close connections have been observed between European (and American) political, economic, and administrative goals for the colonies and their manifestations in the cultural practice of writing travel books. Travel writers’ descriptions of foreign places have been analyzed as attempts to validate, promote, or challenge the ideologies and practices of colonial or imperial domination and expansion. Mary Louise Pratt’s study of the genres and conventions of 18th- and 19th-century exploration narratives about South America and Africa (e.g., the “monarch of all I survey” trope) offered ways of thinking about travel writing as embedded within relations of power between metropole and periphery, as did Edward Said’s theories of representation and cultural imperialism. Particularly Said’s book, Orientalism, helped scholars understand ways in which representations of people in travel texts were intimately bound up with notions of self, in this case, that the Occident defined itself through essentialist, ethnocentric, and racist representations of the Orient. Said’s work became a model for demonstrating cultural forms of imperialism in travel texts, showing how the political, economic, or administrative fact of dominance relies on legitimating discourses such as those articulated through travel writing. . . .
Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing challenge the masculinist history of geography by questioning who and what are relevant subjects of geographic study and, indeed, what counts as geographic knowledge itself. Such questions are worked through ideological constructs that posit men as explorers and women as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and women as tied to the home. Studies of Victorian women who were professional travel writers, tourists, wives of colonial administrators, and other (mostly) elite women who wrote narratives about their experiences abroad during the 19th century have been particularly revealing. From a “liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one means toward female liberation for middle- and upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s gendered identities were negotiated differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby showing women’s self-development through travel. The more recent poststructural turn in studies of Victorian travel writing has focused attention on women’s diverse and fragmented identities as they narrated their travel experiences, emphasizing women’s sense of themselves as women in new locations, but only as they worked through their ties to nation, class, whiteness, and colonial and imperial power structures.
From the passage, we can infer that feminist scholars’ understanding of the experiences of Victorian women travellers is influenced by all of the following EXCEPT scholars':
Solution:
In their analysis of Victorian women travelers,
feminist scholars hav e drawn on their
understanding of how identity is developed (Such
questions are worked through ideological
constructs that posit men as explorers and women
as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and
women as tied to the home); their own perspective
(Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing
challenge the masculinist history of geography by
questioning who and what are relevant subjects of
geographic study and, indeed, what counts as
geographic knowledge itself) and awareness of
gender issues in Victorian societies (From a
“liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one
means toward female liberation for middle- and
upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from
the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which
women’s gendered identities were negotiated
differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby
showing women’s self-development through travel)
There is no mention or reference to class tensions
in Victorian societies.
Q.No: 393
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (10 to 13): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Although one of the most contested concepts in political philosophy, human nature is something on which most people seem to agree. By and large, according to Rutger Bregman in his new book Humankind, we have a rather pessimistic view – not of ourselves exactly, but of everyone else. We see other people as selfish, untrustworthy and dangerous and therefore we behave towards them with defensiveness and suspicion. This was how the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived our natural state to be, believing that all that stood between us and violent anarchy was a strong state and firm leadership.
But in following Hobbes, argues Bregman, we ensure that the negative view we have of human nature is reflected back at us. He instead puts his faith in Jean- Jacques Rousseau, the 18th-century French thinker, who famously declared that man was born free and it was civilisation – with its coercive powers, social classes and restrictive laws – that put him in chains.
Hobbes and Rousseau are seen as the two poles of the human nature argument and it’s no surprise that Bregman strongly sides with the Frenchman. He takes Rousseau’s intuition and paints a picture of a prelapsarian idyll in which, for the better part of 300,000 years, Homo sapiens lived a fulfilling life in harmony with nature . . . Then we discovered agriculture and for the next 10,000 years it was all property, war, greed and injustice. . . .
It was abandoning our nomadic lifestyle and then domesticating animals, says Bregman, that brought about infectious diseases such as measles, smallpox, tuberculosis, syphilis, malaria, cholera and plague. This may be true, but what Bregman never really seems to get to grips with is that pathogens were not the only things that grew with agriculture – so did the number of humans. It’s one thing to maintain friendly relations and a property-less mode of living when you’re 30 or 40 hunter-gatherers following the food. But life becomes a great deal more complex and knowledge far more extensive when there are settlements of many thousands.
“Civilisation has become synonymous with peace and progress and wilderness with war and decline,” writes Bregman. “In reality, for most of human existence, it was the other way around.” Whereas traditional history depicts the collapse of civilisations as “dark ages” in which everything gets worse, modern scholars, he claims, see them more as a reprieve, in which the enslaved gain their freedom and culture flourishes. Like much else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere between the two stated positions.
In any case, the fear of civilisational collapse, Bregman believes, is unfounded. It’s the result of what the Dutch biologist Frans de Waal calls “veneer theory” – the idea that just below the surface, our bestial nature is waiting to break out. . . . There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency to be taken from this bold and thoughtprovoking book and a wealth of evidence in support of the contention that the sense of who we are as a species has been deleteriously distorted. But it seems equally misleading to offer the false choice of Rousseau and Hobbes when, clearly, humanity encompasses both.
Although one of the most contested concepts in political philosophy, human nature is something on which most people seem to agree. By and large, according to Rutger Bregman in his new book Humankind, we have a rather pessimistic view – not of ourselves exactly, but of everyone else. We see other people as selfish, untrustworthy and dangerous and therefore we behave towards them with defensiveness and suspicion. This was how the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived our natural state to be, believing that all that stood between us and violent anarchy was a strong state and firm leadership.
But in following Hobbes, argues Bregman, we ensure that the negative view we have of human nature is reflected back at us. He instead puts his faith in Jean- Jacques Rousseau, the 18th-century French thinker, who famously declared that man was born free and it was civilisation – with its coercive powers, social classes and restrictive laws – that put him in chains.
Hobbes and Rousseau are seen as the two poles of the human nature argument and it’s no surprise that Bregman strongly sides with the Frenchman. He takes Rousseau’s intuition and paints a picture of a prelapsarian idyll in which, for the better part of 300,000 years, Homo sapiens lived a fulfilling life in harmony with nature . . . Then we discovered agriculture and for the next 10,000 years it was all property, war, greed and injustice. . . .
It was abandoning our nomadic lifestyle and then domesticating animals, says Bregman, that brought about infectious diseases such as measles, smallpox, tuberculosis, syphilis, malaria, cholera and plague. This may be true, but what Bregman never really seems to get to grips with is that pathogens were not the only things that grew with agriculture – so did the number of humans. It’s one thing to maintain friendly relations and a property-less mode of living when you’re 30 or 40 hunter-gatherers following the food. But life becomes a great deal more complex and knowledge far more extensive when there are settlements of many thousands.
“Civilisation has become synonymous with peace and progress and wilderness with war and decline,” writes Bregman. “In reality, for most of human existence, it was the other way around.” Whereas traditional history depicts the collapse of civilisations as “dark ages” in which everything gets worse, modern scholars, he claims, see them more as a reprieve, in which the enslaved gain their freedom and culture flourishes. Like much else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere between the two stated positions.
In any case, the fear of civilisational collapse, Bregman believes, is unfounded. It’s the result of what the Dutch biologist Frans de Waal calls “veneer theory” – the idea that just below the surface, our bestial nature is waiting to break out. . . . There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency to be taken from this bold and thoughtprovoking book and a wealth of evidence in support of the contention that the sense of who we are as a species has been deleteriously distorted. But it seems equally misleading to offer the false choice of Rousseau and Hobbes when, clearly, humanity encompasses both.
The author has differing views from Bregman regarding:
Solution:
Bregman believes that it was the rise of civilization
that introduced war and decline in society. However,
the author disagrees. Refer to the lines, “Like much
else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere
between the two stated positions.”
Q.No: 394
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
All of the following, if true, could be seen as supporting the arguments in the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Option 1 - The story of the economic crisis is also
one about international relations, global financial
security, and mass psychology supports the
following statement of the author - It is an absolutely
amazing story, full of human interest and drama,
one whose byways of mathematics, economics,
and psychology are both central to the story of the
last decades and mysteriously unknown to the
general public. Option 2 - The difficulty with
understanding financial matters is that they have
become so arcane supports the following
information - Many bright, literate people have no
idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type
that financial insiders take as elementary facts of
how the world works. Option 4 - Economic crises
could be averted by changing prevailing ideologies
and beliefs echoes the following statement- “If our
laws are not extended to control the new kinds of
super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially
super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day
cause a financial disaster of global-systemic
proportions.” . . . Option 3 contradicts these
statements and is hence, incorrect.
Q.No: 395
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (1 to 5): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Mode of transportation affects the travel experience and thus can produce new types of travel writing and perhaps even new “identities.” Modes of transportation determine the types and duration of social encounters; affect the organization and passage of space and time; . . . and also affect perception and knowledge—how and what the traveler comes to know and write about. The completion of the first U.S. transcontinental highway during the 1920s . . . for example, inaugurated a new genre of travel literature about the United States—the automotive or road narrative. Such narratives highlight the experiences of mostly male protagonists “discovering themselves” on their journeys, emphasizing the independence of road travel and the value of rural folk traditions.
Travel writing’s relationship to empire building— as a type of “colonialist discourse”—has drawn the most attention from academicians. Close connections have been observed between European (and American) political, economic, and administrative goals for the colonies and their manifestations in the cultural practice of writing travel books. Travel writers’ descriptions of foreign places have been analyzed as attempts to validate, promote, or challenge the ideologies and practices of colonial or imperial domination and expansion. Mary Louise Pratt’s study of the genres and conventions of 18th- and 19th-century exploration narratives about South America and Africa (e.g., the “monarch of all I survey” trope) offered ways of thinking about travel writing as embedded within relations of power between metropole and periphery, as did Edward Said’s theories of representation and cultural imperialism. Particularly Said’s book, Orientalism, helped scholars understand ways in which representations of people in travel texts were intimately bound up with notions of self, in this case, that the Occident defined itself through essentialist, ethnocentric, and racist representations of the Orient. Said’s work became a model for demonstrating cultural forms of imperialism in travel texts, showing how the political, economic, or administrative fact of dominance relies on legitimating discourses such as those articulated through travel writing. . . .
Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing challenge the masculinist history of geography by questioning who and what are relevant subjects of geographic study and, indeed, what counts as geographic knowledge itself. Such questions are worked through ideological constructs that posit men as explorers and women as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and women as tied to the home. Studies of Victorian women who were professional travel writers, tourists, wives of colonial administrators, and other (mostly) elite women who wrote narratives about their experiences abroad during the 19th century have been particularly revealing. From a “liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one means toward female liberation for middle- and upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s gendered identities were negotiated differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby showing women’s self-development through travel. The more recent poststructural turn in studies of Victorian travel writing has focused attention on women’s diverse and fragmented identities as they narrated their travel experiences, emphasizing women’s sense of themselves as women in new locations, but only as they worked through their ties to nation, class, whiteness, and colonial and imperial power structures.
Mode of transportation affects the travel experience and thus can produce new types of travel writing and perhaps even new “identities.” Modes of transportation determine the types and duration of social encounters; affect the organization and passage of space and time; . . . and also affect perception and knowledge—how and what the traveler comes to know and write about. The completion of the first U.S. transcontinental highway during the 1920s . . . for example, inaugurated a new genre of travel literature about the United States—the automotive or road narrative. Such narratives highlight the experiences of mostly male protagonists “discovering themselves” on their journeys, emphasizing the independence of road travel and the value of rural folk traditions.
Travel writing’s relationship to empire building— as a type of “colonialist discourse”—has drawn the most attention from academicians. Close connections have been observed between European (and American) political, economic, and administrative goals for the colonies and their manifestations in the cultural practice of writing travel books. Travel writers’ descriptions of foreign places have been analyzed as attempts to validate, promote, or challenge the ideologies and practices of colonial or imperial domination and expansion. Mary Louise Pratt’s study of the genres and conventions of 18th- and 19th-century exploration narratives about South America and Africa (e.g., the “monarch of all I survey” trope) offered ways of thinking about travel writing as embedded within relations of power between metropole and periphery, as did Edward Said’s theories of representation and cultural imperialism. Particularly Said’s book, Orientalism, helped scholars understand ways in which representations of people in travel texts were intimately bound up with notions of self, in this case, that the Occident defined itself through essentialist, ethnocentric, and racist representations of the Orient. Said’s work became a model for demonstrating cultural forms of imperialism in travel texts, showing how the political, economic, or administrative fact of dominance relies on legitimating discourses such as those articulated through travel writing. . . .
Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing challenge the masculinist history of geography by questioning who and what are relevant subjects of geographic study and, indeed, what counts as geographic knowledge itself. Such questions are worked through ideological constructs that posit men as explorers and women as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and women as tied to the home. Studies of Victorian women who were professional travel writers, tourists, wives of colonial administrators, and other (mostly) elite women who wrote narratives about their experiences abroad during the 19th century have been particularly revealing. From a “liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one means toward female liberation for middle- and upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s gendered identities were negotiated differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby showing women’s self-development through travel. The more recent poststructural turn in studies of Victorian travel writing has focused attention on women’s diverse and fragmented identities as they narrated their travel experiences, emphasizing women’s sense of themselves as women in new locations, but only as they worked through their ties to nation, class, whiteness, and colonial and imperial power structures.
From the passage, it can be inferred that scholars argue that Victorian women experienced selfdevelopment through their travels because:
Solution:
Refer the lines, “Many studies from the 1970s
onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s
gendered identities were negotiated differently “at
home” than they were “away,” thereby showing
women’s self-development through travel.” The
other options are beyond the scope of the
information given in the passage.
Q.No: 396
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (6 to 9): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
[There is] a curious new reality: Human contact is becoming a luxury good. As more screens appear in the lives of the poor, screens are disappearing from the lives of the rich. The richer you are, the more you spend to be off-screen. . . .
The joy — at least at first — of the internet revolution was its democratic nature. Facebook is the same Facebook whether you are rich or poor. Gmail is the same Gmail. And it’s all free. There is something mass market and unappealing about that. And as studies show that time on these advertisement-support platforms is unhealthy, it all starts to seem déclassé, like drinking soda or smoking cigarettes, which wealthy people do less than poor people. The wealthy can afford to opt out of having their data and their attention sold as a product. The poor and middle class don’t have the same kind of resources to make that happen.
Screen exposure starts young. And children who spent more than two hours a day looking at a screen got lower scores on thinking and language tests, according to early results of a landmark study on brain development of more than 11,000 children that the National Institutes of Health is supporting. Most disturbingly, the study is finding that the brains of children who spend a lot of time on screens are different. For some kids, there is premature thinning of their cerebral cortex. In adults, one study found an association between screen time and depression. . . .
Tech companies worked hard to get public schools to buy into programs that required schools to have one laptop per student, arguing that it would better prepare children for their screen-based future. But this idea isn’t how the people who actually build the screen-based future raise their own children. In Silicon Valley, time on screens is increasingly seen as unhealthy. Here, the popular elementary school is the local Waldorf School, which promises a back-to-nature, nearly screen-free education. So as wealthy kids are growing up with less screen time, poor kids are growing up with more. How comfortable someone is with human engagement could become a new class marker.
Human contact is, of course, not exactly like organic food . . . . But with screen time, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Silicon Valley behemoths to confuse the public. The poor and the middle class are told that screens are good and important for them and their children. There are fleets of psychologists and neuroscientists on staff at big tech companies working to hook eyes and minds to the screen as fast as possible and for as long as possible. And so human contact is rare. . . .
There is a small movement to pass a “right to disconnect” bill, which would allow workers to turn their phones off, but for now a worker can be punished for going offline and not being available. There is also the reality that in our culture of increasing isolation, in which so many of the traditional gathering places and social structures have disappeared, screens are filling a crucial void.
[There is] a curious new reality: Human contact is becoming a luxury good. As more screens appear in the lives of the poor, screens are disappearing from the lives of the rich. The richer you are, the more you spend to be off-screen. . . .
The joy — at least at first — of the internet revolution was its democratic nature. Facebook is the same Facebook whether you are rich or poor. Gmail is the same Gmail. And it’s all free. There is something mass market and unappealing about that. And as studies show that time on these advertisement-support platforms is unhealthy, it all starts to seem déclassé, like drinking soda or smoking cigarettes, which wealthy people do less than poor people. The wealthy can afford to opt out of having their data and their attention sold as a product. The poor and middle class don’t have the same kind of resources to make that happen.
Screen exposure starts young. And children who spent more than two hours a day looking at a screen got lower scores on thinking and language tests, according to early results of a landmark study on brain development of more than 11,000 children that the National Institutes of Health is supporting. Most disturbingly, the study is finding that the brains of children who spend a lot of time on screens are different. For some kids, there is premature thinning of their cerebral cortex. In adults, one study found an association between screen time and depression. . . .
Tech companies worked hard to get public schools to buy into programs that required schools to have one laptop per student, arguing that it would better prepare children for their screen-based future. But this idea isn’t how the people who actually build the screen-based future raise their own children. In Silicon Valley, time on screens is increasingly seen as unhealthy. Here, the popular elementary school is the local Waldorf School, which promises a back-to-nature, nearly screen-free education. So as wealthy kids are growing up with less screen time, poor kids are growing up with more. How comfortable someone is with human engagement could become a new class marker.
Human contact is, of course, not exactly like organic food . . . . But with screen time, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Silicon Valley behemoths to confuse the public. The poor and the middle class are told that screens are good and important for them and their children. There are fleets of psychologists and neuroscientists on staff at big tech companies working to hook eyes and minds to the screen as fast as possible and for as long as possible. And so human contact is rare. . . .
There is a small movement to pass a “right to disconnect” bill, which would allow workers to turn their phones off, but for now a worker can be punished for going offline and not being available. There is also the reality that in our culture of increasing isolation, in which so many of the traditional gathering places and social structures have disappeared, screens are filling a crucial void.
Which of the following statements about the negative effects of screen time is the author least likely to endorse?
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author has highlighted
the negative impacts of excessive screen time.
Thus, statement 4, which can be interpreted as
stating a positive impact of spending time on
screens, is least likely to find endorsement by the
author.
Q.No: 397
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (6 to 9): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
[There is] a curious new reality: Human contact is becoming a luxury good. As more screens appear in the lives of the poor, screens are disappearing from the lives of the rich. The richer you are, the more you spend to be off-screen. . . .
The joy — at least at first — of the internet revolution was its democratic nature. Facebook is the same Facebook whether you are rich or poor. Gmail is the same Gmail. And it’s all free. There is something mass market and unappealing about that. And as studies show that time on these advertisement-support platforms is unhealthy, it all starts to seem déclassé, like drinking soda or smoking cigarettes, which wealthy people do less than poor people. The wealthy can afford to opt out of having their data and their attention sold as a product. The poor and middle class don’t have the same kind of resources to make that happen.
Screen exposure starts young. And children who spent more than two hours a day looking at a screen got lower scores on thinking and language tests, according to early results of a landmark study on brain development of more than 11,000 children that the National Institutes of Health is supporting. Most disturbingly, the study is finding that the brains of children who spend a lot of time on screens are different. For some kids, there is premature thinning of their cerebral cortex. In adults, one study found an association between screen time and depression. . . .
Tech companies worked hard to get public schools to buy into programs that required schools to have one laptop per student, arguing that it would better prepare children for their screen-based future. But this idea isn’t how the people who actually build the screen-based future raise their own children. In Silicon Valley, time on screens is increasingly seen as unhealthy. Here, the popular elementary school is the local Waldorf School, which promises a back-to-nature, nearly screen-free education. So as wealthy kids are growing up with less screen time, poor kids are growing up with more. How comfortable someone is with human engagement could become a new class marker.
Human contact is, of course, not exactly like organic food . . . . But with screen time, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Silicon Valley behemoths to confuse the public. The poor and the middle class are told that screens are good and important for them and their children. There are fleets of psychologists and neuroscientists on staff at big tech companies working to hook eyes and minds to the screen as fast as possible and for as long as possible. And so human contact is rare. . . .
There is a small movement to pass a “right to disconnect” bill, which would allow workers to turn their phones off, but for now a worker can be punished for going offline and not being available. There is also the reality that in our culture of increasing isolation, in which so many of the traditional gathering places and social structures have disappeared, screens are filling a crucial void.
[There is] a curious new reality: Human contact is becoming a luxury good. As more screens appear in the lives of the poor, screens are disappearing from the lives of the rich. The richer you are, the more you spend to be off-screen. . . .
The joy — at least at first — of the internet revolution was its democratic nature. Facebook is the same Facebook whether you are rich or poor. Gmail is the same Gmail. And it’s all free. There is something mass market and unappealing about that. And as studies show that time on these advertisement-support platforms is unhealthy, it all starts to seem déclassé, like drinking soda or smoking cigarettes, which wealthy people do less than poor people. The wealthy can afford to opt out of having their data and their attention sold as a product. The poor and middle class don’t have the same kind of resources to make that happen.
Screen exposure starts young. And children who spent more than two hours a day looking at a screen got lower scores on thinking and language tests, according to early results of a landmark study on brain development of more than 11,000 children that the National Institutes of Health is supporting. Most disturbingly, the study is finding that the brains of children who spend a lot of time on screens are different. For some kids, there is premature thinning of their cerebral cortex. In adults, one study found an association between screen time and depression. . . .
Tech companies worked hard to get public schools to buy into programs that required schools to have one laptop per student, arguing that it would better prepare children for their screen-based future. But this idea isn’t how the people who actually build the screen-based future raise their own children. In Silicon Valley, time on screens is increasingly seen as unhealthy. Here, the popular elementary school is the local Waldorf School, which promises a back-to-nature, nearly screen-free education. So as wealthy kids are growing up with less screen time, poor kids are growing up with more. How comfortable someone is with human engagement could become a new class marker.
Human contact is, of course, not exactly like organic food . . . . But with screen time, there has been a concerted effort on the part of Silicon Valley behemoths to confuse the public. The poor and the middle class are told that screens are good and important for them and their children. There are fleets of psychologists and neuroscientists on staff at big tech companies working to hook eyes and minds to the screen as fast as possible and for as long as possible. And so human contact is rare. . . .
There is a small movement to pass a “right to disconnect” bill, which would allow workers to turn their phones off, but for now a worker can be punished for going offline and not being available. There is also the reality that in our culture of increasing isolation, in which so many of the traditional gathering places and social structures have disappeared, screens are filling a crucial void.
The statement “The richer you are, the more you spend to be off-screen” is supported by which other line from the passage?
Solution:
The idea behind the statement is that human
contact is becoming a luxury good. The rich are
opting for less screen time. The education of their
children is also geared along these lines, whereas
the poor and middle class does not have the
resources to do so. This idea finds resonance in
the statement- “How comfortable someone is with
human engagement could become a new class
marker.”
Q.No: 398
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (10 to 13): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Although one of the most contested concepts in political philosophy, human nature is something on which most people seem to agree. By and large, according to Rutger Bregman in his new book Humankind, we have a rather pessimistic view – not of ourselves exactly, but of everyone else. We see other people as selfish, untrustworthy and dangerous and therefore we behave towards them with defensiveness and suspicion. This was how the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived our natural state to be, believing that all that stood between us and violent anarchy was a strong state and firm leadership.
But in following Hobbes, argues Bregman, we ensure that the negative view we have of human nature is reflected back at us. He instead puts his faith in Jean- Jacques Rousseau, the 18th-century French thinker, who famously declared that man was born free and it was civilisation – with its coercive powers, social classes and restrictive laws – that put him in chains.
Hobbes and Rousseau are seen as the two poles of the human nature argument and it’s no surprise that Bregman strongly sides with the Frenchman. He takes Rousseau’s intuition and paints a picture of a prelapsarian idyll in which, for the better part of 300,000 years, Homo sapiens lived a fulfilling life in harmony with nature . . . Then we discovered agriculture and for the next 10,000 years it was all property, war, greed and injustice. . . .
It was abandoning our nomadic lifestyle and then domesticating animals, says Bregman, that brought about infectious diseases such as measles, smallpox, tuberculosis, syphilis, malaria, cholera and plague. This may be true, but what Bregman never really seems to get to grips with is that pathogens were not the only things that grew with agriculture – so did the number of humans. It’s one thing to maintain friendly relations and a property-less mode of living when you’re 30 or 40 hunter-gatherers following the food. But life becomes a great deal more complex and knowledge far more extensive when there are settlements of many thousands.
“Civilisation has become synonymous with peace and progress and wilderness with war and decline,” writes Bregman. “In reality, for most of human existence, it was the other way around.” Whereas traditional history depicts the collapse of civilisations as “dark ages” in which everything gets worse, modern scholars, he claims, see them more as a reprieve, in which the enslaved gain their freedom and culture flourishes. Like much else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere between the two stated positions.
In any case, the fear of civilisational collapse, Bregman believes, is unfounded. It’s the result of what the Dutch biologist Frans de Waal calls “veneer theory” – the idea that just below the surface, our bestial nature is waiting to break out. . . . There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency to be taken from this bold and thoughtprovoking book and a wealth of evidence in support of the contention that the sense of who we are as a species has been deleteriously distorted. But it seems equally misleading to offer the false choice of Rousseau and Hobbes when, clearly, humanity encompasses both.
Although one of the most contested concepts in political philosophy, human nature is something on which most people seem to agree. By and large, according to Rutger Bregman in his new book Humankind, we have a rather pessimistic view – not of ourselves exactly, but of everyone else. We see other people as selfish, untrustworthy and dangerous and therefore we behave towards them with defensiveness and suspicion. This was how the 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes conceived our natural state to be, believing that all that stood between us and violent anarchy was a strong state and firm leadership.
But in following Hobbes, argues Bregman, we ensure that the negative view we have of human nature is reflected back at us. He instead puts his faith in Jean- Jacques Rousseau, the 18th-century French thinker, who famously declared that man was born free and it was civilisation – with its coercive powers, social classes and restrictive laws – that put him in chains.
Hobbes and Rousseau are seen as the two poles of the human nature argument and it’s no surprise that Bregman strongly sides with the Frenchman. He takes Rousseau’s intuition and paints a picture of a prelapsarian idyll in which, for the better part of 300,000 years, Homo sapiens lived a fulfilling life in harmony with nature . . . Then we discovered agriculture and for the next 10,000 years it was all property, war, greed and injustice. . . .
It was abandoning our nomadic lifestyle and then domesticating animals, says Bregman, that brought about infectious diseases such as measles, smallpox, tuberculosis, syphilis, malaria, cholera and plague. This may be true, but what Bregman never really seems to get to grips with is that pathogens were not the only things that grew with agriculture – so did the number of humans. It’s one thing to maintain friendly relations and a property-less mode of living when you’re 30 or 40 hunter-gatherers following the food. But life becomes a great deal more complex and knowledge far more extensive when there are settlements of many thousands.
“Civilisation has become synonymous with peace and progress and wilderness with war and decline,” writes Bregman. “In reality, for most of human existence, it was the other way around.” Whereas traditional history depicts the collapse of civilisations as “dark ages” in which everything gets worse, modern scholars, he claims, see them more as a reprieve, in which the enslaved gain their freedom and culture flourishes. Like much else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere between the two stated positions.
In any case, the fear of civilisational collapse, Bregman believes, is unfounded. It’s the result of what the Dutch biologist Frans de Waal calls “veneer theory” – the idea that just below the surface, our bestial nature is waiting to break out. . . . There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency to be taken from this bold and thoughtprovoking book and a wealth of evidence in support of the contention that the sense of who we are as a species has been deleteriously distorted. But it seems equally misleading to offer the false choice of Rousseau and Hobbes when, clearly, humanity encompasses both.
According to the author, the main reason why Bregman contrasts life in pre-agricultural societies with agricultural societies is to:
Solution:
Refer to the concluding lines of the passage-
“There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency
to be taken from this bold and thought-provoking
book and a wealth of evidence in support of the
contention that the sense of who we are as a
species has been deleteriously distorted.” Thus,
this is the reason that the author ascribes to the
contrasts drawn by Bregman. The other options
are limited in the explanations they offer.
Q.No: 399
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
According to the passage, the author is likely to be supportive of which one of the following programmes?
Solution:
Refer the lines, “It seems to me that there is a
much bigger gap between the world of finance and
that of the general public and that there is a need
to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not
to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its
own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest
of us.” This makes option 3 correct. The other
options are not supported by the information given
in the passage.
Q.No: 400
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
Which one of the following, if false, could be seen as supporting the author’s claims?
Solution:
The wording of the question is slightly tricky. The
question is asking you to identify the option, which,
if false, will support the author’s argument. The
first option states that-The economic crisis was
not a failure of collective action to rectify economic
problems. The author argues for the very opposite
in the passage. He is surprised by the sluggishness
of the world governments, by a collective lack of
preparation by the various stakeholders involved.
Thus, 1 is correct. The other options, if untrue, will
weaken the author’s claims.
Q.No: 401
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2020 Slot-3
Question Numbers (14 to 18): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
I’ve been following the economic crisis for more than two years now. I began working on the subject as part of the background to a novel, and soon realized that I had stumbled across the most interesting story I’ve ever found. While I was beginning to work on it, the British bank Northern Rock blew up, and it became clear that, as I wrote at the time, “If our laws are not extended to control the new kinds of super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day cause a financial disaster of global-systemic proportions.” . . . I was both right and too late, because all the groundwork for the crisis had already been done— though the sluggishness of the world’s governments, in not preparing for the great unraveling of autumn 2008, was then and still is stupefying. But this is the first reason why I wrote this book: because what’s happened is extraordinarily interesting. It is an absolutely amazing story, full of human interest and drama, one whose byways of mathematics, economics, and psychology are both central to the story of the last decades and mysteriously unknown to the general public. We have heard a lot about “the two cultures” of science and the arts—we heard a particularly large amount about it in 2009, because it was the fiftieth anniversary of the speech during which C. P. Snow first used the phrase. But I’m not sure the idea of a huge gap between science and the arts is as true as it was half a century ago—it’s certainly true, for instance, that a general reader who wants to pick up an education in the fundamentals of science will find it easier than ever before. It seems to me that there is a much bigger gap between the world of finance and that of the general public and that there is a need to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest of us. Many bright, literate people have no idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type that financial insiders take as elementary facts of how the world works. I am an outsider to finance and economics, and my hope is that I can talk across that gulf.
My need to understand is the same as yours, whoever you are. That’s one of the strangest ironies of this story: after decades in which the ideology of the Western world was personally and economically individualistic, we’ve suddenly been hit by a crisis which shows in the starkest terms that whether we like it or not—and there are large parts of it that you would have to be crazy to like—we’re all in this together. The aftermath of the crisis is going to dominate the economics and politics of our societies for at least a decade to come and perhaps longer.
Which one of the following, if true, would be an accurate inference from the first sentence of the passage?
Solution:
The first line of the passage is-I’ve been following
the economic crisis for more than two years now.
Thus, the only inference that can be drawn is that
the author’s preoccupation with the economic crisis
is not less than two years old.
Q.No: 402
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 1 to 4: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
Which one of the following, if true, would best complement the passage’s findings?
Solution:
The passage states that “Not every species can
use self-control, but most of the animals that can
share another trait in common: long, social lives.”
However, even though the cuttlefish are solitary
creatures that don’t form relationships even with
mates or young, they did prove capable of exhibiting
self-control when trained under the right
circumstances. Thus, if it was established that
cuttlefish also live in big groups and are sociable,
the passages’ findings will be reinforced. The other
options, if true, are likely to contradict the
information given and not complement it.
Q.No: 403
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 1 to 4: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
Which one of the following cannot be inferred from Alexandra Schnell’s experiment?
Solution:
1 – Can be inferred from “……. but sometimes,
they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to
distract themselves from the temptation of the
immediate reward.”
3 – Can be inferred from “(Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.)”
4 – This was the finding of the research experiments.
2 cannot be inferred from the passage. In fact, the success with the cuttlefish seems to suggest otherwise.
3 – Can be inferred from “(Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.)”
4 – This was the finding of the research experiments.
2 cannot be inferred from the passage. In fact, the success with the cuttlefish seems to suggest otherwise.
Q.No: 404
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 1 to 4: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
Cuttlefish are full of personality, as behavioral ecologist Alexandra Schnell found out while researching the cephalopod's potential to display self-control. . . . “Self-control is thought to be the cornerstone of intelligence, as it is an important prerequisite for complex decision-making and planning for the future,” says Schnell . . .
[Schnell's] study used a modified version of the “marshmallow test” . . . During the original marshmallow test, psychologist Walter Mischel presented children between age four and six with one marshmallow. He told them that if they waited 15 minutes and didn’t eat it, he would give them a second marshmallow. A long-term follow-up study showed that the children who waited for the second marshmallow had more success later in life. . . . The cuttlefish version of the experiment looked a lot different. The researchers worked with six cuttlefish under nine months old and presented them with seafood instead of sweets. (Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.) Since the researchers couldn’t explain to the cuttlefish that they would need to wait for their shrimp, they trained them to recognize certain shapes that indicated when a food item would become available. The symbols were pasted on transparent drawers so that the cuttlefish could see the food that was stored inside. One drawer, labeled with a circle to mean “immediate,” held raw king prawn. Another drawer, labeled with a triangle to mean “delayed,” held live grass shrimp. During a control experiment, square labels meant “never.”
“If their self-control is flexible and I hadn’t just trained them to wait in any context, you would expect the cuttlefish to take the immediate reward [in the control], even if it’s their second preference,” says Schnell . . . and that’s what they did. That showed the researchers that cuttlefish wouldn’t reject the prawns if it was the only food available. In the experimental trials, the cuttlefish didn’t jump on the prawns if the live grass shrimp were labeled with a triangle—many waited for the shrimp drawer to open up. Each time the cuttlefish showed it could wait, the researchers tacked another ten seconds on to the next round of waiting before releasing the shrimp. The longest that a cuttlefish waited was 130 seconds.
Schnell [says] that the cuttlefish usually sat at the bottom of the tank and looked at the two food items while they waited, but sometimes, they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to distract themselves from the temptation of the immediate reward.” In past studies, humans, chimpanzees, parrots and dogs also tried to distract themselves while waiting for a reward.
Not every species can use self-control, but most of the animals that can share another trait in common: long, social lives. Cuttlefish, on the other hand, are solitary creatures that don’t form relationships even with mates or young. . . . “We don’t know if living in a social group is important for complex cognition unless we also show those abilities are lacking in less social species,” says . . . comparative psychologist Jennifer Vonk.
In which one of the following scenarios would the cuttlefish’s behaviour demonstrate self-control?
Solution:
1 – If the drawer with the live grass shrimp is
labelled with a square, it means that it will ‘never’
be opened. In this scenario, the cuttlefish will
automatically reach for raw prawns as their preferred
food – the live grass shrimp – is not going to be
available. Thus, there is no need for them to
demonstrate any self-control.
2 – This is the correct answer. In this case, the cuttlefish will have to choose between immediate gratification with a secondary preference – raw prawns and Asian shore crabs – and delayed gratification with their first choice– live grass shrimps. Notice that the drawer is labelled with a ‘triangle’ which means that the drawer will be opened after a delay (one minute in this case). 3 – The cuttlefish prefer the raw prawns to Asian shore crabs. So, there is no need for them to exhibit any self-control since their preferred food is being released first.
4 – Similar to the previous option, the cuttlefish prefer the live grass shrimp the most. Hence, they don’t need to exhibit any self-control in this situation also.
2 – This is the correct answer. In this case, the cuttlefish will have to choose between immediate gratification with a secondary preference – raw prawns and Asian shore crabs – and delayed gratification with their first choice– live grass shrimps. Notice that the drawer is labelled with a ‘triangle’ which means that the drawer will be opened after a delay (one minute in this case). 3 – The cuttlefish prefer the raw prawns to Asian shore crabs. So, there is no need for them to exhibit any self-control since their preferred food is being released first.
4 – Similar to the previous option, the cuttlefish prefer the live grass shrimp the most. Hence, they don’t need to exhibit any self-control in this situation also.
Q.No: 405
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 5 to 8: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.
Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.
Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.
We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.
Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.
Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.
All of the following statements can be inferred from the passage EXCEPT that:
Solution:
1 – Refer the lines: “People become more alike in
appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often
have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus
prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity.”
2 – Refer the lines: “….it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents.”
3 – Refer the lines: “And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.”
4 is in direct contrast to the information given in the concluding paragraph of the passage.
2 – Refer the lines: “….it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents.”
3 – Refer the lines: “And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.”
4 is in direct contrast to the information given in the concluding paragraph of the passage.
Q.No: 406
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 5 to 8: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.
Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.
Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.
We cannot travel outside our neighbourhood without passports. We must wear the same plain clothes. We must exchange our houses every ten years. We cannot avoid labour. We all go to bed at the same time . . . We have religious freedom, but we cannot deny that the soul dies with the body, since ‘but for the fear of punishment, they would have nothing but contempt for the laws and customs of society'. . . . In More’s time, for much of the population, given the plenty and security on offer, such restraints would not have seemed overly unreasonable. For modern readers, however, Utopia appears to rely upon relentless transparency, the repression of variety, and the curtailment of privacy. Utopia provides security: but at what price? In both its external and internal relations, indeed, it seems perilously dystopian.
Such a conclusion might be fortified by examining selectively the tradition which follows More on these points. This often portrays societies where . . . 'it would be almost impossible for man to be depraved, or wicked'. . . . This is achieved both through institutions and mores, which underpin the common life. . . . The passions are regulated and inequalities of wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs, vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by prizing equality and holding riches in contempt. The desire for public power is curbed. Marriage and sexual intercourse are often controlled: in Tommaso Campanella’s The City of the Sun (1623), the first great literary utopia after More’s, relations are forbidden to men before the age of twenty-one and women before nineteen. Communal child-rearing is normal; for Campanella this commences at age two. Greater simplicity of life, ‘living according to nature’, is often a result: the desire for simplicity and purity are closely related. People become more alike in appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity. This model, as J. C. Davis demonstrates, dominated early modern utopianism. . . . And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.
Given these considerations, it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents. Insofar as this proves to be the case, my linkage of both here will be uncomfortably close for some readers. Yet we should not mistake this argument for the assertion that all utopias are, or tend to produce, dystopias. Those who defend this proposition will find that their association here is not nearly close enough. For we have only to acknowledge the existence of thousands of successful intentional communities in which a cooperative ethos predominates and where harmony without coercion is the rule to set aside such an assertion. Here the individual’s submersion in the group is consensual (though this concept is not unproblematic). It results not in enslavement but voluntary submission to group norms. Harmony is achieved without . . . harming others.
Following from the passage, which one of the following may be seen as a characteristic of a utopian society?
Solution:
2 can be inferred from the following lines of the
passage: “This is achieved both through institutions
and mores, which underpin the common life. . ..
The passions are regulated and inequalities of
wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs,
vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by
prizing equality and holding riches in contempt.
The desire for public power is curbed.” The other
options contradict the aspects of utopian societies
as described in the passage.
Q.No: 407
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 9 to 12: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
The sleights of hand that conflate consumption with virtue are a central theme in A Thirst for Empire, a sweeping and richly detailed history of tea by the historian Erika Rappaport. How did tea evolve from an obscure “China drink” to a universal beverage imbued with civilising properties? The answer, in brief, revolves around this conflation, not only by profit-motivated marketers but by a wide variety of interest groups. While abundant historical records have allowed the study of how tea itself moved from east to west, Rappaport is focused on the movement of the idea of tea to suit particular purposes.
Beginning in the 1700s, the temperance movement advocated for tea as a pleasure that cheered but did not inebriate, and industrialists soon borrowed this moral argument in advancing their case for free trade in tea (and hence more open markets for their textiles). Factory owners joined in, compelled by the cause of a sober workforce, while Christian missionaries discovered that tea “would soothe any colonial encounter”. During the Second World War, tea service was presented as a social and patriotic activity that uplifted soldiers and calmed refugees.
But it was tea’s consumer-directed marketing by importers and retailers – and later by brands – that most closely portends current trade debates. An early version of the “farm to table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea containing dirt and hedge clippings. Lipton was soon advertising “from the Garden to Tea Cup” supply chains originating in British India and supervised by “educated Englishmen”. While tea marketing always presented direct consumer benefits (health, energy, relaxation), tea drinkers were also assured that they were participating in a larger noble project that advanced the causes of family, nation and civilization. . . .
Rappaport’s treatment of her subject is refreshingly apolitical. Indeed, it is a virtue that readers will be unable to guess her political orientation: both the miracle of markets and capitalism’s dark underbelly are evident in tea’s complex story, as are the complicated effects of British colonialism. . . . Commodity histories are now themselves commodities: recent works investigate cotton, salt, cod, sugar, chocolate, paper and milk. And morality marketing is now a commodity as well, applied to food, “fair trade” apparel and eco-tourism. Yet tea is, Rappaport makes clear, a world apart – an astonishing success story in which tea marketers not only succeeded in conveying a sense of moral elevation to the consumer but also arguably did advance the cause of civilisation and community.
I have been offered tea at a British garden party, a Bedouin campfire, a Turkish carpet shop and a Japanese chashitsu, to name a few settings. In each case the offering was more an idea – friendship, community, respect – than a drink, and in each case the idea then created a reality. It is not a stretch to say that tea marketers have advanced the particularly noble cause of human dialogue and friendship.
The sleights of hand that conflate consumption with virtue are a central theme in A Thirst for Empire, a sweeping and richly detailed history of tea by the historian Erika Rappaport. How did tea evolve from an obscure “China drink” to a universal beverage imbued with civilising properties? The answer, in brief, revolves around this conflation, not only by profit-motivated marketers but by a wide variety of interest groups. While abundant historical records have allowed the study of how tea itself moved from east to west, Rappaport is focused on the movement of the idea of tea to suit particular purposes.
Beginning in the 1700s, the temperance movement advocated for tea as a pleasure that cheered but did not inebriate, and industrialists soon borrowed this moral argument in advancing their case for free trade in tea (and hence more open markets for their textiles). Factory owners joined in, compelled by the cause of a sober workforce, while Christian missionaries discovered that tea “would soothe any colonial encounter”. During the Second World War, tea service was presented as a social and patriotic activity that uplifted soldiers and calmed refugees.
But it was tea’s consumer-directed marketing by importers and retailers – and later by brands – that most closely portends current trade debates. An early version of the “farm to table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea containing dirt and hedge clippings. Lipton was soon advertising “from the Garden to Tea Cup” supply chains originating in British India and supervised by “educated Englishmen”. While tea marketing always presented direct consumer benefits (health, energy, relaxation), tea drinkers were also assured that they were participating in a larger noble project that advanced the causes of family, nation and civilization. . . .
Rappaport’s treatment of her subject is refreshingly apolitical. Indeed, it is a virtue that readers will be unable to guess her political orientation: both the miracle of markets and capitalism’s dark underbelly are evident in tea’s complex story, as are the complicated effects of British colonialism. . . . Commodity histories are now themselves commodities: recent works investigate cotton, salt, cod, sugar, chocolate, paper and milk. And morality marketing is now a commodity as well, applied to food, “fair trade” apparel and eco-tourism. Yet tea is, Rappaport makes clear, a world apart – an astonishing success story in which tea marketers not only succeeded in conveying a sense of moral elevation to the consumer but also arguably did advance the cause of civilisation and community.
I have been offered tea at a British garden party, a Bedouin campfire, a Turkish carpet shop and a Japanese chashitsu, to name a few settings. In each case the offering was more an idea – friendship, community, respect – than a drink, and in each case the idea then created a reality. It is not a stretch to say that tea marketers have advanced the particularly noble cause of human dialogue and friendship.
The author of this book review is LEAST likely to support the view that:
Solution:
All the other statements have been mentioned in
the passage.
Q.No: 408
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 9 to 12: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
The sleights of hand that conflate consumption with virtue are a central theme in A Thirst for Empire, a sweeping and richly detailed history of tea by the historian Erika Rappaport. How did tea evolve from an obscure “China drink” to a universal beverage imbued with civilising properties? The answer, in brief, revolves around this conflation, not only by profit-motivated marketers but by a wide variety of interest groups. While abundant historical records have allowed the study of how tea itself moved from east to west, Rappaport is focused on the movement of the idea of tea to suit particular purposes.
Beginning in the 1700s, the temperance movement advocated for tea as a pleasure that cheered but did not inebriate, and industrialists soon borrowed this moral argument in advancing their case for free trade in tea (and hence more open markets for their textiles). Factory owners joined in, compelled by the cause of a sober workforce, while Christian missionaries discovered that tea “would soothe any colonial encounter”. During the Second World War, tea service was presented as a social and patriotic activity that uplifted soldiers and calmed refugees.
But it was tea’s consumer-directed marketing by importers and retailers – and later by brands – that most closely portends current trade debates. An early version of the “farm to table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea containing dirt and hedge clippings. Lipton was soon advertising “from the Garden to Tea Cup” supply chains originating in British India and supervised by “educated Englishmen”. While tea marketing always presented direct consumer benefits (health, energy, relaxation), tea drinkers were also assured that they were participating in a larger noble project that advanced the causes of family, nation and civilization. . . .
Rappaport’s treatment of her subject is refreshingly apolitical. Indeed, it is a virtue that readers will be unable to guess her political orientation: both the miracle of markets and capitalism’s dark underbelly are evident in tea’s complex story, as are the complicated effects of British colonialism. . . . Commodity histories are now themselves commodities: recent works investigate cotton, salt, cod, sugar, chocolate, paper and milk. And morality marketing is now a commodity as well, applied to food, “fair trade” apparel and eco-tourism. Yet tea is, Rappaport makes clear, a world apart – an astonishing success story in which tea marketers not only succeeded in conveying a sense of moral elevation to the consumer but also arguably did advance the cause of civilisation and community.
I have been offered tea at a British garden party, a Bedouin campfire, a Turkish carpet shop and a Japanese chashitsu, to name a few settings. In each case the offering was more an idea – friendship, community, respect – than a drink, and in each case the idea then created a reality. It is not a stretch to say that tea marketers have advanced the particularly noble cause of human dialogue and friendship.
The sleights of hand that conflate consumption with virtue are a central theme in A Thirst for Empire, a sweeping and richly detailed history of tea by the historian Erika Rappaport. How did tea evolve from an obscure “China drink” to a universal beverage imbued with civilising properties? The answer, in brief, revolves around this conflation, not only by profit-motivated marketers but by a wide variety of interest groups. While abundant historical records have allowed the study of how tea itself moved from east to west, Rappaport is focused on the movement of the idea of tea to suit particular purposes.
Beginning in the 1700s, the temperance movement advocated for tea as a pleasure that cheered but did not inebriate, and industrialists soon borrowed this moral argument in advancing their case for free trade in tea (and hence more open markets for their textiles). Factory owners joined in, compelled by the cause of a sober workforce, while Christian missionaries discovered that tea “would soothe any colonial encounter”. During the Second World War, tea service was presented as a social and patriotic activity that uplifted soldiers and calmed refugees.
But it was tea’s consumer-directed marketing by importers and retailers – and later by brands – that most closely portends current trade debates. An early version of the “farm to table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea containing dirt and hedge clippings. Lipton was soon advertising “from the Garden to Tea Cup” supply chains originating in British India and supervised by “educated Englishmen”. While tea marketing always presented direct consumer benefits (health, energy, relaxation), tea drinkers were also assured that they were participating in a larger noble project that advanced the causes of family, nation and civilization. . . .
Rappaport’s treatment of her subject is refreshingly apolitical. Indeed, it is a virtue that readers will be unable to guess her political orientation: both the miracle of markets and capitalism’s dark underbelly are evident in tea’s complex story, as are the complicated effects of British colonialism. . . . Commodity histories are now themselves commodities: recent works investigate cotton, salt, cod, sugar, chocolate, paper and milk. And morality marketing is now a commodity as well, applied to food, “fair trade” apparel and eco-tourism. Yet tea is, Rappaport makes clear, a world apart – an astonishing success story in which tea marketers not only succeeded in conveying a sense of moral elevation to the consumer but also arguably did advance the cause of civilisation and community.
I have been offered tea at a British garden party, a Bedouin campfire, a Turkish carpet shop and a Japanese chashitsu, to name a few settings. In each case the offering was more an idea – friendship, community, respect – than a drink, and in each case the idea then created a reality. It is not a stretch to say that tea marketers have advanced the particularly noble cause of human dialogue and friendship.
Today, “conflat[ing] consumption with virtue” can be seen in the marketing of:
Solution:
Refer the lines: “An early version of the “farm to
table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese
sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well
as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea
containing dirt and hedge clippings”. Thus, this
conflation of consumption with virtue is now seen
in the marketing and promotion of sustainably
farmed food.
Q.No: 409
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 13 to 16: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
Which one of the following, if true, would not undermine the democratising potential of the Classic Maya worldview?
Solution:
1 – This is negated by the lines: “Nonhuman
persons were not tethered to specific humans, and
they did not derive their personhood from a
connection with a human. . . .”
2 – This is negated by: “One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree.”
4 – This is challenged by information given throughout the passage.
2 – This is negated by: “One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree.”
4 – This is challenged by information given throughout the passage.
Q.No: 410
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 13 to 16: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
Which one of the following best explains the “additional complexity” that the example of the incense burner illustrates regarding personhood for the Classic Maya?
Solution:
The answer can be inferred from the lines: “With
these Maya examples, we are challenged to
discard the person/ nonperson binary that
constitutes our basic ontological outlook.”
Q.No: 411
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 13 to 16: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
On the basis of the passage, which one of the following worldviews can be inferred to be closest to that of the Classic Maya?
Solution:
For the Mayans, man was by all account not the
only significant thing. Everything was similarly
significant and similarly human. Choice 4 is aligned
with this perspective. The other options are not
consistent with the ideas expressed in the
passage.
Q.No: 412
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-1
Directions for the questions 13 to 16: The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
For the Maya of the Classic period, who lived in Southern Mexico and Central America between 250 and 900 CE, the category of ‘persons’ was not coincident with human beings, as it is for us. That is, human beings were persons – but other, nonhuman entities could be persons, too. . . . In order to explore the slippage of categories between ‘humans’ and ‘persons’, I examined a very specific category of ancient Maya images, found painted in scenes on ceramic vessels. I sought out instances in which faces (some combination of eyes, nose, and mouth) are shown on inanimate objects. . . . Consider my iPhone, which needs to be fed with electricity every night, swaddled in a protective bumper, and enjoys communicating with other fellow-phone-beings. Does it have personhood (if at all) because it is connected to me, drawing this resource from me as an owner or source? For the Maya (who did have plenty of other communicating objects, if not smartphones), the answer was no. Nonhuman persons were not tethered to specific humans, and they did not derive their personhood from a connection with a human. . . . It’s a profoundly democratising way of understanding the world. Humans are not more important persons – we are just one of many kinds of persons who inhabit this world. . . .
The Maya saw personhood as ‘activated’ by experiencing certain bodily needs and through participation in certain social activities. For example, among the faced objects that I examined, persons are marked by personal requirements (such as hunger, tiredness, physical closeness), and by community obligations (communication, interaction, ritual observance). In the images I examined, we see, for instance, faced objects being cradled in humans’ arms; we also see them speaking to humans. These core elements of personhood are both turned inward, what the body or self of a person requires, and outward, what a community expects of the persons who are a part of it, underlining the reciprocal nature of community membership. . . .
Personhood was a nonbinary proposition for the Maya. Entities were able to be persons while also being something else. The faced objects I looked at indicate that they continue to be functional, doing what objects do (a stone implement continues to chop, an incense burner continues to do its smoky work). Furthermore, the Maya visually depicted many objects in ways that indicated the material category to which they belonged – drawings of the stone implement show that a person-tool is still made of stone. One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree. With these Maya examples, we are challenged to discard the person/nonperson binary that constitutes our basic ontological outlook. . . . The porousness of boundaries that we have seen in the Maya world points towards the possibility of living with a certain uncategorisability of the world.
Which one of the following, if true about the Classic Maya, would invalidate the purpose of the iPhone example in the passage?
Solution:
The author says that a thing (iPhone) has a
personality for us because it’s connected or useful
to us, but that was not the case with the Maya
people. To them the non-human were not tied to
specific human beings. To invalidate this example,
we must choose an alternative that is against it.
Option 4 does exactly that. It makes the personality
of incense sticks and stone choppers a function of
their usefulness to humans, something the author
seeks to negate through the example of the thing
(iPhone). All the other three options do not
invalidate the iPhone instance in any way. So, the
correct answer is option 4.
Q.No: 413
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
The author implies that, like scholars, successful leaders:
Solution:
The dilemma is between fiction and telling the public the truth. So, option (2) is the answer.
Q.No: 414
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
Regarding which one of the following quotes could we argue that the author overemphasises the importance of fiction?
Solution:
The only option that talks about fiction is (1). The other options are mentioned in the context of fiction. So, option (1) is the answer. Refer to the key words ‘same fiction’ in option (1).
Q.No: 415
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Many people believe that truth conveys power. . . . Hence sticking with the truth is the best strategy for gaining power. Unfortunately, this is just a comforting myth. In fact, truth and power have a far more complicated relationship, because in human society, power means two very different things.
On the one hand, power means having the ability to manipulate objective realities: to hunt animals, to construct bridges, to cure diseases, to build atom bombs. This kind of power is closely tied to truth. If you believe a false physical theory, you won’t be able to build an atom bomb. On the other hand, power also means having the ability to manipulate human beliefs, thereby getting lots of people to cooperate effectively. Building atom bombs requires not just a good understanding of physics, but also the coordinated labor of millions of humans. Planet Earth was conquered by Homo sapiens rather than by chimpanzees or elephants, because we are the only mammals that can cooperate in very large numbers. And large-scale cooperation depends on believing common stories. But these stories need not be true. You can unite millions of people by making them believe in completely fictional stories about God, about race or about economics. The dual nature of power and truth results in the curious fact that we humans know many more truths than any other animal, but we also believe in much more nonsense. . . .
When it comes to uniting people around a common story, fiction actually enjoys three inherent advantages over the truth. First, whereas the truth is universal, fictions tend to be local. Consequently if we want to distinguish our tribe from foreigners, a fictional story will serve as a far better identity marker than a true story. . . . The second huge advantage of fiction over truth has to do with the handicap principle, which says that reliable signals must be costly to the signaler. Otherwise, they can easily be faked by cheaters. . . . If political loyalty is signaled by believing a true story, anyone can fake it. But believing ridiculous and outlandish stories exacts greater cost, and is therefore a better signal of loyalty. . . . Third, and most important, the truth is often painful and disturbing. Hence if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. An American presidential candidate who tells the American public the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about American history has a 100 percent guarantee of losing the elections. . . . An uncompromising adherence to the truth is an admirable spiritual practice, but it is not a winning political strategy. . . .
Even if we need to pay some price for deactivating our rational faculties, the advantages of increased social cohesion are often so big that fictional stories routinely triumph over the truth in human history. Scholars have known this for thousands of years, which is why scholars often had to decide whether they served the truth or social harmony. Should they aim to unite people by making sure everyone believes in the same fiction, or should they let people know the truth even at the price of disunity?
The author would support none of the following statements about political power EXCEPT that:
Solution:
The author had used the term ‘unalloyed reality’ in the second last paragraph. Truth is often painful and disturbing and people cannot accept it. So, leaders deviate from it in order to retain power. So, (4) is the answer.
Q.No: 416
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
Which one of the following explains the “contradictory pulls” on Indian nationalism?
Solution:
The ‘contradictory pull’ refer to the superior western civilisation compared to India. Refer to the 1st paragraph. Option (1) is factually correct in the light of the 1st paragraph. We were fighting against the colonisers and also, we learnt the material aspect from the colonisers. Therefore, (3) is the answer.
Q.No: 417
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
Which one of the following, if true, would weaken the author’s claims in the passage?
Solution:
The author mentions how the West was superior in the material aspects of culture. Refer to the 1st paragraph. Also, refer to the last sentence of the 1st paragraph. The author observes that the West should not be imitated in all aspects of life. Option (1) if true, would weaken the author’s observation. So, (1) is the answer. The other options are irrelevant.
Q.No: 418
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
I have elaborated . . . a framework for analyzing the contradictory pulls on [Indian] nationalist ideology in its struggle against the dominance of colonialism and the resolution it offered to those contradictions. Briefly, this resolution was built around a separation of the domain of culture into two spheres—the material and the spiritual. It was in the material sphere that the claims of Western civilization were the most powerful. Science, technology, rational forms of economic organization, modern methods of statecraft—these had given the European countries the strength to subjugate the non-European people . . . To overcome this domination, the colonized people had to learn those superior techniques of organizing material life and incorporate them within their own cultures. . . . But this could not mean the imitation of the West in every aspect of life, for then the very distinction between the West and the East would vanish—the self-identity of national culture would itself be threatened. . . .
The discourse of nationalism shows that the material/spiritual distinction was condensed into an analogous, but ideologically far more powerful, dichotomy: that between the outer and the inner. . . . Applying the inner/outer distinction to the matter of concrete day-to-day living separates the social space into ghar and bāhir, the home and the world. The world is the external, the domain of the material; the home represents one’s inner spiritual self, one’s true identity. The world is a treacherous terrain of the pursuit of material interests, where practical considerations reign supreme. It is also typically the domain of the male. The home in its essence must remain unaffected by the profane activities of the material world—and woman is its representation. And so one gets an identification of social roles by gender to correspond with the separation of the social space into ghar and bāhir. . . .
The colonial situation, and the ideological response of nationalism to the critique of Indian tradition, introduced an entirely new substance to [these dichotomies] and effected their transformation. The material/spiritual dichotomy, to which the terms world and home corresponded, had acquired . . . a very special significance in the nationalist mind. The world was where the European power had challenged the non-European peoples and, by virtue of its superior material culture, had subjugated them. But, the nationalists asserted, it had failed to colonize the inner, essential, identity of the East which lay in its distinctive, and superior, spiritual culture. . . . [I]n the entire phase of the national struggle, the crucial need was to protect, preserve and strengthen the inner core of the national culture, its spiritual essence. . . .
Once we match this new meaning of the home/world dichotomy with the identification of social roles by gender, we get the ideological framework within which nationalism answered the women’s question. It would be a grave error to see in this, as liberals are apt to in their despair at the many marks of social conservatism in nationalist practice, a total rejection of the West. Quite the contrary: the nationalist paradigm in fact supplied an ideological principle of selection.
Which one of the following best describes the liberal perception of Indian nationalism?
Solution:
Refer to the 2>nd paragraph where gender roles are mentioned. So, option (1) is the answer.
Q.No: 419
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
From the passage, we can infer that the author is in favour of:
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph. The author is definitely in favour of multilingualism. Therefore, option (4) is the right answer.
Q.No: 420
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
We can infer all of the following about indigenous languages from the passage EXCEPT that:
Solution:
The author doesn’t say that vocabulary and grammatical constructs have been challenging. Therefore, option (4) is the answer. The other 3 options have been mentioned. Refer to the first 2 paragraphs of the passage.
Q.No: 421
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It’s easy to forget that most of the world’s languages are still transmitted orally with no widely established written form. While speech communities are increasingly involved in projects to protect their languages – in print, on air and online – orality is fragile and contributes to linguistic vulnerability. But indigenous languages are about much more than unusual words and intriguing grammar: They function as vehicles for the transmission of cultural traditions, environmental understandings and knowledge about medicinal plants, all at risk when elders die and livelihoods are disrupted.
Both push and pull factors lead to the decline of languages. Through war, famine and natural disasters, whole communities can be destroyed, taking their language with them to the grave, such as the indigenous populations of Tasmania who were wiped out by colonists. More commonly, speakers live on but abandon their language in favor of another vernacular, a widespread process that linguists refer to as “language shift” from which few languages are immune. Such trading up and out of a speech form occurs for complex political, cultural and economic reasons – sometimes voluntary for economic and educational reasons, although often amplified by state coercion or neglect. Welsh, long stigmatized and disparaged by the British state, has rebounded with vigor.
Many speakers of endangered, poorly documented languages have embraced new digital media with excitement. Speakers of previously exclusively oral tongues are turning to the web as a virtual space for languages to live on. Internet technology offers powerful ways for oral traditions and cultural practices to survive, even thrive, among increasingly mobile communities. I have watched as videos of traditional wedding ceremonies and songs are recorded on smartphones in London by Nepali migrants, then uploaded to YouTube and watched an hour later by relatives in remote Himalayan villages . . . Globalization is regularly, and often uncritically, pilloried as a major threat to linguistic diversity. But in fact, globalization is as much process as it is ideology, certainly when it comes to language. The real forces behind cultural homogenization are unbending beliefs, exchanged through a globalized delivery system, reinforced by the historical monolingualism prevalent in much of the West.
Monolingualism – the condition of being able to speak only one language – is regularly accompanied by a deep-seated conviction in the value of that language over all others. Across the largest economies that make up the G8, being monolingual is still often the norm, with multilingualism appearing unusual and even somewhat exotic. The monolingual mindset stands in sharp contrast to the lived reality of most the world, which throughout its history has been more multilingual than unilingual. Monolingualism, then, not globalization, should be our primary concern.
Multilingualism can help us live in a more connected and more interdependent world. By widening access to technology, globalization can support indigenous and scholarly communities engaged in documenting and protecting our shared linguistic heritage. For the last 5,000 years, the rise and fall of languages was intimately tied to the plow, sword and book. In our digital age, the keyboard, screen and web will play a decisive role in shaping the future linguistic diversity of our species.
The author mentions the Welsh language to show that:
Solution:
Refer to the last sentence of the second paragraph where the author mentions the revival of the Welsh language. So, option (2) is the answer. The other options are not mentioned.
Q.No: 422
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
The author of the passage is most likely to support which one of the following statements?
Solution:
Refer to the second paragraph where the author mentions the relation between reality and perception. So, option (4) is the answer.
Q.No: 423
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
According to the last paragraph of the passage, “We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on” something. Which one of the following most broadly captures what we depend on?
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph, especially the sentence, “We hold out beliefs ....” The author also refers to how we acquired those beliefs. Therefore, option (2) is the answer.
Q.No: 424
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-2
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
It has been said that knowledge, or the problem of knowledge, is the scandal of philosophy. The scandal is philosophy’s apparent inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know something or, indeed, that we know anything. Philosopher Michael Williams writes: ‘Is it possible to obtain knowledge at all? This problem is pressing because there are powerful arguments, some very ancient, for the conclusion that it is not . . . Scepticism is the skeleton in Western rationalism’s closet’. While it is not clear that the scandal matters to anyone but philosophers, philosophers point out that it should matter to everyone, at least given a certain conception of knowledge. For, they explain, unless we can ground our claims to knowledge as such, which is to say, distinguish it from mere opinion, superstition, fantasy, wishful thinking, ideology, illusion or delusion, then the actions we take on the basis of presumed knowledge – boarding an airplane, swallowing a pill, finding someone guilty of a crime – will be irrational and unjustifiable.
That is all quite serious-sounding but so also are the rattlings of the skeleton: that is, the sceptic’s contention that we cannot be sure that we know anything – at least not if we think of knowledge as something like having a correct mental representation of reality, and not if we think of reality as something like things-as-they-are-in-themselves, independent of our perceptions, ideas or descriptions. For, the sceptic will note, since reality, under that conception of it, is outside our ken (we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it), we have no way to compare our mental representations with things-as-they-are-in-themselves and therefore no way to determine whether they are correct or incorrect. Thus the sceptic may repeat (rattling loudly), you cannot be sure you ‘know’ something or anything at all – at least not, he may add (rattling softly before disappearing), if that is the way you conceive ‘knowledge’.
There are a number of ways to handle this situation. The most common is to ignore it. Most people outside the academy – and, indeed, most of us inside it – are unaware of or unperturbed by the philosophical scandal of knowledge and go about our lives without too many epistemic anxieties. We hold our beliefs and presumptive knowledges more or less confidently, usually depending on how we acquired them (I saw it with my own eyes; I heard it on Fox News; a guy at the office told me) and how broadly and strenuously they seem to be shared or endorsed by various relevant people: experts and authorities, friends and family members, colleagues and associates. And we examine our convictions more or less closely, explain them more or less extensively, and defend them more or less vigorously, usually depending on what seems to be at stake for ourselves and/or other people and what resources are available for reassuring ourselves or making our beliefs credible to others (look, it’s right here on the page; add up the figures yourself; I happen to be a heart specialist).
“. . . we cannot catch a glimpse of things-in-themselves around the corner of our own eyes; we cannot form an idea of reality that floats above the processes of our conceiving it . . .” Which one of the following statements best reflects the argument being made in this sentence?
Solution:
The reality of something is defined by our perception. If it is not, we cannot perceive that reality. Option (2) is narrow in scope. The author has only given the example of eyesight. So, option (4) is the answer.
Q.No: 425
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Today we can hardly conceive of ourselves without an unconscious. Yet between 1700 and 1900, this notion developed as a genuinely original thought. The “unconscious” burst the shell of conventional language, coined as it had been to embody the fleeting ideas and the shifting conceptions of several generations until, finally, it became fixed and defined in specialized terms within the realm of medical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis.
The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-honored expressions and traditional catchwords. At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before. The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the unconscious brought together the spiritualist and the psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as apparitions, spectral illusions, haunted houses, mediums, trance, automatic writing); the psychiatrist or alienist probing the nature of mental disease, of abnormal ideation, hallucination, delirium, melancholia, mania; the surgeon performing operations with the aid of hypnotism; the magnetizer claiming to correct the disequilibrium in the universal flow of magnetic fluids but who soon came to be regarded as a clever manipulator of the imagination; the physiologist and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anesthesia, the influence of the mind on the body in health and disease; the neurologist concerned with the functions of the brain and the physiological basis of mental life; the philosopher interested in the will, the emotions, consciousness, knowledge, imagination and the creative genius; and, last but not least, the psychologist.
Significantly, most if not all of these practices (for example, hypnotism in surgery or psychological magnetism) originated in the waning years of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as did some of the disciplines (such as psychology and psychical research). The majority of topics too were either new or assumed hitherto unknown colors. Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .
Striving vaguely and independently to give expression to a latent conception, various lines of thought can be brought together by some novel term. The new concept then serves as a kind of resting place or stocktaking in the development of ideas, giving satisfaction and a stimulus for further discussion or speculation. Thus, the massive introduction of the term unconscious by Hartmann in 1869 appeared to focalize many stray thoughts, affording a temporary feeling that a crucial step had been taken forward, a comprehensive knowledge gained, a knowledge that required only further elaboration, explication, and unfolding in order to bring in a bounty of higher understanding. Ultimately, Hartmann’s attempt at defining the unconscious proved fruitless because he extended its reach into every realm of organic and inorganic, spiritual, intellectual, and instinctive existence, severely diluting the precision and compromising the impact of the concept.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Today we can hardly conceive of ourselves without an unconscious. Yet between 1700 and 1900, this notion developed as a genuinely original thought. The “unconscious” burst the shell of conventional language, coined as it had been to embody the fleeting ideas and the shifting conceptions of several generations until, finally, it became fixed and defined in specialized terms within the realm of medical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis.
The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-honored expressions and traditional catchwords. At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before. The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the unconscious brought together the spiritualist and the psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as apparitions, spectral illusions, haunted houses, mediums, trance, automatic writing); the psychiatrist or alienist probing the nature of mental disease, of abnormal ideation, hallucination, delirium, melancholia, mania; the surgeon performing operations with the aid of hypnotism; the magnetizer claiming to correct the disequilibrium in the universal flow of magnetic fluids but who soon came to be regarded as a clever manipulator of the imagination; the physiologist and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anesthesia, the influence of the mind on the body in health and disease; the neurologist concerned with the functions of the brain and the physiological basis of mental life; the philosopher interested in the will, the emotions, consciousness, knowledge, imagination and the creative genius; and, last but not least, the psychologist.
Significantly, most if not all of these practices (for example, hypnotism in surgery or psychological magnetism) originated in the waning years of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as did some of the disciplines (such as psychology and psychical research). The majority of topics too were either new or assumed hitherto unknown colors. Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .
Striving vaguely and independently to give expression to a latent conception, various lines of thought can be brought together by some novel term. The new concept then serves as a kind of resting place or stocktaking in the development of ideas, giving satisfaction and a stimulus for further discussion or speculation. Thus, the massive introduction of the term unconscious by Hartmann in 1869 appeared to focalize many stray thoughts, affording a temporary feeling that a crucial step had been taken forward, a comprehensive knowledge gained, a knowledge that required only further elaboration, explication, and unfolding in order to bring in a bounty of higher understanding. Ultimately, Hartmann’s attempt at defining the unconscious proved fruitless because he extended its reach into every realm of organic and inorganic, spiritual, intellectual, and instinctive existence, severely diluting the precision and compromising the impact of the concept.
All of the following statements may be considered valid inferences from the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
The term or the explanation of the term “anaesthesiology” cannot be found in the given passage. To understand the unconscious, many lateral ways of treating the mind has opened like hypnotic treatment, psychoanalysis, psychological magnetism etc. But anaesthesiology means the branch of medicine concerned with anaesthesia and anaesthetics. It is a completely different branch of study. Hence, it cannot be inferred.
Incorrect options:
1. Refer to, "At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before.” Hence can be inferred.
2. Refer to,” Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .” Can be inferred.
3. Refer to, “The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century.”
Incorrect options:
1. Refer to, "At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before.” Hence can be inferred.
2. Refer to,” Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .” Can be inferred.
3. Refer to, “The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century.”
Q.No: 426
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Today we can hardly conceive of ourselves without an unconscious. Yet between 1700 and 1900, this notion developed as a genuinely original thought. The “unconscious” burst the shell of conventional language, coined as it had been to embody the fleeting ideas and the shifting conceptions of several generations until, finally, it became fixed and defined in specialized terms within the realm of medical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis.
The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-honored expressions and traditional catchwords. At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before. The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the unconscious brought together the spiritualist and the psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as apparitions, spectral illusions, haunted houses, mediums, trance, automatic writing); the psychiatrist or alienist probing the nature of mental disease, of abnormal ideation, hallucination, delirium, melancholia, mania; the surgeon performing operations with the aid of hypnotism; the magnetizer claiming to correct the disequilibrium in the universal flow of magnetic fluids but who soon came to be regarded as a clever manipulator of the imagination; the physiologist and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anesthesia, the influence of the mind on the body in health and disease; the neurologist concerned with the functions of the brain and the physiological basis of mental life; the philosopher interested in the will, the emotions, consciousness, knowledge, imagination and the creative genius; and, last but not least, the psychologist.
Significantly, most if not all of these practices (for example, hypnotism in surgery or psychological magnetism) originated in the waning years of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as did some of the disciplines (such as psychology and psychical research). The majority of topics too were either new or assumed hitherto unknown colors. Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .
Striving vaguely and independently to give expression to a latent conception, various lines of thought can be brought together by some novel term. The new concept then serves as a kind of resting place or stocktaking in the development of ideas, giving satisfaction and a stimulus for further discussion or speculation. Thus, the massive introduction of the term unconscious by Hartmann in 1869 appeared to focalize many stray thoughts, affording a temporary feeling that a crucial step had been taken forward, a comprehensive knowledge gained, a knowledge that required only further elaboration, explication, and unfolding in order to bring in a bounty of higher understanding. Ultimately, Hartmann’s attempt at defining the unconscious proved fruitless because he extended its reach into every realm of organic and inorganic, spiritual, intellectual, and instinctive existence, severely diluting the precision and compromising the impact of the concept.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Today we can hardly conceive of ourselves without an unconscious. Yet between 1700 and 1900, this notion developed as a genuinely original thought. The “unconscious” burst the shell of conventional language, coined as it had been to embody the fleeting ideas and the shifting conceptions of several generations until, finally, it became fixed and defined in specialized terms within the realm of medical psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis.
The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century. The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-honored expressions and traditional catchwords. At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before. The drawn-out attempt to approach and define the unconscious brought together the spiritualist and the psychical researcher of borderline phenomena (such as apparitions, spectral illusions, haunted houses, mediums, trance, automatic writing); the psychiatrist or alienist probing the nature of mental disease, of abnormal ideation, hallucination, delirium, melancholia, mania; the surgeon performing operations with the aid of hypnotism; the magnetizer claiming to correct the disequilibrium in the universal flow of magnetic fluids but who soon came to be regarded as a clever manipulator of the imagination; the physiologist and the physician who puzzled over sleep, dreams, sleepwalking, anesthesia, the influence of the mind on the body in health and disease; the neurologist concerned with the functions of the brain and the physiological basis of mental life; the philosopher interested in the will, the emotions, consciousness, knowledge, imagination and the creative genius; and, last but not least, the psychologist.
Significantly, most if not all of these practices (for example, hypnotism in surgery or psychological magnetism) originated in the waning years of the eighteenth century and during the early decades of the nineteenth century, as did some of the disciplines (such as psychology and psychical research). The majority of topics too were either new or assumed hitherto unknown colors. Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .
Striving vaguely and independently to give expression to a latent conception, various lines of thought can be brought together by some novel term. The new concept then serves as a kind of resting place or stocktaking in the development of ideas, giving satisfaction and a stimulus for further discussion or speculation. Thus, the massive introduction of the term unconscious by Hartmann in 1869 appeared to focalize many stray thoughts, affording a temporary feeling that a crucial step had been taken forward, a comprehensive knowledge gained, a knowledge that required only further elaboration, explication, and unfolding in order to bring in a bounty of higher understanding. Ultimately, Hartmann’s attempt at defining the unconscious proved fruitless because he extended its reach into every realm of organic and inorganic, spiritual, intellectual, and instinctive existence, severely diluting the precision and compromising the impact of the concept.
“The enrichments of literary and intellectual language led to an altered understanding of the meanings that underlie time-honored expressions and traditional catchwords.” Which one of the following interpretations of this sentence would be closest in meaning to the original?
Solution:
3 is the correct option. The phrase clearly states that the new literary and intellectual language because of the rise of unconscious as a literary tool has provided a change to the then systematic understanding of time-honoured expressions and traditional catchwords.
Incorrect options:
1. The phrase “altered by…” makes it incorrect. It talks about change in time honoured expressions and not by it.
2. All options are not correct.
4. The word enriched has a sense of judgement in it, which cannot be inferred from the passage. Whether enriching or uninspiring is open to debate.
Incorrect options:
1. The phrase “altered by…” makes it incorrect. It talks about change in time honoured expressions and not by it.
2. All options are not correct.
4. The word enriched has a sense of judgement in it, which cannot be inferred from the passage. Whether enriching or uninspiring is open to debate.
Q.No: 427
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Back in the early 2000s, an awesome thing happened in the New X-Men comics. Our mutant heroes had been battling giant robots called Sentinels for years, but suddenly these mechanical overlords spawned a new threat: Nano-Sentinels! Not content to rule Earth with their metal fists, these tiny robots invaded our bodies at the microscopic level. Infected humans were slowly converted into machines, cell by cell.
Now, a new wave of extremely odd robots is making at least part of the Nano-Sentinels story come true. Using exotic fabrication materials like squishy hydrogels and elastic polymers, researchers are making autonomous devices that are often tiny and that could turn out to be more powerful than an army of Terminators. Some are 1-centimetre blobs that can skate over water. Others are flat sheets that can roll themselves into tubes, or matchstick-sized plastic coils that act as powerful muscles. No, they won’t be invading our bodies and turning us into Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day swim through our bloodstream to heal us. They could also clean up pollutants in water or fold themselves into different kinds of vehicles for us to drive. . . .
Unlike a traditional robot, which is made of mechanical parts, these new kinds of robots are made from molecular parts. The principle is the same: both are devices that can move around and do things independently. But a robot made from smart materials might be nothing more than a pink drop of hydrogel. Instead of gears and wires, it’s assembled from two kinds of molecules – some that love water and some that avoid it – which interact to allow the bot to skate on top of a pond.
Sometimes these materials are used to enhance more conventional robots. One team of researchers, for example, has developed a different kind of hydrogel that becomes sticky when exposed to a low-voltage zap of electricity and then stops being sticky when the electricity is switched off. This putty-like gel can be pasted right onto the feet or wheels of a robot. When the robot wants to climb a sheer wall or scoot across the ceiling, it can activate its sticky feet with a few volts. Once it is back on a flat surface again, the robot turns off the adhesive like a light switch.
Robots that are wholly or partly made of gloop aren’t the future that I was promised in science fiction. But it’s definitely the future I want. I’m especially keen on the nanometre-scale “soft robots” that could one day swim through our bodies. Metin Sitti, a director at the Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems in Germany, worked with colleagues to prototype these tiny, synthetic beasts using various stretchy materials, such as simple rubber, and seeding them with magnetic microparticles. They are assembled into a finished shape by applying magnetic fields. The results look like flowers or geometric shapes made from Tinkertoy ball and stick modelling kits. They’re guided through tubes of fluid using magnets, and can even stop and cling to the sides of a tube.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Back in the early 2000s, an awesome thing happened in the New X-Men comics. Our mutant heroes had been battling giant robots called Sentinels for years, but suddenly these mechanical overlords spawned a new threat: Nano-Sentinels! Not content to rule Earth with their metal fists, these tiny robots invaded our bodies at the microscopic level. Infected humans were slowly converted into machines, cell by cell.
Now, a new wave of extremely odd robots is making at least part of the Nano-Sentinels story come true. Using exotic fabrication materials like squishy hydrogels and elastic polymers, researchers are making autonomous devices that are often tiny and that could turn out to be more powerful than an army of Terminators. Some are 1-centimetre blobs that can skate over water. Others are flat sheets that can roll themselves into tubes, or matchstick-sized plastic coils that act as powerful muscles. No, they won’t be invading our bodies and turning us into Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day swim through our bloodstream to heal us. They could also clean up pollutants in water or fold themselves into different kinds of vehicles for us to drive. . . .
Unlike a traditional robot, which is made of mechanical parts, these new kinds of robots are made from molecular parts. The principle is the same: both are devices that can move around and do things independently. But a robot made from smart materials might be nothing more than a pink drop of hydrogel. Instead of gears and wires, it’s assembled from two kinds of molecules – some that love water and some that avoid it – which interact to allow the bot to skate on top of a pond.
Sometimes these materials are used to enhance more conventional robots. One team of researchers, for example, has developed a different kind of hydrogel that becomes sticky when exposed to a low-voltage zap of electricity and then stops being sticky when the electricity is switched off. This putty-like gel can be pasted right onto the feet or wheels of a robot. When the robot wants to climb a sheer wall or scoot across the ceiling, it can activate its sticky feet with a few volts. Once it is back on a flat surface again, the robot turns off the adhesive like a light switch.
Robots that are wholly or partly made of gloop aren’t the future that I was promised in science fiction. But it’s definitely the future I want. I’m especially keen on the nanometre-scale “soft robots” that could one day swim through our bodies. Metin Sitti, a director at the Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems in Germany, worked with colleagues to prototype these tiny, synthetic beasts using various stretchy materials, such as simple rubber, and seeding them with magnetic microparticles. They are assembled into a finished shape by applying magnetic fields. The results look like flowers or geometric shapes made from Tinkertoy ball and stick modelling kits. They’re guided through tubes of fluid using magnets, and can even stop and cling to the sides of a tube.
Which one of the following scenarios, if false, could be seen as supporting the passage?
Solution:
Refer to, “No, they won’t be invading our bodies and turning us into
Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day
swim through our bloodstream to heal us.” This makes option 3 the correct answer.
Incorrect Options:
Other options can be rendered incorrect. Although they are false but they are not supporting the passage.
Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day
swim through our bloodstream to heal us.” This makes option 3 the correct answer.
Incorrect Options:
Other options can be rendered incorrect. Although they are false but they are not supporting the passage.
Q.No: 428
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
Which one of the following statements best summarises the author’s position about Pinker’s book?
Solution:
The entire passage deals with the fact that “language, that most human of
all attributes, was innate”. So, it is instinctive in nature as far Pinker and Chomsky are concerned. So, exactly at this point though the claims of Pinker may seem racist to some, transcends all sort of differences and become universal. “The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of
Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.”
1 is incorrect. It is an incorrect assumption.
2 is incorrect. The passage counters that argument.
3 is also factually incorrect.
all attributes, was innate”. So, it is instinctive in nature as far Pinker and Chomsky are concerned. So, exactly at this point though the claims of Pinker may seem racist to some, transcends all sort of differences and become universal. “The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of
Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.”
1 is incorrect. It is an incorrect assumption.
2 is incorrect. The passage counters that argument.
3 is also factually incorrect.
Q.No: 429
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
On the basis of the information in the passage, Pinker and Chomsky may disagree with each other on which one of the following points?
Solution:
Refer to, “Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for
language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution.” This proves that
Chomsky did not agree with Darwinian explanatory paradigm for language. Hence 2 is the correct
option.
Chomsky and Pinker agree with all the other mentioned options.
Chomsky and Pinker agree with all the other mentioned options.
Q.No: 430
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Starting in 1957, [Noam Chomsky] proclaimed a new doctrine: Language, that most human of all attributes, was innate. The grammatical faculty was built into the infant brain, and your average 3-year-old was not a mere apprentice in the great enterprise of absorbing English from his or her parents, but a “linguistic genius.” Since this message was couched in terms of Chomskyan theoretical linguistics, in discourse so opaque that it was nearly incomprehensible even to some scholars, many people did not hear it. Now, in a brilliant, witty and altogether satisfying book, Mr. Chomsky's colleague Steven Pinker . . . has brought Mr. Chomsky's findings to everyman. In “The Language Instinct” he has gathered persuasive data from such diverse fields as cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology and speech therapy to make his points, and when he disagrees with Mr. Chomsky he tells you so. . . .
For Mr. Chomsky and Mr. Pinker, somewhere in the human brain there is a complex set of neural circuits that have been programmed with “super-rules” (making up what Mr. Chomsky calls “universal grammar”), and that these rules are unconscious and instinctive. A half-century ago, this would have been pooh-poohed as a “black box” theory, since one could not actually pinpoint this grammatical faculty in a specific part of the brain, or describe its functioning. But now things are different. Neurosurgeons [have now found that this] “black box” is situated in and around Broca’s area, on the left side of the forebrain. . . .
Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution. He effectively disposes of all claims that intelligent nonhuman primates like chimps have any abilities to learn and use language. It is not that chimps lack the vocal apparatus to speak; it is just that their brains are unable to produce or use grammar. On the other hand, the “language instinct,” when it first appeared among our most distant hominid ancestors, must have given them a selective reproductive advantage over their competitors (including the ancestral chimps). . . .
So according to Mr. Pinker, the roots of language must be in the genes, but there cannot be a “grammar gene” any more than there can be a gene for the heart or any other complex body structure. This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism. Yet Mr. Pinker stresses one point that should allay such fears. Even though there are 4,000 to 6,000 languages today, they are all sufficiently alike to be considered one language by an extraterrestrial observer. In other words, most of the diversity of the world’s cultures, so beloved to anthropologists, is superficial and minor compared to the similarities. Racial differences are literally only “skin deep.” The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.
From the passage, it can be inferred that all of the following are true about Pinker’s book, “The Language Instinct”, EXCEPT that Pinker:
Solution:
“This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral
psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human
behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it
might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism.” So, it becomes clear
that Pinker’s theory was criticised from the behavioural psychology standpoint.
Q.No: 431
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Keeping time accurately comes with a price. The maximum accuracy of a clock is directly related to how much disorder, or entropy, it creates every time it ticks. Natalia Ares at the University of Oxford and her colleagues made this discovery using a tiny clock with an accuracy that can be controlled. The clock consists of a 50-nanometre-thick membrane of silicon nitride, vibrated by an electric current. Each time the membrane moved up and down once and then returned to its original position, the researchers counted a tick, and the regularity of the spacing between the ticks represented the accuracy of the clock. The researchers found that as they increased the clock’s accuracy, the heat produced in the system grew, increasing the entropy of its surroundings by jostling nearby particles . . . “If a clock is more accurate, you are paying for it somehow,” says Ares. In this case, you pay for it by pouring more ordered energy into the clock, which is then converted into entropy. “By measuring time, we are increasing the entropy of the universe,” says Ares. The more entropy there is in the universe, the closer it may be to its eventual demise. “Maybe we should stop measuring time,” says Ares. The scale of the additional entropy is so small, though, that there is no need to worry about its effects, she says.
The increase in entropy in timekeeping may be related to the “arrow of time”, says Marcus Huber at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, who was part of the research team. It has been suggested that the reason that time only flows forward, not in reverse, is that the total amount of entropy in the universe is constantly increasing, creating disorder that cannot be put in order again.
The relationship that the researchers found is a limit on the accuracy of a clock, so it doesn’t mean that a clock that creates the most possible entropy would be maximally accurate – hence a large, inefficient grandfather clock isn’t more precise than an atomic clock. “It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.
When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . . We can’t be sure yet that these results are actually universal, though, because there are many types of clocks for which the relationship between accuracy and entropy haven’t been tested. “It’s still unclear how this principle plays out in real devices such as atomic clocks, which push the ultimate quantum limits of accuracy,” says Mark Mitchison at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. Understanding this relationship could be helpful for designing clocks in the future, particularly those used in quantum computers and other devices where both accuracy and temperature are crucial, says Ares. This finding could also help us understand more generally how the quantum world and the classical world are similar and different in terms of thermodynamics and the passage of time.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Keeping time accurately comes with a price. The maximum accuracy of a clock is directly related to how much disorder, or entropy, it creates every time it ticks. Natalia Ares at the University of Oxford and her colleagues made this discovery using a tiny clock with an accuracy that can be controlled. The clock consists of a 50-nanometre-thick membrane of silicon nitride, vibrated by an electric current. Each time the membrane moved up and down once and then returned to its original position, the researchers counted a tick, and the regularity of the spacing between the ticks represented the accuracy of the clock. The researchers found that as they increased the clock’s accuracy, the heat produced in the system grew, increasing the entropy of its surroundings by jostling nearby particles . . . “If a clock is more accurate, you are paying for it somehow,” says Ares. In this case, you pay for it by pouring more ordered energy into the clock, which is then converted into entropy. “By measuring time, we are increasing the entropy of the universe,” says Ares. The more entropy there is in the universe, the closer it may be to its eventual demise. “Maybe we should stop measuring time,” says Ares. The scale of the additional entropy is so small, though, that there is no need to worry about its effects, she says.
The increase in entropy in timekeeping may be related to the “arrow of time”, says Marcus Huber at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, who was part of the research team. It has been suggested that the reason that time only flows forward, not in reverse, is that the total amount of entropy in the universe is constantly increasing, creating disorder that cannot be put in order again.
The relationship that the researchers found is a limit on the accuracy of a clock, so it doesn’t mean that a clock that creates the most possible entropy would be maximally accurate – hence a large, inefficient grandfather clock isn’t more precise than an atomic clock. “It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.
When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . . We can’t be sure yet that these results are actually universal, though, because there are many types of clocks for which the relationship between accuracy and entropy haven’t been tested. “It’s still unclear how this principle plays out in real devices such as atomic clocks, which push the ultimate quantum limits of accuracy,” says Mark Mitchison at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. Understanding this relationship could be helpful for designing clocks in the future, particularly those used in quantum computers and other devices where both accuracy and temperature are crucial, says Ares. This finding could also help us understand more generally how the quantum world and the classical world are similar and different in terms of thermodynamics and the passage of time.
None of the following statements can be inferred from the passage EXCEPT that:
Solution:
Refer to, “When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . .” Hence option 2 can be inferred.
Q.No: 432
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2021 Slot-3
Comprehension:
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Keeping time accurately comes with a price. The maximum accuracy of a clock is directly related to how much disorder, or entropy, it creates every time it ticks. Natalia Ares at the University of Oxford and her colleagues made this discovery using a tiny clock with an accuracy that can be controlled. The clock consists of a 50-nanometre-thick membrane of silicon nitride, vibrated by an electric current. Each time the membrane moved up and down once and then returned to its original position, the researchers counted a tick, and the regularity of the spacing between the ticks represented the accuracy of the clock. The researchers found that as they increased the clock’s accuracy, the heat produced in the system grew, increasing the entropy of its surroundings by jostling nearby particles . . . “If a clock is more accurate, you are paying for it somehow,” says Ares. In this case, you pay for it by pouring more ordered energy into the clock, which is then converted into entropy. “By measuring time, we are increasing the entropy of the universe,” says Ares. The more entropy there is in the universe, the closer it may be to its eventual demise. “Maybe we should stop measuring time,” says Ares. The scale of the additional entropy is so small, though, that there is no need to worry about its effects, she says.
The increase in entropy in timekeeping may be related to the “arrow of time”, says Marcus Huber at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, who was part of the research team. It has been suggested that the reason that time only flows forward, not in reverse, is that the total amount of entropy in the universe is constantly increasing, creating disorder that cannot be put in order again.
The relationship that the researchers found is a limit on the accuracy of a clock, so it doesn’t mean that a clock that creates the most possible entropy would be maximally accurate – hence a large, inefficient grandfather clock isn’t more precise than an atomic clock. “It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.
When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . . We can’t be sure yet that these results are actually universal, though, because there are many types of clocks for which the relationship between accuracy and entropy haven’t been tested. “It’s still unclear how this principle plays out in real devices such as atomic clocks, which push the ultimate quantum limits of accuracy,” says Mark Mitchison at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. Understanding this relationship could be helpful for designing clocks in the future, particularly those used in quantum computers and other devices where both accuracy and temperature are crucial, says Ares. This finding could also help us understand more generally how the quantum world and the classical world are similar and different in terms of thermodynamics and the passage of time.
The passage below is accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best answer to each question.
Keeping time accurately comes with a price. The maximum accuracy of a clock is directly related to how much disorder, or entropy, it creates every time it ticks. Natalia Ares at the University of Oxford and her colleagues made this discovery using a tiny clock with an accuracy that can be controlled. The clock consists of a 50-nanometre-thick membrane of silicon nitride, vibrated by an electric current. Each time the membrane moved up and down once and then returned to its original position, the researchers counted a tick, and the regularity of the spacing between the ticks represented the accuracy of the clock. The researchers found that as they increased the clock’s accuracy, the heat produced in the system grew, increasing the entropy of its surroundings by jostling nearby particles . . . “If a clock is more accurate, you are paying for it somehow,” says Ares. In this case, you pay for it by pouring more ordered energy into the clock, which is then converted into entropy. “By measuring time, we are increasing the entropy of the universe,” says Ares. The more entropy there is in the universe, the closer it may be to its eventual demise. “Maybe we should stop measuring time,” says Ares. The scale of the additional entropy is so small, though, that there is no need to worry about its effects, she says.
The increase in entropy in timekeeping may be related to the “arrow of time”, says Marcus Huber at the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, who was part of the research team. It has been suggested that the reason that time only flows forward, not in reverse, is that the total amount of entropy in the universe is constantly increasing, creating disorder that cannot be put in order again.
The relationship that the researchers found is a limit on the accuracy of a clock, so it doesn’t mean that a clock that creates the most possible entropy would be maximally accurate – hence a large, inefficient grandfather clock isn’t more precise than an atomic clock. “It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.
When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . . We can’t be sure yet that these results are actually universal, though, because there are many types of clocks for which the relationship between accuracy and entropy haven’t been tested. “It’s still unclear how this principle plays out in real devices such as atomic clocks, which push the ultimate quantum limits of accuracy,” says Mark Mitchison at Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. Understanding this relationship could be helpful for designing clocks in the future, particularly those used in quantum computers and other devices where both accuracy and temperature are crucial, says Ares. This finding could also help us understand more generally how the quantum world and the classical world are similar and different in terms of thermodynamics and the passage of time.
“It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further . . .” What is the purpose of this example?
Solution:
If we provide more fuel, it doesn’t mean that the car will go faster. It will depend on the speed of the car at which it is travelling. In the same way if we increase entropy, doesn’t mean the accuracy will increase, to gain more accuracy more entropy is produced. Hence, 1 is the correct option.
Refer to, ““It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.”
Refer to, ““It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.”
Q.No: 433
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
On the basis of the passage, which one of the following statements can be regarded as true?
Solution:
Refer the concluding lines of the passage:
“Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in
oneself, of becoming a good person, which the
Stoics believed we could do because we have a
touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three
monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam . . .This makes option 3 the correct answer.
The other options are either not mentioned or are
extreme.
Q.No: 434
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
Which one of the following statements would be an accurate inference from the example of Marcus Aurelius?
Solution:
This is a largely factual question. The reference to
Marcus Aurelius comes in the first paragraph and
his role can be deduced from the from lines: “an
army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason
in front of other officers…or perhaps proceeding
as he would have proceeded whether or not this
event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in
a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited
them.”
Q.No: 435
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
Stoicism was founded in 300 BC by the Greek philosopher Zeno and survived into the Roman era until about AD 300. According to the Stoics, emotions consist of two movements. The first movement is the immediate feeling and other reactions (e.g., physiological response) that occur when a stimulus or event occurs. For instance, consider what could have happened if an army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason in front of other officers. The first movement for Marcus may have been (internal) surprise and anger in response to this insult, accompanied perhaps by some involuntary physiological and expressive responses such as face flushing and a movement of the eyebrows. The second movement is what one does next about the emotion. Second movement behaviors occur after thinking and are under one’s control. Examples of second movements for Marcus might have included a plot to seek revenge, actions signifying deference and appeasement, or perhaps proceeding as he would have proceeded whether or not this event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited them. In the Stoic view, choosing a reasoned, unemotional response as the second movement is the only appropriate response.
The Stoics believed that to live the good life and be a good person, we need to free ourselves of nearly all desires such as too much desire for money, power, or sexual gratification. Prior to second movements, we can consider what is important in life. Money, power, and excessive sexual gratification are not important. Character, rationality, and kindness are important. The Epicureans, first associated with the Greek philosopher Epicurus . . . held a similar view, believing that people should enjoy simple pleasures, such as good conversation, friendship, food, and wine, but not be indulgent in these pursuits and not follow passion for those things that hold no real value like power and money. As Oatley (2004) states, “the Epicureans articulated a view–enjoyment of relationship with friends, of things that are real rather than illusory, simple rather than artificially inflated, possible rather than vanishingly unlikely–that is certainly relevant today” . . . In sum, these ancient Greek and Roman philosophers saw emotions, especially strong ones, as potentially dangerous. They viewed emotions as experiences that needed to be [reined] in and controlled.
As Oatley (2004) points out, the Stoic idea bears some similarity to Buddhism. Buddha, living in India in the 6th century BC, argued for cultivating a certain attitude that decreases the probability of (in Stoic terms) destructive second movements. Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value. Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in oneself, of becoming a good person, which the Stoics believed we could do because we have a touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam . . . As with Stoicism, tenets of these religions include controlling our emotions lest we engage in sinful behavior.
“Through meditation and the right attitude, one allows emotions to happen to oneself (it is impossible to prevent this), but one is advised to observe the emotions without necessarily acting on them; one achieves some distance and decides what has value and what does not have value.” In the context of the passage, which one of the following is not a possible implication of the quoted statement?
Solution:
The implied meaning of this line is that rather than
reacting on emotions, one should aim to observe
them and then decide on what is important. There
is no reference to any out-of-body experience.
Q.No: 436
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Which one of the following statements best reflects the main argument of the fourth paragraph of the passage?
Solution:
The main idea of the fourth paragraph is
encapsulated in its opening line: “As an
environment, technologies shape their inhabitants.
In this respect, they are comparable to laws and
customs.” The rest of the paragraph is elaborating
upon this point.
Q.No: 437
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Which one of the following statements contradicts the arguments of the passage?
Solution:
The reference to Foucault’s prisons or Habermas’s
public sphere is an example of ways in which
masses are organized. These are not the only ways
in which this is done.
Q.No: 438
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Which one of the following statements could be inferred as supporting the arguments of the passage?
Solution:
Consider the following lines: “critical theory of
technology regards technologies as an environment
rather than as a collection of tools. We live today
with and even within technologies that determine
our way of life. Along with the constant pressures
to build centers of power, many other social values
and meanings are inscribed in technological
design.” Also, “As an environment, technologies
shape their inhabitants.” This makes option 3
correct.
Q.No: 439
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
Critical theory of technology is a political theory of modernity with a normative dimension. It belongs to a tradition extending from Marx to Foucault and Habermas according to which advances in the formal claims of human rights take center stage while in the background centralization of ever more powerful public institutions and private organizations imposes an authoritarian social order.
Marx attributed this trajectory to the capitalist rationalization of production. Today it marks many institutions besides the factory and every modern political system, including so-called socialist systems. This trajectory arose from the problems of command over a disempowered and deskilled labor force; but everywhere [that] masses are organized - whether it be Foucault's prisons or Habermas's public sphere - the same pattern prevails. Technological design and development is shaped by this pattern as the material base of a distinctive social order. Marcuse would later point to a "project" as the basis of what he called rather confusingly "technological rationality." Releasing technology from this project is a democratic political task.
In accordance with this general line of thought, critical theory of technology regards technologies as an environment rather than as a collection of tools. We live today with and even within technologies that determine our way of life. Along with the constant pressures to build centers of power, many other social values and meanings are inscribed in technological design. A hermeneutics of technology must make explicit the meanings implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they script. Social histories of technologies such as the bicycle, artificial lighting or firearms have made important contributions to this type of analysis. Critical theory of technology attempts to build a methodological approach on the lessons of these histories.
As an environment, technologies shape their inhabitants. In this respect, they are comparable to laws and customs. Each of these institutions can be said to represent those who live under their sway through privileging certain dimensions of their human nature. Laws of property represent the interest in ownership and control. Customs such as parental authority represent the interest of childhood in safety and growth. Similarly, the automobile represents its users in so far as they are interested in mobility. Interests such as these constitute the version of human nature sanctioned by society.
This notion of representation does not imply an eternal human nature. The concept of nature as non-identity in the Frankfurt School suggests an alternative. On these terms, nature is what lies at the limit of history, at the point at which society loses the capacity to imprint its meanings on things and control them effectively. The reference here is, of course, not to the nature of natural science, but to the lived nature in which we find ourselves and which we are. This nature reveals itself as that which cannot be totally encompassed by the machinery of society. For the Frankfurt School, human nature, in all its transcending force, emerges out of a historical context as that context is [depicted] in illicit joys, struggles and pathologies. We can perhaps admit a less romantic . . . conception in which those dimensions of human nature recognized by society are also granted theoretical legitimacy.
All of the following claims can be inferred from the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
1 can be inferred from: “. A hermeneutics of
technology must make explicit the meanings
implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they
script.” 2 can be inferred from: “Critical theory of
technology is a political theory of modernity with a
normative dimension. …..according to which
advances in the formal claims of human rights take
center stage while in the background centralization
of ever more powerful public institutions and private
organizations imposes an authoritarian social
order.” 3 can be inferred from: “Customs such as
parental authority represent the interest of childhood
in safety and growth…..This notion of
representation does not imply an eternal human
nature.” 4 is an extreme statement that finds no
support in the passage.
Q.No: 440
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Stories concerning the Undead have always been with us. From out of the primal darkness of Mankind's earliest years, come whispers of eerie creatures, not quite alive (or alive in a way which we can understand), yet not quite dead either. These may have been ancient and primitive deities who dwelt deep in the surrounding forests and in remote places, or simply those deceased who refused to remain in their tombs and who wandered about the countryside, physically tormenting and frightening those who were still alive. Mostly they were ill-defined–strange sounds in the night beyond the comforting glow of the fire, or a shape, half-glimpsed in the twilight along the edge of an encampment. They were vague and indistinct, but they were always there with the power to terrify and disturb. They had the power to touch the minds of our early ancestors and to fill them with dread. Such fear formed the basis of the earliest tales although the source and exact nature of such terrors still remained very vague.
And as Mankind became more sophisticated, leaving the gloom of their caves and forming themselves into recognizable communities–towns, cities, whole cultures–so the Undead travelled with them, inhabiting their folklore just as they had in former times. Now they began to take on more definite shapes. They became walking cadavers; the physical embodiment of former deities and things which had existed alongside Man since the Creation. Some still remained vague and illdefined but, as Mankind strove to explain the horror which it felt towards them, such creatures emerged more readily into the light.
In order to confirm their abnormal status, many of the Undead were often accorded attributes, which defied the natural order of things–the power to transform themselves into other shapes, the ability to sustain themselves by drinking human blood, and the ability to influence human minds across a distance. Such powers– described as supernatural–only [lent] an added dimension to the terror that humans felt regarding them. And it was only natural, too, that the Undead should become connected with the practice of magic. From very early times, Shamans and witchdoctors had claimed at least some power and control over the spirits of departed ancestors, and this has continued down into more “civilized” times. Formerly, the invisible spirits and forces that thronged around men's earliest encampments, had spoken “through” the tribal Shamans but now, as entities in their own right, they were subject to magical control and could be physically summoned by a competent sorcerer. However, the relationship between the magician and an Undead creature was often a very tenuous and uncertain one. Some sorcerers might have even become Undead entities once they died, but they might also have been susceptible to the powers of other magicians when they did.
From the Middle Ages and into the Age of Enlightenment, theories of the Undead continued to grow and develop. Their names became more familiar–werewolf, vampire, ghoul–each one certain to strike fear into the hearts of ordinary humans.
Stories concerning the Undead have always been with us. From out of the primal darkness of Mankind's earliest years, come whispers of eerie creatures, not quite alive (or alive in a way which we can understand), yet not quite dead either. These may have been ancient and primitive deities who dwelt deep in the surrounding forests and in remote places, or simply those deceased who refused to remain in their tombs and who wandered about the countryside, physically tormenting and frightening those who were still alive. Mostly they were ill-defined–strange sounds in the night beyond the comforting glow of the fire, or a shape, half-glimpsed in the twilight along the edge of an encampment. They were vague and indistinct, but they were always there with the power to terrify and disturb. They had the power to touch the minds of our early ancestors and to fill them with dread. Such fear formed the basis of the earliest tales although the source and exact nature of such terrors still remained very vague.
And as Mankind became more sophisticated, leaving the gloom of their caves and forming themselves into recognizable communities–towns, cities, whole cultures–so the Undead travelled with them, inhabiting their folklore just as they had in former times. Now they began to take on more definite shapes. They became walking cadavers; the physical embodiment of former deities and things which had existed alongside Man since the Creation. Some still remained vague and illdefined but, as Mankind strove to explain the horror which it felt towards them, such creatures emerged more readily into the light.
In order to confirm their abnormal status, many of the Undead were often accorded attributes, which defied the natural order of things–the power to transform themselves into other shapes, the ability to sustain themselves by drinking human blood, and the ability to influence human minds across a distance. Such powers– described as supernatural–only [lent] an added dimension to the terror that humans felt regarding them. And it was only natural, too, that the Undead should become connected with the practice of magic. From very early times, Shamans and witchdoctors had claimed at least some power and control over the spirits of departed ancestors, and this has continued down into more “civilized” times. Formerly, the invisible spirits and forces that thronged around men's earliest encampments, had spoken “through” the tribal Shamans but now, as entities in their own right, they were subject to magical control and could be physically summoned by a competent sorcerer. However, the relationship between the magician and an Undead creature was often a very tenuous and uncertain one. Some sorcerers might have even become Undead entities once they died, but they might also have been susceptible to the powers of other magicians when they did.
From the Middle Ages and into the Age of Enlightenment, theories of the Undead continued to grow and develop. Their names became more familiar–werewolf, vampire, ghoul–each one certain to strike fear into the hearts of ordinary humans.
All of the following statements, if false, could be seen as being in accordance with the passage, EXCEPT
Solution:
The transition from the Middle Ages to the Age of
Enlightenment did see new theories of the Undead.
Thus, if this statement is false, it would not be
aligned with the information given in the passage.
Q.No: 441
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Stories concerning the Undead have always been with us. From out of the primal darkness of Mankind's earliest years, come whispers of eerie creatures, not quite alive (or alive in a way which we can understand), yet not quite dead either. These may have been ancient and primitive deities who dwelt deep in the surrounding forests and in remote places, or simply those deceased who refused to remain in their tombs and who wandered about the countryside, physically tormenting and frightening those who were still alive. Mostly they were ill-defined–strange sounds in the night beyond the comforting glow of the fire, or a shape, half-glimpsed in the twilight along the edge of an encampment. They were vague and indistinct, but they were always there with the power to terrify and disturb. They had the power to touch the minds of our early ancestors and to fill them with dread. Such fear formed the basis of the earliest tales although the source and exact nature of such terrors still remained very vague.
And as Mankind became more sophisticated, leaving the gloom of their caves and forming themselves into recognizable communities–towns, cities, whole cultures–so the Undead travelled with them, inhabiting their folklore just as they had in former times. Now they began to take on more definite shapes. They became walking cadavers; the physical embodiment of former deities and things which had existed alongside Man since the Creation. Some still remained vague and illdefined but, as Mankind strove to explain the horror which it felt towards them, such creatures emerged more readily into the light.
In order to confirm their abnormal status, many of the Undead were often accorded attributes, which defied the natural order of things–the power to transform themselves into other shapes, the ability to sustain themselves by drinking human blood, and the ability to influence human minds across a distance. Such powers– described as supernatural–only [lent] an added dimension to the terror that humans felt regarding them. And it was only natural, too, that the Undead should become connected with the practice of magic. From very early times, Shamans and witchdoctors had claimed at least some power and control over the spirits of departed ancestors, and this has continued down into more “civilized” times. Formerly, the invisible spirits and forces that thronged around men's earliest encampments, had spoken “through” the tribal Shamans but now, as entities in their own right, they were subject to magical control and could be physically summoned by a competent sorcerer. However, the relationship between the magician and an Undead creature was often a very tenuous and uncertain one. Some sorcerers might have even become Undead entities once they died, but they might also have been susceptible to the powers of other magicians when they did.
From the Middle Ages and into the Age of Enlightenment, theories of the Undead continued to grow and develop. Their names became more familiar–werewolf, vampire, ghoul–each one certain to strike fear into the hearts of ordinary humans.
Stories concerning the Undead have always been with us. From out of the primal darkness of Mankind's earliest years, come whispers of eerie creatures, not quite alive (or alive in a way which we can understand), yet not quite dead either. These may have been ancient and primitive deities who dwelt deep in the surrounding forests and in remote places, or simply those deceased who refused to remain in their tombs and who wandered about the countryside, physically tormenting and frightening those who were still alive. Mostly they were ill-defined–strange sounds in the night beyond the comforting glow of the fire, or a shape, half-glimpsed in the twilight along the edge of an encampment. They were vague and indistinct, but they were always there with the power to terrify and disturb. They had the power to touch the minds of our early ancestors and to fill them with dread. Such fear formed the basis of the earliest tales although the source and exact nature of such terrors still remained very vague.
And as Mankind became more sophisticated, leaving the gloom of their caves and forming themselves into recognizable communities–towns, cities, whole cultures–so the Undead travelled with them, inhabiting their folklore just as they had in former times. Now they began to take on more definite shapes. They became walking cadavers; the physical embodiment of former deities and things which had existed alongside Man since the Creation. Some still remained vague and illdefined but, as Mankind strove to explain the horror which it felt towards them, such creatures emerged more readily into the light.
In order to confirm their abnormal status, many of the Undead were often accorded attributes, which defied the natural order of things–the power to transform themselves into other shapes, the ability to sustain themselves by drinking human blood, and the ability to influence human minds across a distance. Such powers– described as supernatural–only [lent] an added dimension to the terror that humans felt regarding them. And it was only natural, too, that the Undead should become connected with the practice of magic. From very early times, Shamans and witchdoctors had claimed at least some power and control over the spirits of departed ancestors, and this has continued down into more “civilized” times. Formerly, the invisible spirits and forces that thronged around men's earliest encampments, had spoken “through” the tribal Shamans but now, as entities in their own right, they were subject to magical control and could be physically summoned by a competent sorcerer. However, the relationship between the magician and an Undead creature was often a very tenuous and uncertain one. Some sorcerers might have even become Undead entities once they died, but they might also have been susceptible to the powers of other magicians when they did.
From the Middle Ages and into the Age of Enlightenment, theories of the Undead continued to grow and develop. Their names became more familiar–werewolf, vampire, ghoul–each one certain to strike fear into the hearts of ordinary humans.
Which one of the following observations is a valid conclusion to draw from the statement, “From out of the primal darkness of Mankind's earliest years, come whispers of eerie creatures, not quite alive (or alive in a way which we can understand), yet not quite dead either.”?
Solution:
The simple meaning of the statement is - Mankind’s
early years were marked by a belief in the existence
of eerie creatures that were neither quite alive nor
dead. The other options are distortions.
Q.No: 442
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The Chinese have two different concepts of a copy. Fangzhipin . . . are imitations where the difference from the original is obvious. These are small models or copies that can be purchased in a museum shop, for example. The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin . . . They are exact reproductions of the original, which, for the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It has absolutely no negative connotations. The discrepancy with regard to the understanding of what a copy is has often led to misunderstandings and arguments between China and Western museums. The Chinese often send copies abroad instead of originals, in the firm belief that they are not essentially different from the originals. The rejection that then comes from the Western museums is perceived by the Chinese as an insult. . . .
The Far Eastern notion of identity is also very confusing to the Western observer. The Ise Grand Shrine [in Japan] is 1,300 years old for the millions of Japanese people who go there on pilgrimage every year. But in reality this temple complex is completely rebuilt from scratch every 20 years. . . .
The cathedral of Freiburg Minster in southwest Germany is covered in scaffolding almost all year round. The sandstone from which it is built is a very soft, porous material that does not withstand natural erosion by rain and wind. After a while, it crumbles. As a result, the cathedral is continually being examined for damage, and eroded stones are replaced. And in the cathedral's dedicated workshop, copies of the damaged sandstone figures are constantly being produced. Of course, attempts are made to preserve the stones from the Middle Ages for as long as possible. But at some point they, too, are removed and replaced with new stones. Fundamentally, this is the same operation as with the Japanese shrine, except in this case the production of a replica takes place very slowly and over long periods of time. . . . In the field of art as well, the idea of an unassailable original developed historically in the Western world. Back in the 17th century [in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity were treated quite differently from today. They were not restored in a way that was faithful to the original. Instead, there was massive intervention in these works, changing their appearance. . . .
It is probably this intellectual position that explains why Asians have far fewer scruples about cloning than Europeans. The South Korean cloning researcher Hwang Woo-suk, who attracted worldwide attention with his cloning experiments in 2004, is a Buddhist. He found a great deal of support and followers among Buddhists, while Christians called for a ban on human cloning. . . . Hwang legitimised his cloning experiments with his religious affiliation: ‘I am Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. And as you know, the basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, therapeutic cloning restarts the circle of life.’
The Chinese have two different concepts of a copy. Fangzhipin . . . are imitations where the difference from the original is obvious. These are small models or copies that can be purchased in a museum shop, for example. The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin . . . They are exact reproductions of the original, which, for the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It has absolutely no negative connotations. The discrepancy with regard to the understanding of what a copy is has often led to misunderstandings and arguments between China and Western museums. The Chinese often send copies abroad instead of originals, in the firm belief that they are not essentially different from the originals. The rejection that then comes from the Western museums is perceived by the Chinese as an insult. . . .
The Far Eastern notion of identity is also very confusing to the Western observer. The Ise Grand Shrine [in Japan] is 1,300 years old for the millions of Japanese people who go there on pilgrimage every year. But in reality this temple complex is completely rebuilt from scratch every 20 years. . . .
The cathedral of Freiburg Minster in southwest Germany is covered in scaffolding almost all year round. The sandstone from which it is built is a very soft, porous material that does not withstand natural erosion by rain and wind. After a while, it crumbles. As a result, the cathedral is continually being examined for damage, and eroded stones are replaced. And in the cathedral's dedicated workshop, copies of the damaged sandstone figures are constantly being produced. Of course, attempts are made to preserve the stones from the Middle Ages for as long as possible. But at some point they, too, are removed and replaced with new stones. Fundamentally, this is the same operation as with the Japanese shrine, except in this case the production of a replica takes place very slowly and over long periods of time. . . . In the field of art as well, the idea of an unassailable original developed historically in the Western world. Back in the 17th century [in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity were treated quite differently from today. They were not restored in a way that was faithful to the original. Instead, there was massive intervention in these works, changing their appearance. . . .
It is probably this intellectual position that explains why Asians have far fewer scruples about cloning than Europeans. The South Korean cloning researcher Hwang Woo-suk, who attracted worldwide attention with his cloning experiments in 2004, is a Buddhist. He found a great deal of support and followers among Buddhists, while Christians called for a ban on human cloning. . . . Hwang legitimised his cloning experiments with his religious affiliation: ‘I am Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. And as you know, the basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, therapeutic cloning restarts the circle of life.’
Which one of the following scenarios is unlikely to follow from the arguments in the passage?
Solution:
As the passage states: “Back in the 17th century
[in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity
were treated quite differently from today. They were
not restored in a way that was faithful to the
original. Instead, there was massive intervention
in these works, changing their appearance. . .”
The reference to religion comes in the context of
cloning.
Q.No: 443
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
The Chinese have two different concepts of a copy. Fangzhipin . . . are imitations where the difference from the original is obvious. These are small models or copies that can be purchased in a museum shop, for example. The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin . . . They are exact reproductions of the original, which, for the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It has absolutely no negative connotations. The discrepancy with regard to the understanding of what a copy is has often led to misunderstandings and arguments between China and Western museums. The Chinese often send copies abroad instead of originals, in the firm belief that they are not essentially different from the originals. The rejection that then comes from the Western museums is perceived by the Chinese as an insult. . . .
The Far Eastern notion of identity is also very confusing to the Western observer. The Ise Grand Shrine [in Japan] is 1,300 years old for the millions of Japanese people who go there on pilgrimage every year. But in reality this temple complex is completely rebuilt from scratch every 20 years. . . .
The cathedral of Freiburg Minster in southwest Germany is covered in scaffolding almost all year round. The sandstone from which it is built is a very soft, porous material that does not withstand natural erosion by rain and wind. After a while, it crumbles. As a result, the cathedral is continually being examined for damage, and eroded stones are replaced. And in the cathedral's dedicated workshop, copies of the damaged sandstone figures are constantly being produced. Of course, attempts are made to preserve the stones from the Middle Ages for as long as possible. But at some point they, too, are removed and replaced with new stones. Fundamentally, this is the same operation as with the Japanese shrine, except in this case the production of a replica takes place very slowly and over long periods of time. . . . In the field of art as well, the idea of an unassailable original developed historically in the Western world. Back in the 17th century [in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity were treated quite differently from today. They were not restored in a way that was faithful to the original. Instead, there was massive intervention in these works, changing their appearance. . . .
It is probably this intellectual position that explains why Asians have far fewer scruples about cloning than Europeans. The South Korean cloning researcher Hwang Woo-suk, who attracted worldwide attention with his cloning experiments in 2004, is a Buddhist. He found a great deal of support and followers among Buddhists, while Christians called for a ban on human cloning. . . . Hwang legitimised his cloning experiments with his religious affiliation: ‘I am Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. And as you know, the basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, therapeutic cloning restarts the circle of life.’
The Chinese have two different concepts of a copy. Fangzhipin . . . are imitations where the difference from the original is obvious. These are small models or copies that can be purchased in a museum shop, for example. The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin . . . They are exact reproductions of the original, which, for the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It has absolutely no negative connotations. The discrepancy with regard to the understanding of what a copy is has often led to misunderstandings and arguments between China and Western museums. The Chinese often send copies abroad instead of originals, in the firm belief that they are not essentially different from the originals. The rejection that then comes from the Western museums is perceived by the Chinese as an insult. . . .
The Far Eastern notion of identity is also very confusing to the Western observer. The Ise Grand Shrine [in Japan] is 1,300 years old for the millions of Japanese people who go there on pilgrimage every year. But in reality this temple complex is completely rebuilt from scratch every 20 years. . . .
The cathedral of Freiburg Minster in southwest Germany is covered in scaffolding almost all year round. The sandstone from which it is built is a very soft, porous material that does not withstand natural erosion by rain and wind. After a while, it crumbles. As a result, the cathedral is continually being examined for damage, and eroded stones are replaced. And in the cathedral's dedicated workshop, copies of the damaged sandstone figures are constantly being produced. Of course, attempts are made to preserve the stones from the Middle Ages for as long as possible. But at some point they, too, are removed and replaced with new stones. Fundamentally, this is the same operation as with the Japanese shrine, except in this case the production of a replica takes place very slowly and over long periods of time. . . . In the field of art as well, the idea of an unassailable original developed historically in the Western world. Back in the 17th century [in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity were treated quite differently from today. They were not restored in a way that was faithful to the original. Instead, there was massive intervention in these works, changing their appearance. . . .
It is probably this intellectual position that explains why Asians have far fewer scruples about cloning than Europeans. The South Korean cloning researcher Hwang Woo-suk, who attracted worldwide attention with his cloning experiments in 2004, is a Buddhist. He found a great deal of support and followers among Buddhists, while Christians called for a ban on human cloning. . . . Hwang legitimised his cloning experiments with his religious affiliation: ‘I am Buddhist, and I have no philosophical problem with cloning. And as you know, the basis of Buddhism is that life is recycled through reincarnation. In some ways, I think, therapeutic cloning restarts the circle of life.’
Based on the passage, which one of the following copies would a Chinese museum be unlikely to consider as having less value than the original?
Solution:
Refer the following lines from the first paragraph:
“The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin … They
are exact reproductions of the original, which, for
the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It
has absolutely no negative connotations.” The other
options are examples of Fangzhipin and these are
likely to have less value than the original.
Q.No: 444
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
[Octopuses are] misfits in their own extended families . . . They belong to the Mollusca class Cephalopoda. But they don’t look like their cousins at all. Other molluscs include sea snails, sea slugs, bivalves – most are shelled invertebrates with a dorsal foot. Cephalopods are all arms, and can be as tiny as 1 centimetre and as large at 30 feet. Some of them have brains the size of a walnut, which is large for an invertebrate….
It makes sense for these molluscs to have added protection in the form of a higher cognition; they don’t have a shell covering them, and pretty much everything feeds on cephalopods, including humans. But how did cephalopods manage to secure their own invisibility cloak? Cephalopods fire from multiple cylinders to achieve this in varying degrees from species to species. There are four main catalysts – chromatophores, iridophores, papillae and leucophores….
[Chromatophores] are organs on their bodies that contain pigment sacs, which have red, yellow and brown pigment granules. These sacs have a network of radial muscles, meaning muscles arranged in a circle radiating outwards. These are connected to the brain by a nerve. When the cephalopod wants to change colour, the brain carries an electrical impulse through the nerve to the muscles that expand outwards, pulling open the sacs to display the colours on the skin. Why these three colours? Because these are the colours the light reflects at the depths they live in (the rest is absorbed before it reaches those depths)….
Well, what about other colours? Cue the iridophores. Think of a second level of skin that has thin stacks of cells. These can reflect light back at different wavelengths. . . . It’s using the same properties that we’ve seen in hologram stickers, or rainbows on puddles of oil. You move your head and you see a different colour. The sticker isn’t doing anything but reflecting light – it’s your movement that’s changing the appearance of the colour. This property of holograms, oil and other such surfaces is called “iridescence”….
Papillae are sections of the skin that can be deformed to make a texture bumpy. Even humans possess them (goosebumps) but cannot use them in the manner that cephalopods can. For instance, the use of these cells is how an octopus can wrap itself over a rock and appear jagged or how a squid or cuttlefish can imitate the look of a coral reef by growing miniature towers on its skin. It actually matches the texture of the substrate it chooses.
Finally, the leucophores: According to a paper, published in Nature, cuttlefish and octopuses possess an additional type of reflector cell called a leucophore. They are cells that scatter full spectrum light so that they appear white in a similar way that a polar bear’s fur appears white. Leucophores will also reflect any filtered light shown on them . . . If the water appears blue at a certain depth, the octopuses and cuttlefish can appear blue; if the water appears green, they appear green, and so on and so forth.
[Octopuses are] misfits in their own extended families . . . They belong to the Mollusca class Cephalopoda. But they don’t look like their cousins at all. Other molluscs include sea snails, sea slugs, bivalves – most are shelled invertebrates with a dorsal foot. Cephalopods are all arms, and can be as tiny as 1 centimetre and as large at 30 feet. Some of them have brains the size of a walnut, which is large for an invertebrate….
It makes sense for these molluscs to have added protection in the form of a higher cognition; they don’t have a shell covering them, and pretty much everything feeds on cephalopods, including humans. But how did cephalopods manage to secure their own invisibility cloak? Cephalopods fire from multiple cylinders to achieve this in varying degrees from species to species. There are four main catalysts – chromatophores, iridophores, papillae and leucophores….
[Chromatophores] are organs on their bodies that contain pigment sacs, which have red, yellow and brown pigment granules. These sacs have a network of radial muscles, meaning muscles arranged in a circle radiating outwards. These are connected to the brain by a nerve. When the cephalopod wants to change colour, the brain carries an electrical impulse through the nerve to the muscles that expand outwards, pulling open the sacs to display the colours on the skin. Why these three colours? Because these are the colours the light reflects at the depths they live in (the rest is absorbed before it reaches those depths)….
Well, what about other colours? Cue the iridophores. Think of a second level of skin that has thin stacks of cells. These can reflect light back at different wavelengths. . . . It’s using the same properties that we’ve seen in hologram stickers, or rainbows on puddles of oil. You move your head and you see a different colour. The sticker isn’t doing anything but reflecting light – it’s your movement that’s changing the appearance of the colour. This property of holograms, oil and other such surfaces is called “iridescence”….
Papillae are sections of the skin that can be deformed to make a texture bumpy. Even humans possess them (goosebumps) but cannot use them in the manner that cephalopods can. For instance, the use of these cells is how an octopus can wrap itself over a rock and appear jagged or how a squid or cuttlefish can imitate the look of a coral reef by growing miniature towers on its skin. It actually matches the texture of the substrate it chooses.
Finally, the leucophores: According to a paper, published in Nature, cuttlefish and octopuses possess an additional type of reflector cell called a leucophore. They are cells that scatter full spectrum light so that they appear white in a similar way that a polar bear’s fur appears white. Leucophores will also reflect any filtered light shown on them . . . If the water appears blue at a certain depth, the octopuses and cuttlefish can appear blue; if the water appears green, they appear green, and so on and so forth.
All of the following are reasons for octopuses being “misfits” EXCEPT that they:
Solution:
Options 2 and 3 can be inferred from the first
paragraph of the passage. Option 4 can be inferred
from the second paragraph.
Q.No: 445
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
[Octopuses are] misfits in their own extended families . . . They belong to the Mollusca class Cephalopoda. But they don’t look like their cousins at all. Other molluscs include sea snails, sea slugs, bivalves – most are shelled invertebrates with a dorsal foot. Cephalopods are all arms, and can be as tiny as 1 centimetre and as large at 30 feet. Some of them have brains the size of a walnut, which is large for an invertebrate….
It makes sense for these molluscs to have added protection in the form of a higher cognition; they don’t have a shell covering them, and pretty much everything feeds on cephalopods, including humans. But how did cephalopods manage to secure their own invisibility cloak? Cephalopods fire from multiple cylinders to achieve this in varying degrees from species to species. There are four main catalysts – chromatophores, iridophores, papillae and leucophores….
[Chromatophores] are organs on their bodies that contain pigment sacs, which have red, yellow and brown pigment granules. These sacs have a network of radial muscles, meaning muscles arranged in a circle radiating outwards. These are connected to the brain by a nerve. When the cephalopod wants to change colour, the brain carries an electrical impulse through the nerve to the muscles that expand outwards, pulling open the sacs to display the colours on the skin. Why these three colours? Because these are the colours the light reflects at the depths they live in (the rest is absorbed before it reaches those depths)….
Well, what about other colours? Cue the iridophores. Think of a second level of skin that has thin stacks of cells. These can reflect light back at different wavelengths. . . . It’s using the same properties that we’ve seen in hologram stickers, or rainbows on puddles of oil. You move your head and you see a different colour. The sticker isn’t doing anything but reflecting light – it’s your movement that’s changing the appearance of the colour. This property of holograms, oil and other such surfaces is called “iridescence”….
Papillae are sections of the skin that can be deformed to make a texture bumpy. Even humans possess them (goosebumps) but cannot use them in the manner that cephalopods can. For instance, the use of these cells is how an octopus can wrap itself over a rock and appear jagged or how a squid or cuttlefish can imitate the look of a coral reef by growing miniature towers on its skin. It actually matches the texture of the substrate it chooses.
Finally, the leucophores: According to a paper, published in Nature, cuttlefish and octopuses possess an additional type of reflector cell called a leucophore. They are cells that scatter full spectrum light so that they appear white in a similar way that a polar bear’s fur appears white. Leucophores will also reflect any filtered light shown on them . . . If the water appears blue at a certain depth, the octopuses and cuttlefish can appear blue; if the water appears green, they appear green, and so on and so forth.
[Octopuses are] misfits in their own extended families . . . They belong to the Mollusca class Cephalopoda. But they don’t look like their cousins at all. Other molluscs include sea snails, sea slugs, bivalves – most are shelled invertebrates with a dorsal foot. Cephalopods are all arms, and can be as tiny as 1 centimetre and as large at 30 feet. Some of them have brains the size of a walnut, which is large for an invertebrate….
It makes sense for these molluscs to have added protection in the form of a higher cognition; they don’t have a shell covering them, and pretty much everything feeds on cephalopods, including humans. But how did cephalopods manage to secure their own invisibility cloak? Cephalopods fire from multiple cylinders to achieve this in varying degrees from species to species. There are four main catalysts – chromatophores, iridophores, papillae and leucophores….
[Chromatophores] are organs on their bodies that contain pigment sacs, which have red, yellow and brown pigment granules. These sacs have a network of radial muscles, meaning muscles arranged in a circle radiating outwards. These are connected to the brain by a nerve. When the cephalopod wants to change colour, the brain carries an electrical impulse through the nerve to the muscles that expand outwards, pulling open the sacs to display the colours on the skin. Why these three colours? Because these are the colours the light reflects at the depths they live in (the rest is absorbed before it reaches those depths)….
Well, what about other colours? Cue the iridophores. Think of a second level of skin that has thin stacks of cells. These can reflect light back at different wavelengths. . . . It’s using the same properties that we’ve seen in hologram stickers, or rainbows on puddles of oil. You move your head and you see a different colour. The sticker isn’t doing anything but reflecting light – it’s your movement that’s changing the appearance of the colour. This property of holograms, oil and other such surfaces is called “iridescence”….
Papillae are sections of the skin that can be deformed to make a texture bumpy. Even humans possess them (goosebumps) but cannot use them in the manner that cephalopods can. For instance, the use of these cells is how an octopus can wrap itself over a rock and appear jagged or how a squid or cuttlefish can imitate the look of a coral reef by growing miniature towers on its skin. It actually matches the texture of the substrate it chooses.
Finally, the leucophores: According to a paper, published in Nature, cuttlefish and octopuses possess an additional type of reflector cell called a leucophore. They are cells that scatter full spectrum light so that they appear white in a similar way that a polar bear’s fur appears white. Leucophores will also reflect any filtered light shown on them . . . If the water appears blue at a certain depth, the octopuses and cuttlefish can appear blue; if the water appears green, they appear green, and so on and so forth.
Based on the passage, it can be inferred that camouflaging techniques in an octopus are most dissimilar to those in:
Solution:
Cuttlefish, squid and polar bear have been
mentioned in the last twp paragraphs of the
passage. Snails have been termed dissimilar in
the first paragraph of the passage.
Q.No: 446
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
We can infer that the author would approve of a more evolved engineering pedagogy that includes all of the following EXCEPT:
Solution:
Refer to these lines of the passage: ‘Nontechnical
parameters such as access to a technology,
cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed
political and invalid in this way of learning. But those
technical ideals are at their core social and political
choices determined by a dominant culture focused
on economic growth for the most privileged
segments of society. By choosing to downplay
public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering
design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement
from societal concerns amongst engineers that is
antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.’
Options 1, 2 and 3 can be inferred from these lines.
Option 4 contradicts the main idea of the first
paragraph.
Q.No: 447
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
In this passage, the author is making the claim that:
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from the first paragraph of
the passage: ‘When we teach engineering …
and solution process.’ Option 2 does not present
the author’s main point as the passage does not
mentions any shift in the engineering pedagogy.
Option 3 contradicts the arguments of the passage. So does option 4.
Option 3 contradicts the arguments of the passage. So does option 4.
Q.No: 448
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
When we teach engineering problems now, we ask students to come to a single “best” solution defined by technical ideals like low cost, speed to build, and ability to scale. This way of teaching primes students to believe that their decision-making is purely objective, as it is grounded in math and science. This is known as technical-social dualism, the idea that the technical and social dimensions of engineering problems are readily separable and remain distinct throughout the problem-definition and solution process.
Nontechnical parameters such as access to a technology, cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed political and invalid in this way of learning. But those technical ideals are at their core social and political choices determined by a dominant culture focused on economic growth for the most privileged segments of society. By choosing to downplay public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement from societal concerns amongst engineers that is antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.
In my field of medical devices, ignoring social dimensions has real consequences…. Most FDAapproved drugs are incorrectly dosed for people assigned female at birth, leading to unexpected adverse reactions. This is because they have been inadequately represented in clinical trials.
Beyond physical failings, subjective beliefs treated as facts by those in decision-making roles can encode social inequities. For example, spirometers, routinely used devices that measure lung capacity, still have correction factors that automatically assume smaller lung capacity in Black and Asian individuals. These racially based adjustments are derived from research done by eugenicists who thought these racial differences were biologically determined and who considered nonwhite people as inferior. These machines ignore the influence of social and environmental factors on lung capacity.
Many technologies for systemically marginalized people have not been built because they were not deemed important such as better early diagnostics and treatment for diseases like endometriosis, a disease that afflicts 10 percent of people with uteruses. And we hardly question whether devices are built sustainably, which has led to a crisis of medical waste and health care accounting for 10 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions.
Social justice must be made core to the way engineers are trained. Some universities are working on this…. Engineers taught this way will be prepared to think critically about what problems we choose to solve, how we do so responsibly and how we build teams that challenge our ways of thinking.
Individual engineering professors are also working to embed societal needs in their pedagogy. Darshan Karwat at the University of Arizona developed activist engineering to challenge engineers to acknowledge their full moral and social responsibility through practical selfreflection. Khalid Kadir at the University of California, Berkeley, created the popular course Engineering, Environment, and Society that teaches engineers how to engage in place-based knowledge, an understanding of the people, context and history, to design better technical approaches in collaboration with communities. When we design and build with equity and justice in mind, we craft better solutions that respond to the complexities of entrenched systemic problems.
The author gives all of the following reasons for why marginalised people are systematically discriminated against in technology-related interventions EXCEPT:
Solution:
All options except 3 relate to why marginalized
people are systematically discriminated against
in technology-related interventions: racially-based
adjustments are derived from research done by
eugenicists; subjective beliefs treated as facts
encodes social inequities and the supposed
technical ‘ideals’ are determined by a culture
focused on the privileged.
Q.No: 449
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Humans today make music. Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement: that only certain humans make music, that extensive training is involved, that many societies distinguish musical specialists from nonmusicians, that in today’s societies most listen to music rather than making it, and so forth. These qualifications, whatever their local merit, are moot in the face of the overarching truth that making music, considered from a cognitive and psychological vantage, is the province of all those who perceive and experience what is made. We are, almost all of us, musicians — everyone who can entrain (not necessarily dance) to a beat, who can recognize a repeated tune (not necessarily sing it), who can distinguish one instrument or one singing voice from another. I will often use an antique word, recently revived, to name this broader musical experience. Humans are musicking creatures….
The set of capacities that enables musicking is a principal marker of modern humanity. There is nothing polemical in this assertion except a certain insistence, which will figure often in what follows, that musicking be included in our thinking about fundamental human commonalities. Capacities involved in musicking are many and take shape in complicated ways, arising from innate dispositions . . . Most of these capacities overlap with nonmusical ones, though a few may be distinct and dedicated to musical perception and production. In the area of overlap, linguistic capacities seem to be particularly important, and humans are (in principle) language-makers in addition to music-makers — speaking creatures as well as musicking ones.
Humans are symbol-makers too, a feature tightly bound up with language, not so tightly with music. The species Cassirer dubbed Homo symbolicus cannot help but tangle musicking in webs of symbolic thought and expression, habitually making it a component of behavioral complexes that form such expression. But in fundamental features musicking is neither languagelike nor symbol-like, and from these differences come many clues to its ancient emergence.
If musicking is a primary, shared trait of modern humans, then to describe its emergence must be to detail the coalescing of that modernity. This took place, archaeologists are clear, over a very long durée: at least 50,000 years or so, more likely something closer to 200,000, depending in part on what that coalescence is taken to comprise. If we look back 20,000 years, a small portion of this long period, we reach the lives of humans whose musical capacities were probably little different from our own. As we look farther back we reach horizons where this similarity can no longer hold — perhaps 40,000 years ago, perhaps 70,000, perhaps 100,000. But we never cross a line before which all the cognitive capacities recruited in modern musicking abruptly disappear. Unless we embrace the incredible notion that music sprang forth in full-blown glory, its emergence will have to be tracked in gradualist terms across a long period.
This is one general feature of a history of music’s emergence . . . The history was at once sociocultural and biological . . . The capacities recruited in musicking are many, so describing its emergence involves following several or many separate strands.
Humans today make music. Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement: that only certain humans make music, that extensive training is involved, that many societies distinguish musical specialists from nonmusicians, that in today’s societies most listen to music rather than making it, and so forth. These qualifications, whatever their local merit, are moot in the face of the overarching truth that making music, considered from a cognitive and psychological vantage, is the province of all those who perceive and experience what is made. We are, almost all of us, musicians — everyone who can entrain (not necessarily dance) to a beat, who can recognize a repeated tune (not necessarily sing it), who can distinguish one instrument or one singing voice from another. I will often use an antique word, recently revived, to name this broader musical experience. Humans are musicking creatures….
The set of capacities that enables musicking is a principal marker of modern humanity. There is nothing polemical in this assertion except a certain insistence, which will figure often in what follows, that musicking be included in our thinking about fundamental human commonalities. Capacities involved in musicking are many and take shape in complicated ways, arising from innate dispositions . . . Most of these capacities overlap with nonmusical ones, though a few may be distinct and dedicated to musical perception and production. In the area of overlap, linguistic capacities seem to be particularly important, and humans are (in principle) language-makers in addition to music-makers — speaking creatures as well as musicking ones.
Humans are symbol-makers too, a feature tightly bound up with language, not so tightly with music. The species Cassirer dubbed Homo symbolicus cannot help but tangle musicking in webs of symbolic thought and expression, habitually making it a component of behavioral complexes that form such expression. But in fundamental features musicking is neither languagelike nor symbol-like, and from these differences come many clues to its ancient emergence.
If musicking is a primary, shared trait of modern humans, then to describe its emergence must be to detail the coalescing of that modernity. This took place, archaeologists are clear, over a very long durée: at least 50,000 years or so, more likely something closer to 200,000, depending in part on what that coalescence is taken to comprise. If we look back 20,000 years, a small portion of this long period, we reach the lives of humans whose musical capacities were probably little different from our own. As we look farther back we reach horizons where this similarity can no longer hold — perhaps 40,000 years ago, perhaps 70,000, perhaps 100,000. But we never cross a line before which all the cognitive capacities recruited in modern musicking abruptly disappear. Unless we embrace the incredible notion that music sprang forth in full-blown glory, its emergence will have to be tracked in gradualist terms across a long period.
This is one general feature of a history of music’s emergence . . . The history was at once sociocultural and biological . . . The capacities recruited in musicking are many, so describing its emergence involves following several or many separate strands.
“Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail after this bald statement . . .” In the context of the passage, what is the author trying to communicate in this quoted extract?
Solution:
“Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail
after this bald statement . . .” Through these lines
the author wants to state that despite multiple
qualifications that one might think about while
thinking about musicians, humans are necessarily
musicking. Therefore, option 2 is correct.
Q.No: 450
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
We begin with the emergence of the philosophy of the social sciences as an arena of thought and as a set of social institutions. The two characterisations overlap but are not congruent. Academic disciplines are social institutions. . . . My view is that institutions are all those social entities that organise action: they link acting individuals into social structures. There are various kinds of institutions. Hegelians and Marxists emphasise universal institutions such as the family, rituals, governance, economy and the military. These are mostly institutions that just grew. Perhaps in some imaginary beginning of time they spontaneously appeared. In their present incarnations, however, they are very much the product of conscious attempts to mould and plan them. We have family law, established and disestablished churches, constitutions and laws, including those governing the economy and the military. Institutions deriving from statute, like joint-stock companies are formal by contrast with informal ones such as friendships. There are some institutions that come in both informal and formal variants, as well as in mixed ones. Consider the fact that the stock exchange and the black market are both market institutions, one formal one not. Consider further that there are many features of the work of the stock exchange that rely on informal, noncodifiable agreements, not least the language used for communication. To be precise, mixtures are the norm . . . From constitutions at the top to by-laws near the bottom we are always adding to, or tinkering with, earlier institutions, the grown and the designed are intertwined.
It is usual in social thought to treat culture and tradition as different from, although alongside, institutions. The view taken here is different. Culture and tradition are sub-sets of institutions analytically isolated for explanatory or expository purposes. Some social scientists have taken all institutions, even purely local ones, to be entities that satisfy basic human needs – under local conditions . . . Others differed and declared any structure of reciprocal roles and norms an institution. Most of these differences are differences of emphasis rather than disagreements. Let us straddle all these versions and present institutions very generally . . . as structures that serve to coordinate the actions of individuals. . . . Institutions themselves then have no aims or purpose other than those given to them by actors or used by actors to explain them . . .
Language is the formative institution for social life and for science . . . Both formal and informal language is involved, naturally grown or designed. (Language is all of these to varying degrees.) Languages are paradigms of institutions or, from another perspective, nested sets of institutions. Syntax, semantics, lexicon and alphabet/character-set are all institutions within the larger institutional framework of a written language. Natural languages are typical examples of what Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design’[;] reformed natural languages and artificial languages introduce design into their modifications or refinements of natural language. Above all, languages are paradigms of institutional tools that function to coordinate.
We begin with the emergence of the philosophy of the social sciences as an arena of thought and as a set of social institutions. The two characterisations overlap but are not congruent. Academic disciplines are social institutions. . . . My view is that institutions are all those social entities that organise action: they link acting individuals into social structures. There are various kinds of institutions. Hegelians and Marxists emphasise universal institutions such as the family, rituals, governance, economy and the military. These are mostly institutions that just grew. Perhaps in some imaginary beginning of time they spontaneously appeared. In their present incarnations, however, they are very much the product of conscious attempts to mould and plan them. We have family law, established and disestablished churches, constitutions and laws, including those governing the economy and the military. Institutions deriving from statute, like joint-stock companies are formal by contrast with informal ones such as friendships. There are some institutions that come in both informal and formal variants, as well as in mixed ones. Consider the fact that the stock exchange and the black market are both market institutions, one formal one not. Consider further that there are many features of the work of the stock exchange that rely on informal, noncodifiable agreements, not least the language used for communication. To be precise, mixtures are the norm . . . From constitutions at the top to by-laws near the bottom we are always adding to, or tinkering with, earlier institutions, the grown and the designed are intertwined.
It is usual in social thought to treat culture and tradition as different from, although alongside, institutions. The view taken here is different. Culture and tradition are sub-sets of institutions analytically isolated for explanatory or expository purposes. Some social scientists have taken all institutions, even purely local ones, to be entities that satisfy basic human needs – under local conditions . . . Others differed and declared any structure of reciprocal roles and norms an institution. Most of these differences are differences of emphasis rather than disagreements. Let us straddle all these versions and present institutions very generally . . . as structures that serve to coordinate the actions of individuals. . . . Institutions themselves then have no aims or purpose other than those given to them by actors or used by actors to explain them . . .
Language is the formative institution for social life and for science . . . Both formal and informal language is involved, naturally grown or designed. (Language is all of these to varying degrees.) Languages are paradigms of institutions or, from another perspective, nested sets of institutions. Syntax, semantics, lexicon and alphabet/character-set are all institutions within the larger institutional framework of a written language. Natural languages are typical examples of what Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design’[;] reformed natural languages and artificial languages introduce design into their modifications or refinements of natural language. Above all, languages are paradigms of institutional tools that function to coordinate.
Consider the fact that the stock exchange and the black market are both market institutions, one formal one not.” Which one of the following statements best explains this quote, in the context of the passage?
Solution:
Refer to these lines of the passage: ‘here are some
institutions that come in both informal and
formal variants, as well as in mixed ones.
Consider the fact that the stock exchange and
the black market are both market institutions,
one formal one not.’ Clearly, through these lines,
the author wants to imply exactly what option 3
states.
Q.No: 451
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-2
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
We begin with the emergence of the philosophy of the social sciences as an arena of thought and as a set of social institutions. The two characterisations overlap but are not congruent. Academic disciplines are social institutions. . . . My view is that institutions are all those social entities that organise action: they link acting individuals into social structures. There are various kinds of institutions. Hegelians and Marxists emphasise universal institutions such as the family, rituals, governance, economy and the military. These are mostly institutions that just grew. Perhaps in some imaginary beginning of time they spontaneously appeared. In their present incarnations, however, they are very much the product of conscious attempts to mould and plan them. We have family law, established and disestablished churches, constitutions and laws, including those governing the economy and the military. Institutions deriving from statute, like joint-stock companies are formal by contrast with informal ones such as friendships. There are some institutions that come in both informal and formal variants, as well as in mixed ones. Consider the fact that the stock exchange and the black market are both market institutions, one formal one not. Consider further that there are many features of the work of the stock exchange that rely on informal, noncodifiable agreements, not least the language used for communication. To be precise, mixtures are the norm . . . From constitutions at the top to by-laws near the bottom we are always adding to, or tinkering with, earlier institutions, the grown and the designed are intertwined.
It is usual in social thought to treat culture and tradition as different from, although alongside, institutions. The view taken here is different. Culture and tradition are sub-sets of institutions analytically isolated for explanatory or expository purposes. Some social scientists have taken all institutions, even purely local ones, to be entities that satisfy basic human needs – under local conditions . . . Others differed and declared any structure of reciprocal roles and norms an institution. Most of these differences are differences of emphasis rather than disagreements. Let us straddle all these versions and present institutions very generally . . . as structures that serve to coordinate the actions of individuals. . . . Institutions themselves then have no aims or purpose other than those given to them by actors or used by actors to explain them . . .
Language is the formative institution for social life and for science . . . Both formal and informal language is involved, naturally grown or designed. (Language is all of these to varying degrees.) Languages are paradigms of institutions or, from another perspective, nested sets of institutions. Syntax, semantics, lexicon and alphabet/character-set are all institutions within the larger institutional framework of a written language. Natural languages are typical examples of what Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design’[;] reformed natural languages and artificial languages introduce design into their modifications or refinements of natural language. Above all, languages are paradigms of institutional tools that function to coordinate.
We begin with the emergence of the philosophy of the social sciences as an arena of thought and as a set of social institutions. The two characterisations overlap but are not congruent. Academic disciplines are social institutions. . . . My view is that institutions are all those social entities that organise action: they link acting individuals into social structures. There are various kinds of institutions. Hegelians and Marxists emphasise universal institutions such as the family, rituals, governance, economy and the military. These are mostly institutions that just grew. Perhaps in some imaginary beginning of time they spontaneously appeared. In their present incarnations, however, they are very much the product of conscious attempts to mould and plan them. We have family law, established and disestablished churches, constitutions and laws, including those governing the economy and the military. Institutions deriving from statute, like joint-stock companies are formal by contrast with informal ones such as friendships. There are some institutions that come in both informal and formal variants, as well as in mixed ones. Consider the fact that the stock exchange and the black market are both market institutions, one formal one not. Consider further that there are many features of the work of the stock exchange that rely on informal, noncodifiable agreements, not least the language used for communication. To be precise, mixtures are the norm . . . From constitutions at the top to by-laws near the bottom we are always adding to, or tinkering with, earlier institutions, the grown and the designed are intertwined.
It is usual in social thought to treat culture and tradition as different from, although alongside, institutions. The view taken here is different. Culture and tradition are sub-sets of institutions analytically isolated for explanatory or expository purposes. Some social scientists have taken all institutions, even purely local ones, to be entities that satisfy basic human needs – under local conditions . . . Others differed and declared any structure of reciprocal roles and norms an institution. Most of these differences are differences of emphasis rather than disagreements. Let us straddle all these versions and present institutions very generally . . . as structures that serve to coordinate the actions of individuals. . . . Institutions themselves then have no aims or purpose other than those given to them by actors or used by actors to explain them . . .
Language is the formative institution for social life and for science . . . Both formal and informal language is involved, naturally grown or designed. (Language is all of these to varying degrees.) Languages are paradigms of institutions or, from another perspective, nested sets of institutions. Syntax, semantics, lexicon and alphabet/character-set are all institutions within the larger institutional framework of a written language. Natural languages are typical examples of what Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design’[;] reformed natural languages and artificial languages introduce design into their modifications or refinements of natural language. Above all, languages are paradigms of institutional tools that function to coordinate.
All of the following inferences from the passage are false, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Natural languages are typical examples of what
Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but
not the execution of any human design”. In other
words, there is no conscious human intent in this
stage of language development. So, option 2 can
be inferred to be true based on the passage.
Therefore, option 2 is the correct answer.
Q.No: 452
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
A fundamental conclusion by the author is that:
Solution:
Refer to the last sentence of the penultimate
paragraph where the author expresses his views.
Incorrect answers:
Option (4) is a close option but option (1) is a better answer choice. It conveys the fundamental conclusion provided in the passage. Options (2) and (3) are out of scope.
Incorrect answers:
Option (4) is a close option but option (1) is a better answer choice. It conveys the fundamental conclusion provided in the passage. Options (2) and (3) are out of scope.
Q.No: 453
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (9 to 12):The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Interpretations of the Indian past . . . were inevitably influenced by colonial concerns and interests, and also by prevalent European ideas about history, civilization and the Orient. Orientalist scholars studied the languages and the texts with selected Indian scholars, but made little attempt to understand the world-view of those who were teaching them. The readings therefore are something of a disjuncture from the traditional ways of looking at the Indian past. . . .
Orientalism [which we can understand broadly as Western perceptions of the Orient] fuelled the fantasy and the freedom sought by European Romanticism, particularly in its opposition to the more disciplined Neo-Classicism. The cultures of Asia were seen as bringing a new Romantic paradigm. Another Renaissance was anticipated through an acquaintance with the Orient, and this, it was thought, would be different from the earlier Greek Renaissance. It was believed that this Oriental Renaissance would liberate European thought and literature from the increasing focus on discipline and rationality that had followed from the earlier Enlightenment. . . . [The Romantic English poets, Wordsworth and Coleridge,] were apprehensive of the changes introduced by industrialization and turned to nature and to fantasies of the Orient.
However, this enthusiasm gradually changed, to conform with the emphasis later in the nineteenth century on the innate superiority of European civilization. Oriental civilizations were now seen as having once been great but currently in decline. The various phases of Orientalism tended to mould European understanding of the Indian past into a particular pattern. . . . There was an attempt to formulate Indian culture as uniform, such formulations being derived from texts that were given priority. The so-called 'discovery' of India was largely through selected literature in Sanskrit. This interpretation tended to emphasize non-historical aspects of Indian culture, for example the idea of an unchanging continuity of society and religion over 3,000 years; and it was believed that the Indian pattern of life was so concerned with metaphysics and the subtleties of religious belief that little attention was given to the more tangible aspects.
German Romanticism endorsed this image of India, and it became the mystic land for many Europeans, where even the most ordinary actions were imbued with a complex symbolism. This was the genesis of the idea of the spiritual east, and also, incidentally, the refuge of European intellectuals seeking to distance themselves from the changing patterns of their own societies. A dichotomy in values was maintained, Indian values being described as 'spiritual' and European values as 'materialistic', with little attempt to juxtapose these values with the reality of Indian society. This theme has been even more firmly endorsed by a section of Indian opinion during the last hundred years.
It was a consolation to the Indian intelligentsia for its perceived inability to counter the technical superiority of the west, a superiority viewed as having enabled Europe to colonize Asia and other parts of the world. At the height of anti-colonial nationalism it acted as a salve for having been made a colony of Britain.
Interpretations of the Indian past . . . were inevitably influenced by colonial concerns and interests, and also by prevalent European ideas about history, civilization and the Orient. Orientalist scholars studied the languages and the texts with selected Indian scholars, but made little attempt to understand the world-view of those who were teaching them. The readings therefore are something of a disjuncture from the traditional ways of looking at the Indian past. . . .
Orientalism [which we can understand broadly as Western perceptions of the Orient] fuelled the fantasy and the freedom sought by European Romanticism, particularly in its opposition to the more disciplined Neo-Classicism. The cultures of Asia were seen as bringing a new Romantic paradigm. Another Renaissance was anticipated through an acquaintance with the Orient, and this, it was thought, would be different from the earlier Greek Renaissance. It was believed that this Oriental Renaissance would liberate European thought and literature from the increasing focus on discipline and rationality that had followed from the earlier Enlightenment. . . . [The Romantic English poets, Wordsworth and Coleridge,] were apprehensive of the changes introduced by industrialization and turned to nature and to fantasies of the Orient.
However, this enthusiasm gradually changed, to conform with the emphasis later in the nineteenth century on the innate superiority of European civilization. Oriental civilizations were now seen as having once been great but currently in decline. The various phases of Orientalism tended to mould European understanding of the Indian past into a particular pattern. . . . There was an attempt to formulate Indian culture as uniform, such formulations being derived from texts that were given priority. The so-called 'discovery' of India was largely through selected literature in Sanskrit. This interpretation tended to emphasize non-historical aspects of Indian culture, for example the idea of an unchanging continuity of society and religion over 3,000 years; and it was believed that the Indian pattern of life was so concerned with metaphysics and the subtleties of religious belief that little attention was given to the more tangible aspects.
German Romanticism endorsed this image of India, and it became the mystic land for many Europeans, where even the most ordinary actions were imbued with a complex symbolism. This was the genesis of the idea of the spiritual east, and also, incidentally, the refuge of European intellectuals seeking to distance themselves from the changing patterns of their own societies. A dichotomy in values was maintained, Indian values being described as 'spiritual' and European values as 'materialistic', with little attempt to juxtapose these values with the reality of Indian society. This theme has been even more firmly endorsed by a section of Indian opinion during the last hundred years.
It was a consolation to the Indian intelligentsia for its perceived inability to counter the technical superiority of the west, a superiority viewed as having enabled Europe to colonize Asia and other parts of the world. At the height of anti-colonial nationalism it acted as a salve for having been made a colony of Britain.
It can be inferred from the passage that to gain a more accurate view of a nation's history and culture, scholars should do all of the following EXCEPT:
Solution:
Other than option 4, the other options are
mentioned in the passage. Refer to the first 2
paragraphs in particular.
Q.No: 454
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
From the passage, we can infer that the author is apprehensive about the use of sophisticated automation for all of the following reasons EXCEPT that:
Solution:
Other than option 4, the other options are
mentioned in the passage. The entire passage
showcases the author’s views on ‘Applications that
offer lots of prompts and tips’ He is apprehensive
about the use of sophisticated automation.
Q.No: 455
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
It can be inferred that in the Utrecht University experiment, one group of people was “aimlessly clicking around” because:
Solution:
Referring to, “The people using the more advanced
software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click
around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The
supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited
their thinking and learning.” This makes option 4
correct.
Incorrect Options:
Other options are vague and cannot be determined from the passage.
Incorrect Options:
Other options are vague and cannot be determined from the passage.
Q.No: 456
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
None of the following statements is implied by the arguments of the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Refer to the penultimate paragraph where the author
draws a similarity between genetic and bioengineers.
Incorrect answers: The other options are not
implied in the passage.
Q.No: 457
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
The author claims that, “Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words”. Which one of the following statements best expresses the point being made by the author?
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph of the passage where
the author mentions how the apparent veil between
the organic and the manufactured have been
obliterated. The other options cannot be
substantiated in the light of the given quoted
sentence.
Q.No: 458
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
Which one of the following is not a valid inference from the passage?
Solution:
Refer to the second last paragraph of the passage
where the social disorganization of the African
American migrants is discussed. Therefore, option
(2) is correct.
Incorrect answers The other options are not valid inferences from the passage.
Incorrect answers The other options are not valid inferences from the passage.
Q.No: 459
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
Sociologists working in the Chicago School tradition have focused on how rapid or dramatic social change causes increases in crime. Just as Durkheim, Marx, Toennies, and other European sociologists thought that the rapid changes produced by industrialization and urbanization produced crime and disorder, so too did the Chicago School theorists. The location of the University of Chicago provided an excellent opportunity for Park, Burgess, and McKenzie to study the social ecology of the city. Shaw and McKay found . . . that areas of the city characterized by high levels of social disorganization had higher rates of crime and delinquency.
In the 1920s and 1930s Chicago, like many American cities, experienced considerable immigration. Rapid population growth is a disorganizing influence, but growth resulting from in-migration of very different people is particularly disruptive. Chicago's in-migrants were both native-born whites and blacks from rural areas and small towns, and foreign immigrants. The heavy industry of cities like Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburgh drew those seeking opportunities and new lives. Farmers and villagers from America's hinterland, like their European cousins of whom Durkheim wrote, moved in large numbers into cities. At the start of the twentieth century, Americans were predominately a rural population, but by the century's mid-point most lived in urban areas. The social lives of these migrants, as well as those already living in the cities they moved to, were disrupted by the differences between urban and rural life. According to social disorganization theory, until the social ecology of the ''new place'' can adapt, this rapid change is a criminogenic influence. But most rural migrants, and even many of the foreign immigrants to the city, looked like and eventually spoke the same language as the natives of the cities into which they moved. These similarities allowed for more rapid social integration for these migrants than was the case for African Americans and most foreign immigrants.
In these same decades America experienced what has been called ''the great migration'': the massive movement of African Americans out of the rural South and into northern (and some southern) cities. The scale of this migration is one of the most dramatic in human history. These migrants, unlike their white counterparts, were not integrated into the cities they now called home. In fact, most American cities at the end of the twentieth century were characterized by high levels of racial residential segregation . . . Failure to integrate these migrants, coupled with other forces of social disorganization such as crowding, poverty, and illness, caused crime rates to climb in the cities, particularly in the segregated wards and neighborhoods where the migrants were forced to live.
Foreign immigrants during this period did not look as dramatically different from the rest of the population as blacks did, but the migrants from eastern and southern Europe who came to American cities did not speak English, and were frequently Catholic, while the native born were mostly Protestant. The combination of rapid population growth with the diversity of those moving into the cities created what the Chicago School sociologists called social disorganization.
Which one of the following sets of words/phrases best encapsulates the issues discussed in the passage?
Solution:
Option (2) presents the correct sequence of the
words/phrases as given in the passage. Therefore,
option (2) is the appropriate answer.
Q.No: 460
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
Nature has all along yielded her flesh to humans. First, we took nature's materials as food, fibers, and shelter. Then we learned to extract raw materials from her biosphere to create our own new synthetic materials. Now Bios is yielding us her mind—we are taking her logic.
Clockwork logic—the logic of the machines—will only build simple contraptions. Truly complex systems such as a cell, a meadow, an economy, or a brain (natural or artificial) require a rigorous nontechnological logic. We now see that no logic except bio-logic can assemble a thinking device, or even a workable system of any magnitude.
It is an astounding discovery that one can extract the logic of Bios out of biology and have something useful. Although many philosophers in the past have suspected one could abstract the laws of life and apply them elsewhere, it wasn't until the complexity of computers and human-made systems became as complicated as living things, that it was possible to prove this. It's eerie how much of life can be transferred. So far, some of the traits of the living that have successfully been transported to mechanical systems are: self-replication, self-governance, limited self-repair, mild evolution, and partial learning.
We have reason to believe yet more can be synthesized and made into something new. Yet at the same time that the logic of Bios is being imported into machines, the logic of Technos is being imported into life. The root of bioengineering is the desire to control the organic long enough to improve it. Domesticated plants and animals are examples of technos-logic applied to life. The wild aromatic root of the Queen Anne's lace weed has been fine-tuned over generations by selective herb gatherers until it has evolved into a sweet carrot of the garden; the udders of wild bovines have been selectively enlarged in a "unnatural" way to satisfy humans rather than calves. Milk cows and carrots, therefore, are human inventions as much as steam engines and gunpowder are. But milk cows and carrots are more indicative of the kind of inventions humans will make in the future: products that are grown rather than manufactured.
Genetic engineering is precisely what cattle breeders do when they select better strains of Holsteins, only bioengineers employ more precise and powerful control. While carrot and milk cow breeders had to rely on diffuse organic evolution, modern genetic engineers can use directed artificial evolution—purposeful design—which greatly accelerates improvements.
The overlap of the mechanical and the lifelike increases year by year. Part of this bionic convergence is a matter of words. The meanings of "mechanical" and "life" are both stretching until all complicated things can be perceived as machines, and all self-sustaining machines can be perceived as alive. Yet beyond semantics, two concrete trends are happening: (1) Human-made things are behaving more lifelike, and (2) Life is becoming more engineered. The apparent veil between the organic and the manufactured has crumpled to reveal that the two really are, and have always been, of one being.
Which one of the following sets of words/phrases best serves as keywords to the passage?
Solution:
Option (3) conveys the correct sequence of ideas
given in the passage. The other options are incorrect
in the light of the passage.
Q.No: 461
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (9 to 12):The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
Interpretations of the Indian past . . . were inevitably influenced by colonial concerns and interests, and also by prevalent European ideas about history, civilization and the Orient. Orientalist scholars studied the languages and the texts with selected Indian scholars, but made little attempt to understand the world-view of those who were teaching them. The readings therefore are something of a disjuncture from the traditional ways of looking at the Indian past. . . .
Orientalism [which we can understand broadly as Western perceptions of the Orient] fuelled the fantasy and the freedom sought by European Romanticism, particularly in its opposition to the more disciplined Neo-Classicism. The cultures of Asia were seen as bringing a new Romantic paradigm. Another Renaissance was anticipated through an acquaintance with the Orient, and this, it was thought, would be different from the earlier Greek Renaissance. It was believed that this Oriental Renaissance would liberate European thought and literature from the increasing focus on discipline and rationality that had followed from the earlier Enlightenment. . . . [The Romantic English poets, Wordsworth and Coleridge,] were apprehensive of the changes introduced by industrialization and turned to nature and to fantasies of the Orient.
However, this enthusiasm gradually changed, to conform with the emphasis later in the nineteenth century on the innate superiority of European civilization. Oriental civilizations were now seen as having once been great but currently in decline. The various phases of Orientalism tended to mould European understanding of the Indian past into a particular pattern. . . . There was an attempt to formulate Indian culture as uniform, such formulations being derived from texts that were given priority. The so-called 'discovery' of India was largely through selected literature in Sanskrit. This interpretation tended to emphasize non-historical aspects of Indian culture, for example the idea of an unchanging continuity of society and religion over 3,000 years; and it was believed that the Indian pattern of life was so concerned with metaphysics and the subtleties of religious belief that little attention was given to the more tangible aspects.
German Romanticism endorsed this image of India, and it became the mystic land for many Europeans, where even the most ordinary actions were imbued with a complex symbolism. This was the genesis of the idea of the spiritual east, and also, incidentally, the refuge of European intellectuals seeking to distance themselves from the changing patterns of their own societies. A dichotomy in values was maintained, Indian values being described as 'spiritual' and European values as 'materialistic', with little attempt to juxtapose these values with the reality of Indian society. This theme has been even more firmly endorsed by a section of Indian opinion during the last hundred years.
It was a consolation to the Indian intelligentsia for its perceived inability to counter the technical superiority of the west, a superiority viewed as having enabled Europe to colonize Asia and other parts of the world. At the height of anti-colonial nationalism it acted as a salve for having been made a colony of Britain.
Interpretations of the Indian past . . . were inevitably influenced by colonial concerns and interests, and also by prevalent European ideas about history, civilization and the Orient. Orientalist scholars studied the languages and the texts with selected Indian scholars, but made little attempt to understand the world-view of those who were teaching them. The readings therefore are something of a disjuncture from the traditional ways of looking at the Indian past. . . .
Orientalism [which we can understand broadly as Western perceptions of the Orient] fuelled the fantasy and the freedom sought by European Romanticism, particularly in its opposition to the more disciplined Neo-Classicism. The cultures of Asia were seen as bringing a new Romantic paradigm. Another Renaissance was anticipated through an acquaintance with the Orient, and this, it was thought, would be different from the earlier Greek Renaissance. It was believed that this Oriental Renaissance would liberate European thought and literature from the increasing focus on discipline and rationality that had followed from the earlier Enlightenment. . . . [The Romantic English poets, Wordsworth and Coleridge,] were apprehensive of the changes introduced by industrialization and turned to nature and to fantasies of the Orient.
However, this enthusiasm gradually changed, to conform with the emphasis later in the nineteenth century on the innate superiority of European civilization. Oriental civilizations were now seen as having once been great but currently in decline. The various phases of Orientalism tended to mould European understanding of the Indian past into a particular pattern. . . . There was an attempt to formulate Indian culture as uniform, such formulations being derived from texts that were given priority. The so-called 'discovery' of India was largely through selected literature in Sanskrit. This interpretation tended to emphasize non-historical aspects of Indian culture, for example the idea of an unchanging continuity of society and religion over 3,000 years; and it was believed that the Indian pattern of life was so concerned with metaphysics and the subtleties of religious belief that little attention was given to the more tangible aspects.
German Romanticism endorsed this image of India, and it became the mystic land for many Europeans, where even the most ordinary actions were imbued with a complex symbolism. This was the genesis of the idea of the spiritual east, and also, incidentally, the refuge of European intellectuals seeking to distance themselves from the changing patterns of their own societies. A dichotomy in values was maintained, Indian values being described as 'spiritual' and European values as 'materialistic', with little attempt to juxtapose these values with the reality of Indian society. This theme has been even more firmly endorsed by a section of Indian opinion during the last hundred years.
It was a consolation to the Indian intelligentsia for its perceived inability to counter the technical superiority of the west, a superiority viewed as having enabled Europe to colonize Asia and other parts of the world. At the height of anti-colonial nationalism it acted as a salve for having been made a colony of Britain.
It can be inferred from the passage that the author is not likely to support the view that:
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred in the light of the last
paragraph of the passage.
Incorrect answers: The other options cannot be inferred from the given passage and therefore, can be ruled out.
Incorrect answers: The other options cannot be inferred from the given passage and therefore, can be ruled out.
Q.No: 462
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2022 Slot-3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by a set of questions. Choose the best
answer to each question.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
As software improves, the people using it become less likely to sharpen their own know-how. Applications that offer lots of prompts and tips are often to blame; simpler, less solicitous programs push people harder to think, act and learn.
Ten years ago, information scientists at Utrecht University in the Netherlands had a group of people carry out complicated analytical and planning tasks using either rudimentary software that provided no assistance or sophisticated software that offered a great deal of aid. The researchers found that the people using the simple software developed better strategies, made fewer mistakes and developed a deeper aptitude for the work. The people using the more advanced software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited their thinking and learning.
[According to] philosopher Hubert Dreyfus . . . . our skills get sharper only through practice, when we use them regularly to overcome different sorts of difficult challenges. The goal of modern software, by contrast, is to ease our way through such challenges. Arduous, painstaking work is exactly what programmers are most eager to automate—after all, that is where the immediate efficiency gains tend to lie. In other words, a fundamental tension ripples between the interests of the people doing the automation and the interests of the people doing the work.
Nevertheless, automation’s scope continues to widen. With the rise of electronic health records, physicians increasingly rely on software templates to guide them through patient exams. The programs incorporate valuable checklists and alerts, but they also make medicine more routinized and formulaic—and distance doctors from their patients. . . . Harvard Medical School professor Beth Lown, in a 2012 journal article . . . warned that when doctors become “screen-driven,” following a computer’s prompts rather than “the patient’s narrative thread,” their thinking can become constricted. In the worst cases, they may miss important diagnostic signals. . . .
In a recent paper published in the journal Diagnosis, three medical researchers . . . examined the misdiagnosis of Thomas Eric Duncan, the first person to die of Ebola in the U.S., at Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital Dallas. They argue that the digital templates used by the hospital's clinicians to record patient information probably helped to induce a kind of tunnel vision. “These highly constrained tools,” the researchers write, “are optimized for data capture but at the expense of sacrificing their utility for appropriate triage and diagnosis, leading users to miss the forest for the trees.” Medical software, they write, is no “replacement for basic history-taking, examination skills, and critical thinking.” . . .
There is an alternative. In “human-centered automation,” the talents of people take precedence. . . . In this model, software plays an essential but secondary role. It takes over routine functions that a human operator has already mastered, issues alerts when unexpected situations arise, provides fresh information that expands the operator’s perspective and counters the biases that often distort human thinking. The technology becomes the expert’s partner, not the expert’s replacement.
In the Ebola misdiagnosis case, we can infer that doctors probably missed the forest for the trees because:
Solution:
Due to the introduction of digital templates for
medicinal purposes, doctors sometimes tend to
follow the results blindly, like in the case of the
Ebola patient. Hence option 4 provides a broad
spectrum.
Incorrect Options:
The use of the term ‘forced’ makes option 1 incorrect.
Option 2 and 3 cannot be verified from the passage. They look like assumptions.
Incorrect Options:
The use of the term ‘forced’ makes option 1 incorrect.
Option 2 and 3 cannot be verified from the passage. They look like assumptions.
Q.No: 463
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. . . .
As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy.
Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1.1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe—hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations.
As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.
RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. . . .
As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy.
Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1.1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe—hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations.
As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.
The author presents a possible economic solution to an existing issue facing Lozère that takes into account the divergent and competing interests of:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
The passage discusses the conflict between the interests of farmers (concerned about livestock losses) and environmentalists (who celebrate the return of wolves as a sign of ecological health). The author suggests that tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept, could serve as an economic solution benefiting both parties. This aligns with option (3) farmers and environmentalists.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmentalists and politicians: The passage does not specifically discuss a solution involving both these groups.
2. Tourists and environmentalists: While tourists enjoy visiting wolf parks, the passage does not suggest a solution that specifically reconciles the interests of tourists with environmentalists.
4. Politicians and farmers: There is no mention of a solution involving both these groups in the passage.
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
The passage discusses the conflict between the interests of farmers (concerned about livestock losses) and environmentalists (who celebrate the return of wolves as a sign of ecological health). The author suggests that tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept, could serve as an economic solution benefiting both parties. This aligns with option (3) farmers and environmentalists.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmentalists and politicians: The passage does not specifically discuss a solution involving both these groups.
2. Tourists and environmentalists: While tourists enjoy visiting wolf parks, the passage does not suggest a solution that specifically reconciles the interests of tourists with environmentalists.
4. Politicians and farmers: There is no mention of a solution involving both these groups in the passage.
Q.No: 464
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
The author mentions Tanzania’s Hadza community to illustrate:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
That forager communities’ lifestyles derived not from ignorance about alternatives, but from their own choice.
The passage uses the example of the Hadza of Tanzania to highlight a key point of Sahlins’s argument: that forager societies, like the Hadza, are aware of alternative ways of living, such as agriculture, but consciously choose to maintain their foraging lifestyle. This illustrates Sahlins’s view that forager societies are not just remnants of a past way of life but are actively choosing their cultural values and lifestyle.
Incorrect Answers:
1. How pre-agrarian societies did not hamper the emergence of more advanced agrarian practices in contiguous communities: The passage does not discuss the impact of pre-agrarian societies on the emergence of agrarian practices.
2. How two vastly different ways of living and working were able to coexist in proximity for centuries: The passage doesn’t emphasize the coexistence aspect as much as it does the aspect of choice and rejection of alternatives.
3. That hunter-gatherer communities’ subsistence level techniques equipped them to survive well into contemporary times: The passage focuses more on the aspect of conscious choice rather than the effectiveness of their subsistence techniques.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
That forager communities’ lifestyles derived not from ignorance about alternatives, but from their own choice.
The passage uses the example of the Hadza of Tanzania to highlight a key point of Sahlins’s argument: that forager societies, like the Hadza, are aware of alternative ways of living, such as agriculture, but consciously choose to maintain their foraging lifestyle. This illustrates Sahlins’s view that forager societies are not just remnants of a past way of life but are actively choosing their cultural values and lifestyle.
Incorrect Answers:
1. How pre-agrarian societies did not hamper the emergence of more advanced agrarian practices in contiguous communities: The passage does not discuss the impact of pre-agrarian societies on the emergence of agrarian practices.
2. How two vastly different ways of living and working were able to coexist in proximity for centuries: The passage doesn’t emphasize the coexistence aspect as much as it does the aspect of choice and rejection of alternatives.
3. That hunter-gatherer communities’ subsistence level techniques equipped them to survive well into contemporary times: The passage focuses more on the aspect of conscious choice rather than the effectiveness of their subsistence techniques.
Q.No: 465
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually [concerned with] national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward-looking.
My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad [who have] centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. . . . Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking – full of movement, border-crossing and south-south interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anticapitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . .
The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book. . . .
For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those [commonly found ones] are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in [my] book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. . . . It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world.
This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. . . . African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.
For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually [concerned with] national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward-looking.
My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad [who have] centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. . . . Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking – full of movement, border-crossing and south-south interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anticapitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . .
The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book. . . .
For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those [commonly found ones] are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in [my] book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. . . . It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world.
This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. . . . African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.
All of the following statements, if true, would weaken the passage’s claim about the relationship between mainstream English-language fiction and Indian Ocean novels EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Most mainstream English-language novels have historically privileged the Christian, white, male experience of travel and adventure.
This statement is consistent with the passage’s argument that mainstream English-language fiction often centers experiences in Europe or the US, with a background of Christianity and whiteness. The other statements, if true, would weaken the passage’s claim by either suggesting a different portrayal of Africa in Indian Ocean novels or by contradicting the claim about the typical settings and themes of mainstream English-language novels.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by a postcolonial nostalgia for an idyllic past: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels are not presenting a complex and realistic view of Africa, but rather a romanticized one.
3. Very few mainstream English-language novels have historically been set in American and European metropolitan centres: If true, this would contradict the passage’s claim that mainstream English-language fiction mostly centers experiences in Europe or the US.
4. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by an Orientalist imagination of its cultural crudeness: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels do not offer a rich and nuanced portrayal of Africa, but rather one that is simplistic and stereotypical.
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Most mainstream English-language novels have historically privileged the Christian, white, male experience of travel and adventure.
This statement is consistent with the passage’s argument that mainstream English-language fiction often centers experiences in Europe or the US, with a background of Christianity and whiteness. The other statements, if true, would weaken the passage’s claim by either suggesting a different portrayal of Africa in Indian Ocean novels or by contradicting the claim about the typical settings and themes of mainstream English-language novels.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by a postcolonial nostalgia for an idyllic past: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels are not presenting a complex and realistic view of Africa, but rather a romanticized one.
3. Very few mainstream English-language novels have historically been set in American and European metropolitan centres: If true, this would contradict the passage’s claim that mainstream English-language fiction mostly centers experiences in Europe or the US.
4. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by an Orientalist imagination of its cultural crudeness: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels do not offer a rich and nuanced portrayal of Africa, but rather one that is simplistic and stereotypical.
Q.No: 466
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
The examples of the Inuit and Aboriginal Australians are offered in the passage to show:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
How physical circumstances can dictate human behaviour and cultures.
The passage uses the examples of the Inuit and Aboriginal Australians to illustrate how geographic factors significantly influence cultural practices and societal developments. The Inuit developed warm fur clothes due to the cold Arctic climate, while Aboriginal Australians did not develop agriculture due to the lack of domesticable native species. These examples underscore the role of physical, geographic circumstances in shaping human behavior and cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. That despite geographical isolation, traditional societies were self-sufficient and adaptive: While the passage does illustrate the adaptation of these societies to their environments, it primarily focuses on the geographic determinants of their lifestyle choices, not necessarily on their selfsufficiency or adaptiveness.
3. How environmental factors lead to comparatively divergent paths in livelihoods and development: This is a valid point made in the passage, showing how geographic factors led to different developments like the absence of agriculture in the Arctic and in Australia.
4. Human resourcefulness across cultures in adapting to their surroundings: While this could be a secondary theme, the main emphasis of the examples is on how geography dictated certain cultural and societal developments, rather than highlighting the resourcefulness of these cultures.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
How physical circumstances can dictate human behaviour and cultures.
The passage uses the examples of the Inuit and Aboriginal Australians to illustrate how geographic factors significantly influence cultural practices and societal developments. The Inuit developed warm fur clothes due to the cold Arctic climate, while Aboriginal Australians did not develop agriculture due to the lack of domesticable native species. These examples underscore the role of physical, geographic circumstances in shaping human behavior and cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. That despite geographical isolation, traditional societies were self-sufficient and adaptive: While the passage does illustrate the adaptation of these societies to their environments, it primarily focuses on the geographic determinants of their lifestyle choices, not necessarily on their selfsufficiency or adaptiveness.
3. How environmental factors lead to comparatively divergent paths in livelihoods and development: This is a valid point made in the passage, showing how geographic factors led to different developments like the absence of agriculture in the Arctic and in Australia.
4. Human resourcefulness across cultures in adapting to their surroundings: While this could be a secondary theme, the main emphasis of the examples is on how geography dictated certain cultural and societal developments, rather than highlighting the resourcefulness of these cultures.
Q.No: 467
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. . . .
As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy.
Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1.1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe—hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations.
As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.
RESIDENTS of Lozère, a hilly department in southern France, recite complaints familiar to many rural corners of Europe. In remote hamlets and villages, with names such as Le Bacon and Le Bacon Vieux, mayors grumble about a lack of local schools, jobs, or phone and internet connections. Farmers of grazing animals add another concern: the return of wolves. Eradicated from France last century, the predators are gradually creeping back to more forests and hillsides. “The wolf must be taken in hand,” said an aspiring parliamentarian, Francis Palombi, when pressed by voters in an election campaign early this summer. Tourists enjoy visiting a wolf park in Lozère, but farmers fret over their livestock and their livelihoods. . . .
As early as the ninth century, the royal office of the Luparii—wolf-catchers—was created in France to tackle the predators. Those official hunters (and others) completed their job in the 1930s, when the last wolf disappeared from the mainland. Active hunting and improved technology such as rifles in the 19th century, plus the use of poison such as strychnine later on, caused the population collapse. But in the early 1990s the animals reappeared. They crossed the Alps from Italy, upsetting sheep farmers on the French side of the border. Wolves have since spread to areas such as Lozère, delighting environmentalists, who see the predators’ presence as a sign of wider ecological health. Farmers, who say the wolves cause the deaths of thousands of sheep and other grazing animals, are less cheerful. They grumble that green activists and politically correct urban types have allowed the return of an old enemy.
Various factors explain the changes of the past few decades. Rural depopulation is part of the story. In Lozère, for example, farming and a once-flourishing mining industry supported a population of over 140,000 residents in the mid-19th century. Today the department has fewer than 80,000 people, many in its towns. As humans withdraw, forests are expanding. In France, between 1990 and 2015, forest cover increased by an average of 102,000 hectares each year, as more fields were given over to trees. Now, nearly one-third of mainland France is covered by woodland of some sort. The decline of hunting as a sport also means more forests fall quiet. In the mid-to-late 20th century over 2m hunters regularly spent winter weekends tramping in woodland, seeking boars, birds and other prey. Today the Fédération Nationale des Chasseurs, the national body, claims 1.1m people hold hunting licences, though the number of active hunters is probably lower. The mostly protected status of the wolf in Europe—hunting them is now forbidden, other than when occasional culls are sanctioned by the state—plus the efforts of NGOs to track and count the animals, also contribute to the recovery of wolf populations.
As the lupine population of Europe spreads westwards, with occasional reports of wolves seen closer to urban areas, expect to hear of more clashes between farmers and those who celebrate the predators’ return. Farmers’ losses are real, but are not the only economic story. Tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept and the animals’ spread is discussed, also generate income and jobs in rural areas.
Which one of the following statements, if true, would weaken the author’s claims?
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise: To determine which statement would weaken the author's claims, we first need to understand the main points presented in the passage. The passage focuses on the return of wolves to Lozère, a rural area in southern France, and the resulting conflict between the interests of farmers, who are concerned about their livestock, and environmentalists, who view the return of wolves as a positive sign of ecological health. Based on the above analysis, option (2), "Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise," would be the most likely to weaken the author's claims, as it introduces a new concern (safety of tourists) that isn't addressed in the passage. However, it's important to note that even this point doesn't directly counter the main argument but rather adds a different perspective to the issue. This could potentially weaken the claim by adding a new dimension to the wolf-related concerns. If wolf attacks on tourists are increasing, it contradicts the notion that wolves are only a threat to livestock and not to humans. This could shift the narrative and add weight to the concerns of those opposed to the wolves' return.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The old mining sites of Lozère are now being used as grazing pastures for sheep: This statement doesn't directly weaken the author's claims. It provides information about land use in Lozère but doesn't address the core issue of the conflict between the return of wolves and the interests of different groups. If anything, it might indicate more potential targets (sheep) for wolves, thereby supporting the farmers' concerns rather than weakening the author's overall narrative.
3. Unemployment concerns the residents of Lozère: While unemployment is a significant issue, this statement does not directly relate to or weaken the author's claims about the conflict arising from the return of wolves. The issue of unemployment is separate from the environmental versus agricultural concerns central to the passage.
4. Having migrated out in the last century, wolves are now returning to Lozère: This statement actually reinforces the author's primary claim rather than weakening it. The fact that wolves are returning to Lozère is a key point in the passage and is the basis of the conflict described.
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise: To determine which statement would weaken the author's claims, we first need to understand the main points presented in the passage. The passage focuses on the return of wolves to Lozère, a rural area in southern France, and the resulting conflict between the interests of farmers, who are concerned about their livestock, and environmentalists, who view the return of wolves as a positive sign of ecological health. Based on the above analysis, option (2), "Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise," would be the most likely to weaken the author's claims, as it introduces a new concern (safety of tourists) that isn't addressed in the passage. However, it's important to note that even this point doesn't directly counter the main argument but rather adds a different perspective to the issue. This could potentially weaken the claim by adding a new dimension to the wolf-related concerns. If wolf attacks on tourists are increasing, it contradicts the notion that wolves are only a threat to livestock and not to humans. This could shift the narrative and add weight to the concerns of those opposed to the wolves' return.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The old mining sites of Lozère are now being used as grazing pastures for sheep: This statement doesn't directly weaken the author's claims. It provides information about land use in Lozère but doesn't address the core issue of the conflict between the return of wolves and the interests of different groups. If anything, it might indicate more potential targets (sheep) for wolves, thereby supporting the farmers' concerns rather than weakening the author's overall narrative.
3. Unemployment concerns the residents of Lozère: While unemployment is a significant issue, this statement does not directly relate to or weaken the author's claims about the conflict arising from the return of wolves. The issue of unemployment is separate from the environmental versus agricultural concerns central to the passage.
4. Having migrated out in the last century, wolves are now returning to Lozère: This statement actually reinforces the author's primary claim rather than weakening it. The fact that wolves are returning to Lozère is a key point in the passage and is the basis of the conflict described.
Q.No: 468
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
The author of the passage criticises Sahlins’s essay for its:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Cursory treatment of the effects of racism and colonialism on societies.
The passage acknowledges that while Sahlins’s essay does recognize the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it doesn’t thematize or delve deeply into these issues as much as might be expected today. The criticism here is that these significant factors in the history and current situation of forager societies are not given the extensive consideration they warrant.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Failure to supplement its thesis with robust empirical data: The author states that the empirical validity of the data is not the main point, suggesting that the criticism is not about the lack of robust data.
2. Critique of anthropologists who disparage the choices of foragers in today’s society: The passage does not present this as a criticism of Sahlins’s essay.
3. Outdated values regarding present-day foragers versus ancient foraging communities: The passage criticizes Sahlins for potentially using present-day foragers as proxies for the Paleolithic, not for having outdated values regarding them.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Cursory treatment of the effects of racism and colonialism on societies.
The passage acknowledges that while Sahlins’s essay does recognize the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it doesn’t thematize or delve deeply into these issues as much as might be expected today. The criticism here is that these significant factors in the history and current situation of forager societies are not given the extensive consideration they warrant.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Failure to supplement its thesis with robust empirical data: The author states that the empirical validity of the data is not the main point, suggesting that the criticism is not about the lack of robust data.
2. Critique of anthropologists who disparage the choices of foragers in today’s society: The passage does not present this as a criticism of Sahlins’s essay.
3. Outdated values regarding present-day foragers versus ancient foraging communities: The passage criticizes Sahlins for potentially using present-day foragers as proxies for the Paleolithic, not for having outdated values regarding them.
Q.No: 469
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
All of the following can be inferred from the passage EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
While most human phenomena result from culture and individual choice, some have bio-geographic origins:
The passage makes a case for the significance of both geographic and non-geographic factors in influencing human phenomena, which supports this inference.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Individual dictat and contingency were not the causal factors for the use of fur clothing in some very cold climates: The passage specifically argues that the development of warm fur clothes by the Inuit was not due to individual decisions but was a straightforward geographic necessity, making this a correct inference.
2. Several academic studies of human phenomena in the past involved racist interpretations: The passage acknowledges that many older explanations in various fields, including geography, were racist, which makes this a valid inference.
4. Agricultural practices changed drastically in the Australian continent after it was colonised:
While the passage discusses that Aboriginal Australia remained a continent of hunter/ gatherers with no indigenous farming or herding due to biogeographic reasons, it does not provide specific information about how agricultural practices changed after colonization. It only mentions that non-native crops and animals were brought to Australia by colonists, but does not detail a drastic change in agricultural practices.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
While most human phenomena result from culture and individual choice, some have bio-geographic origins:
The passage makes a case for the significance of both geographic and non-geographic factors in influencing human phenomena, which supports this inference.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Individual dictat and contingency were not the causal factors for the use of fur clothing in some very cold climates: The passage specifically argues that the development of warm fur clothes by the Inuit was not due to individual decisions but was a straightforward geographic necessity, making this a correct inference.
2. Several academic studies of human phenomena in the past involved racist interpretations: The passage acknowledges that many older explanations in various fields, including geography, were racist, which makes this a valid inference.
4. Agricultural practices changed drastically in the Australian continent after it was colonised:
While the passage discusses that Aboriginal Australia remained a continent of hunter/ gatherers with no indigenous farming or herding due to biogeographic reasons, it does not provide specific information about how agricultural practices changed after colonization. It only mentions that non-native crops and animals were brought to Australia by colonists, but does not detail a drastic change in agricultural practices.
Q.No: 470
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
All of the following are advanced by the author as reasons why non-geographers disregard geographic influences on human phenomena EXCEPT their:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Dismissal of explanations that involve geographical causes for human behaviour.
The passage specifically criticizes nongeographers for their reflex rejection of geographic explanations (i.e., denouncing them as “geographic determinism”). However, it does not mention that they dismiss all explanations involving geographical causes. The other reasons cited (disciplinary training lacking in geography, lingering impressions of past offensive analyses, and a focus on humancentric explanations) are mentioned as contributing to the disregard of geographic influences.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Disciplinary training which typically does not include technical knowledge of geography: The passage mentions that most historians and economists don’t acquire detailed geographical knowledge as part of their professional training.
2. Lingering impressions of past geographic analyses that were politically offensive: The passage notes that the racist nature of some early geographic explanations has tainted the field in the eyes of many scholars.
3. Belief in the central role of humans, unrelated to physical surroundings, in influencing phenomena: The author points out that historians often emphasize the role of individual decisions and chance, which aligns with a belief in the central role of humans over geographic factors.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Dismissal of explanations that involve geographical causes for human behaviour.
The passage specifically criticizes nongeographers for their reflex rejection of geographic explanations (i.e., denouncing them as “geographic determinism”). However, it does not mention that they dismiss all explanations involving geographical causes. The other reasons cited (disciplinary training lacking in geography, lingering impressions of past offensive analyses, and a focus on humancentric explanations) are mentioned as contributing to the disregard of geographic influences.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Disciplinary training which typically does not include technical knowledge of geography: The passage mentions that most historians and economists don’t acquire detailed geographical knowledge as part of their professional training.
2. Lingering impressions of past geographic analyses that were politically offensive: The passage notes that the racist nature of some early geographic explanations has tainted the field in the eyes of many scholars.
3. Belief in the central role of humans, unrelated to physical surroundings, in influencing phenomena: The author points out that historians often emphasize the role of individual decisions and chance, which aligns with a belief in the central role of humans over geographic factors.
Q.No: 471
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
The author of the passage mentions Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” to:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Show how Sahlins's views complemented Galbraith's criticism of the consumerism and inequality of contemporary society. The passage notes that Sahlins’s essay, “The Original Affluent Society,” had a thematic connection to Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society.” Both works offer critical perspectives on contemporary society’s focus on material wealth and consumerism. Sahlins’s argument about foraging societies pursuing affluence not through material accumulation but through wanting less is seen as complementing Galbraith’s skepticism about postwar prosperity and inequality in America.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Document the influence of Galbraith’s cynical views on modern consumerism on Sahlins’s analysis of pre-historic societies: The passage doesn’t imply that Galbraith directly influenced Sahlins’s work; rather, it suggests a thematic connection or a nod to Galbraith’s work.
3. Show how Galbraith’s theories refute Sahlins’s thesis on the contentment of pre-hunter-gatherer communities: Galbraith’s work is not presented as a refutation of Sahlins’s thesis; instead, both seem to critique certain aspects of modern society.
4. Contrast the materialist nature of contemporary growth paths with the pacifist content ways of living among the foragers: While there is a contrast drawn, the passage does not specifically describe Galbraith’s work as focusing on “pacifist content ways of living.”
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Show how Sahlins's views complemented Galbraith's criticism of the consumerism and inequality of contemporary society. The passage notes that Sahlins’s essay, “The Original Affluent Society,” had a thematic connection to Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society.” Both works offer critical perspectives on contemporary society’s focus on material wealth and consumerism. Sahlins’s argument about foraging societies pursuing affluence not through material accumulation but through wanting less is seen as complementing Galbraith’s skepticism about postwar prosperity and inequality in America.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Document the influence of Galbraith’s cynical views on modern consumerism on Sahlins’s analysis of pre-historic societies: The passage doesn’t imply that Galbraith directly influenced Sahlins’s work; rather, it suggests a thematic connection or a nod to Galbraith’s work.
3. Show how Galbraith’s theories refute Sahlins’s thesis on the contentment of pre-hunter-gatherer communities: Galbraith’s work is not presented as a refutation of Sahlins’s thesis; instead, both seem to critique certain aspects of modern society.
4. Contrast the materialist nature of contemporary growth paths with the pacifist content ways of living among the foragers: While there is a contrast drawn, the passage does not specifically describe Galbraith’s work as focusing on “pacifist content ways of living.”
Q.No: 472
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
[Fifty] years after its publication in English [in 1972], and just a year since [Marshall] Sahlins himself died— we may ask: why did [his essay] “Original Affluent Society” have such an impact, and how has it fared since? . . . Sahlins’s principal argument was simple but counterintuitive: before being driven into marginal environments by colonial powers, hunter-gatherers, or foragers, were not engaged in a desperate struggle for meager survival. Quite the contrary, they satisfied their needs with far less work than people in agricultural and industrial societies, leaving them more time to use as they wished. Hunters, he quipped, keep bankers’ hours. Refusing to maximize, many were “more concerned with games of chance than with chances of game.” . . . The so-called Neolithic Revolution, rather than improving life, imposed a harsher work regime and set in motion the long history of growing inequality . . .
Moreover, foragers had other options. The contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, who had long been surrounded by farmers, knew they had alternatives and rejected them. To Sahlins, this showed that foragers are not simply examples of human diversity or victimhood but something more profound: they demonstrated that societies make real choices. Culture, a way of living oriented around a distinctive set of values, manifests a fundamental principle of collective self-determination. . . .
But the point [of the essay] is not so much the empirical validity of the data—the real interest for most readers, after all, is not in foragers either today or in the Paleolithic—but rather its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and bourgeois individualism. The empirical served a philosophical and political project, a thought experiment and stimulus to the imagination of possibilities.
With its title’s nod toward The Affluent Society (1958), economist John Kenneth Galbraith’s famously skeptical portrait of America’s postwar prosperity and inequality, and dripping with New Left contempt for consumerism, “The Original Affluent Society” brought this critical perspective to bear on the contemporary world. It did so through the classic anthropological move of showing that radical alternatives to the readers’ lives really exist. If the capitalist world seeks wealth through ever greater material production to meet infinitely expansive desires, foraging societies follow “the Zen road to affluence”: not by getting more, but by wanting less. If it seems that foragers have been left behind by “progress,” this is due only to the ethnocentric self-congratulation of the West. Rather than accumulate material goods, these societies are guided by other values: leisure, mobility, and above all, freedom. . . .
Viewed in today’s context, of course, not every aspect of the essay has aged well. While acknowledging the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it does not thematize them as heavily as we might today. Rebuking evolutionary anthropologists for treating present-day foragers as “left behind” by progress, it too can succumb to the temptation to use them as proxies for the Paleolithic. Yet these characteristics should not distract us from appreciating Sahlins’s effort to show that if we want to conjure new possibilities, we need to learn about actually inhabitable worlds.
We can infer that Sahlins's main goal in writing his essay was to:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Hold a mirror to an acquisitive society, with examples of other communities that have chosen successfully to be non-materialistic.
Sahlins’s essay is portrayed as a critique of modern, materialistic societies, using foraging societies as a contrast. These societies, which follow “the Zen road to affluence” by wanting less rather than acquiring more, serve as a challenge to the values of contemporary capitalist societies. The essay is seen as a thought experiment to stimulate the imagination about different ways of living, emphasizing the values of leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Counter Galbraith’s pessimistic view of the inevitability of a capitalist trajectory for economic growth: The passage does not suggest that Sahlins was directly countering Galbraith’s view.
3. Put forth the view that, despite egalitarian origins, economic progress brings greater inequality and social hierarchies: While this is a theme in Sahlins’s work, it is not presented as the main goal of his essay.
4. Highlight the fact that while we started off as a fairly contented egalitarian people, we have progressively degenerated into materialism: The passage suggests that Sahlins’s essay was more about presenting an alternative perspective rather than depicting a degeneration into materialism.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Hold a mirror to an acquisitive society, with examples of other communities that have chosen successfully to be non-materialistic.
Sahlins’s essay is portrayed as a critique of modern, materialistic societies, using foraging societies as a contrast. These societies, which follow “the Zen road to affluence” by wanting less rather than acquiring more, serve as a challenge to the values of contemporary capitalist societies. The essay is seen as a thought experiment to stimulate the imagination about different ways of living, emphasizing the values of leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Counter Galbraith’s pessimistic view of the inevitability of a capitalist trajectory for economic growth: The passage does not suggest that Sahlins was directly countering Galbraith’s view.
3. Put forth the view that, despite egalitarian origins, economic progress brings greater inequality and social hierarchies: While this is a theme in Sahlins’s work, it is not presented as the main goal of his essay.
4. Highlight the fact that while we started off as a fairly contented egalitarian people, we have progressively degenerated into materialism: The passage suggests that Sahlins’s essay was more about presenting an alternative perspective rather than depicting a degeneration into materialism.
Q.No: 473
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually [concerned with] national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward-looking.
My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad [who have] centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. . . . Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking – full of movement, border-crossing and south-south interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anticapitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . .
The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book. . . .
For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those [commonly found ones] are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in [my] book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. . . . It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world.
This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. . . . African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.
For early postcolonial literature, the world of the novel was often the nation. Postcolonial novels were usually [concerned with] national questions. Sometimes the whole story of the novel was taken as an allegory of the nation, whether India or Tanzania. This was important for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, but could also be limiting – land-focused and inward-looking.
My new book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores another kind of world of the novel: not the village or nation, but the Indian Ocean world. The book describes a set of novels in which the Indian Ocean is at the centre of the story. It focuses on the novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen and Joseph Conrad [who have] centred the Indian Ocean world in the majority of their novels. . . . Their work reveals a world that is outward-looking – full of movement, border-crossing and south-south interconnection. They are all very different – from colonially inclined (Conrad) to radically anticapitalist (Collen), but together draw on and shape a wider sense of Indian Ocean space through themes, images, metaphors and language. This has the effect of remapping the world in the reader’s mind, as centred in the interconnected global south. . . .
The Indian Ocean world is a term used to describe the very long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab coasts, and South and East Asia. These connections were made possible by the geography of the Indian Ocean. For much of history, travel by sea was much easier than by land, which meant that port cities very far apart were often more easily connected to each other than to much closer inland cities. Historical and archaeological evidence suggests that what we now call globalisation first appeared in the Indian Ocean. This is the interconnected oceanic world referenced and produced by the novels in my book. . . .
For their part Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen and even Conrad reference a different set of histories and geographies than the ones most commonly found in fiction in English. Those [commonly found ones] are mostly centred in Europe or the US, assume a background of Christianity and whiteness, and mention places like Paris and New York. The novels in [my] book highlight instead a largely Islamic space, feature characters of colour and centralise the ports of Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java and Bombay. . . . It is a densely imagined, richly sensory image of a southern cosmopolitan culture which provides for an enlarged sense of place in the world.
This remapping is particularly powerful for the representation of Africa. In the fiction, sailors and travellers are not all European. . . . African, as well as Indian and Arab characters, are traders, nakhodas (dhow ship captains), runaways, villains, missionaries and activists. This does not mean that Indian Ocean Africa is romanticised. Migration is often a matter of force; travel is portrayed as abandonment rather than adventure, freedoms are kept from women and slavery is rife. What it does mean is that the African part of the Indian Ocean world plays an active role in its long, rich history and therefore in that of the wider world.
All of the following claims contribute to the “remapping” discussed by the passage, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Cosmopolitanism originated in the West and travelled to the East through globalisation. The passage emphasizes the longstanding global connections and cosmopolitan culture of the Indian Ocean world, suggesting a rich history of interconnectedness, trade, and cultural exchange independent of Western influence. This contradicts the claim that cosmopolitanism originated in the West and then spread to the East, making it the exception to the remapping theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The world of early international trade and commerce was not the sole domain of white Europeans: This supports the remapping by challenging the Eurocentric view of history and emphasizing the active role of non-European cultures in early global trade.
2. The global south, as opposed to the global north, was the first centre of globalisation: This aligns with the passage’s suggestion that what we now call globalization first appeared in the Indian Ocean, indicating an early global interconnectedness centered in the global south.
3. Indian Ocean novels have gone beyond the specifics of national concerns to explore rich regional pasts: This is directly related to the remapping theme, as the passage describes these novels as moving beyond national narratives to focus on the broader Indian Ocean world.
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Cosmopolitanism originated in the West and travelled to the East through globalisation. The passage emphasizes the longstanding global connections and cosmopolitan culture of the Indian Ocean world, suggesting a rich history of interconnectedness, trade, and cultural exchange independent of Western influence. This contradicts the claim that cosmopolitanism originated in the West and then spread to the East, making it the exception to the remapping theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The world of early international trade and commerce was not the sole domain of white Europeans: This supports the remapping by challenging the Eurocentric view of history and emphasizing the active role of non-European cultures in early global trade.
2. The global south, as opposed to the global north, was the first centre of globalisation: This aligns with the passage’s suggestion that what we now call globalization first appeared in the Indian Ocean, indicating an early global interconnectedness centered in the global south.
3. Indian Ocean novels have gone beyond the specifics of national concerns to explore rich regional pasts: This is directly related to the remapping theme, as the passage describes these novels as moving beyond national narratives to focus on the broader Indian Ocean world.
Q.No: 474
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 1
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
Many human phenomena and characteristics – such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, genes, incomes, life expectancies, and other things – are influenced both by geographic factors and by non-geographic factors. Geographic factors mean physical and biological factors tied to geographic location, including climate, the distributions of wild plant and animal species, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors include those factors subsumed under the term culture, other factors subsumed under the term history, and decisions by individual people. . . .
[T]he differences between the current economies of North and South Korea . . . cannot be attributed to the modest environmental differences between [them] . . .
They are instead due entirely to the different [government] policies . . . At the opposite extreme, the Inuit and other traditional peoples living north of the Arctic Circle developed warm fur clothes but no agriculture, while equatorial lowland peoples around the world never developed warm fur clothes but often did develop agriculture. The explanation is straightforwardly geographic, rather than a cultural or historical quirk unrelated to geography. . . . Aboriginal Australia remained the sole continent occupied only by hunter/gatherers and with no indigenous farming or herding . . . [Here the] explanation is biogeographic: the Australian continent has no domesticable native animal species and few domesticable native plant species. Instead, the crops and domestic animals that now make Australia a food and wool exporter are all non-native (mainly Eurasian) species such as sheep, wheat, and grapes, brought to Australia by overseas colonists.
Today, no scholar would be silly enough to deny that culture, history, and individual choices play a big role in many human phenomena. Scholars don’t react to cultural, historical, and individual-agent explanations by denouncing “cultural determinism,” “historical determinism,” or “individual determinism,” and then thinking no further. But many scholars do react to any explanation invoking some geographic role, by denouncing “geographic determinism” . . .
Several reasons may underlie this widespread but nonsensical view. One reason is that some geographic explanations advanced a century ago were racist, thereby causing all geographic explanations to become tainted by racist associations in the minds of many scholars other than geographers. But many genetic, historical, psychological, and anthropological explanations advanced a century ago were also racist, yet the validity of newer non-racist genetic etc. explanations is widely accepted today.
Another reason for reflex rejection of geographic explanations is that historians have a tradition, in their discipline, of stressing the role of contingency (a favorite word among historians) based on individual decisions and chance. Often that view is warranted . . . But often, too, that view is unwarranted. The development of warm fur clothes among the Inuit living north of the Arctic Circle was not because one influential Inuit leader persuaded other Inuit in 1783 to adopt warm fur clothes, for no good environmental reason.
A third reason is that geographic explanations usually depend on detailed technical facts of geography and other fields of scholarship . . . Most historians and economists don’t acquire that detailed knowledge as part of the professional training.
The author criticises scholars who are not geographers for all of the following reasons EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Their outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena.
The passage does not specifically criticize nongeographer scholars for holding outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena. The criticisms mentioned are regarding their reaction to geographic explanations (such as labeling them as deterministic), their focus on individual decisions, and the rejection of biogeographic factors. The passage doesn’t address their views on past cultural and historical phenomena as being outdated.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The importance they place on the role of individual decisions when studying human phenomena: The author criticizes historians for sometimes overemphasizing contingency based on individual decisions, making this a valid criticism according to the passage.
3. Their labelling of geographic explanations as deterministic: The author points out that many scholars reject geographic explanations by denouncing them as “geographic determinism,” which is presented as a criticism in the passage.
4. Their rejection of the role of biogeographic factors in social and cultural phenomena: The passage criticizes scholars for overlooking the importance of geographic factors, including biogeographic factors, in influencing human phenomena.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Their outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena.
The passage does not specifically criticize nongeographer scholars for holding outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena. The criticisms mentioned are regarding their reaction to geographic explanations (such as labeling them as deterministic), their focus on individual decisions, and the rejection of biogeographic factors. The passage doesn’t address their views on past cultural and historical phenomena as being outdated.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The importance they place on the role of individual decisions when studying human phenomena: The author criticizes historians for sometimes overemphasizing contingency based on individual decisions, making this a valid criticism according to the passage.
3. Their labelling of geographic explanations as deterministic: The author points out that many scholars reject geographic explanations by denouncing them as “geographic determinism,” which is presented as a criticism in the passage.
4. Their rejection of the role of biogeographic factors in social and cultural phenomena: The passage criticizes scholars for overlooking the importance of geographic factors, including biogeographic factors, in influencing human phenomena.
Q.No: 475
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
All of the following describe the “common-sense view” of history, EXCEPT:
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Identifies which description does not align with the “common-sense view” of history.
Correct Answer: History is like science: a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality.
This view contrasts with the common-sense view’s focus on objective facts, suggesting a more interpretive approach (“...the belief in a hard core of historical facts...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Objective history from facts: Aligns with the common-sense view.
3. Real history in ancient engravings: Consistent with the emphasis on factual evidence.
4. Positivist methods for credible history: Agrees with the reliance on factual and empirical evidence.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Identifies which description does not align with the “common-sense view” of history.
Correct Answer: History is like science: a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality.
This view contrasts with the common-sense view’s focus on objective facts, suggesting a more interpretive approach (“...the belief in a hard core of historical facts...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Objective history from facts: Aligns with the common-sense view.
3. Real history in ancient engravings: Consistent with the emphasis on factual evidence.
4. Positivist methods for credible history: Agrees with the reliance on factual and empirical evidence.
Q.No: 476
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
If the author of the passage were to write a book on the Battle of Hastings along the lines of his/her own reasoning, the focus of the historical account would be on:
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks about the likely focus of a historical account of the Battle of Hastings by the author, given their perspective on history.
Correct Answer: Exploring the socio-political and economic factors that led to the Battle.
The author emphasizes interpretation over just collecting facts. The passage suggests a broader focus on socio-political and economic contexts rather than just factual details (“But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Deriving historical facts: Contradicts the author’s emphasis on interpretation.
3. Relying on auxiliary sciences: Misinterprets the author’s view that auxiliary sciences support, not define, a historian’s work.
4. Detailed timeline of events: Overly factual, not in line with the author’s emphasis on broader socio-political contexts.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks about the likely focus of a historical account of the Battle of Hastings by the author, given their perspective on history.
Correct Answer: Exploring the socio-political and economic factors that led to the Battle.
The author emphasizes interpretation over just collecting facts. The passage suggests a broader focus on socio-political and economic contexts rather than just factual details (“But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Deriving historical facts: Contradicts the author’s emphasis on interpretation.
3. Relying on auxiliary sciences: Misinterprets the author’s view that auxiliary sciences support, not define, a historian’s work.
4. Detailed timeline of events: Overly factual, not in line with the author’s emphasis on broader socio-political contexts.
Q.No: 477
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
The Positivists, anxious to stake out their claim for history as a science, contributed the weight of their influence to the cult of facts. First ascertain the facts, said the positivists, then draw your conclusions from them…. This is what may [be] called the common-sense view of history. History consists of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on … [Sir George Clark] contrasted the "hard core of facts" in history with the surrounding pulp of disputable interpretation forgetting perhaps that the pulpy part of the fruit is more rewarding than the hard core…. It recalls the favourite dictum of the great liberal journalist C. P. Scott: "Facts are sacred, opinion is free."…
What is a historical fact? … According to the commonsense view, there are certain basic facts which are the same for all historians and which form, so to speak, the backbone of history—the fact, for example, that the Battle of Hastings was fought in 1066. But this view calls for two observations. In the first place, it is not with facts like these that the historian is primarily concerned. It is no doubt important to know that the great battle was fought in 1066 and not in 1065 or 1067, and that it was fought at Hastings and not at Eastbourne or Brighton. The historian must not get these things wrong. But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy is like praising an architect for using well-seasoned timber or properly mixed concrete in his building. It is a necessary condition of his work, but not his essential function. It is precisely for matters of this kind that the historian is entitled to rely on what have been called the "auxiliary sciences" of history—archaeology, epigraphy, numismatics, chronology, and so forth….
The second observation is that the necessity to establish these basic facts rests not on any quality in the facts themselves, but on an apriori decision of the historian. In spite of C. P. Scott's motto, every journalist knows today that the most effective way to influence opinion is by the selection and arrangement of the appropriate facts. It used to be said that facts speak for themselves. This is, of course, untrue. The facts speak only when the historian calls on them: it is he who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context…. The only reason why we are interested to know that the battle was fought at Hastings in 1066 is that historians regard it as a major historical event…. Professor Talcott Parsons once called [science] "a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality." It might perhaps have been put more simply. But history is, among other things, that. The historian is necessarily selective. The belief in a hard core of historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is a preposterous fallacy, but one which it is very hard to eradicate.
All of the following, if true, can weaken the passage’s claim that facts do not speak for themselves, EXCEPT:
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks which statement does not weaken the passage’s claim about the nature of historical facts.
Correct Answer: Facts, like truth, can be relative: what is fact for person X may not be so for person Y.
Supports the passage’s view that facts require interpretation and are not absolute (“The facts speak only when the historian calls on them...”).
Incorrect Answers:
1. Objective and universal nature of facts: Contradicts the passage’s emphasis on interpretation.
2. Independent truth value of facts: Against the passage’s subjective view of historical interpretation.
4. Order of facts and meaning production: Suggests facts alone can convey meaning, opposing the passage’s view.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks which statement does not weaken the passage’s claim about the nature of historical facts.
Correct Answer: Facts, like truth, can be relative: what is fact for person X may not be so for person Y.
Supports the passage’s view that facts require interpretation and are not absolute (“The facts speak only when the historian calls on them...”).
Incorrect Answers:
1. Objective and universal nature of facts: Contradicts the passage’s emphasis on interpretation.
2. Independent truth value of facts: Against the passage’s subjective view of historical interpretation.
4. Order of facts and meaning production: Suggests facts alone can convey meaning, opposing the passage’s view.
Q.No: 478
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
All of the following statements are evidence of the decline of liberalism today, EXCEPT:
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which statement does not represent evidence of liberalism’s decline as discussed in the passage.
Correct Answer: “And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.”
While this statement discusses a negative aspect of modernity, it does not directly relate to the decline of liberalism, which is the central theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Democracy degraded: Indicates a failure of liberal democratic ideals.
3. Gap between liberalism’s claims and reality: Directly critiques the failure of liberalism to meet its promises.
4. Business aristocracy and vast companies: Suggests economic disparities arising under liberal policies, a sign of liberalism’s decline.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which statement does not represent evidence of liberalism’s decline as discussed in the passage.
Correct Answer: “And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.”
While this statement discusses a negative aspect of modernity, it does not directly relate to the decline of liberalism, which is the central theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Democracy degraded: Indicates a failure of liberal democratic ideals.
3. Gap between liberalism’s claims and reality: Directly critiques the failure of liberalism to meet its promises.
4. Business aristocracy and vast companies: Suggests economic disparities arising under liberal policies, a sign of liberalism’s decline.
Q.No: 479
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
The author of the passage refers to “the Davos elite” to illustrate his views on:
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Asks about the role of the “Davos elite” in illustrating the author’s views on liberalism.
Correct Answer: The hypocrisy of the liberal rich, who profess to subscribe to liberal values while cornering most of the wealth.
The passage uses “the Davos elite” as an example of the hypocrisy within liberal circles, where the wealthy, despite espousing liberal values, accumulate wealth and privileges, contradicting liberal ideals.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Rise in shared futures interest: Not supported by the passage.
2. Rich capturing debate: Doesn’t capture the irony and hypocrisy highlighted in the passage.
3. Unlikelihood of past liberalism return: Misinterprets the passage’s discussion on the Davos elite.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Asks about the role of the “Davos elite” in illustrating the author’s views on liberalism.
Correct Answer: The hypocrisy of the liberal rich, who profess to subscribe to liberal values while cornering most of the wealth.
The passage uses “the Davos elite” as an example of the hypocrisy within liberal circles, where the wealthy, despite espousing liberal values, accumulate wealth and privileges, contradicting liberal ideals.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Rise in shared futures interest: Not supported by the passage.
2. Rich capturing debate: Doesn’t capture the irony and hypocrisy highlighted in the passage.
3. Unlikelihood of past liberalism return: Misinterprets the passage’s discussion on the Davos elite.
Q.No: 480
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
The author of the passage is likely to disagree with all of the following statements, EXCEPT:
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Identifies a statement that the author of the passage would likely agree with.
Correct Answer: Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so.
The passage acknowledges the historical adaptability of liberalism, showing how it has reformed in response to challenges.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Liberalism as a dying ideal: The passage does not suggest liberalism needs replacing but rather calls for its reform.
3. Essence of liberalism in freedoms: Oversimplifies liberalism, contrary to the passage’s broader view.
4. Claims of disintegration exaggerated: The passage does recognize the challenges faced by liberalism, not dismissing them as exaggerations.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Identifies a statement that the author of the passage would likely agree with.
Correct Answer: Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so.
The passage acknowledges the historical adaptability of liberalism, showing how it has reformed in response to challenges.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Liberalism as a dying ideal: The passage does not suggest liberalism needs replacing but rather calls for its reform.
3. Essence of liberalism in freedoms: Oversimplifies liberalism, contrary to the passage’s broader view.
4. Claims of disintegration exaggerated: The passage does recognize the challenges faced by liberalism, not dismissing them as exaggerations.
Q.No: 481
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
Over the past four centuries liberalism has been so successful that it has driven all its opponents off the battlefield. Now it is disintegrating, destroyed by a mix of hubris and internal contradictions, according to Patrick Deneen, a professor of politics at the University of Notre Dame…. Equality of opportunity has produced a new meritocratic aristocracy that has all the aloofness of the old aristocracy with none of its sense of noblesse oblige. Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd. And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery. “The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry” is now so wide that “the lie can no longer be accepted,” Mr Deneen writes. What better proof of this than the vision of 1,000 private planes whisking their occupants to Davos to discuss the question of “creating a shared future in a fragmented world”?….
Deneen does an impressive job of capturing the current mood of disillusionment, echoing left-wing complaints about rampant commercialism, right-wing complaints about narcissistic and bullying students, and general worries about atomisation and selfishness. But when he concludes that all this adds up to a failure of liberalism, is his argument convincing?…. He argues that the essence of liberalism lies in freeing individuals from constraints. In fact, liberalism contains a wide range of intellectual traditions which provide different answers to the question of how to trade off the relative claims of rights and responsibilities, individual expression and social ties…. liberals experimented with a range of ideas from devolving power from the centre to creating national education systems.
Mr Deneen’s fixation on the essence of liberalism leads to the second big problem of his book: his failure to recognise liberalism’s ability to reform itself and address its internal problems. The late 19th century saw America suffering from many of the problems that are reappearing today, including the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies, the corruption of politics and the sense that society was dividing into winners and losers. But a wide variety of reformers, working within the liberal tradition, tackled these problems head on. Theodore Roosevelt took on the trusts. Progressives cleaned up government corruption. University reformers modernised academic syllabuses and built ladders of opportunity. Rather than dying, liberalism reformed itself.
Mr Deneen is right to point out that the record of liberalism in recent years has been dismal. He is also right to assert that the world has much to learn from the premodern notions of liberty as self-mastery and selfdenial. The biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomisation but old-fashioned greed, as members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options. But he is wrong to argue that the only way for people to liberate themselves from the contradictions of liberalism is “liberation from liberalism itself”. The best way to read “Why Liberalism Failed” is not as a funeral oration but as a call to action: up your game, or else.
The author of the passage faults Deneen’s conclusions for all of the following reasons, EXCEPT:
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which criticism is not made by the author against Deneen’s conclusions on liberalism.
Correct Answer: Its repeated harking back to premodern notions of liberty.
The passage does not criticize Deneen for referring to pre modern notions of liberty. In fact, it acknowledges the value in revisiting these concepts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Extreme pessimism: The passage criticizes Deneen’s overly pessimistic view of liberalism’s future.
3. Failure to note historical reversals: The passage points out Deneen’s oversight of historical examples where liberalism has managed to reform.
4. Narrow definition of liberalism: The passage faults Deneen for focusing too narrowly on individual freedom in defining liberalism.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which criticism is not made by the author against Deneen’s conclusions on liberalism.
Correct Answer: Its repeated harking back to premodern notions of liberty.
The passage does not criticize Deneen for referring to pre modern notions of liberty. In fact, it acknowledges the value in revisiting these concepts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Extreme pessimism: The passage criticizes Deneen’s overly pessimistic view of liberalism’s future.
3. Failure to note historical reversals: The passage points out Deneen’s oversight of historical examples where liberalism has managed to reform.
4. Narrow definition of liberalism: The passage faults Deneen for focusing too narrowly on individual freedom in defining liberalism.
Q.No: 482
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The Second Hand September campaign, led by Oxfam . . . seeks to encourage shopping at local organisations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands such as Primark and Boohoo in the name of saving our planet. As innocent as mindless scrolling through online shops may seem, such consumers are unintentionally—or perhaps even knowingly—contributing to an industry that uses more energy than aviation….
Brits buy more garments than any other country in Europe, so it comes as no shock that many of those clothes end up in UK landfills each year: 300,000 tonnes of them, to be exact. This waste of clothing is destructive to our planet, releasing greenhouse gasses as clothes are burnt as well as bleeding toxins and dyes into the surrounding soil and water. As ecologist Chelsea Rochman bluntly put it, “The mismanagement of our waste has even come back to haunt us on our dinner plate.”
It’s not surprising, then, that people are scrambling for a solution, the most common of which is second-hand shopping. Retailers selling consigned clothing are currently expanding at a rapid rate … If everyone bought just one used item in a year, it would save 449 million lbs of waste, equivalent to the weight of 1 million Polar bears. “Thrifting” has increasingly become a trendy practice. London is home to many second-hand, or more commonly coined ‘vintage’, shops across the city from Bayswater to Brixton.
So you’re cool and you care about the planet; you’ve killed two birds with one stone. But do people simply purchase a second-hand item, flash it on Instagram with #vintage and call it a day without considering whether what they are doing is actually effective?
According to a study commissioned by Patagonia, for instance, older clothes shed more microfibres. These can end up in our rivers and seas after just one wash due to the worn material, thus contributing to microfibre pollution. To break it down, the amount of microfibres released by laundering 100,000 fleece jackets is equivalent to as many as 11,900 plastic grocery bags, and up to 40 per cent of that ends up in our oceans… So where does this leave second-hand consumers? [They would be well advised to buy] high-quality items that shed less and last longer [as this] combats both microfibre pollution and excess garments ending up in landfills….
Luxury brands would rather not circulate their latest season stock around the globe to be sold at a cheaper price, which is why companies like ThredUP, a US fashion resale marketplace, have not yet caught on in the UK. There will always be a market for consignment but there is also a whole generation of people who have been taught that only buying new products is the norm; second-hand luxury goods are not in their psyche. Ben Whitaker, director at Liquidation Firm B-Stock, told Prospect that unless recycling becomes cost-effective and filters into mass production, with the right technology to partner it, “high-end retailers would rather put brand before sustainability.”
The Second Hand September campaign, led by Oxfam . . . seeks to encourage shopping at local organisations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands such as Primark and Boohoo in the name of saving our planet. As innocent as mindless scrolling through online shops may seem, such consumers are unintentionally—or perhaps even knowingly—contributing to an industry that uses more energy than aviation….
Brits buy more garments than any other country in Europe, so it comes as no shock that many of those clothes end up in UK landfills each year: 300,000 tonnes of them, to be exact. This waste of clothing is destructive to our planet, releasing greenhouse gasses as clothes are burnt as well as bleeding toxins and dyes into the surrounding soil and water. As ecologist Chelsea Rochman bluntly put it, “The mismanagement of our waste has even come back to haunt us on our dinner plate.”
It’s not surprising, then, that people are scrambling for a solution, the most common of which is second-hand shopping. Retailers selling consigned clothing are currently expanding at a rapid rate … If everyone bought just one used item in a year, it would save 449 million lbs of waste, equivalent to the weight of 1 million Polar bears. “Thrifting” has increasingly become a trendy practice. London is home to many second-hand, or more commonly coined ‘vintage’, shops across the city from Bayswater to Brixton.
So you’re cool and you care about the planet; you’ve killed two birds with one stone. But do people simply purchase a second-hand item, flash it on Instagram with #vintage and call it a day without considering whether what they are doing is actually effective?
According to a study commissioned by Patagonia, for instance, older clothes shed more microfibres. These can end up in our rivers and seas after just one wash due to the worn material, thus contributing to microfibre pollution. To break it down, the amount of microfibres released by laundering 100,000 fleece jackets is equivalent to as many as 11,900 plastic grocery bags, and up to 40 per cent of that ends up in our oceans… So where does this leave second-hand consumers? [They would be well advised to buy] high-quality items that shed less and last longer [as this] combats both microfibre pollution and excess garments ending up in landfills….
Luxury brands would rather not circulate their latest season stock around the globe to be sold at a cheaper price, which is why companies like ThredUP, a US fashion resale marketplace, have not yet caught on in the UK. There will always be a market for consignment but there is also a whole generation of people who have been taught that only buying new products is the norm; second-hand luxury goods are not in their psyche. Ben Whitaker, director at Liquidation Firm B-Stock, told Prospect that unless recycling becomes cost-effective and filters into mass production, with the right technology to partner it, “high-end retailers would rather put brand before sustainability.”
The act of “thrifting”, as described in the passage, can be considered ironic because it:
Solution:
For questions 9 to 12:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Asks about the irony in the practice of “thrifting” as described in the passage.
Correct Answer: Has created environmental problems.
The passage notes that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution, which is ironic considering thrifting is promoted for environmental benefits.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Luxury clothing at low prices: Not mentioned as ironic in the passage.
2. Not cost-effective for retailers: Not discussed in the passage.
3. Anti-consumerist attitude: Not directly related to the irony mentioned in the passage.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Asks about the irony in the practice of “thrifting” as described in the passage.
Correct Answer: Has created environmental problems.
The passage notes that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution, which is ironic considering thrifting is promoted for environmental benefits.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Luxury clothing at low prices: Not mentioned as ironic in the passage.
2. Not cost-effective for retailers: Not discussed in the passage.
3. Anti-consumerist attitude: Not directly related to the irony mentioned in the passage.
Q.No: 483
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The Second Hand September campaign, led by Oxfam . . . seeks to encourage shopping at local organisations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands such as Primark and Boohoo in the name of saving our planet. As innocent as mindless scrolling through online shops may seem, such consumers are unintentionally—or perhaps even knowingly—contributing to an industry that uses more energy than aviation….
Brits buy more garments than any other country in Europe, so it comes as no shock that many of those clothes end up in UK landfills each year: 300,000 tonnes of them, to be exact. This waste of clothing is destructive to our planet, releasing greenhouse gasses as clothes are burnt as well as bleeding toxins and dyes into the surrounding soil and water. As ecologist Chelsea Rochman bluntly put it, “The mismanagement of our waste has even come back to haunt us on our dinner plate.”
It’s not surprising, then, that people are scrambling for a solution, the most common of which is second-hand shopping. Retailers selling consigned clothing are currently expanding at a rapid rate … If everyone bought just one used item in a year, it would save 449 million lbs of waste, equivalent to the weight of 1 million Polar bears. “Thrifting” has increasingly become a trendy practice. London is home to many second-hand, or more commonly coined ‘vintage’, shops across the city from Bayswater to Brixton.
So you’re cool and you care about the planet; you’ve killed two birds with one stone. But do people simply purchase a second-hand item, flash it on Instagram with #vintage and call it a day without considering whether what they are doing is actually effective?
According to a study commissioned by Patagonia, for instance, older clothes shed more microfibres. These can end up in our rivers and seas after just one wash due to the worn material, thus contributing to microfibre pollution. To break it down, the amount of microfibres released by laundering 100,000 fleece jackets is equivalent to as many as 11,900 plastic grocery bags, and up to 40 per cent of that ends up in our oceans… So where does this leave second-hand consumers? [They would be well advised to buy] high-quality items that shed less and last longer [as this] combats both microfibre pollution and excess garments ending up in landfills….
Luxury brands would rather not circulate their latest season stock around the globe to be sold at a cheaper price, which is why companies like ThredUP, a US fashion resale marketplace, have not yet caught on in the UK. There will always be a market for consignment but there is also a whole generation of people who have been taught that only buying new products is the norm; second-hand luxury goods are not in their psyche. Ben Whitaker, director at Liquidation Firm B-Stock, told Prospect that unless recycling becomes cost-effective and filters into mass production, with the right technology to partner it, “high-end retailers would rather put brand before sustainability.”
The Second Hand September campaign, led by Oxfam . . . seeks to encourage shopping at local organisations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands such as Primark and Boohoo in the name of saving our planet. As innocent as mindless scrolling through online shops may seem, such consumers are unintentionally—or perhaps even knowingly—contributing to an industry that uses more energy than aviation….
Brits buy more garments than any other country in Europe, so it comes as no shock that many of those clothes end up in UK landfills each year: 300,000 tonnes of them, to be exact. This waste of clothing is destructive to our planet, releasing greenhouse gasses as clothes are burnt as well as bleeding toxins and dyes into the surrounding soil and water. As ecologist Chelsea Rochman bluntly put it, “The mismanagement of our waste has even come back to haunt us on our dinner plate.”
It’s not surprising, then, that people are scrambling for a solution, the most common of which is second-hand shopping. Retailers selling consigned clothing are currently expanding at a rapid rate … If everyone bought just one used item in a year, it would save 449 million lbs of waste, equivalent to the weight of 1 million Polar bears. “Thrifting” has increasingly become a trendy practice. London is home to many second-hand, or more commonly coined ‘vintage’, shops across the city from Bayswater to Brixton.
So you’re cool and you care about the planet; you’ve killed two birds with one stone. But do people simply purchase a second-hand item, flash it on Instagram with #vintage and call it a day without considering whether what they are doing is actually effective?
According to a study commissioned by Patagonia, for instance, older clothes shed more microfibres. These can end up in our rivers and seas after just one wash due to the worn material, thus contributing to microfibre pollution. To break it down, the amount of microfibres released by laundering 100,000 fleece jackets is equivalent to as many as 11,900 plastic grocery bags, and up to 40 per cent of that ends up in our oceans… So where does this leave second-hand consumers? [They would be well advised to buy] high-quality items that shed less and last longer [as this] combats both microfibre pollution and excess garments ending up in landfills….
Luxury brands would rather not circulate their latest season stock around the globe to be sold at a cheaper price, which is why companies like ThredUP, a US fashion resale marketplace, have not yet caught on in the UK. There will always be a market for consignment but there is also a whole generation of people who have been taught that only buying new products is the norm; second-hand luxury goods are not in their psyche. Ben Whitaker, director at Liquidation Firm B-Stock, told Prospect that unless recycling becomes cost-effective and filters into mass production, with the right technology to partner it, “high-end retailers would rather put brand before sustainability.”
Based on the passage, we can infer that the opposite of fast fashion, ‘slow fashion’, would most likely refer to clothes that:
Solution:
For questions 9 to 12:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Inquires about the likely characteristics of ‘slow fashion’ based on the passage.
Correct Answer: Are of high quality and long lasting.
The passage suggests that buying high-quality items that last longer could combat environmental issues, implying these are characteristics of ‘slow fashion.’
Incorrect Answers:
Sold by genuine vintage stores: Not specifically mentioned as a feature of ‘slow fashion.’
Do not shed microfibres: While desirable, not directly linked to the concept of ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Do not bleed toxins and dyes: Also desirable, but not directly tied to ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Inquires about the likely characteristics of ‘slow fashion’ based on the passage.
Correct Answer: Are of high quality and long lasting.
The passage suggests that buying high-quality items that last longer could combat environmental issues, implying these are characteristics of ‘slow fashion.’
Incorrect Answers:
Sold by genuine vintage stores: Not specifically mentioned as a feature of ‘slow fashion.’
Do not shed microfibres: While desirable, not directly linked to the concept of ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Do not bleed toxins and dyes: Also desirable, but not directly tied to ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Q.No: 484
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Umberto Eco, an Italian writer, was right when he said the language of Europe is translation. Netflix and other deep-pocketed global firms speak it well. Just as the EU employs a small army of translators and interpreters to turn intricate laws or impassioned speeches of Romanian MEPs into the EU’s 24 official languages, so do the likes of Netflix. It now offers dubbing in 34 languages and subtitling in a few more….
The economics of European productions are more appealing, too. American audiences are more willing than before to give dubbed or subtitled viewing a chance. This means shows such as “Lupin”, a French crime caper on Netflix, can become global hits…. In 2015, about 75% of Netflix’s original content was American; now the figure is half, according to Ampere, a mediaanalysis company. Netflix has about 100 productions under way in Europe, which is more than big public broadcasters in France or Germany….
Not everything works across borders. Comedy sometimes struggles. Whodunits and bloodthirsty maelstroms between arch Romans and uppity tribesmen have a more universal appeal. Some do it better than others. Barbarians aside, German television is not always built for export, says one executive, being polite. A bigger problem is that national broadcasters still dominate. Streaming services, such as Netflix or Disney+, account for about a third of all viewing hours, even in markets where they are well-established. Europe is an ageing continent. The generation of teens staring at phones is outnumbered by their elders who prefer to gawp at the box.
In Brussels and national capitals, the prospect of Netflix as a cultural hegemon is seen as a threat. “Cultural sovereignty” is the watchword of European executives worried that the Americans will eat their lunch. To be fair, Netflix content sometimes seems stuck in an uncanny valley somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, with local quirks stripped out. Netflix originals tend to have fewer specific cultural references than shows produced by domestic rivals, according to Enders, a market analyst. The company used to have an imperial model of commissioning, with executives in Los Angeles cooking up ideas French people might like. Now Netflix has offices across Europe. But ultimately the big decisions rest with American executives. This makes European politicians nervous.
They should not be. An irony of European integration is that it is often American companies that facilitate it. Google Translate makes European newspapers comprehensible, even if a little clunky, for the continent’s non-polyglots. American social-media companies make it easier for Europeans to talk politics across borders. (That they do not always like to hear what they say about each other is another matter.) Now Netflix and friends pump the same content into homes across a continent, making culture a cross-border endeavour, too. If Europeans are to share a currency, bail each other out in times of financial need and share vaccines in a pandemic, then they need to have something in common—even if it is just bingeing on the same series. Watching fictitious northern and southern Europeans tear each other apart 2,000 years ago beats doing so in reality.
Umberto Eco, an Italian writer, was right when he said the language of Europe is translation. Netflix and other deep-pocketed global firms speak it well. Just as the EU employs a small army of translators and interpreters to turn intricate laws or impassioned speeches of Romanian MEPs into the EU’s 24 official languages, so do the likes of Netflix. It now offers dubbing in 34 languages and subtitling in a few more….
The economics of European productions are more appealing, too. American audiences are more willing than before to give dubbed or subtitled viewing a chance. This means shows such as “Lupin”, a French crime caper on Netflix, can become global hits…. In 2015, about 75% of Netflix’s original content was American; now the figure is half, according to Ampere, a mediaanalysis company. Netflix has about 100 productions under way in Europe, which is more than big public broadcasters in France or Germany….
Not everything works across borders. Comedy sometimes struggles. Whodunits and bloodthirsty maelstroms between arch Romans and uppity tribesmen have a more universal appeal. Some do it better than others. Barbarians aside, German television is not always built for export, says one executive, being polite. A bigger problem is that national broadcasters still dominate. Streaming services, such as Netflix or Disney+, account for about a third of all viewing hours, even in markets where they are well-established. Europe is an ageing continent. The generation of teens staring at phones is outnumbered by their elders who prefer to gawp at the box.
In Brussels and national capitals, the prospect of Netflix as a cultural hegemon is seen as a threat. “Cultural sovereignty” is the watchword of European executives worried that the Americans will eat their lunch. To be fair, Netflix content sometimes seems stuck in an uncanny valley somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, with local quirks stripped out. Netflix originals tend to have fewer specific cultural references than shows produced by domestic rivals, according to Enders, a market analyst. The company used to have an imperial model of commissioning, with executives in Los Angeles cooking up ideas French people might like. Now Netflix has offices across Europe. But ultimately the big decisions rest with American executives. This makes European politicians nervous.
They should not be. An irony of European integration is that it is often American companies that facilitate it. Google Translate makes European newspapers comprehensible, even if a little clunky, for the continent’s non-polyglots. American social-media companies make it easier for Europeans to talk politics across borders. (That they do not always like to hear what they say about each other is another matter.) Now Netflix and friends pump the same content into homes across a continent, making culture a cross-border endeavour, too. If Europeans are to share a currency, bail each other out in times of financial need and share vaccines in a pandemic, then they need to have something in common—even if it is just bingeing on the same series. Watching fictitious northern and southern Europeans tear each other apart 2,000 years ago beats doing so in reality.
Which one of the following research findings would weaken the author’s conclusion in the final paragraph?
Solution:
For questions 13 to 16:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which research finding would weaken the author’s conclusion in the final paragraph.
Correct Answer: Research shows there is a wide variance in the popularity and viewing of Netflix shows across different EU countries.
If there’s wide variance in popularity across EU countries, it undermines the idea of shared cultural experiences fostering European integration.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Netflix hits popular in North America: Aligns with the passage’s mention of European shows’ global appeal.
2. Older women’s viewing preferences: Does not directly counter the passage’s conclusion about cultural integration.
4. Netflix losing market share: Doesn’t directly address the cultural impact or unifying role of Netflix content in Europe.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which research finding would weaken the author’s conclusion in the final paragraph.
Correct Answer: Research shows there is a wide variance in the popularity and viewing of Netflix shows across different EU countries.
If there’s wide variance in popularity across EU countries, it undermines the idea of shared cultural experiences fostering European integration.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Netflix hits popular in North America: Aligns with the passage’s mention of European shows’ global appeal.
2. Older women’s viewing preferences: Does not directly counter the passage’s conclusion about cultural integration.
4. Netflix losing market share: Doesn’t directly address the cultural impact or unifying role of Netflix content in Europe.
Q.No: 485
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 2
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Umberto Eco, an Italian writer, was right when he said the language of Europe is translation. Netflix and other deep-pocketed global firms speak it well. Just as the EU employs a small army of translators and interpreters to turn intricate laws or impassioned speeches of Romanian MEPs into the EU’s 24 official languages, so do the likes of Netflix. It now offers dubbing in 34 languages and subtitling in a few more….
The economics of European productions are more appealing, too. American audiences are more willing than before to give dubbed or subtitled viewing a chance. This means shows such as “Lupin”, a French crime caper on Netflix, can become global hits…. In 2015, about 75% of Netflix’s original content was American; now the figure is half, according to Ampere, a mediaanalysis company. Netflix has about 100 productions under way in Europe, which is more than big public broadcasters in France or Germany….
Not everything works across borders. Comedy sometimes struggles. Whodunits and bloodthirsty maelstroms between arch Romans and uppity tribesmen have a more universal appeal. Some do it better than others. Barbarians aside, German television is not always built for export, says one executive, being polite. A bigger problem is that national broadcasters still dominate. Streaming services, such as Netflix or Disney+, account for about a third of all viewing hours, even in markets where they are well-established. Europe is an ageing continent. The generation of teens staring at phones is outnumbered by their elders who prefer to gawp at the box.
In Brussels and national capitals, the prospect of Netflix as a cultural hegemon is seen as a threat. “Cultural sovereignty” is the watchword of European executives worried that the Americans will eat their lunch. To be fair, Netflix content sometimes seems stuck in an uncanny valley somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, with local quirks stripped out. Netflix originals tend to have fewer specific cultural references than shows produced by domestic rivals, according to Enders, a market analyst. The company used to have an imperial model of commissioning, with executives in Los Angeles cooking up ideas French people might like. Now Netflix has offices across Europe. But ultimately the big decisions rest with American executives. This makes European politicians nervous.
They should not be. An irony of European integration is that it is often American companies that facilitate it. Google Translate makes European newspapers comprehensible, even if a little clunky, for the continent’s non-polyglots. American social-media companies make it easier for Europeans to talk politics across borders. (That they do not always like to hear what they say about each other is another matter.) Now Netflix and friends pump the same content into homes across a continent, making culture a cross-border endeavour, too. If Europeans are to share a currency, bail each other out in times of financial need and share vaccines in a pandemic, then they need to have something in common—even if it is just bingeing on the same series. Watching fictitious northern and southern Europeans tear each other apart 2,000 years ago beats doing so in reality.
Umberto Eco, an Italian writer, was right when he said the language of Europe is translation. Netflix and other deep-pocketed global firms speak it well. Just as the EU employs a small army of translators and interpreters to turn intricate laws or impassioned speeches of Romanian MEPs into the EU’s 24 official languages, so do the likes of Netflix. It now offers dubbing in 34 languages and subtitling in a few more….
The economics of European productions are more appealing, too. American audiences are more willing than before to give dubbed or subtitled viewing a chance. This means shows such as “Lupin”, a French crime caper on Netflix, can become global hits…. In 2015, about 75% of Netflix’s original content was American; now the figure is half, according to Ampere, a mediaanalysis company. Netflix has about 100 productions under way in Europe, which is more than big public broadcasters in France or Germany….
Not everything works across borders. Comedy sometimes struggles. Whodunits and bloodthirsty maelstroms between arch Romans and uppity tribesmen have a more universal appeal. Some do it better than others. Barbarians aside, German television is not always built for export, says one executive, being polite. A bigger problem is that national broadcasters still dominate. Streaming services, such as Netflix or Disney+, account for about a third of all viewing hours, even in markets where they are well-established. Europe is an ageing continent. The generation of teens staring at phones is outnumbered by their elders who prefer to gawp at the box.
In Brussels and national capitals, the prospect of Netflix as a cultural hegemon is seen as a threat. “Cultural sovereignty” is the watchword of European executives worried that the Americans will eat their lunch. To be fair, Netflix content sometimes seems stuck in an uncanny valley somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, with local quirks stripped out. Netflix originals tend to have fewer specific cultural references than shows produced by domestic rivals, according to Enders, a market analyst. The company used to have an imperial model of commissioning, with executives in Los Angeles cooking up ideas French people might like. Now Netflix has offices across Europe. But ultimately the big decisions rest with American executives. This makes European politicians nervous.
They should not be. An irony of European integration is that it is often American companies that facilitate it. Google Translate makes European newspapers comprehensible, even if a little clunky, for the continent’s non-polyglots. American social-media companies make it easier for Europeans to talk politics across borders. (That they do not always like to hear what they say about each other is another matter.) Now Netflix and friends pump the same content into homes across a continent, making culture a cross-border endeavour, too. If Europeans are to share a currency, bail each other out in times of financial need and share vaccines in a pandemic, then they need to have something in common—even if it is just bingeing on the same series. Watching fictitious northern and southern Europeans tear each other apart 2,000 years ago beats doing so in reality.
Based only on information provided in the passage, which one of the following hypothetical Netflix shows would be most successful with audiences across the EU?
Solution:
For questions 13 to 16:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which hypothetical Netflix show would be most successful across the EU based on the passage.
Correct Answer: A murder mystery drama set in North Africa and France.
The passage notes the universal appeal of certain genres like historical dramas and murder mysteries, making this option the most likely to succeed across different cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Italian comedy: Comedy struggles across borders, as mentioned in the passage.
2. Trans-Atlantic romantic drama: Not specifically aligned with the passage’s emphasis on universally appealing genres.
4. German TV science fiction: German television is noted as not always being built for export, except for notable exceptions.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which hypothetical Netflix show would be most successful across the EU based on the passage.
Correct Answer: A murder mystery drama set in North Africa and France.
The passage notes the universal appeal of certain genres like historical dramas and murder mysteries, making this option the most likely to succeed across different cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Italian comedy: Comedy struggles across borders, as mentioned in the passage.
2. Trans-Atlantic romantic drama: Not specifically aligned with the passage’s emphasis on universally appealing genres.
4. German TV science fiction: German television is noted as not always being built for export, except for notable exceptions.
Q.No: 486
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
Which one of the following statements is NOT supported by the passage?
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: The question asks which statement is NOT supported by the passage. It requires identifying the option that either contradicts or is not mentioned in the passage’s content regarding romanticism and its characterization.
Correct Answer:
1. Recent studies on romanticism seek to refute the differences between national romanticisms.
This option is not supported by the passage. The passage actually suggests that recent studies do not overlook the differences among national romanticisms. Instead, they aim to characterize romanticism based on particular philosophical questions, acknowledging these differences.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Characterizing romantic aesthetics is both possible and desirable: This idea is directly stated in the passage, especially in the third paragraph, where the response to Lovejoy’s skepticism is discussed.
3. Many romantics rejected the idea of aesthetics as a separate domain: This concept is outlined in the second paragraph, where the paradox in romantic aesthetics is discussed.
4. Romantic aesthetics are primarily expressed through fragments, aphorisms, and poems: The passage, in the second paragraph, notes that the views of romantics are often found in non-theoretical forms such as fragments and poems, which aligns with this statement.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: The question asks which statement is NOT supported by the passage. It requires identifying the option that either contradicts or is not mentioned in the passage’s content regarding romanticism and its characterization.
Correct Answer:
1. Recent studies on romanticism seek to refute the differences between national romanticisms.
This option is not supported by the passage. The passage actually suggests that recent studies do not overlook the differences among national romanticisms. Instead, they aim to characterize romanticism based on particular philosophical questions, acknowledging these differences.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Characterizing romantic aesthetics is both possible and desirable: This idea is directly stated in the passage, especially in the third paragraph, where the response to Lovejoy’s skepticism is discussed.
3. Many romantics rejected the idea of aesthetics as a separate domain: This concept is outlined in the second paragraph, where the paradox in romantic aesthetics is discussed.
4. Romantic aesthetics are primarily expressed through fragments, aphorisms, and poems: The passage, in the second paragraph, notes that the views of romantics are often found in non-theoretical forms such as fragments and poems, which aligns with this statement.
Q.No: 487
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
According to the romantics, aesthetics:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 2 asks about the romantics’ perspective on aesthetics. It seeks to determine how the romantics viewed the role and scope of aesthetics in human life, based on the information provided in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. permeates all aspects of human life, philosophical and mundane.
The passage, particularly in its second paragraph, discusses the romantics’ view on aesthetics. It highlights that many romantics rejected the idea of confining aesthetics to a separate, circumscribed domain of human life, distinct from practical and theoretical aspects. Instead, they believed that aesthetics – the character of art and beauty and our engagement with them – should shape all aspects of human existence. This belief implies that aesthetics, according to the romantics, is not just a matter of philosophical or artistic concern but is fundamental and pervasive in everyday life as well.
Incorrect Answers:
1. should be confined to a specific domain separate from the practical and theoretical aspects of life: This option is directly contradicted by the passage, which states that the romantics rejected the confinement of aesthetics to a separate domain.
2. is primarily the concern of philosophers and artists, rather than of ordinary people: The passage argues against this, noting the romantics’ belief that beauty and art should be central in the lives of not only philosophers and artists but also ordinary people.
4. is widely considered to be irrelevant to human existence: This statement is the opposite of the romantics’ view as described in the passage. The romantics saw aesthetics as fundamental to human existence, not irrelevant.
The passage clearly communicates the romantics’ expansive view of aesthetics, seeing it as an integral and pervasive aspect of human life, influencing both philosophical thought and everyday experiences.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 2 asks about the romantics’ perspective on aesthetics. It seeks to determine how the romantics viewed the role and scope of aesthetics in human life, based on the information provided in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. permeates all aspects of human life, philosophical and mundane.
The passage, particularly in its second paragraph, discusses the romantics’ view on aesthetics. It highlights that many romantics rejected the idea of confining aesthetics to a separate, circumscribed domain of human life, distinct from practical and theoretical aspects. Instead, they believed that aesthetics – the character of art and beauty and our engagement with them – should shape all aspects of human existence. This belief implies that aesthetics, according to the romantics, is not just a matter of philosophical or artistic concern but is fundamental and pervasive in everyday life as well.
Incorrect Answers:
1. should be confined to a specific domain separate from the practical and theoretical aspects of life: This option is directly contradicted by the passage, which states that the romantics rejected the confinement of aesthetics to a separate domain.
2. is primarily the concern of philosophers and artists, rather than of ordinary people: The passage argues against this, noting the romantics’ belief that beauty and art should be central in the lives of not only philosophers and artists but also ordinary people.
4. is widely considered to be irrelevant to human existence: This statement is the opposite of the romantics’ view as described in the passage. The romantics saw aesthetics as fundamental to human existence, not irrelevant.
The passage clearly communicates the romantics’ expansive view of aesthetics, seeing it as an integral and pervasive aspect of human life, influencing both philosophical thought and everyday experiences.
Q.No: 488
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (1 to 4): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject. Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism. Lovejoy, for example, claimed that romanticism is “the scandal of literary history and criticism” . . . The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is the lack of any “single real entity, or type of entity” that the concept “romanticism” designates. Lovejoy concluded, “the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing” . . .
The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally, “aesthetics” refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and art should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive.
Nevertheless, in spite of these challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy’s radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: “[Although] one does have a certain sympathy with Lovejoy’s despair…[he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement…and it is important to discover what it is” . . .
Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of “particular philosophical questions and concerns” . . .
While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central protagonists in the following are the German romantics. Two reasons explain this focus: first, because it has paved the way for the other romanticisms, German romanticism has a pride of place among the different national romanticisms . . . Second, the aesthetic outlook that was developed in Germany roughly between 1796 and 1801–02 — the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as “Early Romanticism” . . .— offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the aftermath of Kant’s philosophy.
According to the passage, recent studies on romanticism avoid “a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place” because they:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 3 inquires about the approach recent studies on romanticism take to avoid defining the movement in terms of “a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place.” The question requires identifying the reason behind this approach as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
1. prefer to focus on the fundamental concerns of the romantics.
The correct answer aligns with the key point in the fourth paragraph of the passage. The passage explains that recent studies on romanticism do not attempt to define it narrowly by time, place, or a single definition. Instead, these studies aim to characterize romanticism based on “particular philosophical questions and concerns.” This approach suggests a focus on the fundamental and central ideas that the romantics grappled with, rather than confining the movement to specific historical or geographical contexts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. prefer to highlight the paradox of romantic aesthetics as a concept: While the passage does discuss the paradoxical nature of romantic aesthetics, it does not suggest that this is the reason why recent studies avoid a single definition or specific time/place.
3. understand that the variety of romanticisms renders a general analysis impossible: The passage actually counters this view by suggesting that, despite the variety, a general characterization focused on fundamental concerns is both possible and desirable.
4. seek to discredit Lovejoy’s scepticism regarding romanticism: Discrediting Lovejoy’s skepticism is not the stated goal of these studies. While they respond to his skepticism, they do so by focusing on the philosophical aspects of romanticism, not by seeking to discredit his views.
The passage underscores the idea that recent studies on romanticism aim to capture the essence of the movement through its core philosophical concerns, rather than limiting it to specific historical or geographical parameters. This approach acknowledges the diversity within romanticism while still striving for a meaningful characterization.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 3 inquires about the approach recent studies on romanticism take to avoid defining the movement in terms of “a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place.” The question requires identifying the reason behind this approach as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
1. prefer to focus on the fundamental concerns of the romantics.
The correct answer aligns with the key point in the fourth paragraph of the passage. The passage explains that recent studies on romanticism do not attempt to define it narrowly by time, place, or a single definition. Instead, these studies aim to characterize romanticism based on “particular philosophical questions and concerns.” This approach suggests a focus on the fundamental and central ideas that the romantics grappled with, rather than confining the movement to specific historical or geographical contexts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. prefer to highlight the paradox of romantic aesthetics as a concept: While the passage does discuss the paradoxical nature of romantic aesthetics, it does not suggest that this is the reason why recent studies avoid a single definition or specific time/place.
3. understand that the variety of romanticisms renders a general analysis impossible: The passage actually counters this view by suggesting that, despite the variety, a general characterization focused on fundamental concerns is both possible and desirable.
4. seek to discredit Lovejoy’s scepticism regarding romanticism: Discrediting Lovejoy’s skepticism is not the stated goal of these studies. While they respond to his skepticism, they do so by focusing on the philosophical aspects of romanticism, not by seeking to discredit his views.
The passage underscores the idea that recent studies on romanticism aim to capture the essence of the movement through its core philosophical concerns, rather than limiting it to specific historical or geographical parameters. This approach acknowledges the diversity within romanticism while still striving for a meaningful characterization.
Q.No: 489
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
The author endorses Pinker’s views on the importance of logical reasoning as it:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 5 inquires about the author’s endorsement of Steven Pinker’s views on logical reasoning. The question aims to identify the specific aspect of logical reasoning that the author agrees with, as highlighted in Pinker’s book. It focuses on understanding which benefit of logical reasoning, as presented in the passage, the author supports.
Correct Answer:
1. equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems.
The author endorses Pinker’s views that logical reasoning equips individuals to effectively address real-world, practical problems. In the third paragraph of the passage, the author discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its direct application in various contexts like medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This alignment with Pinker’s argument highlights the author’s agreement that mastering rational tools, as Pinker outlines, can significantly improve how individuals navigate and solve complex, practical issues in different domains.
Incorrect Answers:
2. provides a moral compass for resolving important ethical dilemmas: The passage does not specifically indicate that the author believes logical reasoning provides a moral compass for ethical dilemmas. While Pinker acknowledges the moral aspect of rationality, the passage does not explicitly endorse this view.
3. focuses public attention on real issues like development rather than sensational events: Although the author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage focusing on sensational events, this agreement does not specifically relate to the endorsement of logical reasoning’s importance.
4. helps people to gain expertise in statistics and other scientific disciplines: While the author appreciates Pinker’s primer on statistics, the endorsement is more broadly about the application of rationality in practical problem-solving, rather than specifically gaining expertise in scientific disciplines.
The author’s endorsement of Pinker’s views is centered on the practical applicability and utility of logical reasoning in tackling real-world challenges, aligning with Pinker’s analysis of how rationality can improve decision-making across various life domains.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 5 inquires about the author’s endorsement of Steven Pinker’s views on logical reasoning. The question aims to identify the specific aspect of logical reasoning that the author agrees with, as highlighted in Pinker’s book. It focuses on understanding which benefit of logical reasoning, as presented in the passage, the author supports.
Correct Answer:
1. equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems.
The author endorses Pinker’s views that logical reasoning equips individuals to effectively address real-world, practical problems. In the third paragraph of the passage, the author discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its direct application in various contexts like medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This alignment with Pinker’s argument highlights the author’s agreement that mastering rational tools, as Pinker outlines, can significantly improve how individuals navigate and solve complex, practical issues in different domains.
Incorrect Answers:
2. provides a moral compass for resolving important ethical dilemmas: The passage does not specifically indicate that the author believes logical reasoning provides a moral compass for ethical dilemmas. While Pinker acknowledges the moral aspect of rationality, the passage does not explicitly endorse this view.
3. focuses public attention on real issues like development rather than sensational events: Although the author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage focusing on sensational events, this agreement does not specifically relate to the endorsement of logical reasoning’s importance.
4. helps people to gain expertise in statistics and other scientific disciplines: While the author appreciates Pinker’s primer on statistics, the endorsement is more broadly about the application of rationality in practical problem-solving, rather than specifically gaining expertise in scientific disciplines.
The author’s endorsement of Pinker’s views is centered on the practical applicability and utility of logical reasoning in tackling real-world challenges, aligning with Pinker’s analysis of how rationality can improve decision-making across various life domains.
Q.No: 490
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
The author refers to the ancient Greek philosophers to:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 6 focuses on the purpose behind the author’s reference to ancient Greek philosophers in the context of Pinker’s discussion on rational behavior. It aims to determine how these philosophers’ views are used to complement or critique Pinker’s arguments about rationality.
Correct Answer:
1. reveal gaps in Pinker’s discussion of the importance of ethical considerations in rational behavior.
The author uses the example of ancient Greek philosophers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, to highlight a significant aspect that is underexplored in Pinker’s discussion: the role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior. The fourth paragraph of the passage notes that while Pinker recognizes rationality as a moral virtue, he does not thoroughly develop this point. By referencing the ancient Greeks, who deeply explored the relationship between moral character and rationality, the author points out that understanding and utilizing rationality beneficially requires not just cognitive skills but also a well-formed moral character. This connection, richly investigated by the Greeks, is presented as a critical dimension missing in Pinker’s analysis.
Incorrect Answers:
2. highlight the influence of their thinking on the development of Pinker’s arguments: The passage does not suggest that Pinker’s arguments on rationality were directly influenced by the thoughts of ancient Greek philosophers.
3. indicate the various similarities between their thinking and Pinker’s conclusions: While there may be parallels, the passage specifically uses the Greek philosophers to point out what Pinker does not cover, rather than to draw similarities.
4. show how dreams and visions have for centuries influenced subconscious behavior and pathbreaking inventions: The passage mentions dreams and visions in the context of explaining that not all significant achievements stem from conscious reasoning. However, the reference to Greek philosophers is specifically linked to the ethical aspects of rational behavior, not to the role of subconscious processes in creativity.
The use of ancient Greek philosophers in the passage serves to underline a notable omission in Pinker’s treatment of rationality – the ethical and moral dimensions that are crucial for its beneficial application, a theme extensively explored by these philosophers but only briefly touched upon by Pinker.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 6 focuses on the purpose behind the author’s reference to ancient Greek philosophers in the context of Pinker’s discussion on rational behavior. It aims to determine how these philosophers’ views are used to complement or critique Pinker’s arguments about rationality.
Correct Answer:
1. reveal gaps in Pinker’s discussion of the importance of ethical considerations in rational behavior.
The author uses the example of ancient Greek philosophers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, to highlight a significant aspect that is underexplored in Pinker’s discussion: the role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior. The fourth paragraph of the passage notes that while Pinker recognizes rationality as a moral virtue, he does not thoroughly develop this point. By referencing the ancient Greeks, who deeply explored the relationship between moral character and rationality, the author points out that understanding and utilizing rationality beneficially requires not just cognitive skills but also a well-formed moral character. This connection, richly investigated by the Greeks, is presented as a critical dimension missing in Pinker’s analysis.
Incorrect Answers:
2. highlight the influence of their thinking on the development of Pinker’s arguments: The passage does not suggest that Pinker’s arguments on rationality were directly influenced by the thoughts of ancient Greek philosophers.
3. indicate the various similarities between their thinking and Pinker’s conclusions: While there may be parallels, the passage specifically uses the Greek philosophers to point out what Pinker does not cover, rather than to draw similarities.
4. show how dreams and visions have for centuries influenced subconscious behavior and pathbreaking inventions: The passage mentions dreams and visions in the context of explaining that not all significant achievements stem from conscious reasoning. However, the reference to Greek philosophers is specifically linked to the ethical aspects of rational behavior, not to the role of subconscious processes in creativity.
The use of ancient Greek philosophers in the passage serves to underline a notable omission in Pinker’s treatment of rationality – the ethical and moral dimensions that are crucial for its beneficial application, a theme extensively explored by these philosophers but only briefly touched upon by Pinker.
Q.No: 491
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
The author mentions Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene and Mozart’s symphonies to illustrate the point that:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 7 examines the reason behind the author’s mention of Kekulé’s discovery of benzene’s structure and Mozart’s symphonies. The question aims to identify what these examples illustrate about the nature of human achievement as discussed in Pinker’s book on rationality.
Correct Answer:
2. great innovations across various fields can stem from flashes of intuition and are not always propelled by logical thinking.
The author references Kekulé and Mozart to illustrate that extraordinary human achievements in science, music, and other fields often arise from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from conscious, sequential reasoning. In the third paragraph, the author contrasts Pinker’s emphasis on rational, deliberate thinking with the fact that many significant discoveries and creations occur as sudden insights. These examples serve to highlight the broader spectrum of human cognition and creativity, encompassing both the rational processes emphasized by Pinker and the intuitive, spontaneous bursts of inspiration that have led to major scientific and artistic breakthroughs.
Incorrect Answers:
1. unlike the sciences, human achievements in other fields are a mix of logical reasoning and spontaneous epiphanies: This option incorrectly implies a separation between sciences and other fields regarding the role of intuition. The passage suggests that intuition plays a significant role in both scientific and artistic achievements.
3. Pinker’s conclusions on sequential reasoning are belied by European achievements which, in the past, were more rooted in unconscious bursts of genius: The passage does not suggest that European achievements contradict Pinker’s conclusions; rather, it presents these achievements as additional aspects of human creativity.
4. it is not just the creative arts, but also scientific fields that have benefitted from flashes of creativity: While this statement is true, it does not capture the specific point the author is making about the contrast between Pinker’s focus on sequential reasoning and the broader nature of creativity and insight.
The passage uses the examples of Kekulé and Mozart to underscore the idea that significant achievements often originate from intuitive insights, adding a dimension to human creativity and problem-solving that extends beyond the deliberate, logical reasoning highlighted by Pinker.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 7 examines the reason behind the author’s mention of Kekulé’s discovery of benzene’s structure and Mozart’s symphonies. The question aims to identify what these examples illustrate about the nature of human achievement as discussed in Pinker’s book on rationality.
Correct Answer:
2. great innovations across various fields can stem from flashes of intuition and are not always propelled by logical thinking.
The author references Kekulé and Mozart to illustrate that extraordinary human achievements in science, music, and other fields often arise from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from conscious, sequential reasoning. In the third paragraph, the author contrasts Pinker’s emphasis on rational, deliberate thinking with the fact that many significant discoveries and creations occur as sudden insights. These examples serve to highlight the broader spectrum of human cognition and creativity, encompassing both the rational processes emphasized by Pinker and the intuitive, spontaneous bursts of inspiration that have led to major scientific and artistic breakthroughs.
Incorrect Answers:
1. unlike the sciences, human achievements in other fields are a mix of logical reasoning and spontaneous epiphanies: This option incorrectly implies a separation between sciences and other fields regarding the role of intuition. The passage suggests that intuition plays a significant role in both scientific and artistic achievements.
3. Pinker’s conclusions on sequential reasoning are belied by European achievements which, in the past, were more rooted in unconscious bursts of genius: The passage does not suggest that European achievements contradict Pinker’s conclusions; rather, it presents these achievements as additional aspects of human creativity.
4. it is not just the creative arts, but also scientific fields that have benefitted from flashes of creativity: While this statement is true, it does not capture the specific point the author is making about the contrast between Pinker’s focus on sequential reasoning and the broader nature of creativity and insight.
The passage uses the examples of Kekulé and Mozart to underscore the idea that significant achievements often originate from intuitive insights, adding a dimension to human creativity and problem-solving that extends beyond the deliberate, logical reasoning highlighted by Pinker.
Q.No: 492
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (5 to 8): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
Steven Pinker’s new book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” offers a pragmatic dose of measured optimism, presenting rationality as a fragile but achievable ideal in personal and civic life. . . . Pinker’s ambition to illuminate such a crucial topic offers the welcome prospect of a return to sanity. . . . It’s no small achievement to make formal logic, game theory, statistics and Bayesian reasoning delightful topics full of charm and relevance.
It’s also plausible to believe that a wider application of the rational tools he analyzes would improve the world in important ways. His primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty is particularly timely and should be required reading before consuming any news about the [COVID] pandemic. More broadly, he argues that less media coverage of shocking but vanishingly rare events, from shark attacks to adverse vaccine reactions, would help prevent dangerous overreactions, fatalism and the diversion of finite resources away from solvable but lessdramatic issues, like malnutrition in the developing world. It’s a reasonable critique, and Pinker is not the first to make it. But analyzing the political economy of journalism — its funding structures, ownership concentration and increasing reliance on social media shares — would have given a fuller picture of why so much coverage is so misguided and what we might do about it.
Pinker’s main focus is the sort of conscious, sequential reasoning that can track the steps in a geometric proof or an argument in formal logic. Skill in this domain maps directly onto the navigation of many real-world problems, and Pinker shows how greater mastery of the tools of rationality can improve decision-making in medical, legal, financial and many other contexts in which we must act on uncertain and shifting information. . . .
Despite the undeniable power of the sort of rationality he describes, many of the deepest insights in the history of science, math, music and art strike their originators in moments of epiphany. From the 19th-century chemist Friedrich August Kekulé’s discovery of the structure of benzene to any of Mozart’s symphonies, much extraordinary human achievement is not a product of conscious, sequential reasoning. Even Plato’s Socrates — who anticipated many of Pinker’s points by nearly 2,500 years, showing the virtue of knowing what you do not know and examining all premises in arguments, not simply trusting speakers’ authority or charisma — attributed many of his most profound insights to dreams and visions. Conscious reasoning is helpful in sorting the wheat from the chaff, but it would be interesting to consider the hidden aquifers that make much of the grain grow in the first place.
The role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior is also underexplored. Pinker recognizes that rationality “is not just a cognitive virtue but a moral one.” But this profoundly important point, one subtly explored by ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, doesn’t really get developed. This is a shame, since possessing the right sort of moral character is arguably a precondition for using rationality in beneficial ways.
According to the author, for Pinker as well as the ancient Greek philosophers, rational thinking involves all of the following EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 8 probes into the conceptualization of rational thinking as presented by Steven Pinker and the ancient Greek philosophers in the passage. It asks which aspect of rational thinking is not included in their views, as discussed in the book “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters.” The question tests the reader’s understanding of how Pinker and the Greek philosophers perceive rational thinking, particularly regarding its scope and application.
Correct Answer:
4. the primacy of conscious sequential reasoning as the basis for seminal human achievements.
The passage, especially in the third paragraph, discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its utility in various real-world situations. However, it contrasts this with the idea that many great scientific and artistic achievements come from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from deliberate, logical processes. Examples like Kekulé’s discovery and Mozart’s symphonies are cited to illustrate this point. Moreover, the reference to Socrates — a figure who predates Pinker by millennia and emphasized knowing one’s ignorance and examining premises in arguments — indicates that profound insights often come from beyond conscious reasoning. Thus, while both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value rational thought, they do not assert it as the sole or primary basis for all significant human achievements.
Incorrect Answers:
1. arriving at independent conclusions irrespective of who is presenting the argument: The passage implies that both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value the ability to think independently, without undue influence from authority figures or charismatic individuals. This aligns with a critical aspect of rational thinking.
2. an awareness of underlying assumptions in an argument and gaps in one’s own knowledge: Pinker’s focus on rationality, as well as the philosophical teachings of ancient Greeks like Socrates, encompass an understanding of one’s limitations and the importance of questioning assumptions, which is a fundamental part of rational thought.
3. the belief that the ability to reason logically encompasses an ethical and moral dimension: The passage acknowledges that Pinker sees rationality as a moral virtue, an idea that is also explored by Greek philosophers. This indicates that both view rational thinking as having ethical and moral implications.
The passage illustrates that while Pinker and the Greek philosophers recognize the importance of rational, logical reasoning, they also acknowledge the role of intuition and spontaneous insight in human achievements. This perspective suggests a more comprehensive understanding of rationality, extending beyond the confines of conscious, sequential reasoning.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 8 probes into the conceptualization of rational thinking as presented by Steven Pinker and the ancient Greek philosophers in the passage. It asks which aspect of rational thinking is not included in their views, as discussed in the book “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters.” The question tests the reader’s understanding of how Pinker and the Greek philosophers perceive rational thinking, particularly regarding its scope and application.
Correct Answer:
4. the primacy of conscious sequential reasoning as the basis for seminal human achievements.
The passage, especially in the third paragraph, discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its utility in various real-world situations. However, it contrasts this with the idea that many great scientific and artistic achievements come from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from deliberate, logical processes. Examples like Kekulé’s discovery and Mozart’s symphonies are cited to illustrate this point. Moreover, the reference to Socrates — a figure who predates Pinker by millennia and emphasized knowing one’s ignorance and examining premises in arguments — indicates that profound insights often come from beyond conscious reasoning. Thus, while both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value rational thought, they do not assert it as the sole or primary basis for all significant human achievements.
Incorrect Answers:
1. arriving at independent conclusions irrespective of who is presenting the argument: The passage implies that both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value the ability to think independently, without undue influence from authority figures or charismatic individuals. This aligns with a critical aspect of rational thinking.
2. an awareness of underlying assumptions in an argument and gaps in one’s own knowledge: Pinker’s focus on rationality, as well as the philosophical teachings of ancient Greeks like Socrates, encompass an understanding of one’s limitations and the importance of questioning assumptions, which is a fundamental part of rational thought.
3. the belief that the ability to reason logically encompasses an ethical and moral dimension: The passage acknowledges that Pinker sees rationality as a moral virtue, an idea that is also explored by Greek philosophers. This indicates that both view rational thinking as having ethical and moral implications.
The passage illustrates that while Pinker and the Greek philosophers recognize the importance of rational, logical reasoning, they also acknowledge the role of intuition and spontaneous insight in human achievements. This perspective suggests a more comprehensive understanding of rationality, extending beyond the confines of conscious, sequential reasoning.
Q.No: 493
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The biggest challenge [The Nutmeg’s Curse by Ghosh] throws down is to the prevailing understanding of when the climate crisis started. Most of us have accepted . . . that it started with the widespread use of coal at the beginning of the Industrial Age in the 18th century and worsened with the mass adoption of oil and natural gas in the 20th.
Ghosh takes this history at least three centuries back, to the start of European colonialism in the 15th century. He [starts] the book with a 1621 massacre by Dutch invaders determined to impose a monopoly on nutmeg cultivation and trade in the Banda islands in today’s Indonesia. Not only do the Dutch systematically depopulate the islands through genocide, they also try their best to bring nutmeg cultivation into plantation mode. These are the two points to which Ghosh returns through examples from around the world. One, how European colonialists decimated not only indigenous populations but also indigenous understanding of the relationship between humans and Earth. Two, how this was an invasion not only of humans but of the Earth itself, and how this continues to the present day by looking at nature as a ‘resource’ to exploit. . . .
We know we are facing more frequent and more severe heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts and wildfires due to climate change. We know our expansion through deforestation, dam building, canal cutting – in short, terraforming, the word Ghosh uses – has brought us repeated disasters . . . Are these the responses of an angry Gaia who has finally had enough? By using the word ‘curse’ in the title, the author makes it clear that he thinks so. I use the pronoun ‘who’ knowingly, because Ghosh has quoted many non-European sources to enquire into the relationship between humans and the world around them so that he can question the prevalent way of looking at Earth as an inert object to be exploited to the maximum.
As Ghosh’s text, notes and bibliography show once more, none of this is new. There have always been challenges to the way European colonialists looked at other civilisations and at Earth. It is just that the invaders and their myriad backers in the fields of economics, politics, anthropology, philosophy, literature, technology, physics, chemistry, biology have dominated global intellectual discourse. . . .
There are other points of view that we can hear today if we listen hard enough. Those observing global climate negotiations know about the Latin American way of looking at Earth as Pachamama (Earth Mother). They also know how such a framing is just provided lip service and is ignored in the substantive portions of the negotiations. In The Nutmeg’s Curse, Ghosh explains why. He shows the extent of the vested interest in the oil economy – not only for oil-exporting countries, but also for a superpower like the US that controls oil drilling, oil prices and oil movement around the world. Many of us know power utilities are sabotaging decentralised solar power generation today because it hits their revenues and control. And how the other points of view are so often drowned out.
The biggest challenge [The Nutmeg’s Curse by Ghosh] throws down is to the prevailing understanding of when the climate crisis started. Most of us have accepted . . . that it started with the widespread use of coal at the beginning of the Industrial Age in the 18th century and worsened with the mass adoption of oil and natural gas in the 20th.
Ghosh takes this history at least three centuries back, to the start of European colonialism in the 15th century. He [starts] the book with a 1621 massacre by Dutch invaders determined to impose a monopoly on nutmeg cultivation and trade in the Banda islands in today’s Indonesia. Not only do the Dutch systematically depopulate the islands through genocide, they also try their best to bring nutmeg cultivation into plantation mode. These are the two points to which Ghosh returns through examples from around the world. One, how European colonialists decimated not only indigenous populations but also indigenous understanding of the relationship between humans and Earth. Two, how this was an invasion not only of humans but of the Earth itself, and how this continues to the present day by looking at nature as a ‘resource’ to exploit. . . .
We know we are facing more frequent and more severe heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts and wildfires due to climate change. We know our expansion through deforestation, dam building, canal cutting – in short, terraforming, the word Ghosh uses – has brought us repeated disasters . . . Are these the responses of an angry Gaia who has finally had enough? By using the word ‘curse’ in the title, the author makes it clear that he thinks so. I use the pronoun ‘who’ knowingly, because Ghosh has quoted many non-European sources to enquire into the relationship between humans and the world around them so that he can question the prevalent way of looking at Earth as an inert object to be exploited to the maximum.
As Ghosh’s text, notes and bibliography show once more, none of this is new. There have always been challenges to the way European colonialists looked at other civilisations and at Earth. It is just that the invaders and their myriad backers in the fields of economics, politics, anthropology, philosophy, literature, technology, physics, chemistry, biology have dominated global intellectual discourse. . . .
There are other points of view that we can hear today if we listen hard enough. Those observing global climate negotiations know about the Latin American way of looking at Earth as Pachamama (Earth Mother). They also know how such a framing is just provided lip service and is ignored in the substantive portions of the negotiations. In The Nutmeg’s Curse, Ghosh explains why. He shows the extent of the vested interest in the oil economy – not only for oil-exporting countries, but also for a superpower like the US that controls oil drilling, oil prices and oil movement around the world. Many of us know power utilities are sabotaging decentralised solar power generation today because it hits their revenues and control. And how the other points of view are so often drowned out.
All of the following can be inferred from the reviewer’s discussion of “The Nutmeg’s Curse”, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: Question 10 asks which statement cannot be inferred from the reviewer’s discussion of “The Nutmeg’s Curse.” This requires identifying an idea or notion that is not supported by, or is contradictory to, the content of the passage.
Correct Answer:
2. Academic discourses have always served the function of raising awareness about environmental preservation.
This statement cannot be inferred from the passage, as it does not discuss the historical role of academic discourses in environmental preservation. While the passage does mention the dominance of European perspectives in various academic fields, it does not explicitly state or imply that these discourses have consistently been focused on raising environmental awareness. Therefore, this option stands out as the one least supported by the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmental preservation policymakers can learn from non-European and/or pre-colonial societies: This is implied in the passage, which discusses the value of non-European perspectives on nature and the environment.
3. The contemporary dominant perception of nature and the environment was put in place by processes of colonialism: The passage explicitly discusses how European colonialism shaped perceptions and attitudes towards nature and the environment.
4. The history of climate change is deeply intertwined with the history of colonialism: Ghosh’s book, as described in the passage, traces the climate crisis back to the start of European colonialism, indicating a deep interconnection.
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: Question 10 asks which statement cannot be inferred from the reviewer’s discussion of “The Nutmeg’s Curse.” This requires identifying an idea or notion that is not supported by, or is contradictory to, the content of the passage.
Correct Answer:
2. Academic discourses have always served the function of raising awareness about environmental preservation.
This statement cannot be inferred from the passage, as it does not discuss the historical role of academic discourses in environmental preservation. While the passage does mention the dominance of European perspectives in various academic fields, it does not explicitly state or imply that these discourses have consistently been focused on raising environmental awareness. Therefore, this option stands out as the one least supported by the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmental preservation policymakers can learn from non-European and/or pre-colonial societies: This is implied in the passage, which discusses the value of non-European perspectives on nature and the environment.
3. The contemporary dominant perception of nature and the environment was put in place by processes of colonialism: The passage explicitly discusses how European colonialism shaped perceptions and attitudes towards nature and the environment.
4. The history of climate change is deeply intertwined with the history of colonialism: Ghosh’s book, as described in the passage, traces the climate crisis back to the start of European colonialism, indicating a deep interconnection.
Q.No: 494
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (9 to 12): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
The biggest challenge [The Nutmeg’s Curse by Ghosh] throws down is to the prevailing understanding of when the climate crisis started. Most of us have accepted . . . that it started with the widespread use of coal at the beginning of the Industrial Age in the 18th century and worsened with the mass adoption of oil and natural gas in the 20th.
Ghosh takes this history at least three centuries back, to the start of European colonialism in the 15th century. He [starts] the book with a 1621 massacre by Dutch invaders determined to impose a monopoly on nutmeg cultivation and trade in the Banda islands in today’s Indonesia. Not only do the Dutch systematically depopulate the islands through genocide, they also try their best to bring nutmeg cultivation into plantation mode. These are the two points to which Ghosh returns through examples from around the world. One, how European colonialists decimated not only indigenous populations but also indigenous understanding of the relationship between humans and Earth. Two, how this was an invasion not only of humans but of the Earth itself, and how this continues to the present day by looking at nature as a ‘resource’ to exploit. . . .
We know we are facing more frequent and more severe heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts and wildfires due to climate change. We know our expansion through deforestation, dam building, canal cutting – in short, terraforming, the word Ghosh uses – has brought us repeated disasters . . . Are these the responses of an angry Gaia who has finally had enough? By using the word ‘curse’ in the title, the author makes it clear that he thinks so. I use the pronoun ‘who’ knowingly, because Ghosh has quoted many non-European sources to enquire into the relationship between humans and the world around them so that he can question the prevalent way of looking at Earth as an inert object to be exploited to the maximum.
As Ghosh’s text, notes and bibliography show once more, none of this is new. There have always been challenges to the way European colonialists looked at other civilisations and at Earth. It is just that the invaders and their myriad backers in the fields of economics, politics, anthropology, philosophy, literature, technology, physics, chemistry, biology have dominated global intellectual discourse. . . .
There are other points of view that we can hear today if we listen hard enough. Those observing global climate negotiations know about the Latin American way of looking at Earth as Pachamama (Earth Mother). They also know how such a framing is just provided lip service and is ignored in the substantive portions of the negotiations. In The Nutmeg’s Curse, Ghosh explains why. He shows the extent of the vested interest in the oil economy – not only for oil-exporting countries, but also for a superpower like the US that controls oil drilling, oil prices and oil movement around the world. Many of us know power utilities are sabotaging decentralised solar power generation today because it hits their revenues and control. And how the other points of view are so often drowned out.
The biggest challenge [The Nutmeg’s Curse by Ghosh] throws down is to the prevailing understanding of when the climate crisis started. Most of us have accepted . . . that it started with the widespread use of coal at the beginning of the Industrial Age in the 18th century and worsened with the mass adoption of oil and natural gas in the 20th.
Ghosh takes this history at least three centuries back, to the start of European colonialism in the 15th century. He [starts] the book with a 1621 massacre by Dutch invaders determined to impose a monopoly on nutmeg cultivation and trade in the Banda islands in today’s Indonesia. Not only do the Dutch systematically depopulate the islands through genocide, they also try their best to bring nutmeg cultivation into plantation mode. These are the two points to which Ghosh returns through examples from around the world. One, how European colonialists decimated not only indigenous populations but also indigenous understanding of the relationship between humans and Earth. Two, how this was an invasion not only of humans but of the Earth itself, and how this continues to the present day by looking at nature as a ‘resource’ to exploit. . . .
We know we are facing more frequent and more severe heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts and wildfires due to climate change. We know our expansion through deforestation, dam building, canal cutting – in short, terraforming, the word Ghosh uses – has brought us repeated disasters . . . Are these the responses of an angry Gaia who has finally had enough? By using the word ‘curse’ in the title, the author makes it clear that he thinks so. I use the pronoun ‘who’ knowingly, because Ghosh has quoted many non-European sources to enquire into the relationship between humans and the world around them so that he can question the prevalent way of looking at Earth as an inert object to be exploited to the maximum.
As Ghosh’s text, notes and bibliography show once more, none of this is new. There have always been challenges to the way European colonialists looked at other civilisations and at Earth. It is just that the invaders and their myriad backers in the fields of economics, politics, anthropology, philosophy, literature, technology, physics, chemistry, biology have dominated global intellectual discourse. . . .
There are other points of view that we can hear today if we listen hard enough. Those observing global climate negotiations know about the Latin American way of looking at Earth as Pachamama (Earth Mother). They also know how such a framing is just provided lip service and is ignored in the substantive portions of the negotiations. In The Nutmeg’s Curse, Ghosh explains why. He shows the extent of the vested interest in the oil economy – not only for oil-exporting countries, but also for a superpower like the US that controls oil drilling, oil prices and oil movement around the world. Many of us know power utilities are sabotaging decentralised solar power generation today because it hits their revenues and control. And how the other points of view are so often drowned out.
Which one of the following, if true, would make the reviewer’s choice of the pronoun “who” for Gaia inappropriate?
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: This question asks which statement, if true, would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" for Gaia inappropriate. In the passage, the reviewer uses "who" to refer to Gaia, implying that the Earth is being treated as a living entity. We need to find the option that would challenge or contradict this perception.
Correct Answer:
Option 2: Non-European societies have perceived the Earth as a non-living source of all resources.
• This is the correct answer because if non-European societies viewed the Earth as a non-living entity, it would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" (implying a living being) inappropriate. The passage emphasizes that many non-European societies, like those in Latin America (with their concept of Pachamama or Earth Mother), view the Earth as a living, sentient entity. If instead, they saw the Earth as non-living, the use of "who" would no longer make sense.
Incorrect Answer Explanations:
Option 1: There is a direct cause–effect relationship between human activities and global climate change.
• This is irrelevant to the use of the pronoun "who." Whether or not there is a direct cause-effect relationship between human activities and climate change doesn't impact the view of the Earth as a living or non-living entity.
Option 3: Modern western science discovers new evidence for the Earth being an inanimate object.
• While this might seem like it could make "who" inappropriate, the passage is focused on non-European perspectives and alternative worldviews, not modern Western science. The reviewer’s choice of “who” is based on Ghosh’s exploration of non-European beliefs, not Western scientific discoveries.
Option 4: Ghosh’s book has a different title: “The Nutmeg’s Revenge”.
• A different title for Ghosh’s book wouldn’t affect the appropriateness of the pronoun “who.” The reviewer’s choice of “who” relates to the concept of the Earth being viewed as a living entity, not the book’s title.
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: This question asks which statement, if true, would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" for Gaia inappropriate. In the passage, the reviewer uses "who" to refer to Gaia, implying that the Earth is being treated as a living entity. We need to find the option that would challenge or contradict this perception.
Correct Answer:
Option 2: Non-European societies have perceived the Earth as a non-living source of all resources.
• This is the correct answer because if non-European societies viewed the Earth as a non-living entity, it would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" (implying a living being) inappropriate. The passage emphasizes that many non-European societies, like those in Latin America (with their concept of Pachamama or Earth Mother), view the Earth as a living, sentient entity. If instead, they saw the Earth as non-living, the use of "who" would no longer make sense.
Incorrect Answer Explanations:
Option 1: There is a direct cause–effect relationship between human activities and global climate change.
• This is irrelevant to the use of the pronoun "who." Whether or not there is a direct cause-effect relationship between human activities and climate change doesn't impact the view of the Earth as a living or non-living entity.
Option 3: Modern western science discovers new evidence for the Earth being an inanimate object.
• While this might seem like it could make "who" inappropriate, the passage is focused on non-European perspectives and alternative worldviews, not modern Western science. The reviewer’s choice of “who” is based on Ghosh’s exploration of non-European beliefs, not Western scientific discoveries.
Option 4: Ghosh’s book has a different title: “The Nutmeg’s Revenge”.
• A different title for Ghosh’s book wouldn’t affect the appropriateness of the pronoun “who.” The reviewer’s choice of “who” relates to the concept of the Earth being viewed as a living entity, not the book’s title.
Q.No: 495
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
Which one of the following statements, if true, would undermine the central idea of the passage?
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 13 asks which statement, if true, would undermine the central idea of the passage. This requires identifying a scenario that contradicts the main argument or findings presented in the passage regarding cultural property laws and archaeological discoveries.
Correct Answer:
4. UNESCO finances archaeological research in poor, but archaeologically-rich source countries.
If UNESCO actively finances archaeological research in poor countries, this could undermine the passage’s central idea that strict cultural property laws diminish incentives for archaeological discoveries. The passage argues that such laws reduce foreign investments in exploration, suggesting a need for funding and collaboration. However, if UNESCO provides significant funding, the negative impact of these laws on discoveries might be lessened or mitigated, challenging the passage’s argument.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Western countries apologizing: Apologies from Western countries for past looting wouldn’t necessarily undermine the idea that cultural property laws have reduced archaeological discoveries.
2. Affluent source countries affording excavations: The ability of affluent source countries to fund their excavations does not contradict the passage’s central idea regarding the impact of patrimony laws on poorer countries.
3. Museums in deprived countries displaying antiques: The establishment of local museums to display artifacts doesn’t directly challenge the passage’s argument about reduced archaeological discoveries due to patrimony laws.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 13 asks which statement, if true, would undermine the central idea of the passage. This requires identifying a scenario that contradicts the main argument or findings presented in the passage regarding cultural property laws and archaeological discoveries.
Correct Answer:
4. UNESCO finances archaeological research in poor, but archaeologically-rich source countries.
If UNESCO actively finances archaeological research in poor countries, this could undermine the passage’s central idea that strict cultural property laws diminish incentives for archaeological discoveries. The passage argues that such laws reduce foreign investments in exploration, suggesting a need for funding and collaboration. However, if UNESCO provides significant funding, the negative impact of these laws on discoveries might be lessened or mitigated, challenging the passage’s argument.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Western countries apologizing: Apologies from Western countries for past looting wouldn’t necessarily undermine the idea that cultural property laws have reduced archaeological discoveries.
2. Affluent source countries affording excavations: The ability of affluent source countries to fund their excavations does not contradict the passage’s central idea regarding the impact of patrimony laws on poorer countries.
3. Museums in deprived countries displaying antiques: The establishment of local museums to display artifacts doesn’t directly challenge the passage’s argument about reduced archaeological discoveries due to patrimony laws.
Q.No: 496
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
From the passage we can infer that the author is likely to advise poor, but archaeologically-rich source countries to do all of the following, EXCEPT:
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 14 asks what the author is likely to advise poor but archaeologically-rich source countries to do, based on the content of the passage, except for one option that the author wouldn’t advise.
Correct Answer:
4. Fund institutes in other countries to undertake archaeological exploration in the source country, reaping the benefits of cutting-edge techniques.
This option is the least likely to be advised by the author, as the passage suggests that the author advocates for easing strict patrimony laws to encourage more archaeological discoveries through international collaboration. It doesn’t specifically suggest that source countries should fund institutions in other countries for exploration. The other options align more closely with the passage’s content, emphasizing collaborative efforts and modifications to cultural property laws.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Adopt China’s strategy: The passage cites China as a successful example of easing cultural property laws and embracing international research.
2. Allow foreign countries to analyze and exhibit finds: This aligns with the suggestion for more collaborative approaches in archaeology.
3. Motivate other countries to finance explorations: Encouraging foreign investments in archaeological projects is consistent with the passage’s argument.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 14 asks what the author is likely to advise poor but archaeologically-rich source countries to do, based on the content of the passage, except for one option that the author wouldn’t advise.
Correct Answer:
4. Fund institutes in other countries to undertake archaeological exploration in the source country, reaping the benefits of cutting-edge techniques.
This option is the least likely to be advised by the author, as the passage suggests that the author advocates for easing strict patrimony laws to encourage more archaeological discoveries through international collaboration. It doesn’t specifically suggest that source countries should fund institutions in other countries for exploration. The other options align more closely with the passage’s content, emphasizing collaborative efforts and modifications to cultural property laws.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Adopt China’s strategy: The passage cites China as a successful example of easing cultural property laws and embracing international research.
2. Allow foreign countries to analyze and exhibit finds: This aligns with the suggestion for more collaborative approaches in archaeology.
3. Motivate other countries to finance explorations: Encouraging foreign investments in archaeological projects is consistent with the passage’s argument.
Q.No: 497
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
Which one of the following statements best expresses the paradox of patrimony laws?
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 15 seeks to identify the best statement that captures the paradox of patrimony laws as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. They were aimed at protecting cultural property, but instead reduced new archaeological discoveries.
This option directly reflects the paradox discussed in the passage: patrimony laws were intended to protect cultural heritage from exploitation, but the study cited in the passage shows that these laws have actually led to a sharp decrease in new archaeological discoveries. This unintended consequence forms the core of the paradox.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Withholding national treasure from museums: The paradox is not about withholding treasures but about the impact on discoveries.
2. Neglect of historical sites: The passage doesn’t suggest that patrimony laws resulted in site neglect.
4. Reduced business for auctioneers: The focus of the paradox is on archaeological discoveries, not auctioneers’ business.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 15 seeks to identify the best statement that captures the paradox of patrimony laws as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. They were aimed at protecting cultural property, but instead reduced new archaeological discoveries.
This option directly reflects the paradox discussed in the passage: patrimony laws were intended to protect cultural heritage from exploitation, but the study cited in the passage shows that these laws have actually led to a sharp decrease in new archaeological discoveries. This unintended consequence forms the core of the paradox.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Withholding national treasure from museums: The paradox is not about withholding treasures but about the impact on discoveries.
2. Neglect of historical sites: The passage doesn’t suggest that patrimony laws resulted in site neglect.
4. Reduced business for auctioneers: The focus of the paradox is on archaeological discoveries, not auctioneers’ business.
Q.No: 498
Test Name : CAT Actual Paper 2023 Slot 3
Question Numbers (13 to 16): The passage below is
accompanied by four questions. Based on the passage,
choose the best answer for each question.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
In 2006, the Met [art museum in the US] agreed to return the Euphronios krater, a masterpiece Greek urn that had been a museum draw since 1972. In 2007, the Getty [art museum in the US] agreed to return 40 objects to Italy, including a marble Aphrodite, in the midst of looting scandals. And in December, Sotheby’s and a private owner agreed to return an ancient Khmer statue of a warrior, pulled from auction two years before, to Cambodia.
Cultural property, or patrimony, laws limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory, including outright export prohibitions and national ownership laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials and policymakers portray cultural property laws in general as invaluable tools for counteracting the ugly legacy of Western cultural imperialism.
During the late 19th and early 20th century — an era former Met director Thomas Hoving called “the age of piracy” — American and European art museums acquired antiquities by hook or by crook, from grave robbers or souvenir collectors, bounty from digs and ancient sites in impoverished but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws were intended to protect future archaeological discoveries against Western imperialist designs. . . .
I surveyed 90 countries with one or more archaeological sites on UNESCO’s World Heritage Site list, and my study shows that in most cases the number of discovered sites diminishes sharply after a country passes a cultural property law. There are 222 archaeological sites listed for those 90 countries. When you look into the history of the sites, you see that all but 21 were discovered before the passage of cultural property laws. . . .
Strict cultural patrimony laws are popular in most countries. But the downside may be that they reduce incentives for foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations and educational institutions to invest in overseas exploration because their efforts will not necessarily be rewarded by opportunities to hold, display and study what is uncovered. To the extent that source countries can fund their own archaeological projects, artifacts and sites may still be discovered. . . . The survey has far-reaching implications. It suggests that source countries, particularly in the developing world, should narrow their cultural property laws so that they can reap the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically increase tourism and enhance cultural pride. This does not mean these nations should abolish restrictions on foreign excavation and foreign claims to artifacts.
China provides an interesting alternative approach for source nations eager for foreign archaeological investment. From 1935 to 2003, China had a restrictive cultural property law that prohibited foreign ownership of Chinese cultural artifacts. In those years, China’s most significant archaeological discovery occurred by chance, in 1974, when peasant farmers accidentally uncovered ranks of buried terra cotta warriors, which are part of Emperor Qin’s spectacular tomb system.
In 2003, the Chinese government switched course, dropping its cultural property law and embracing collaborative international archaeological research. Since then, China has nominated 11 archaeological sites for inclusion in the World Heritage Site list, including eight in 2013, the most ever for China.
It can be inferred from the passage that archaeological sites are considered important by some source countries because they:
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 16 asks what can be inferred about why some source countries consider archaeological sites important, based on the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. Give a boost to the tourism sector.
The passage suggests that archaeological sites are valued partly because of their potential to boost tourism. This is inferred from the discussion on the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically include increased tourism and enhanced cultural pride.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Generate funds for future discoveries: While plausible, the passage doesn’t explicitly link site importance to funding future discoveries.
2. Subject to strict patrimony laws: The importance of sites isn’t directly attributed to the existence of patrimony laws.
4. Symbol of Western imperialism: The passage discusses Western imperialism in the context of looting and exploitation, not as a reason for the importance of sites in source countries.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 16 asks what can be inferred about why some source countries consider archaeological sites important, based on the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. Give a boost to the tourism sector.
The passage suggests that archaeological sites are valued partly because of their potential to boost tourism. This is inferred from the discussion on the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically include increased tourism and enhanced cultural pride.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Generate funds for future discoveries: While plausible, the passage doesn’t explicitly link site importance to funding future discoveries.
2. Subject to strict patrimony laws: The importance of sites isn’t directly attributed to the existence of patrimony laws.
4. Symbol of Western imperialism: The passage discusses Western imperialism in the context of looting and exploitation, not as a reason for the importance of sites in source countries.
Solution:
This is a main idea question; if you look at the complete passage, the author through examples of aeroplanes and cars and even telephones etc. is trying to show that innovation has not happened as much as it has been made out to be. The changes have been basically incremental and cosmetic.
Solution:
Refer to the last two lines of the last paragraph.
Solution:
The answer is clearly stated in the fifth line.
Solution:
The second-last paragraph talks of the various factors that are responsible for this. Answer choice (3) combines all of them.
Solution:
The centre as can be seen from the first paragraph is the - rival centers of capital on the Continent and in America, therefore none of these is the answer.
Solution:
The answer can be figured out from the first and the third paragraph.
Solution:
Solution:
Solution:
Solution:
Solution:
Solution:
Solution:
Reciprocal roles determine normative human behaviour in society.
This is the main idea of the passage that is carried throughout. Note that role of biology is negated and reciprocal roles are affirmed in paragraph 1 and 2.
This is the main idea of the passage that is carried throughout. Note that role of biology is negated and reciprocal roles are affirmed in paragraph 1 and 2.
Solution:
We would not have been offended by the father playing his role tongue in cheek.
All the other options would have been false if biological linkages would have structured human society.
All the other options would have been false if biological linkages would have structured human society.
Solution:
The last para where the author mentions the examples of a waitress and clergyman, and driver refers to the alignment of self with the rules being performed and society preventing manifestation of the true self.
Solution:
Define the place of the poet in his culture.
The lines starting with But suddenly I understood ..define the position of the poet in his culture.
The lines starting with But suddenly I understood ..define the position of the poet in his culture.
Solution:
Refer to the 5th line of the 2nd para. Here the term "adventures of experience" refers to the poet & artists who over vitalize and enrich the past for us.
Solution:
Refer to the 5th paragraph of the passage. The sentence two two-cent
.suggested excess clearly tell us that it was intemperance on part of the author which made him pine for two two-cent ice-cream cones instead of one four-cent pie.
Solution:
Refer to the last line of the 4th paragraph of the passage. Here the author says that the intentions of his elders in not letting him eat two-cent cones was cruelly pedagogical. This implies that the justification was didactic in nature. This makes option (1) correct. The rest of the options are incorrect in context of the passage. Dietetic refers to anything related with diet or the use of food. Dialectic refers to the nature of logical argumentation. Diatonic refers to using only the seven tones of a standard scale without chromatic alterations. Diastolic refers to the rhythmically occurring relaxation and the dilation of the heart chambers.
Solution:
Spiders know how to spin webs highlights the inherent qualities of living species. This analogy can be replaced in a similar way by Bees collecting nectar which is also a part of their inane trait. Options(1), (3), (4), (5) mention traits which are acquired over a period of time by putting in some kind of effort in order to be adept at them.
Solution:
Refer to the 3rd paragraph of the passage where the author says that the scientists believe that the complexity of language is part of our biological birthright. He further illustrates the scientists point of view that it cannot be taught. The author strengthens this view by quoting Oscar Wilde, making option(1) as the correct answer option. The rest of the options are not mentioned in the passage.
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author is talking about language as a type of instinct that is existent is human beings and not any specific attribute or skill that is learnt by them over a period of time. In the first paragraph, the author claims But I prefer the admittedly quaint term instinct. Similarly in the last paragraph of the passage, the author concludes by saying that Finally, since language is the product of a well engineered biological instinct, we shall see that it is not the nutty barrel of monkeys that entertainer-columnists make it out to be.
Solution:
In the 3rd paragraph, refer to the lines At the time of previous droughts.......to have reliable water supplies. Hence, it is evident that the final drought which caused the collapse of the Maya civilization was different from the previous droughts because man had left no unoccupied land away from agriculture to start life in a new way.
Solution:
The first paragraph of the passage states that To summarize the Classic Maya collapse, we can tentatively identify five strands. I acknowledge, however, that Maya archaeologists still disagree vigorously among themselves-in part, because the different strands evidently varied in importance among different parts of the Maya realm; because detailed archaeological studies are available for only some Maya sites, and because it remains puzzling why most of the Maya heartland remained nearly empty of population and failed to recover after the collapse and after re-growth of forests. Hence, there is not one specific factor that can individually explain the collapse of the Maya civilization. Therefore, the correct answer would be option 4.
Solution:
Refer to the first sentence of the first paragraph of the passage where science and art have ben stated as similar in including a whole range of separate, though interconnecting activities. Hence, option(1) is the correct answer.
Solution:
In the first paragraph of the passage, refer to the lines Briefly, then, the concepts of modern art are of legitimately......visual and spiritual experience. Hence, the ideologies of the art of the twentieth century can be better realised by the fast changing world of visual and metaphysical understanding. The rest of the options have no link with the concepts and ideologies of the art of the twentieth century.
Solution:
A traditional kinship group provides security, identity as well as an entire scheme of things.
Solution:
Both the examples have been cited in the passage to show the extent of disintegration of kinship.
Solution:
The passage states that farming led to kinship becoming more important.
Solution:
The rise in individual self consciousness has led to the loss of sanity, supportiveness as well as warmth.
Solution:
The passage deals with the changes in kinship patterns over time and their effect on the individuals.
Solution:
The author says that serial monogamy is a series of marriages and divorces.
Solution:
According to the passage, smaller families are less influential.
Solution:
Genealogy refers to family history.
Solution:
The most distressing trend is the decline in the ability to form long term intimate bonding.
Solution:
The passage states that the political and economic benefits of the rise of the individuals have been positive.
Solution:
The marauder within refers to the criminal class.
Solution:
The intellectual patrons of Australia in its first colonial years were Hobbes and Sade.
Solution:
The English did not regard Australia as a new frontier. It was settled to defend the English property from the criminal class.
Solution:
The late 18th century abounded in schemes of social goodness.
Solution:
Sanguine means confident or hopeful.
Solution:
The passage primarily deals with the settlement of Australia as a penal colony to defend the English property from the criminal class.
Solution:
The existence of the criminal class was one of the prime sociological beliefs of late Georgian and early Victorian England.
Solution:
Penology is the study of punishment in relation to crime.
Solution:
For seventeen years no observation was made on the island.
Solution:
Sydney Harbor is the new name for Port Jackson.
Solution:
The author says that mans emotions are the product of his rational faculty; his emotions cannot be understood without reference to the conceptual power of his consciousness.
Solution:
The biological basis of choosing efficacy has been said to be the relationship of efficacy to survival.
Solution:
Nature has left man free in choosing values.
Solution:
The passage clearly states that man chooses his own values, irrespective of their actual effect on his life.
Solution:
The passage states that man first acquires preferences through pleasure and pain as well as through efficacy and inefficacy.
Solution:
Reason serves the dual function of cognition as well as of evaluation.
Solution:
As a child a human being experiences issues relating to values through physical sensations of pleasure and pain.
Solution:
Since man must act to live, he is actually forced to select values.
Solution:
The passage clearly states that man experiences efficacy as well as pleasure as primary, hence the question is not debatable.
Solution:
As a being of volitional consciousness, man is not biologically programmed to make right value choices automatically.
Solution:
A heightened roller coaster effect, and not an opportunity for a roller coaster ride, is a characteristic of the stage of small victories.
Solution:
Entering a new culture involves an appreciative process, to help members of different cultures value the differences.
Solution:
Opening a bank account is an example of a small victory as it is preceded by anxiety and information collection.
Solution:
Entering a new culture is a learning process that results in valuing and affirming the best in a culture, while at the same time seeing it as a whole.
Solution:
The passage states that appreciative inquiry must precede cultural changes in an organization.
Solution:
The passage emphasizes that affirmation of a new culture involves viewing the whole, including the points that are less desirable.
Solution:
The author does not approve of legal limits on interest charged on money lent to people. The last paragraph shows his support for the free market operations.
Solution:
The author states that though the law precludes the man from borrowing, upon terms, which it deems too disadvantageous, it does not preclude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous.
Solution:
The author states that he knows of no economist of any standing who has favoured a legal limit on the rate of interest on borrowed money.
Solution:
Usury is defined as charging rates on money that are in excess of the legal limits.
Solution:
Bentham was primarily concerned with loans to individuals or business enterprises.
Solution:
The author laments that it is an oppression for a man to claim his money, but not to keep it from him. Thus he implies that a man becomes an oppressor only because the borrower does not return the money.
Solution:
The passage states that no man of sound mind and with his eyes open should be hindered from obtaining money.
Solution:
The author emphasizes the importance of free market operations throughout the passage, and draws attention to the validity of the mischief of the
anti-usurious laws. He also condemns politicians and so (d) is the most fitting description for the author.
anti-usurious laws. He also condemns politicians and so (d) is the most fitting description for the author.
Solution:
The author states that the working class that may be the lender for the first time in history, will be the hardest hit by the legal regulations.
Solution:
The bickering illustrated that Eagle constituted a collective effort, and now they were having a hard time deciding on the contribution of each individual.
Solution:
The author seems to suggest that with the launch of the machine everything that preceded it becomes past. Even the team started losing its glue and instead bickering started.
Solution:
The word after birth was used for the team that was losing its glue, that is the Eclipse Group.
Solution:
During the conversation West said that none of it had come out the way he had expected and that he was glad it was all over.
Solution:
The telegram was described as a classy gesture by all.
Solution:
One of the Microkids exclaimed that he had a great talk with West, showing that it as an honour for him.
Solution:
The machine had crashed during the programme but no one except the company engineers noticed and the problem was fast corrected. The event was written up at length in both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times, the next day.
Solution:
Some of the engineers seemed to the author to be out of place, being untutored in that sort of a performance.
Solution:
It refers to the fact that in front of the Press even those who had not been around when Eagle was conceived were described as having had the responsibility for it.
Solution:
The author states that ego and money motivates people and clearly the machine no longer belonged to the makers.
Solution:
The passage states that speeding up social reforms
implied a risk of revolt, which could be avoided by
maintaining status quo.
Solution:
The examination system was the traditional avenue of
selecting the officials.
Solution:
The Restoration statesmen tried to restore the society,
and not create a new one. They tried to stretch the
traditional ideology in order to make the Confucian
system under the new conditions.
Solution:
The only similarity was their intent to conserve.
Solution:
None of these philosophers has been mentioned in
the passage.
Solution:
The aim of the Restoration was to restore to their
original vitality the best of the ancient institutes.
Solution:
Western conservatism distrusted cosmopolitanism.
Solution:
The passage is basically about Chinese Conservatism.
Solution:
India has the lengthiest constitution in the world.
Solution:
Israel does not have a written constitution.
Solution:
Presidential cabinet is not even mentioned in the
American constitution.
Solution:
The constitutions of new states in the US are very
concise.
Solution:
A normative constitution has the status of supreme
law and is fully activate and effective.
Solution:
Where the written constitution is only nominal, behind
the verbal façade will be found the real constitution
containing the basic principles according to which
power is exercised in actual fact.
Solution:
Since a long constitution says too many things, on too
many subjects, it has to be amended often.
Solution:
The presence or absence of a written constitution
makes a difference, but only of a degree.
Solution:
The author is concerned about the books and is also
well informed about the topic.
Solution:
The paper of archival quality refers to a long lasting
paper.
Solution:
Wood pulp helped in producing large quantities of
paper.
Solution:
Paper that is acidic is highly unstable.
Solution:
This is not a reason mentioned in the passage, for
producing long lasting paper.
Solution:
Reduction in government funding has not been
mentioned as a reason for curtailing purchase of new
books.
Solution:
The continued use of wood pulp will not have any
effect on the governments.
Solution:
Lignin is a major factor that causes paper to discolour.
Solution:
Eisaku Sato was the Prime Minister for eight years.
Solution:
Hirohito has been said to be on throne for 61 years at
the time of writing of the passage, which was in 1987.
Solution:
Mr. Tanaka was involved in a bribe scandal.
Solution:
The passage says that Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone is now
bowing out.
Solution:
He has proved himself more skillful in the game of
factional politics and thus his hopes are stronger.
Solution:
The author states that how Mr. Takeshita will fare after
taking over the reins of the government is not certain,
and reasons about this in an objective manner.
Solution:
The quick turnover of Prime Ministers has led to
factionalism in LDP.
Solution:
Mr. Takeshita will be the first Prime Minister with humble
rural origins.
Solution:
The three Prime Ministers mentioned by name here are
Mr. Nakasone, Mr. Eisaku Sato and Mr. Kakue Tanaka.
Solution:
The passage is basically about how ants communicate.
Solution:
Ants attack strangers who might belong to the same
species.
Solution:
If they did so they would have been unable to
communicate with the drunken ants.
Solution:
Chloroform killed the ants.
Solution:
The author has a playful, whimsical way of writing.
Solution:
All others can pass through the atmospheric windows
without distortion.
Solution:
Chloroform killed the ants.
Solution:
Telescope mounting is used to neutralize the Earths
rotation relative to the stars.
Solution:
The precession period of the Earth is 26,000 years.
Solution:
The diurnal spinning is the spinning of the Earth on its
own axis, having no relation to the gravitational force
of the Sun or the Moon.
Solution:
The last passage states that there can be uncertainty
in the rate of orbital motion of the Earth.
Solution:
Man made signals can interfere with the radio
wavelengths between 1cm. And 20m. implying that
they also fall in the same range.
Solution:
US was more concerned with order than with reforms
of any kind.
Solution:
Latin Americans regarded it as economic imperialism.
Solution:
The Act of Bogota was most closely related to the
Marshall Plan or Latin America.
Solution:
US preferred dictatorship to the spread of communism
in Latin America.
Solution:
The Presidents initiative to present financial economic
aid to Latin America has been presented as an example
of his efforts to mend his Latin Ameriacn fences.
Thus he was not acting to continue to keep communism
from intruding the country.
Solution:
The real danger to the Republicans is the fact that its
axioms, and not its policies, are under fire. Refer ninth
paragraph line 1.
Solution:
The greatest attractions of weather, for the author, is
that it is apolitical.
Solution:
The author is watching the weather channel, thus he is
in his house.
Solution:
The weather is not manipulable.
Solution:
The second form of socialism involves all the difficulties
of the first one and much more.
Solution:
The difference is in their attitude towards change.
Solution:
Both have been mentioned as the characteristics of the
two persons.
Solution:
Corruption in high places has not been mentioned in the
passage.
Solution:
The aim of the revolutionary socialism is to substitute the
new rule for the old one at one stroke.
Solution:
The author does not symapthize with either of the two
sides.
Solution:
The author has tried to defend philosophy in the passage.
Solution:
The passage states that philosophy is politely respected
but secretly despised.
Solution:
Philosophy has not been said to be immoral
Solution:
Philosophy has not been mentioned as being responsible
for making the world a better place to live in.
Solution:
If philosophy did not exist, masses would not think for
themselves, and would thus be easier to manipulate for
the politicians.
Solution:
'Chairs at the universities' refers to the departments at
the universities.
Solution:
The existence of philosophy is proved by the defence
measures it provokes.
Solution:
The author says that at least the book had a convincing
villain.
Solution:
The passage is obviously talking about a film review.
Solution:
The author praises the film for its technical effects and
sophistication at the technological level, but is
disappointed with its story line.
Solution:
The writer says, one leaves it vaguely disappointed.
Solution:
He is thankful for such films because they fill the cinemas,
and this leads people to continue financing films.
Solution:
The author finds it neither frightening nor amusing.
Solution:
'Muck about with nature' implies 'interfere with nature'.
Solution:
'Pundit' in the passage means an expert.
Solution:
The problem the new cabinet faced was of the foreign
exchange market. Refer first line paragraph fourth.
Solution:
Neil Kinnock has been mentioned as being the leader of
the Labour Party. Refer first line paragraph third.
Solution:
The only way out was to raise the interest rates by at
least 2 per cent. Refer fifth paragraph line 6.
Solution:
We can infer that the Bank of England could exert
enormous pressure on the government in its policy
formulation.
Solution:
He wanted to complete his cabinet appointments and to
consult his own advisors.
Solution:
It was not clear if the other countries would follow the
lead, hence realignment was not a viable option.
Solution:
Maastricht has not been mentioned as part of the Labour
cabinet.
Solution:
The wrong policies have not been mentioned as a reason
for the defeat of the Conservative Party.
Solution:
Pins are so cheap that a child stealing it would not even
feel that he is actually stealing something.
Solution:
Pins are so cheap that a child stealing it would not even
feel that he is actually stealing something.
Solution:
The author feels that Adam Smith boasted about
something that was actually undesirable.
Solution:
It takes much less time to make pins by machines today.
Solution:
The author is clearly against machines taking the place
of men.
Solution:
Adam Smith was a supporter of mass production.
Solution:
The statement means that as people get richer they lose
out on individual abilities.
Solution:
He is attacking this fact by making fun of it.
Solution:
None of the given statements continue with what the
author has said in the last paragraph.
Solution:
The passage refers to the British Government as the
'Empire', and talks about the way it takes over foreign
territories.
Solution:
The author says that simple tribes are often friendly and
honest.
Solution:
He says that the civilized empire grows at the expense
of the home tax payers, without any intention or approval
on their parts.
Solution:
Civilized countries practise protection, which means there
is an imposition of heavy taxes on imported goods.
Solution:
'Officious' means 'self-important'.
Solution:
Though they seem to come with the intention of trade,
soon gun boats follow and a government is set up by the
capitalists in the new land.
Solution:
He perceives no sign of a revolution in ethical matters.
Solution:
The author finds no reason why the doctrines of Darwin
should change our moral ideas.
Solution:
The Chief Good refers to the welfare of the community
realized in its members.
Solution:
He advocates a return to a non-Christian and perhaps a
Hellenic ideal.
Solution:
The moral code of Christianity has been rejected by all
except fanatics.
Solution:
The passage is obviously against all the subsidies.
Solution:
The author believes that actually the poor pays for the
subsidies and most subsidies go to the rich.
Solution:
Utopia is an imaginary perfect world.
Solution:
The author believes that subsidies do more harm than
good.
Solution:
All are victims of subsidies.
Solution:
Deve Gowdas government has shown some courage
when it came to petroleum prices.
Solution:
The passage is about the fact that ultimately subsidies
are not really beneficial.
Solution:
Experts call inflation and not subsides the most
regressive form of taxation. Refer paragraph second
line 6.
Solution:
The contention has been proved to be true.
Solution:
There is prevalence of uninucleate cells.
Solution:
Nuclei of a binucleate cell serve as a source of hereditary
information.
Solution:
The function of the crystalline layer has not been
mentioned in the passage.
Solution:
A lobate form provides a much greater surface area for
nuclear cytoplasmic exchanges.
Solution:
Fungi are multinucleate because the cross walls are
either absent or irregularly present.
Solution:
Such people need extraordinary talent to become rich.
Solution:
Ambitious people have not been mentioned as the ones
likely to get rich quickly.
Solution:
The author says that there is no way by which to judge
the goodness or badness of a person.
Solution:
He rejects the notion that the wealth is distributed
according to merit and feels that it is biased in favour of
the rich.
Solution:
The author refers to someone as ' intelligent lady' implying
that he is probably writing to someone.
Solution:
'Improvidence' means spending too much of money.
Solution:
The example proves that might scores over love and
religion.
Solution:
He has been referred to as the umpire, and the passage
also mentions the assertiveness being shown by the
Election Commission regarding code of conduct during
the elections.
Solution:
The passage is about an issue-less election, as
highlighted even by the last sentence of the passage.
Solution:
Ramakrishna Hegde's involvement in any alleged
corruption case has not been mentioned in the passage.
Solution:
All the parties have failed to submit audited returns every
year.
Solution:
The greater awareness among the public has not been
credited with the changes coming in the system.
Solution:
The empowerment of women has not been mentioned
as a possible issue of the elections.
Solution:
The reference is to an open discussion of the caste
issue on a global platform.
Solution:
Referring to paragraph 1, lines (7-8) its obvious that
choice (c) is correct. Inverted representations ....
such inversions.
Solution:
Clearly, the UN conference is looking at discriminations
based on caste, especially looking at paragraph 1.
Choices (A) and (E) mention that choice (B) is a
positive area and is not being addressed and choices
(C) and (D) are too broad. This makes choice (a)
correct.
Solution:
Paragraph 2, line 5 clearly indicates that choice (b) is
correct.
Solution:
The author mentions in paragraph 2, line 3 race is a
biological category and in the last paragraph line 5
It would thus seem ... that dialectic. This means all
biological constructs are social constructs of which
race is one. This makes choice (b) correct.
Solution:
A mono-syllabic word has only one syllable. So it can
have only one onset. A phoneme, according to the
passage, can be initial and final.
Solution:
According to second last paragraph, line seven, its
obvious that choice (d) is correct.
Solution:
The last part of the first paragraph makes it clear that
(d) is correct.
Solution:
According to the last para, lines 7-10. The Treiman
and Zudowski experiment showed that 4 and 5-yearold
children found the onset-rime version ...
significantly easier ... only the 6-year-old ... were able
to perform both versions ... with an equal level of
success.
Solution:
Refer to the sentence in paragraph 2 rimes
correspond to rhymes in single-syllabus words.
Solution:
Choice (b) is false because the author says in
paragraph one, line 4 Few people .... Choice (c) is
false because the author says ... Coarse-textured
.... in the fifth last line of the first para. Choice (d) is
also incorrect as revealed in the last part of the
passage. Choice (a) is correct as the authors
appreciation is for her singing though he does pay
attention to other aspects of her life.
Solution:
The answer is presented in the fourth last line of the
first para, what middle age ... This makes choice (c)
correct.
Solution:
The answer to this is also presented directly in the
last line of the second paragraph suffering was
her .... . This makes choice (d) correct.
Solution:
Billie Holiday was fortunate to have the best musicians
of the 1930s to accompany her notably Teddy
Wilson, Frankie Newton and Lester Young ...
Solution:
The author mentions in the first paragraph, lines 3-5,
Each of the ..... This makes choice (c) correct.
Solution:
Refer to the part The film itself ... opening by Dersus
grave. Besides (a) can be easily inferred from the
second paragraph.
Solution:
The answer is presented directly in lines 2-4 of the
third paragraph. ... nostalgic, melancholy....
Solution:
The answer is in lines 4-6 of the third paragraph.
First section of ..... This makes choice (c) is correct.
Solution:
This aspect is highlighted in the last paragraph and
choice (d) is the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part Kurosawa defines the world of the
film initially upon a void, a missing presence.
Solution:
Refer to the seventh paragraph lines 4-5 ... the greater
the urge for change in a society, the stronger the
appeal of a dynamic leadership ... This makes choice
(c) correct.
Solution:
The answer to this question is present in the last
paragraph in the second line From the argument....
This makes choice (a) correct.
Solution:
Choice (A) is present in paragraph four, line one, choice
(B) is mentioned in the last line of the fourth paragraph
and choice (D) is mentioned in the 3rd last line of the
seventh para. This makes choice (a) correct.
Solution:
The answer is presented in lines 1 to 4 of paragraph
2. This makes choice (a) correct.
Solution:
Refer to the first line of the fifth paragraph But a
system governed solely by impersonal rules can at
best ensure order and stability; it cannot ... formal
equality will be replaced by real equality ... This makes
choice (d) correct.
Solution:
A can be inferred, refer to the part Democracy
rests on two different principles ... the principle of
equality before the law ... the leadership principle ...
one principle cannot be promoted without some
sacrifice of the other... D can be inferred, refer to the
part their continued preoccupation with plans and
schemes ... to bridge the gap between the ideal of
equality and the reality which is so contrary to it ...
leadership with a measure of charisma ... B and C
venture too far by using the words disadvantages
and limitations respectively which have no contextual
relevance.
Solution:
The second and third lines of the second paragraph
mention Dark Age... this makes choice (b) correct.
Solution:
Lines one to three of the fourth paragraph mention
The main problem... making choice (b) the answer.
Solution:
Lines three-five of the fifth paragraph Recently, some
members ... makes choice (a) correct.
Solution:
As revealed in the first line of the last paragraph,
choice (b) is correct.
Solution:
The writer is using satire to mildly tease the French
winemaker. (1), (3) and (4) are rather extreme choices.
Solution:
Refer to the part some areas
have now produced a
generation of growers using the varietal names on
their labels. The writer says that (1) is probably the
only option left for French winemakers.
Solution:
Refer to the part it is on every wine label
the name
of the grape from which the wine is made
acquired
a basic lexicon. (2) well describes that the French
winemakers are scared of this trend.
Solution:
Option (4) is the most substantiated reason to support
Dr. Renauds findings. The development in (4) would
support Dr. Renaud's findings that fat-derived
cholesterols can be dispersed by the tannins in wine.
Solution:
(1), (2) and (4) are stated in the 4th paragraph. (3) is
unlikely. A consumer may still not be enough of a
connoisseur to discriminate wine tastes.
Solution:
Refer to the part India would resist payment, and
paralyze the war effort. (3) is clearly the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part it reminded the British vividly. (3) is
clearly the answer. (1) was an outcome, not a cause.
(2) is a minor factor. (4) is far-sighted.
Solution:
(1), (3) and (4) are stated in the third paragraph. (2) is
not a reason for the emergence of the 'white man's
burden'. It is a consequence, not a cause.
Solution:
Refer to the part it was supposedly for the good of the
conquered. (1) entirely captures the meaning of the
'white man's burden'.
Solution:
Refer to the last line of the first paragraph, the second
paragraph and the last line of the passage. They amply
support (4) as the answer. (1) does not touch on the
financial implications. White mans burden is a single
aspect of the passage, not the main idea, so (2) is not
right. (3) can be ruled out straightaway.
Solution:
Refer to the part much of biotechnology research is
also funded by governments. (3) is clearly the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part anti-GM campaign has been quite
effective in Europe. (3) is clearly the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part use of ever-stronger herbicides which
are poisonous. The last line specifically supports (2)
as the answer and not (1) which is discussed in a
different context. The passage has no intention of
keeping competing plants standing at all, let alone
keeping them weed-free, so (3) is wrong.
Solution:
Refer to the part much of biotechnology research is
also funded by governments in both developing and developed countries. (4) is the answer. (1), (2) and
(3) are disputed in the passage.
Solution:
Refer to the part GM controversy will soon hit the
headlines in India
use the protato in its midday
meal program for schools. (1) can be inferred. (2) is,
of course, wrong. (3) is doubtful. (4) is also not true.
Solution:
The last sentence of the 2nd paragraph states these
large gatherings which continues as they in the 3rd
paragraph. (1) is clearly the answer.
Solution:
The passage begins with description of social life and
towards the last few paragraphs, moves on to show
drying up of our social life.
(3) is clearly the answer.
(2) and (4) are rather extreme observations. (1) is also
a blunt statement, whereas the passage does have a
subtle tone.
Solution:
Refer to the part Interest, wonder
the need of the
first two must not be underrated. (2) is clearly the
answer.
Solution:
Discriminate means to recognize passionate attitude,
distinguish is too technical a word to fit the requirement.
(2) and (4) are irrelevant.
Solution:
The correct ans. is (4) as can be seen by the first line
of the second last para. If you read the previous para
also youll find that what the author is actually saying is
that the so called social life is not as per the real
definitions. (1). is not right as the author is nowhere
showing that the crowds in poor Calcutta can turn
violent anytime. He is just giving a couple of instances
to prove his point. We cant generalize like this. (2) is
the opposite of what the author is trying to show. (3)
again is a generalization.
Solution:
Refer to the part it remains a fact that the Greeks
never
seem to have realized the importance of experiment.
(1) is clearly the answer. The Greek preference for
geometry is not mentioned in the passage, so (2) and
(4) are out. (3) is a superficial answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part physical processes of nature would
prove to be unfolding themselves according to rigorous
mathematical laws. (3) is clearly the answer. (1) is not
true. (2) is also refuted and (4) is irrelevant.
Solution:
Refer to the part account be taken of his joint
contributions to mathematics and physics. (2) is
clearly the answer. (1), (3) and (4) are specific aspects.
Solution:
Refer to the part extension of the validity. The writer
states that Einstein's special principle is an extension
of the validity of the classical Newtonian principle. This
being the concluding sentence makes (4) the best
answer. (1) and (2) are not correct observations. (3)
sounds plausible but it is actually a vague observation.
Solution:
The correct answer is (3) If you read the 6th line of last
para its given that the principles assertion was that
absolute velocity must ever escape all experimental
detection. Which means that sometimes we cant
experiment. This is very similar to (3). Ans. choice (1)
is a fact and not an implication. (2). Is again a fact and
in (4). The word meaningless is too strong and this
choice is a generalization from a specific point.
Generalizations need not be correct.
Solution:
Refer to the part better if it lasts for years
wealthy
with all you have gained on the way. (2) is clearly the
answer. (3) is far-fetched. (1) is an isolated
observation. (4) is totally incorrect.
Solution:
Refer to the part as many sensual perfumes as you
can
to gather stores of knowledge. (1) is clearly the
answer. (2), (3) and (4) are short-sighted observations.
Solution:
Refer to the part Keep Ithaka always in your mind.
Arriving there is what you are destined for. (4) is
undoubtedly the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part you bring them along inside your
soul. (3) is undoubtedly the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the part Ithaka gave you the marvelous journey,
without her you would not have set out. The poem has
a tone of encouragement and promise. (2) is clearly
the answer. (1), (3) and (4) are ridiculous choices.
Solution:
Paragraph 4 clearly talks about the increase in size of the aircraft.
Solution:
See third paragraph last two lines. It is clearly mentioned that 'new free-flight concept . . . and other planes'.
Solution:
Paragraph 5, fourth line says that there is 'also a need for . . ., design talents . . .'
Solution:
First paragraph fifth line says . . ., happened in less than a decade.
Solution:
Paragraph 2, fourth line talks about the differences and explicitly mentions takes off vertically.
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 5, line 1 'became . . . more divorced from religion.'
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 1, line 10 . . . a means for advancement not only in income but also in status.
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 3: Let us look at the clerical side first and paragraph 4, line 5 even though they entered the clergy, had secular goals.
Solution:
Refer to para 1, line 7 Christians educate their sons
. . . for gain . . .
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 4, line 1 edu was taking on many secular qualities . . .
Solution:
Refer to the part while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of Panchayats
Solution:
Refer to the words volition which means preference and circumscribe which means confine
Solution:
Refer to the part while the dynamics of federalism and democracy have given added strength to the rights given to the States in the Constitution, they have worked against the rights of Panchayats
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Solution:
Refer to the part exposed the intra-State level of our federal system to a dilemma of which the inter-State and Union-State layers are free
Solution:
Refer to the part jobs in which they are closely supervised and are required to follow orders.
Solution:
Refer to the part Ultimately, corporate norms are based on middle-class values
Solution:
Refer to the part Were separated by class
Solution:
(1), (2) and (3) are specifically stated in the passage at the end of the first paragraph and the second paragraph.
Solution:
Refer to last paragraph, line 10 they would build what was more beautiful than . . .
Solution:
Refer to paragraph 1, line 3 Mysticism on the whole was alien and last paragraph lines 6 and 7.
Solution:
Refer to last paragraph, lines 3 and 4 Simplicity in the Parthenon St. Columns . . .
Solution:
Paragraph 4, last line . . . insignificant atom that was man.
Solution:
Paragraph 1, line 3 Mysticism on the whole was alien and paragraph 2 line 1 Greek art is intellectual are . . .
Solution:
The author thinks it is the duty of science to study the
means by which we can adapt ourselves to the new
world.
Solution:
The examples of these scientists have been given to
show that scientists have always been associated
with war.
Solution:
The author says that it is the labour of scientists that
has led to all these dangers so scientists have to
work to save mankind from this madness.
Solution:
Till now the scientists felt loyalty to their own state
was paramount. But now the loyalty to human race
should replace it.
Solution:
The example has been used to prove how scientists
felt that loyalty to their states, to whatever ends it led
to, was paramount.
Solution:
The passage states that scientists have always been
associated with war and always have been respected.
Solution:
The passage states that it is part of the duty of men of
science to see that important knowledge is widely
disseminated and is not falsified in the interests of this
or that propaganda.
Solution:
Only an adequate progress in human sciences can
overcome evils that have resulted from the knowledge
of the physical world.
Solution:
Science is in its very nature a liberator, a liberator of
bondage to physical nature and, in time to come a
liberator from the weight of destructive passion.
Solution:
The whole argument is based on the fact that we are
planning our development with a purpose in mind. If
development cannot be planned, the argument is
weakened.
Solution:
The statement that our economic development is
inspired by social justice implies both the assumptions.
Solution:
The argument suggests that our economic development
will lead to better standard of living and it will in turn
bring social justice.
Solution:
The reasons given for taking interest in hydro electric
projects are that oil prices are increasing and that
renewable sources should be tapped.
Solution:
If hydroelectric power is costlier, then such projects
will not help in the face of rising oil prices.
Solution:
The statement suggests that without music, dance or
art one cannot be fully alive; hence there can be no
civilization.
Solution:
If art has no relation with civilization, the whole
argument is nullified.
Solution:
The statement considers being vibrantly alive as being
a necessary condition for being civilized.
Solution:
If two parties limit the choice of the voters, we cannot
have a true democracy.
Solution:
If politics were also played like any other game then
two parties would be enough to play that game.
Solution:
The author states that democracy would be possible
with just two parties if it were a game like cricket,
thus assuming that cricket is played by two parties,
or teams.
Solution:
The last paragraph of the passage tells us that
Columbus was merely ascribing to the medieval
Christian notion of maps.
Solution:
The author does not offer any explanation of his own,
rather he charts the historical positioning of North in
the passage.
Solution:
The passage mentions that it would be hard to envision
the French and American Revolution without the
enlightened voices in print. This helped to expose new
voices to people.
Solution:
The entire point of the passage has been that despite
being an advantageous invention, the iPhone has failed
to liberate or cause an impact comparable to
Gutenberg’s invention of the press. This is best
captured in 2.
Solution:
4 has neither been stated in the passage nor has it
been implied. The other options can be directly verified
from the passage.
Solution:
Option 2 is the correct answer as after talking about
what stifles creativity (in paragraph 3), the author
presents the 1968 report( in order to validate the
previous point). Option 1 states exactly the opposite
of what is stated in the passage. Option 3 is incorrect
because the reduction of creativity cannot be
attributed to learning more. Option 4 is unrelated.
The passage does not talk about technology.
However, the second option is only the best option.
“Schools today” makes it a dicey option.
Solution:
In the 2nd last paragraph of the passage, it is stated
that the creativity of only those people can be
utilized who use their minds to work. This implies
that people who work with their hands are not
creative. Hence, option 1 is the correct answer.
Solution:
All options 1, 3 and 4 address the symptoms of
climate change. They fail to attack the main cause,
let alone providing a solution to that cause. Option
2 addresses the cause and even provides a
solution to the issue of climate change. Hence it
is the correct answer.
Solution:
Option 1 is correct as the entire passage is about
how the effects of climate change are interrelated.
Options 2, 3 and 4 are incorrect because the
passage does not give us enough information to
claim them.
Solution:
Towards the end of the passage, the author states
that though car drivers want autonomy, public
transport will be the future as this is the only
solution to traffic problem. This makes option 3
correct. Options 1 and 4 are beyond the scope of
the passage. Option 2 is ambiguous.
Solution:
Refer to the main idea of the passage. This question is very close to question number 4. The author would definitely support any step that relieves the common man of the pressure of ‘being happy’. So, option 3 will be supported by the author.
Solution:
The main message of the passage is that the current theory of natural selection doesn’t look adequate to explain the process of evolution. So, option 3 would challenge this notion. Hence, option 4 is the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the first paragraph. The author says that consumers are wrongly blamed and held responsible for the rise in plastic pollution. According to the author, companies that manufacture plastic unnecessarily are to be held responsible. So, he will support option 4 the most.
Solution:
It is an easy answer. Option 3 talks about the main idea of the passage. As PTSD like symptoms in elephants is the main focus of the passage, option 3 is the best answer. Option 2 is irrelevant. Option 4 goes beyond the scope of the passage. Option 1 is close but it talks about ‘all animals’. So, it is too broad.
Solution:
This answer given by CAT is dicey. A metaphor is an indirect reference. The given line is neither a metaphor nor an ode. It is also not an exaggeration. Refer to the first line of the penultimate paragraph. Refer to the line: "What Bradshaw and her colleagues describe would seem to be an extreme form of anthropocentric conjecture if the evidence that they’ve compiled from various elephant researchers. . . weren’t so compelling." Option 2 is a close answer and may appear to be a better choice too. However, CAT has given option 1 as the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the 2nd paragraph, "...e-governance can be just as bad
as any other…".From this line it can be inferred that
the electronic monitoring system was a superficial
solution to a serious problem. The right answer is
option (1).
Solution:
The overall passage talks about the complacency
with the service providers. The instances given
make option (1) the right answer.
Solution:
The author isn’t protesting about the cause but in
general talking about the pros and cons of the
matter. The right answer is option (4).
Solution:
Option (2) isn’t mentioned in the passage therefore
being the right answer.
Solution:
Since the time period mentioned in the passage
belong to an ancient time, one can infer from the
paragraph that snails were edible. The right answer
is option (2).
Solution:
There is no mention of the methane and helium in
the passage, therefore it can be inferred that the
close option and answer is option (1).
Solution:
Option 1, 2 and 3 are mentioned in the passage while
option 4 isn’t. The right answer is option (4).
Solution:
The main idea of the passage is to find the best
person for a job, thus option (4) is the right answer.
Solution:
2nd passage, 1-8 lines, it can be referred from the
lines that the option (1) is the right answer.
Solution:
In order to answer this question, we need to refer
to the last paragraph of the passage. Consider the
lines, ‘For start-ups that promise accessible
simplicity, their very structure still might eventually
push them toward overwhelming variety……’ Thus,
the fourth option provides the right answer. While
option 1 is only partially correct, options 2 and 3
are factually inconsistent with the information
provided in the passage.
Solution:
In this question we need to identify the inference
that can’t be made based on the information
provided in the passage. The statement having too
many product options can be overwhelming for
consumers can be easily inferred from the initial
lines of the passage.
Similarly, consumers are susceptible to marketing images that they see on social media can be inferred from the lines, ‘Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram….’
The statement too many options have made it difficult for consumers to trust products can be inferred from ‘They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .’.
Thus, the only statement that can’t be inferred is ‘consumers tend to prefer products by start-ups over those by established companies.’
Similarly, consumers are susceptible to marketing images that they see on social media can be inferred from the lines, ‘Indeed, choice fatigue is one reason so many people gravitate toward lifestyle influencers on Instagram….’
The statement too many options have made it difficult for consumers to trust products can be inferred from ‘They’re selling nice things, but maybe more importantly, they’re selling a confidence in those things, and an ability to opt out of the stuff rat race. . . .’.
Thus, the only statement that can’t be inferred is ‘consumers tend to prefer products by start-ups over those by established companies.’
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author is in favor of
offering limited choices to customers. This particular
option demonstrates that offering fewer products
can bring positive results. Thus, it strengthens the
author’s content and is the right answer.
The other options directly contradict the information provided in the passage and weaken the author’s claims.
The other options directly contradict the information provided in the passage and weaken the author’s claims.
Solution:
Options 1, 3 and 4 are out of scope and cannot be
considered. The origin of the story of Aladdin was
based on Diyab’s life experiences. He transmitted
this story to Galland who made it a part of Arabian
Nights. Therefore, the correct answer is option 2.
Solution:
Diyab’s travelogue serves as evidence for the
character of Aladdin being based on him. This
negates options 2 and 4. Moreover, the secondlast
paragraph of the passage is suggestive of
Diyab’s cosmopolitanism and cross-cultural
experience. So, option 3 is also negated. Refer to
the following lines from the first paragraph of the
passage, “Galland, who wrote in his diary that he
first heard the tale from a Syrian storyteller from
Aleppo named Hanna Diyab”. There is no evidence
of Diyab’s narration of the story to Galland. This
makes option 1 the correct answer.
Solution:
Refer the lines Topophilia is difficult to design for
and impossible to quantify, and its most articulate
interpreters have been self-reflective philosophers
such as Henry David Thoreau, evoking a
marvelously intricate sense of place at Walden
Pond, and Tuan, describing his deep affinity for
the desert. Thus, there is an element of
subjectiveness that underlies all topophilic
expression. Hence, option 2 is the right answer.
Solution:
This is a slightly difficult question. We have to read
the options carefully and look for the one that is
not against what the author has to say.
Option 1 is contradictory because the author says that olfactory response is the third most important factor, while the option says that it is the most important factor.
Option 3 can be ruled out because the author says in the first paragraph: the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. The author says, ‘vary greatly’, while the option says, ‘vary little’.
Refer the lines - “As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify…” However, the option says that New Urbanism succeeded in those designs where architects collaborated with their clients. Thus, option 4 can also be negated.
Option 2 can be seen in the last paragraph and is parallel to what the author has to say. This is not contradicting the author’s argument, and hence it is the right choice.
Option 1 is contradictory because the author says that olfactory response is the third most important factor, while the option says that it is the most important factor.
Option 3 can be ruled out because the author says in the first paragraph: the emotive ties with the material environment vary greatly from person to person and in intensity, subtlety, and mode of expression. The author says, ‘vary greatly’, while the option says, ‘vary little’.
Refer the lines - “As Tuan noted, purely aesthetic responses often are suddenly revealed, but their intensity rarely is long-lasting. Topophilia is difficult to design for and impossible to quantify…” However, the option says that New Urbanism succeeded in those designs where architects collaborated with their clients. Thus, option 4 can also be negated.
Option 2 can be seen in the last paragraph and is parallel to what the author has to say. This is not contradicting the author’s argument, and hence it is the right choice.
Solution:
This example has been discussed in the last
paragraph of the passage where the author is
talking about the darker applications of topophilia
while exploring the affiliations between people and
places. This immediately negates statements 3
and 4 - manner in which environments are designed
to minimize the social exclusion of their clientele
and sensitive response to race and class problems
in upscale residential developments. There is no
discussion regarding nationalist projects of the
elites. Hence, option 1 is the right answer.
Solution:
The answer to this question can be found in the
last lines of the passage - And just as a beloved
landscape is suddenly revealed, so too may
landscapes of fear cast a dark shadow over a place
that makes one feel a sense of dread or anxiety—
or topophobia.
Solution:
The question asks us to select an option that
cannot be inferred from the passage. The statement
that is made in the passage is: “In the late 1960s,
purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock
idioms. Electrification, however, comes in many
forms.” In other words, electrification need not
always come through rock alone. It might come
from any other form of music as well. Thus, this
option surely cannot be inferred.
“…the lyrical freedom of Bob Dylan…” this phrase supports option 1.
Option 2 can be inferred because Cecil Sharp talks about folk music’s ability to adapt. The music of 40s and 60s demonstrates that adaptation.
The passage says that in the late 1960s, Purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms, this suggests that it had critics. Thus, option 4 can be inferred.
“…the lyrical freedom of Bob Dylan…” this phrase supports option 1.
Option 2 can be inferred because Cecil Sharp talks about folk music’s ability to adapt. The music of 40s and 60s demonstrates that adaptation.
The passage says that in the late 1960s, Purists were suspicious of folk songs recast in rock idioms, this suggests that it had critics. Thus, option 4 can be inferred.
Solution:
Fossilized refers to something belonging to/
associated with the past. Out of the options given,
only the second option comes close in meaning.
The other options don’t correlate with the word
fossilized.
Solution:
The author appreciates how folk forms have been
used by modern musicians and the fusion of folk
with other forms of music throughout the passage.
Hence, he is likely to agree with all options except
4 because it says that folk music exhibits unusual
homogeneity.
If there is homogeneity, then the idea of adapting and infusing with other kinds of music is not valid. Thus, the author will not agree with this.
If there is homogeneity, then the idea of adapting and infusing with other kinds of music is not valid. Thus, the author will not agree with this.
Solution:
The fact that the author speaks Arabic but still
considers the Arabic as outsiders would clearly
make the author’s critics argue that language is
insufficient to bridge the cultural barriers. So, option
1 is the answer.
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 4 support the argument as they
are mentioned in the passage. Option 1 is
mentioned in the first paragraph. Option 2 is
mentioned in the second paragraph. Option 4 is
mentioned towards the end concluding part of the
passage where it says that modernity was an
external thing that was imposed on the Indian
society which eventually led to underdevelopment.
Option 3 is the correct answer because it was not
the modernity that caused the change in the colonial
policy but the other way round.
Solution:
‘Here’ in the given context refers to India. This is
supported by the parts of the passage which
precede it. ‘Endogenous change’ means internal
change and according to the quoted lines such
change is not something which happens in India.
Rather it is forced upon the Indians by the colonial
policies. So, option 3 is the answer. Options 1 and
4 do not specifically talk about India.
Solution:
Option 2 is the answer. Options 1, 3 and 4 do not
make sense according to the given passage. The
only reason why modernity was introduced to
change the Indian society was to address the
marginalization that the colonial state felt as it was
already modern and the Indian society was not at
that time.
Solution:
The following sequence captures the flow of the
arguments in the given passage: 1st line of the 1st
paragraph, “British colonial policy…”, 3rd sentence
of the 1st paragraph, “…Enlightenment…”, 6th
sentence of the 1st paragraph, “…modernity…”, 2nd
sentence of the second paragraph, “…with
subjection.” and the last sentence of the last
paragraph. In other words, the colonial policy
included Enlightenment of the colonized people
and modernity was forced upon them only to
dominate them which eventually led to
underdevelopment and dependency. So, option 3
is the answer.
Solution:
Option 2 is directly mentioned in the given passage.
Refer to the sentences, “But this modernity did
not enter a passive society. Sometimes, its
initiatives were resisted by pre-existing structural
forms. At times, there was a more direct form of
collective resistance.”
Solution:
Refer to the 5th paragraph of the given passage.
The reason why the city of Manus is mentioned in
the passage is to emphasize the fact that
subsidised city like Manaus could stop
deforestation and this serves as an example that
urban areas can help in protecting the environment.
So, option 4 is the answer.
Solution:
Options 1 and 4 are mentioned in the last paragraph
and option 3 is mentioned in the fifth paragraph.
Option 2 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
Solution:
‘Jars’ in the phrase “still jars” is used as a verb; it
means ‘to bear unpleasant effect on’ or ‘annoy’.
Calthorpe’s statements: “The city is the most
environmentally benign form of human settlement.
Each city dweller consumes less land, less
energy, less water, and produces less pollution
than his counterpart in settlements of lower
densities.” still bear an unpleasant effect on the
people as his statements contradict what people
think about cities.
Solution:
Sentences 2 and 5 can be clubbed together.
Sentence 2 talks about speaking from the third
person’s point of view while sentence 5 mentions
a change in perspective. Sentences 3 and 4 can
be clubbed together as well because both explain
rumination. Therefore, sentence 1 is the odd
sentence.
Solution:
Sentence 4 explains sentence 3. Hence, 3 and 4
can be defined as a mandatory pair. 2 and 1 also
form a mandatory pair because sentence 1 talks
about harmony of nature which is an explanation
of ‘integrated, well-ordered system’ mentioned in
sentence 2.
Solution:
Except sentence 2, the other sentences talk about
single panel comics and the characteristic feature
of being interesting, humorous, funny and
possessing an element of joke. Thus, all the
sentences, except sentence 2, can be clubbed
together.
Solution:
Sentence 2 mentions atonality and it is further
explained in sentence 1. Sentence 4 follows and
sentence 3 mentions how to compose or perform
atonal music. Hence, sentence 3 closes the
paragraph effectively.
Solution:
Except sentence 2, the other sentences talk about
the problem of plastic pollution and how marine
animals eat plastic. Sentence 2 doesn’t talk about
the consumption of plastic. Hence, it is the odd
sentence.
Solution:
2 and 4 form a mandatory pair. In sentence 2, there
is the mention of ‘treating objects as equivalent.’
The same idea is explained further in sentence 4.
Sentence 3 talks about structure and order and
sentence 1 explains the word ‘structure’ further.’
Solution:
Sentence 1 talks about a certain representation
and this representation is given in sentence 4.
Hence, 4 and 1 form a mandatory pair. Sentence 3
talks about caring practices and time that is further
elaborated in sentence 2.
Solution:
Refer to the first sentence of the last paragraph.
The author reiterates that a complete sentence
needs a noun and verb. Hence, option (2), if false,
will support the author’s belief. Option (4), if true,
will support the author’s belief and hence, it is
wrong. Option (3) is out of scope. Option (1) is a
statement that is mentioned in the passage. It
doesn’t support the author’s belief.
Solution:
The author swears by the rules of grammar. Refer
to paragraphs 1 and 5. Hence, option (3), if true,
will most probably be supported by the author.
Option (1) is wrong because the author is not
critiquing the rules of grammar. He wants that the
rules of grammar be followed. Option (2) is exactly
the opposite of what the author says in the
passage. Option (4) is incorrect because is out of
scope.
Solution:
The passage talks about the importance of
grammar. Not knowing the fundamentals of
grammar can impact framing a sentence. Refer to
the last paragraph where the author sums up the
main idea in the passage. The remaining options
are narrow in scope.
Solution:
Nouns and verbs are separate parts of speech.
The quoted sentence implies juxtaposing 2
disparate things and the result is something that
is coherent and meaningful. Hence, option (4)
comes closest to the idea that is there in the quoted
sentence.
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred from the first paragraph.
Option (3) can be inferred from the second
paragraph. Option (4) can be inferred from the third
last paragraph. Option (2) is not stated and so, is
the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph where the author
mentions the similarities between the modern times
and the currency usage during the Tang period.
The other 3 options are incorrect in the light of the
passage. We don’t know if grains were the most
used currency.
Solution:
Option (3) can be inferred from the second and
third paragraphs of the passage. Also, refer to the
4th paragraph where the author mentions the factor
of immigration. Option (1) is not the reason behind
the faster call pulse rate Option (2) is wrong
because the elephant seals that have sophisticated
structures containing doublets and triplets have
migrated to the islands from the southern rookeries.
Option (4) is out of scope.
Solution:
This is a fact based question and the answer has
been clearly given in the last paragraph. Refer to
the last three sentences of the passage for the
answer where the transition from simple to
complex composition has been mentioned. Option
(2) states exactly the opposite of what the passage
says. Option (4) is factually incorrect. These days,
modern males exhibit more individual diversity.
Option (1) is out of scope.
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred in the light of the first
sentence of the last paragraph. Option (2) can be
inferred in the last 4 sentences of the passage.
Option (4) can be inferred in the light of the third
sentence of the 4th paragraph.
Solution:
Note the word ‘strutting’ in the second paragraph.
Strutting refers to an arrogant behaviour.
Furthermore, the French Revolution ended with a
reign of terror. Hence, option (3) is the most
plausible explanation. The other options cannot
be inferred in the light of the passage.
Solution:
This is again a fact based question. Refer to the
last sentence of the last paragraph for the answer
where the relationship between American
individualist anarchists and free-market liberals has
been mentioned. The remaining options are not
stated in the passage.
Solution:
Option 1 is mentioned in the second paragraph of
the given passage. Option 2 is found in the first
and second sentences of the fourth paragraph,
“While renewable energy is a more recent addition
to financial portfolios, investments in the sector
must be considered in light of our understanding
of capital accumulation. As agricultural finance
reveals, the concentration of control of corporate
activity facilitates profit generation.” The passage
says that the renewable energy is already a hot or
lucrative business and talks about looking at the
social and environmental impact it would have,
however, it does not say that the possible negative
impacts of renewable energy need to be studied
before it can be offered as a financial investment
opportunity. Hence, option 3 is the answer. Option
4 is mentioned in the last sentence of the paragraph
of the given passage, “The disposal of toxic waste
has long perpetuated social injustice through the
flows of waste to the Global South and to
marginalized communities in the Global North…”
Solution:
Refer to “As renewable energy production requires
land, water, and labor, among other inputs, it
imposes costs on people and the environment.
Hydropower projects, for instance, have led to
community dispossession and exclusion…”
Hence, option 2 is correct as it is false according
to the given passage. Option 1 is true because a
lot of money needs to be invested in order to get
high returns. Option 3 is true as non-renewable
energy system is more profitable. Option 4 is also
true. Refer to, “Renewable energy can be produced
at the household or neighborhood level. However,
such small-scale, localized production is unlikely
to generate high returns for investors.”
Solution:
The passage talks about renewable energy. So,
option 1 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
The passage does not talk about the need for the
study of the coexistence of marginalised people
with their environments. It cannot be inferred from
the given passage either. So, option is incorrect.
The passage does not suggest the localised, smallscale
development of renewable energy systems.
Thus, option 2 is also incorrect. Option 4 can be
inferred from “The disposal of toxic waste has long
perpetuated social injustice through the flows of
waste to the Global South and to marginalized
communities in the Global North…”
Solution:
The author does not suggest any thing about the
non-renewable energy in the first paragraph of the
given passage. So, option 1 cannot be inferred from
it. Profitability of renewable energy was not the
author’s only reservation. In fact, the author’s
concern is whether renewable energy system would
work without causing any harm to the environment.
So, option 2 is incorrect. However, this very concern
of the author makes option 3 the correct option.
Option 4 cannot be inferred from the given passage.
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from “The task is to
understand how artifacts contribute to the
construction of a world…” Option 2 can be inferred
from “visual culture is what images, acts of seeing,
and attendant intellectual, emotional, and
perceptual sensibilities do to build, maintain, or
transform the worlds in which people live.” Option
3 can be inferred from the fourth paragraph of the
given passage. However, option 4 cannot be inferred
from the given passage.
Solution:
‘Epiphenomena’ means phenomena which is a
supplementary to something else. Hence, option
4 is an obvious answer. The other options are
incorrect.
Solution:
The quoted sentence says that no amount of social
analysis can explain the existence of Michelangelo
and Leonardo. So, options 1, 2 and 4 are incorrect.
Only option 3 is the most accurate interpretation
of the given sentence.
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 3 fail to convey the meaning of
the given statement. The given statement says that
seeing becomes meaningful visual experience
because of agreements of meaningfulness we
establish with images that we perceive. Hence,
option 4 is the answer.
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from the first two sentences
of the passage, “Aggression is any behavior that
is directed toward injuring, harming, or inflicting
pain on another living being or group of beings.
Generally, the victim(s) of aggression must wish
to avoid such behavior in order for it to be considered
true aggression.” Options 2 and 4 are implied in
the sentence, “Sigmund Freud (1930) proposed
that all individuals are born with a death instinct
that predisposes us to a variety of aggressive
behaviors, including suicide (self directed
aggression) and mental illness (possibly due to
an unhealthy or unnatural suppression of
aggressive urges).” Option 3 is not logically implied
by the passage as neural inhibition and
testosterone are discussed separately. Hence,
option 3 is the answer.
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 3 are incorrect. Option 4 is found
in the sentences, “The first variable is the aggressor
him/herself. The second is the social situation or
circumstance in which the aggressive act(s)
occur(s). The third variable is the target or victim
of aggression.”
Solution:
Option 1 subverts the meaning of the quoted
sentence. It is not mentioned that the use of torture
to extract information is most effective when the
torturer is not emotionally involved in the torture.
So, option 2 can be eliminated. Option 3 best
explains the quoted sentence in the question. It is
said in the quoted sentence that no feelings are
involved, so option 4 is incorrect.
Solution:
Options 1, 2 and 4 cannot be inferred. Since
conquistadors, Vasco da Gama and the East India
Company were colonisers and if the scope of
looting were to be widened colonialism should be
regarded as an organised form of looting. Thus,
from the given statement we can infer that the
author believes that colonialism should be
considered an organised form of piracy. Hence,
option 3 is the answer.
Solution:
In their analysis of Victorian women travelers,
feminist scholars hav e drawn on their
understanding of how identity is developed (Such
questions are worked through ideological
constructs that posit men as explorers and women
as travelers—or, conversely, men as travelers and
women as tied to the home); their own perspective
(Feminist geographers’ studies of travel writing
challenge the masculinist history of geography by
questioning who and what are relevant subjects of
geographic study and, indeed, what counts as
geographic knowledge itself) and awareness of
gender issues in Victorian societies (From a
“liberal” feminist perspective, travel presented one
means toward female liberation for middle- and
upper-class Victorian women. Many studies from
the 1970s onward demonstrated the ways in which
women’s gendered identities were negotiated
differently “at home” than they were “away,” thereby
showing women’s self-development through travel)
There is no mention or reference to class tensions
in Victorian societies.
Solution:
Bregman believes that it was the rise of civilization
that introduced war and decline in society. However,
the author disagrees. Refer to the lines, “Like much
else in this book, the truth is probably somewhere
between the two stated positions.”
Solution:
Option 1 - The story of the economic crisis is also
one about international relations, global financial
security, and mass psychology supports the
following statement of the author - It is an absolutely
amazing story, full of human interest and drama,
one whose byways of mathematics, economics,
and psychology are both central to the story of the
last decades and mysteriously unknown to the
general public. Option 2 - The difficulty with
understanding financial matters is that they have
become so arcane supports the following
information - Many bright, literate people have no
idea about all sorts of economic basics, of a type
that financial insiders take as elementary facts of
how the world works. Option 4 - Economic crises
could be averted by changing prevailing ideologies
and beliefs echoes the following statement- “If our
laws are not extended to control the new kinds of
super-powerful, super-complex, and potentially
super-risky investment vehicles, they will one day
cause a financial disaster of global-systemic
proportions.” . . . Option 3 contradicts these
statements and is hence, incorrect.
Solution:
Refer the lines, “Many studies from the 1970s
onward demonstrated the ways in which women’s
gendered identities were negotiated differently “at
home” than they were “away,” thereby showing
women’s self-development through travel.” The
other options are beyond the scope of the
information given in the passage.
Solution:
Throughout the passage, the author has highlighted
the negative impacts of excessive screen time.
Thus, statement 4, which can be interpreted as
stating a positive impact of spending time on
screens, is least likely to find endorsement by the
author.
Solution:
The idea behind the statement is that human
contact is becoming a luxury good. The rich are
opting for less screen time. The education of their
children is also geared along these lines, whereas
the poor and middle class does not have the
resources to do so. This idea finds resonance in
the statement- “How comfortable someone is with
human engagement could become a new class
marker.”
Solution:
Refer to the concluding lines of the passage-
“There’s a great deal of reassuring human decency
to be taken from this bold and thought-provoking
book and a wealth of evidence in support of the
contention that the sense of who we are as a
species has been deleteriously distorted.” Thus,
this is the reason that the author ascribes to the
contrasts drawn by Bregman. The other options
are limited in the explanations they offer.
Solution:
Refer the lines, “It seems to me that there is a
much bigger gap between the world of finance and
that of the general public and that there is a need
to narrow that gap, if the financial industry is not
to be a kind of priesthood, administering to its
own mysteries and feared and resented by the rest
of us.” This makes option 3 correct. The other
options are not supported by the information given
in the passage.
Solution:
The wording of the question is slightly tricky. The
question is asking you to identify the option, which,
if false, will support the author’s argument. The
first option states that-The economic crisis was
not a failure of collective action to rectify economic
problems. The author argues for the very opposite
in the passage. He is surprised by the sluggishness
of the world governments, by a collective lack of
preparation by the various stakeholders involved.
Thus, 1 is correct. The other options, if untrue, will
weaken the author’s claims.
Solution:
The first line of the passage is-I’ve been following
the economic crisis for more than two years now.
Thus, the only inference that can be drawn is that
the author’s preoccupation with the economic crisis
is not less than two years old.
Solution:
The passage states that “Not every species can
use self-control, but most of the animals that can
share another trait in common: long, social lives.”
However, even though the cuttlefish are solitary
creatures that don’t form relationships even with
mates or young, they did prove capable of exhibiting
self-control when trained under the right
circumstances. Thus, if it was established that
cuttlefish also live in big groups and are sociable,
the passages’ findings will be reinforced. The other
options, if true, are likely to contradict the
information given and not complement it.
Solution:
1 – Can be inferred from “……. but sometimes,
they would turn away from the king prawn “as if to
distract themselves from the temptation of the
immediate reward.”
3 – Can be inferred from “(Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.)”
4 – This was the finding of the research experiments.
2 cannot be inferred from the passage. In fact, the success with the cuttlefish seems to suggest otherwise.
3 – Can be inferred from “(Preliminary experiments showed that cuttlefishes’ favorite food is live grass shrimp, while raw prawns are so-so and Asian shore crab is nearly unacceptable.)”
4 – This was the finding of the research experiments.
2 cannot be inferred from the passage. In fact, the success with the cuttlefish seems to suggest otherwise.
Solution:
1 – If the drawer with the live grass shrimp is
labelled with a square, it means that it will ‘never’
be opened. In this scenario, the cuttlefish will
automatically reach for raw prawns as their preferred
food – the live grass shrimp – is not going to be
available. Thus, there is no need for them to
demonstrate any self-control.
2 – This is the correct answer. In this case, the cuttlefish will have to choose between immediate gratification with a secondary preference – raw prawns and Asian shore crabs – and delayed gratification with their first choice– live grass shrimps. Notice that the drawer is labelled with a ‘triangle’ which means that the drawer will be opened after a delay (one minute in this case). 3 – The cuttlefish prefer the raw prawns to Asian shore crabs. So, there is no need for them to exhibit any self-control since their preferred food is being released first.
4 – Similar to the previous option, the cuttlefish prefer the live grass shrimp the most. Hence, they don’t need to exhibit any self-control in this situation also.
2 – This is the correct answer. In this case, the cuttlefish will have to choose between immediate gratification with a secondary preference – raw prawns and Asian shore crabs – and delayed gratification with their first choice– live grass shrimps. Notice that the drawer is labelled with a ‘triangle’ which means that the drawer will be opened after a delay (one minute in this case). 3 – The cuttlefish prefer the raw prawns to Asian shore crabs. So, there is no need for them to exhibit any self-control since their preferred food is being released first.
4 – Similar to the previous option, the cuttlefish prefer the live grass shrimp the most. Hence, they don’t need to exhibit any self-control in this situation also.
Solution:
1 – Refer the lines: “People become more alike in
appearance, opinion, and outlook than they often
have been. Unity, order, and homogeneity thus
prevail at the cost of individuality and diversity.”
2 – Refer the lines: “….it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents.”
3 – Refer the lines: “And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.”
4 is in direct contrast to the information given in the concluding paragraph of the passage.
2 – Refer the lines: “….it is not unreasonable to take as our starting point here the hypothesis that utopia and dystopia evidently share more in common than is often supposed. Indeed, they might be twins, the progeny of the same parents.”
3 – Refer the lines: “And utopian homogeneity remains a familiar theme well into the twentieth century.”
4 is in direct contrast to the information given in the concluding paragraph of the passage.
Solution:
2 can be inferred from the following lines of the
passage: “This is achieved both through institutions
and mores, which underpin the common life. . ..
The passions are regulated and inequalities of
wealth and distinction are minimized. Needs,
vanity, and emulation are restrained, often by
prizing equality and holding riches in contempt.
The desire for public power is curbed.” The other
options contradict the aspects of utopian societies
as described in the passage.
Solution:
All the other statements have been mentioned in
the passage.
Solution:
Refer the lines: “An early version of the “farm to
table” movement was sparked by anti-Chinese
sentiment and concerns over trade deficits, as well
as by the reality and threat of adulterated tea
containing dirt and hedge clippings”. Thus, this
conflation of consumption with virtue is now seen
in the marketing and promotion of sustainably
farmed food.
Solution:
1 – This is negated by the lines: “Nonhuman
persons were not tethered to specific humans, and
they did not derive their personhood from a
connection with a human. . . .”
2 – This is negated by: “One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree.”
4 – This is challenged by information given throughout the passage.
2 – This is negated by: “One additional complexity: the incense burner (which would have been made of clay, and decorated with spiky appliques representing the sacred ceiba tree found in this region) is categorised as a person – but also as a tree.”
4 – This is challenged by information given throughout the passage.
Solution:
The answer can be inferred from the lines: “With
these Maya examples, we are challenged to
discard the person/ nonperson binary that
constitutes our basic ontological outlook.”
Solution:
For the Mayans, man was by all account not the
only significant thing. Everything was similarly
significant and similarly human. Choice 4 is aligned
with this perspective. The other options are not
consistent with the ideas expressed in the
passage.
Solution:
The author says that a thing (iPhone) has a
personality for us because it’s connected or useful
to us, but that was not the case with the Maya
people. To them the non-human were not tied to
specific human beings. To invalidate this example,
we must choose an alternative that is against it.
Option 4 does exactly that. It makes the personality
of incense sticks and stone choppers a function of
their usefulness to humans, something the author
seeks to negate through the example of the thing
(iPhone). All the other three options do not
invalidate the iPhone instance in any way. So, the
correct answer is option 4.
Solution:
The dilemma is between fiction and telling the public the truth. So, option (2) is the answer.
Solution:
The only option that talks about fiction is (1). The other options are mentioned in the context of fiction. So, option (1) is the answer. Refer to the key words ‘same fiction’ in option (1).
Solution:
The author had used the term ‘unalloyed reality’ in the second last paragraph. Truth is often painful and disturbing and people cannot accept it. So, leaders deviate from it in order to retain power. So, (4) is the answer.
Solution:
The ‘contradictory pull’ refer to the superior western civilisation compared to India. Refer to the 1st paragraph. Option (1) is factually correct in the light of the 1st paragraph. We were fighting against the colonisers and also, we learnt the material aspect from the colonisers. Therefore, (3) is the answer.
Solution:
The author mentions how the West was superior in the material aspects of culture. Refer to the 1st paragraph. Also, refer to the last sentence of the 1st paragraph. The author observes that the West should not be imitated in all aspects of life. Option (1) if true, would weaken the author’s observation. So, (1) is the answer. The other options are irrelevant.
Solution:
Refer to the 2>nd paragraph where gender roles are mentioned. So, option (1) is the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph. The author is definitely in favour of multilingualism. Therefore, option (4) is the right answer.
Solution:
The author doesn’t say that vocabulary and grammatical constructs have been challenging. Therefore, option (4) is the answer. The other 3 options have been mentioned. Refer to the first 2 paragraphs of the passage.
Solution:
Refer to the last sentence of the second paragraph where the author mentions the revival of the Welsh language. So, option (2) is the answer. The other options are not mentioned.
Solution:
Refer to the second paragraph where the author mentions the relation between reality and perception. So, option (4) is the answer.
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph, especially the sentence, “We hold out beliefs ....” The author also refers to how we acquired those beliefs. Therefore, option (2) is the answer.
Solution:
The reality of something is defined by our perception. If it is not, we cannot perceive that reality. Option (2) is narrow in scope. The author has only given the example of eyesight. So, option (4) is the answer.
Solution:
The term or the explanation of the term “anaesthesiology” cannot be found in the given passage. To understand the unconscious, many lateral ways of treating the mind has opened like hypnotic treatment, psychoanalysis, psychological magnetism etc. But anaesthesiology means the branch of medicine concerned with anaesthesia and anaesthetics. It is a completely different branch of study. Hence, it cannot be inferred.
Incorrect options:
1. Refer to, "At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before.” Hence can be inferred.
2. Refer to,” Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .” Can be inferred.
3. Refer to, “The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century.”
Incorrect options:
1. Refer to, "At the same time, once coined, powerful new ideas attracted to themselves a whole host of seemingly unrelated issues, practices, and experiences, creating a peculiar network of preoccupations that as a group had not existed before.” Hence can be inferred.
2. Refer to,” Thus, before 1790, few if any spoke, in medical terms, of the affinity between creative genius and the hallucinations of the insane . . .” Can be inferred.
3. Refer to, “The vocabulary concerning the soul and the mind increased enormously in the course of the nineteenth century.”
Solution:
3 is the correct option. The phrase clearly states that the new literary and intellectual language because of the rise of unconscious as a literary tool has provided a change to the then systematic understanding of time-honoured expressions and traditional catchwords.
Incorrect options:
1. The phrase “altered by…” makes it incorrect. It talks about change in time honoured expressions and not by it.
2. All options are not correct.
4. The word enriched has a sense of judgement in it, which cannot be inferred from the passage. Whether enriching or uninspiring is open to debate.
Incorrect options:
1. The phrase “altered by…” makes it incorrect. It talks about change in time honoured expressions and not by it.
2. All options are not correct.
4. The word enriched has a sense of judgement in it, which cannot be inferred from the passage. Whether enriching or uninspiring is open to debate.
Solution:
Refer to, “No, they won’t be invading our bodies and turning us into
Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day
swim through our bloodstream to heal us.” This makes option 3 the correct answer.
Incorrect Options:
Other options can be rendered incorrect. Although they are false but they are not supporting the passage.
Sentinels – which I personally find a little disappointing – but some of them could one day
swim through our bloodstream to heal us.” This makes option 3 the correct answer.
Incorrect Options:
Other options can be rendered incorrect. Although they are false but they are not supporting the passage.
Solution:
The entire passage deals with the fact that “language, that most human of
all attributes, was innate”. So, it is instinctive in nature as far Pinker and Chomsky are concerned. So, exactly at this point though the claims of Pinker may seem racist to some, transcends all sort of differences and become universal. “The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of
Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.”
1 is incorrect. It is an incorrect assumption.
2 is incorrect. The passage counters that argument.
3 is also factually incorrect.
all attributes, was innate”. So, it is instinctive in nature as far Pinker and Chomsky are concerned. So, exactly at this point though the claims of Pinker may seem racist to some, transcends all sort of differences and become universal. “The fundamental unity of humanity is the theme of
Mr. Chomsky's universal grammar, and of this exciting book.”
1 is incorrect. It is an incorrect assumption.
2 is incorrect. The passage counters that argument.
3 is also factually incorrect.
Solution:
Refer to, “Unlike Mr. Chomsky, Mr. Pinker firmly places the wiring of the brain for
language within the framework of Darwinian natural selection and evolution.” This proves that
Chomsky did not agree with Darwinian explanatory paradigm for language. Hence 2 is the correct
option.
Chomsky and Pinker agree with all the other mentioned options.
Chomsky and Pinker agree with all the other mentioned options.
Solution:
“This proposition will undoubtedly raise the hackles of some behavioral
psychologists and anthropologists, for it apparently contradicts the liberal idea that human
behavior may be changed for the better by improvements in culture and environment, and it
might seem to invite the twin bugaboos of biological determinism and racism.” So, it becomes clear
that Pinker’s theory was criticised from the behavioural psychology standpoint.
Solution:
Refer to, “When the researchers compared their results with theoretical models developed for clocks that rely on quantum effects, they were surprised to find that the relationship between accuracy and entropy seemed to be the same for both. . . .” Hence option 2 can be inferred.
Solution:
If we provide more fuel, it doesn’t mean that the car will go faster. It will depend on the speed of the car at which it is travelling. In the same way if we increase entropy, doesn’t mean the accuracy will increase, to gain more accuracy more entropy is produced. Hence, 1 is the correct option.
Refer to, ““It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.”
Refer to, ““It’s a bit like fuel use in a car. Just because I’m using more fuel doesn’t mean that I’m going faster or further,” says Huber.”
Solution:
Refer the concluding lines of the passage:
“Additionally, the Stoic idea of developing virtue in
oneself, of becoming a good person, which the
Stoics believed we could do because we have a
touch of the divine, laid the foundation for the three
monotheistic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam . . .This makes option 3 the correct answer.
The other options are either not mentioned or are
extreme.
Solution:
This is a largely factual question. The reference to
Marcus Aurelius comes in the first paragraph and
his role can be deduced from the from lines: “an
army general accused Marcus Aurelius of treason
in front of other officers…or perhaps proceeding
as he would have proceeded whether or not this
event occurred: continuing to lead the Romans in
a way that Marcus Aurelius believed best benefited
them.”
Solution:
The implied meaning of this line is that rather than
reacting on emotions, one should aim to observe
them and then decide on what is important. There
is no reference to any out-of-body experience.
Solution:
The main idea of the fourth paragraph is
encapsulated in its opening line: “As an
environment, technologies shape their inhabitants.
In this respect, they are comparable to laws and
customs.” The rest of the paragraph is elaborating
upon this point.
Solution:
The reference to Foucault’s prisons or Habermas’s
public sphere is an example of ways in which
masses are organized. These are not the only ways
in which this is done.
Solution:
Consider the following lines: “critical theory of
technology regards technologies as an environment
rather than as a collection of tools. We live today
with and even within technologies that determine
our way of life. Along with the constant pressures
to build centers of power, many other social values
and meanings are inscribed in technological
design.” Also, “As an environment, technologies
shape their inhabitants.” This makes option 3
correct.
Solution:
1 can be inferred from: “. A hermeneutics of
technology must make explicit the meanings
implicit in the devices we use and the rituals they
script.” 2 can be inferred from: “Critical theory of
technology is a political theory of modernity with a
normative dimension. …..according to which
advances in the formal claims of human rights take
center stage while in the background centralization
of ever more powerful public institutions and private
organizations imposes an authoritarian social
order.” 3 can be inferred from: “Customs such as
parental authority represent the interest of childhood
in safety and growth…..This notion of
representation does not imply an eternal human
nature.” 4 is an extreme statement that finds no
support in the passage.
Solution:
The transition from the Middle Ages to the Age of
Enlightenment did see new theories of the Undead.
Thus, if this statement is false, it would not be
aligned with the information given in the passage.
Solution:
The simple meaning of the statement is - Mankind’s
early years were marked by a belief in the existence
of eerie creatures that were neither quite alive nor
dead. The other options are distortions.
Solution:
As the passage states: “Back in the 17th century
[in the West], excavated artworks from antiquity
were treated quite differently from today. They were
not restored in a way that was faithful to the
original. Instead, there was massive intervention
in these works, changing their appearance. . .”
The reference to religion comes in the context of
cloning.
Solution:
Refer the following lines from the first paragraph:
“The second concept for a copy is fuzhipin … They
are exact reproductions of the original, which, for
the Chinese, are of equal value to the original. It
has absolutely no negative connotations.” The other
options are examples of Fangzhipin and these are
likely to have less value than the original.
Solution:
Options 2 and 3 can be inferred from the first
paragraph of the passage. Option 4 can be inferred
from the second paragraph.
Solution:
Cuttlefish, squid and polar bear have been
mentioned in the last twp paragraphs of the
passage. Snails have been termed dissimilar in
the first paragraph of the passage.
Solution:
Refer to these lines of the passage: ‘Nontechnical
parameters such as access to a technology,
cultural relevancy or potential harms are deemed
political and invalid in this way of learning. But those
technical ideals are at their core social and political
choices determined by a dominant culture focused
on economic growth for the most privileged
segments of society. By choosing to downplay
public welfare as a critical parameter for engineering
design, we risk creating a culture of disengagement
from societal concerns amongst engineers that is
antithetical to the ethical code of engineering.’
Options 1, 2 and 3 can be inferred from these lines.
Option 4 contradicts the main idea of the first
paragraph.
Solution:
Option 1 can be inferred from the first paragraph of
the passage: ‘When we teach engineering …
and solution process.’ Option 2 does not present
the author’s main point as the passage does not
mentions any shift in the engineering pedagogy.
Option 3 contradicts the arguments of the passage. So does option 4.
Option 3 contradicts the arguments of the passage. So does option 4.
Solution:
All options except 3 relate to why marginalized
people are systematically discriminated against
in technology-related interventions: racially-based
adjustments are derived from research done by
eugenicists; subjective beliefs treated as facts
encodes social inequities and the supposed
technical ‘ideals’ are determined by a culture
focused on the privileged.
Solution:
“Think beyond all the qualifications that might trail
after this bald statement . . .” Through these lines
the author wants to state that despite multiple
qualifications that one might think about while
thinking about musicians, humans are necessarily
musicking. Therefore, option 2 is correct.
Solution:
Refer to these lines of the passage: ‘here are some
institutions that come in both informal and
formal variants, as well as in mixed ones.
Consider the fact that the stock exchange and
the black market are both market institutions,
one formal one not.’ Clearly, through these lines,
the author wants to imply exactly what option 3
states.
Solution:
Natural languages are typical examples of what
Ferguson called ‘the result of human action, but
not the execution of any human design”. In other
words, there is no conscious human intent in this
stage of language development. So, option 2 can
be inferred to be true based on the passage.
Therefore, option 2 is the correct answer.
Solution:
Refer to the last sentence of the penultimate
paragraph where the author expresses his views.
Incorrect answers:
Option (4) is a close option but option (1) is a better answer choice. It conveys the fundamental conclusion provided in the passage. Options (2) and (3) are out of scope.
Incorrect answers:
Option (4) is a close option but option (1) is a better answer choice. It conveys the fundamental conclusion provided in the passage. Options (2) and (3) are out of scope.
Solution:
Other than option 4, the other options are
mentioned in the passage. Refer to the first 2
paragraphs in particular.
Solution:
Other than option 4, the other options are
mentioned in the passage. The entire passage
showcases the author’s views on ‘Applications that
offer lots of prompts and tips’ He is apprehensive
about the use of sophisticated automation.
Solution:
Referring to, “The people using the more advanced
software, meanwhile, would often “aimlessly click
around” when confronted with a tricky problem. The
supposedly helpful software actually short-circuited
their thinking and learning.” This makes option 4
correct.
Incorrect Options:
Other options are vague and cannot be determined from the passage.
Incorrect Options:
Other options are vague and cannot be determined from the passage.
Solution:
Refer to the penultimate paragraph where the author
draws a similarity between genetic and bioengineers.
Incorrect answers: The other options are not
implied in the passage.
Solution:
Refer to the last paragraph of the passage where
the author mentions how the apparent veil between
the organic and the manufactured have been
obliterated. The other options cannot be
substantiated in the light of the given quoted
sentence.
Solution:
Refer to the second last paragraph of the passage
where the social disorganization of the African
American migrants is discussed. Therefore, option
(2) is correct.
Incorrect answers The other options are not valid inferences from the passage.
Incorrect answers The other options are not valid inferences from the passage.
Solution:
Option (2) presents the correct sequence of the
words/phrases as given in the passage. Therefore,
option (2) is the appropriate answer.
Solution:
Option (3) conveys the correct sequence of ideas
given in the passage. The other options are incorrect
in the light of the passage.
Solution:
Option (1) can be inferred in the light of the last
paragraph of the passage.
Incorrect answers: The other options cannot be inferred from the given passage and therefore, can be ruled out.
Incorrect answers: The other options cannot be inferred from the given passage and therefore, can be ruled out.
Solution:
Due to the introduction of digital templates for
medicinal purposes, doctors sometimes tend to
follow the results blindly, like in the case of the
Ebola patient. Hence option 4 provides a broad
spectrum.
Incorrect Options:
The use of the term ‘forced’ makes option 1 incorrect.
Option 2 and 3 cannot be verified from the passage. They look like assumptions.
Incorrect Options:
The use of the term ‘forced’ makes option 1 incorrect.
Option 2 and 3 cannot be verified from the passage. They look like assumptions.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
The passage discusses the conflict between the interests of farmers (concerned about livestock losses) and environmentalists (who celebrate the return of wolves as a sign of ecological health). The author suggests that tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept, could serve as an economic solution benefiting both parties. This aligns with option (3) farmers and environmentalists.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmentalists and politicians: The passage does not specifically discuss a solution involving both these groups.
2. Tourists and environmentalists: While tourists enjoy visiting wolf parks, the passage does not suggest a solution that specifically reconciles the interests of tourists with environmentalists.
4. Politicians and farmers: There is no mention of a solution involving both these groups in the passage.
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
The passage discusses the conflict between the interests of farmers (concerned about livestock losses) and environmentalists (who celebrate the return of wolves as a sign of ecological health). The author suggests that tourist venues, such as parks where wolves are kept, could serve as an economic solution benefiting both parties. This aligns with option (3) farmers and environmentalists.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmentalists and politicians: The passage does not specifically discuss a solution involving both these groups.
2. Tourists and environmentalists: While tourists enjoy visiting wolf parks, the passage does not suggest a solution that specifically reconciles the interests of tourists with environmentalists.
4. Politicians and farmers: There is no mention of a solution involving both these groups in the passage.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
That forager communities’ lifestyles derived not from ignorance about alternatives, but from their own choice.
The passage uses the example of the Hadza of Tanzania to highlight a key point of Sahlins’s argument: that forager societies, like the Hadza, are aware of alternative ways of living, such as agriculture, but consciously choose to maintain their foraging lifestyle. This illustrates Sahlins’s view that forager societies are not just remnants of a past way of life but are actively choosing their cultural values and lifestyle.
Incorrect Answers:
1. How pre-agrarian societies did not hamper the emergence of more advanced agrarian practices in contiguous communities: The passage does not discuss the impact of pre-agrarian societies on the emergence of agrarian practices.
2. How two vastly different ways of living and working were able to coexist in proximity for centuries: The passage doesn’t emphasize the coexistence aspect as much as it does the aspect of choice and rejection of alternatives.
3. That hunter-gatherer communities’ subsistence level techniques equipped them to survive well into contemporary times: The passage focuses more on the aspect of conscious choice rather than the effectiveness of their subsistence techniques.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
That forager communities’ lifestyles derived not from ignorance about alternatives, but from their own choice.
The passage uses the example of the Hadza of Tanzania to highlight a key point of Sahlins’s argument: that forager societies, like the Hadza, are aware of alternative ways of living, such as agriculture, but consciously choose to maintain their foraging lifestyle. This illustrates Sahlins’s view that forager societies are not just remnants of a past way of life but are actively choosing their cultural values and lifestyle.
Incorrect Answers:
1. How pre-agrarian societies did not hamper the emergence of more advanced agrarian practices in contiguous communities: The passage does not discuss the impact of pre-agrarian societies on the emergence of agrarian practices.
2. How two vastly different ways of living and working were able to coexist in proximity for centuries: The passage doesn’t emphasize the coexistence aspect as much as it does the aspect of choice and rejection of alternatives.
3. That hunter-gatherer communities’ subsistence level techniques equipped them to survive well into contemporary times: The passage focuses more on the aspect of conscious choice rather than the effectiveness of their subsistence techniques.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Most mainstream English-language novels have historically privileged the Christian, white, male experience of travel and adventure.
This statement is consistent with the passage’s argument that mainstream English-language fiction often centers experiences in Europe or the US, with a background of Christianity and whiteness. The other statements, if true, would weaken the passage’s claim by either suggesting a different portrayal of Africa in Indian Ocean novels or by contradicting the claim about the typical settings and themes of mainstream English-language novels.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by a postcolonial nostalgia for an idyllic past: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels are not presenting a complex and realistic view of Africa, but rather a romanticized one.
3. Very few mainstream English-language novels have historically been set in American and European metropolitan centres: If true, this would contradict the passage’s claim that mainstream English-language fiction mostly centers experiences in Europe or the US.
4. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by an Orientalist imagination of its cultural crudeness: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels do not offer a rich and nuanced portrayal of Africa, but rather one that is simplistic and stereotypical.
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Most mainstream English-language novels have historically privileged the Christian, white, male experience of travel and adventure.
This statement is consistent with the passage’s argument that mainstream English-language fiction often centers experiences in Europe or the US, with a background of Christianity and whiteness. The other statements, if true, would weaken the passage’s claim by either suggesting a different portrayal of Africa in Indian Ocean novels or by contradicting the claim about the typical settings and themes of mainstream English-language novels.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by a postcolonial nostalgia for an idyllic past: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels are not presenting a complex and realistic view of Africa, but rather a romanticized one.
3. Very few mainstream English-language novels have historically been set in American and European metropolitan centres: If true, this would contradict the passage’s claim that mainstream English-language fiction mostly centers experiences in Europe or the US.
4. The depiction of Africa in most Indian Ocean novels is driven by an Orientalist imagination of its cultural crudeness: If true, this would weaken the claim by suggesting that Indian Ocean novels do not offer a rich and nuanced portrayal of Africa, but rather one that is simplistic and stereotypical.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
How physical circumstances can dictate human behaviour and cultures.
The passage uses the examples of the Inuit and Aboriginal Australians to illustrate how geographic factors significantly influence cultural practices and societal developments. The Inuit developed warm fur clothes due to the cold Arctic climate, while Aboriginal Australians did not develop agriculture due to the lack of domesticable native species. These examples underscore the role of physical, geographic circumstances in shaping human behavior and cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. That despite geographical isolation, traditional societies were self-sufficient and adaptive: While the passage does illustrate the adaptation of these societies to their environments, it primarily focuses on the geographic determinants of their lifestyle choices, not necessarily on their selfsufficiency or adaptiveness.
3. How environmental factors lead to comparatively divergent paths in livelihoods and development: This is a valid point made in the passage, showing how geographic factors led to different developments like the absence of agriculture in the Arctic and in Australia.
4. Human resourcefulness across cultures in adapting to their surroundings: While this could be a secondary theme, the main emphasis of the examples is on how geography dictated certain cultural and societal developments, rather than highlighting the resourcefulness of these cultures.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
How physical circumstances can dictate human behaviour and cultures.
The passage uses the examples of the Inuit and Aboriginal Australians to illustrate how geographic factors significantly influence cultural practices and societal developments. The Inuit developed warm fur clothes due to the cold Arctic climate, while Aboriginal Australians did not develop agriculture due to the lack of domesticable native species. These examples underscore the role of physical, geographic circumstances in shaping human behavior and cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. That despite geographical isolation, traditional societies were self-sufficient and adaptive: While the passage does illustrate the adaptation of these societies to their environments, it primarily focuses on the geographic determinants of their lifestyle choices, not necessarily on their selfsufficiency or adaptiveness.
3. How environmental factors lead to comparatively divergent paths in livelihoods and development: This is a valid point made in the passage, showing how geographic factors led to different developments like the absence of agriculture in the Arctic and in Australia.
4. Human resourcefulness across cultures in adapting to their surroundings: While this could be a secondary theme, the main emphasis of the examples is on how geography dictated certain cultural and societal developments, rather than highlighting the resourcefulness of these cultures.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise: To determine which statement would weaken the author's claims, we first need to understand the main points presented in the passage. The passage focuses on the return of wolves to Lozère, a rural area in southern France, and the resulting conflict between the interests of farmers, who are concerned about their livestock, and environmentalists, who view the return of wolves as a positive sign of ecological health. Based on the above analysis, option (2), "Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise," would be the most likely to weaken the author's claims, as it introduces a new concern (safety of tourists) that isn't addressed in the passage. However, it's important to note that even this point doesn't directly counter the main argument but rather adds a different perspective to the issue. This could potentially weaken the claim by adding a new dimension to the wolf-related concerns. If wolf attacks on tourists are increasing, it contradicts the notion that wolves are only a threat to livestock and not to humans. This could shift the narrative and add weight to the concerns of those opposed to the wolves' return.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The old mining sites of Lozère are now being used as grazing pastures for sheep: This statement doesn't directly weaken the author's claims. It provides information about land use in Lozère but doesn't address the core issue of the conflict between the return of wolves and the interests of different groups. If anything, it might indicate more potential targets (sheep) for wolves, thereby supporting the farmers' concerns rather than weakening the author's overall narrative.
3. Unemployment concerns the residents of Lozère: While unemployment is a significant issue, this statement does not directly relate to or weaken the author's claims about the conflict arising from the return of wolves. The issue of unemployment is separate from the environmental versus agricultural concerns central to the passage.
4. Having migrated out in the last century, wolves are now returning to Lozère: This statement actually reinforces the author's primary claim rather than weakening it. The fact that wolves are returning to Lozère is a key point in the passage and is the basis of the conflict described.
Para 1: Residents of Lozère, a rural area in southern France, share common rural European concerns such as a lack of local schools, jobs, and communication services. A unique issue they face is the return of wolves, previously eradicated but now reappearing in the region. This has caused concern among farmers about their livestock and livelihoods. The issue has gained political attention, with parliamentarian candidate Francis Palombi addressing it during a campaign.
Para 2: The history of wolf management in France dates back to the ninth century with the establishment of the Luparii, official wolf-catchers. By the 1930s, wolves were extinct in mainland France due to hunting and the use of poisons like strychnine. However, in the early 1990s, wolves re-emerged, migrating from Italy to France, much to the dismay of sheep farmers. While environmentalists view their return positively as a sign of ecological health, farmers are troubled by the threat to their livestock.
Para 3: The changes in the past decades can be attributed to factors like rural depopulation. For example, Lozère’s population has significantly decreased since the mid-19th century, leading to an increase in forested areas. The decline in hunting activity has also contributed to quieter forests. The protected status of wolves in Europe and conservation efforts by NGOs have aided in the recovery of wolf populations.
Para 4: As wolves spread westward in Europe, including closer to urban areas, tensions between farmers and wolf advocates are expected to rise. While farmers suffer losses due to wolves, the presence of these animals also boosts tourism and job opportunities in rural areas, highlighting the complex economic impact of wildlife conservation.
Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise: To determine which statement would weaken the author's claims, we first need to understand the main points presented in the passage. The passage focuses on the return of wolves to Lozère, a rural area in southern France, and the resulting conflict between the interests of farmers, who are concerned about their livestock, and environmentalists, who view the return of wolves as a positive sign of ecological health. Based on the above analysis, option (2), "Wolf attacks on tourists in Lozère are on the rise," would be the most likely to weaken the author's claims, as it introduces a new concern (safety of tourists) that isn't addressed in the passage. However, it's important to note that even this point doesn't directly counter the main argument but rather adds a different perspective to the issue. This could potentially weaken the claim by adding a new dimension to the wolf-related concerns. If wolf attacks on tourists are increasing, it contradicts the notion that wolves are only a threat to livestock and not to humans. This could shift the narrative and add weight to the concerns of those opposed to the wolves' return.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The old mining sites of Lozère are now being used as grazing pastures for sheep: This statement doesn't directly weaken the author's claims. It provides information about land use in Lozère but doesn't address the core issue of the conflict between the return of wolves and the interests of different groups. If anything, it might indicate more potential targets (sheep) for wolves, thereby supporting the farmers' concerns rather than weakening the author's overall narrative.
3. Unemployment concerns the residents of Lozère: While unemployment is a significant issue, this statement does not directly relate to or weaken the author's claims about the conflict arising from the return of wolves. The issue of unemployment is separate from the environmental versus agricultural concerns central to the passage.
4. Having migrated out in the last century, wolves are now returning to Lozère: This statement actually reinforces the author's primary claim rather than weakening it. The fact that wolves are returning to Lozère is a key point in the passage and is the basis of the conflict described.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Cursory treatment of the effects of racism and colonialism on societies.
The passage acknowledges that while Sahlins’s essay does recognize the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it doesn’t thematize or delve deeply into these issues as much as might be expected today. The criticism here is that these significant factors in the history and current situation of forager societies are not given the extensive consideration they warrant.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Failure to supplement its thesis with robust empirical data: The author states that the empirical validity of the data is not the main point, suggesting that the criticism is not about the lack of robust data.
2. Critique of anthropologists who disparage the choices of foragers in today’s society: The passage does not present this as a criticism of Sahlins’s essay.
3. Outdated values regarding present-day foragers versus ancient foraging communities: The passage criticizes Sahlins for potentially using present-day foragers as proxies for the Paleolithic, not for having outdated values regarding them.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Cursory treatment of the effects of racism and colonialism on societies.
The passage acknowledges that while Sahlins’s essay does recognize the violence of colonialism, racism, and dispossession, it doesn’t thematize or delve deeply into these issues as much as might be expected today. The criticism here is that these significant factors in the history and current situation of forager societies are not given the extensive consideration they warrant.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Failure to supplement its thesis with robust empirical data: The author states that the empirical validity of the data is not the main point, suggesting that the criticism is not about the lack of robust data.
2. Critique of anthropologists who disparage the choices of foragers in today’s society: The passage does not present this as a criticism of Sahlins’s essay.
3. Outdated values regarding present-day foragers versus ancient foraging communities: The passage criticizes Sahlins for potentially using present-day foragers as proxies for the Paleolithic, not for having outdated values regarding them.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
While most human phenomena result from culture and individual choice, some have bio-geographic origins:
The passage makes a case for the significance of both geographic and non-geographic factors in influencing human phenomena, which supports this inference.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Individual dictat and contingency were not the causal factors for the use of fur clothing in some very cold climates: The passage specifically argues that the development of warm fur clothes by the Inuit was not due to individual decisions but was a straightforward geographic necessity, making this a correct inference.
2. Several academic studies of human phenomena in the past involved racist interpretations: The passage acknowledges that many older explanations in various fields, including geography, were racist, which makes this a valid inference.
4. Agricultural practices changed drastically in the Australian continent after it was colonised:
While the passage discusses that Aboriginal Australia remained a continent of hunter/ gatherers with no indigenous farming or herding due to biogeographic reasons, it does not provide specific information about how agricultural practices changed after colonization. It only mentions that non-native crops and animals were brought to Australia by colonists, but does not detail a drastic change in agricultural practices.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
While most human phenomena result from culture and individual choice, some have bio-geographic origins:
The passage makes a case for the significance of both geographic and non-geographic factors in influencing human phenomena, which supports this inference.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Individual dictat and contingency were not the causal factors for the use of fur clothing in some very cold climates: The passage specifically argues that the development of warm fur clothes by the Inuit was not due to individual decisions but was a straightforward geographic necessity, making this a correct inference.
2. Several academic studies of human phenomena in the past involved racist interpretations: The passage acknowledges that many older explanations in various fields, including geography, were racist, which makes this a valid inference.
4. Agricultural practices changed drastically in the Australian continent after it was colonised:
While the passage discusses that Aboriginal Australia remained a continent of hunter/ gatherers with no indigenous farming or herding due to biogeographic reasons, it does not provide specific information about how agricultural practices changed after colonization. It only mentions that non-native crops and animals were brought to Australia by colonists, but does not detail a drastic change in agricultural practices.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Dismissal of explanations that involve geographical causes for human behaviour.
The passage specifically criticizes nongeographers for their reflex rejection of geographic explanations (i.e., denouncing them as “geographic determinism”). However, it does not mention that they dismiss all explanations involving geographical causes. The other reasons cited (disciplinary training lacking in geography, lingering impressions of past offensive analyses, and a focus on humancentric explanations) are mentioned as contributing to the disregard of geographic influences.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Disciplinary training which typically does not include technical knowledge of geography: The passage mentions that most historians and economists don’t acquire detailed geographical knowledge as part of their professional training.
2. Lingering impressions of past geographic analyses that were politically offensive: The passage notes that the racist nature of some early geographic explanations has tainted the field in the eyes of many scholars.
3. Belief in the central role of humans, unrelated to physical surroundings, in influencing phenomena: The author points out that historians often emphasize the role of individual decisions and chance, which aligns with a belief in the central role of humans over geographic factors.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Dismissal of explanations that involve geographical causes for human behaviour.
The passage specifically criticizes nongeographers for their reflex rejection of geographic explanations (i.e., denouncing them as “geographic determinism”). However, it does not mention that they dismiss all explanations involving geographical causes. The other reasons cited (disciplinary training lacking in geography, lingering impressions of past offensive analyses, and a focus on humancentric explanations) are mentioned as contributing to the disregard of geographic influences.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Disciplinary training which typically does not include technical knowledge of geography: The passage mentions that most historians and economists don’t acquire detailed geographical knowledge as part of their professional training.
2. Lingering impressions of past geographic analyses that were politically offensive: The passage notes that the racist nature of some early geographic explanations has tainted the field in the eyes of many scholars.
3. Belief in the central role of humans, unrelated to physical surroundings, in influencing phenomena: The author points out that historians often emphasize the role of individual decisions and chance, which aligns with a belief in the central role of humans over geographic factors.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Show how Sahlins's views complemented Galbraith's criticism of the consumerism and inequality of contemporary society. The passage notes that Sahlins’s essay, “The Original Affluent Society,” had a thematic connection to Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society.” Both works offer critical perspectives on contemporary society’s focus on material wealth and consumerism. Sahlins’s argument about foraging societies pursuing affluence not through material accumulation but through wanting less is seen as complementing Galbraith’s skepticism about postwar prosperity and inequality in America.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Document the influence of Galbraith’s cynical views on modern consumerism on Sahlins’s analysis of pre-historic societies: The passage doesn’t imply that Galbraith directly influenced Sahlins’s work; rather, it suggests a thematic connection or a nod to Galbraith’s work.
3. Show how Galbraith’s theories refute Sahlins’s thesis on the contentment of pre-hunter-gatherer communities: Galbraith’s work is not presented as a refutation of Sahlins’s thesis; instead, both seem to critique certain aspects of modern society.
4. Contrast the materialist nature of contemporary growth paths with the pacifist content ways of living among the foragers: While there is a contrast drawn, the passage does not specifically describe Galbraith’s work as focusing on “pacifist content ways of living.”
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Show how Sahlins's views complemented Galbraith's criticism of the consumerism and inequality of contemporary society. The passage notes that Sahlins’s essay, “The Original Affluent Society,” had a thematic connection to Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society.” Both works offer critical perspectives on contemporary society’s focus on material wealth and consumerism. Sahlins’s argument about foraging societies pursuing affluence not through material accumulation but through wanting less is seen as complementing Galbraith’s skepticism about postwar prosperity and inequality in America.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Document the influence of Galbraith’s cynical views on modern consumerism on Sahlins’s analysis of pre-historic societies: The passage doesn’t imply that Galbraith directly influenced Sahlins’s work; rather, it suggests a thematic connection or a nod to Galbraith’s work.
3. Show how Galbraith’s theories refute Sahlins’s thesis on the contentment of pre-hunter-gatherer communities: Galbraith’s work is not presented as a refutation of Sahlins’s thesis; instead, both seem to critique certain aspects of modern society.
4. Contrast the materialist nature of contemporary growth paths with the pacifist content ways of living among the foragers: While there is a contrast drawn, the passage does not specifically describe Galbraith’s work as focusing on “pacifist content ways of living.”
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Hold a mirror to an acquisitive society, with examples of other communities that have chosen successfully to be non-materialistic.
Sahlins’s essay is portrayed as a critique of modern, materialistic societies, using foraging societies as a contrast. These societies, which follow “the Zen road to affluence” by wanting less rather than acquiring more, serve as a challenge to the values of contemporary capitalist societies. The essay is seen as a thought experiment to stimulate the imagination about different ways of living, emphasizing the values of leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Counter Galbraith’s pessimistic view of the inevitability of a capitalist trajectory for economic growth: The passage does not suggest that Sahlins was directly countering Galbraith’s view.
3. Put forth the view that, despite egalitarian origins, economic progress brings greater inequality and social hierarchies: While this is a theme in Sahlins’s work, it is not presented as the main goal of his essay.
4. Highlight the fact that while we started off as a fairly contented egalitarian people, we have progressively degenerated into materialism: The passage suggests that Sahlins’s essay was more about presenting an alternative perspective rather than depicting a degeneration into materialism.
Para 1: Fifty years after its publication, Marshall Sahlins’ essay “Original Affluent Society” remains influential. Sahlins argued that hunter-gatherers were not desperately struggling for survival but were in fact living with more leisure time compared to those in agricultural and industrial societies. He suggested that the Neolithic Revolution, which transitioned humans to farming, led to a harsher work regime and greater inequality.
Para 2: Sahlins pointed out that foraging societies, like the contemporary Hadza of Tanzania, consciously chose their lifestyle despite knowing about alternatives like farming. This demonstrated that societies make intentional choices based on cultural values, highlighting the principle of collective self-determination.
Para 3: The essay’s significance lies more in its conceptual challenge to contemporary economic life and individualism than in the empirical accuracy of the data about foragers. It serves as a philosophical and political thought experiment, stimulating the imagination about alternative ways of living.
Para 4: ”The Original Affluent Society” draws parallels with John Kenneth Galbraith’s “The Affluent Society” and critiques postwar American consumerism. Sahlins used anthropological perspectives to present foraging societies as viable alternatives to capitalist materialism, emphasizing values like leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Para 5: In the current context, some aspects of the essay may seem outdated, particularly its lighter focus on issues like colonialism, racism, and dispossession. However, its core message, urging the exploration of different ways of living to imagine new possibilities, remains relevant.
Hold a mirror to an acquisitive society, with examples of other communities that have chosen successfully to be non-materialistic.
Sahlins’s essay is portrayed as a critique of modern, materialistic societies, using foraging societies as a contrast. These societies, which follow “the Zen road to affluence” by wanting less rather than acquiring more, serve as a challenge to the values of contemporary capitalist societies. The essay is seen as a thought experiment to stimulate the imagination about different ways of living, emphasizing the values of leisure, mobility, and freedom over material accumulation.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Counter Galbraith’s pessimistic view of the inevitability of a capitalist trajectory for economic growth: The passage does not suggest that Sahlins was directly countering Galbraith’s view.
3. Put forth the view that, despite egalitarian origins, economic progress brings greater inequality and social hierarchies: While this is a theme in Sahlins’s work, it is not presented as the main goal of his essay.
4. Highlight the fact that while we started off as a fairly contented egalitarian people, we have progressively degenerated into materialism: The passage suggests that Sahlins’s essay was more about presenting an alternative perspective rather than depicting a degeneration into materialism.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Cosmopolitanism originated in the West and travelled to the East through globalisation. The passage emphasizes the longstanding global connections and cosmopolitan culture of the Indian Ocean world, suggesting a rich history of interconnectedness, trade, and cultural exchange independent of Western influence. This contradicts the claim that cosmopolitanism originated in the West and then spread to the East, making it the exception to the remapping theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The world of early international trade and commerce was not the sole domain of white Europeans: This supports the remapping by challenging the Eurocentric view of history and emphasizing the active role of non-European cultures in early global trade.
2. The global south, as opposed to the global north, was the first centre of globalisation: This aligns with the passage’s suggestion that what we now call globalization first appeared in the Indian Ocean, indicating an early global interconnectedness centered in the global south.
3. Indian Ocean novels have gone beyond the specifics of national concerns to explore rich regional pasts: This is directly related to the remapping theme, as the passage describes these novels as moving beyond national narratives to focus on the broader Indian Ocean world.
Para 1: Early postcolonial literature often focused on the nation as the main setting for novels, with stories frequently serving as allegories for national issues in countries like India or Tanzania. While this was crucial for supporting anti-colonial nationalism, it was also limiting due to its land-focused and inward-looking nature.
Para 2: The book “Writing Ocean Worlds” explores novels centered around the Indian Ocean world, moving beyond the typical village or national focus. It discusses the works of novelists Amitav Ghosh, Abdulrazak Gurnah, Lindsey Collen, and Joseph Conrad, who depict the Indian Ocean as a hub of outward-looking activities like movement and border-crossing. These novels offer diverse perspectives and contribute to remapping the reader’s world view, centering it in the interconnected global south.
Para 3: The term “Indian Ocean world” refers to the historical and long-lasting connections among the coasts of East Africa, the Arab regions, and South and East Asia. Geographical features made sea travel easier than land travel, leading to early forms of globalization. The book highlights how these connections are represented in the novels.
Para 4: The authors Ghosh, Gurnah, Collen, and Conrad present different histories and geographies compared to typical English fiction, which usually centers around Europe or the US. Their novels focus on Islamic spaces, characters of color, and important port cities like Malindi, Mombasa, Aden, Java, and Bombay, offering a richly sensory portrayal of a southern cosmopolitan culture.
Para 5: The novels discussed in the book effectively remap the representation of Africa in literature. African, Indian, and Arab characters play various active roles, from traders to ship captains. While not romanticizing the African part of the Indian Ocean world, acknowledging issues like forced migration and slavery, the novels emphasize Africa’s significant contribution to the history of the region and the wider world.
Cosmopolitanism originated in the West and travelled to the East through globalisation. The passage emphasizes the longstanding global connections and cosmopolitan culture of the Indian Ocean world, suggesting a rich history of interconnectedness, trade, and cultural exchange independent of Western influence. This contradicts the claim that cosmopolitanism originated in the West and then spread to the East, making it the exception to the remapping theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. The world of early international trade and commerce was not the sole domain of white Europeans: This supports the remapping by challenging the Eurocentric view of history and emphasizing the active role of non-European cultures in early global trade.
2. The global south, as opposed to the global north, was the first centre of globalisation: This aligns with the passage’s suggestion that what we now call globalization first appeared in the Indian Ocean, indicating an early global interconnectedness centered in the global south.
3. Indian Ocean novels have gone beyond the specifics of national concerns to explore rich regional pasts: This is directly related to the remapping theme, as the passage describes these novels as moving beyond national narratives to focus on the broader Indian Ocean world.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Their outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena.
The passage does not specifically criticize nongeographer scholars for holding outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena. The criticisms mentioned are regarding their reaction to geographic explanations (such as labeling them as deterministic), their focus on individual decisions, and the rejection of biogeographic factors. The passage doesn’t address their views on past cultural and historical phenomena as being outdated.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The importance they place on the role of individual decisions when studying human phenomena: The author criticizes historians for sometimes overemphasizing contingency based on individual decisions, making this a valid criticism according to the passage.
3. Their labelling of geographic explanations as deterministic: The author points out that many scholars reject geographic explanations by denouncing them as “geographic determinism,” which is presented as a criticism in the passage.
4. Their rejection of the role of biogeographic factors in social and cultural phenomena: The passage criticizes scholars for overlooking the importance of geographic factors, including biogeographic factors, in influencing human phenomena.
Para 1: Human phenomena and characteristics, such as behaviors, beliefs, economies, and genes, are influenced by both geographic and non-geographic factors. Geographic factors include physical and biological elements like climate, species distribution, soils, and topography. Non-geographic factors encompass cultural aspects, historical elements, and individual decisions.
Para 2: The passage illustrates how geographic factors significantly impact human activities, contrasting North and South Korea’s economies, which are shaped by governmental policies rather than environmental differences. In contrast, the development of warm clothing among Arctic Circle inhabitants and the absence of agriculture in equatorial regions are directly attributed to geographic conditions. Similarly, Australia’s lack of indigenous farming or herding is explained by its biogeography.
Para 3: While it is universally accepted that culture, history, and individual choices significantly influence human phenomena, the author notes a reluctance among scholars to acknowledge the role of geography, often denouncing it as “geographic determinism.”
Para 4: The hesitance to accept geographic explanations may stem from historical associations with racist ideologies. The author argues that just as modern, nonracist genetic, historical, and psychological explanations are accepted, so should contemporary geographic explanations be considered valid.
Para 5: Historians often emphasize the role of contingency based on individual decisions and chance, leading to a reflex rejection of geographic explanations. However, this approach can sometimes be unwarranted, as evidenced by the necessity of warm clothing for the Inuit, which was driven by environmental needs rather than individual decisions.
Para 6: The author suggests that another reason for the reluctance to accept geographic explanations is the lack of detailed geographic knowledge among many historians and economists, as such knowledge is not typically part of their professional training.
Their outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena.
The passage does not specifically criticize nongeographer scholars for holding outdated interpretations of past cultural and historical phenomena. The criticisms mentioned are regarding their reaction to geographic explanations (such as labeling them as deterministic), their focus on individual decisions, and the rejection of biogeographic factors. The passage doesn’t address their views on past cultural and historical phenomena as being outdated.
Incorrect Answers:
2. The importance they place on the role of individual decisions when studying human phenomena: The author criticizes historians for sometimes overemphasizing contingency based on individual decisions, making this a valid criticism according to the passage.
3. Their labelling of geographic explanations as deterministic: The author points out that many scholars reject geographic explanations by denouncing them as “geographic determinism,” which is presented as a criticism in the passage.
4. Their rejection of the role of biogeographic factors in social and cultural phenomena: The passage criticizes scholars for overlooking the importance of geographic factors, including biogeographic factors, in influencing human phenomena.
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Identifies which description does not align with the “common-sense view” of history.
Correct Answer: History is like science: a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality.
This view contrasts with the common-sense view’s focus on objective facts, suggesting a more interpretive approach (“...the belief in a hard core of historical facts...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Objective history from facts: Aligns with the common-sense view.
3. Real history in ancient engravings: Consistent with the emphasis on factual evidence.
4. Positivist methods for credible history: Agrees with the reliance on factual and empirical evidence.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Identifies which description does not align with the “common-sense view” of history.
Correct Answer: History is like science: a selective system of cognitive orientations to reality.
This view contrasts with the common-sense view’s focus on objective facts, suggesting a more interpretive approach (“...the belief in a hard core of historical facts...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Objective history from facts: Aligns with the common-sense view.
3. Real history in ancient engravings: Consistent with the emphasis on factual evidence.
4. Positivist methods for credible history: Agrees with the reliance on factual and empirical evidence.
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks about the likely focus of a historical account of the Battle of Hastings by the author, given their perspective on history.
Correct Answer: Exploring the socio-political and economic factors that led to the Battle.
The author emphasizes interpretation over just collecting facts. The passage suggests a broader focus on socio-political and economic contexts rather than just factual details (“But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Deriving historical facts: Contradicts the author’s emphasis on interpretation.
3. Relying on auxiliary sciences: Misinterprets the author’s view that auxiliary sciences support, not define, a historian’s work.
4. Detailed timeline of events: Overly factual, not in line with the author’s emphasis on broader socio-political contexts.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks about the likely focus of a historical account of the Battle of Hastings by the author, given their perspective on history.
Correct Answer: Exploring the socio-political and economic factors that led to the Battle.
The author emphasizes interpretation over just collecting facts. The passage suggests a broader focus on socio-political and economic contexts rather than just factual details (“But [to] praise a historian for his accuracy...”).
Incorrect Answers:
2. Deriving historical facts: Contradicts the author’s emphasis on interpretation.
3. Relying on auxiliary sciences: Misinterprets the author’s view that auxiliary sciences support, not define, a historian’s work.
4. Detailed timeline of events: Overly factual, not in line with the author’s emphasis on broader socio-political contexts.
Solution:
For questions 1 to 4:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks which statement does not weaken the passage’s claim about the nature of historical facts.
Correct Answer: Facts, like truth, can be relative: what is fact for person X may not be so for person Y.
Supports the passage’s view that facts require interpretation and are not absolute (“The facts speak only when the historian calls on them...”).
Incorrect Answers:
1. Objective and universal nature of facts: Contradicts the passage’s emphasis on interpretation.
2. Independent truth value of facts: Against the passage’s subjective view of historical interpretation.
4. Order of facts and meaning production: Suggests facts alone can convey meaning, opposing the passage’s view.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: The Positivists’ influence on history is discussed, emphasizing their approach of ascertaining facts before drawing conclusions. This approach, known as the common-sense view, sees history as a collection of facts derived from documents and inscriptions.
Paragraph 2: Challenges the common-sense view by arguing that significant historical facts are not the primary concern of historians. It emphasizes the importance of broader contexts and interpretations, with factual accuracy being a necessary but not essential function of historians.
Paragraph 3: Further critiques the common-sense view, stating that facts don’t speak for themselves and require interpretation by historians. It emphasizes the selective nature of history and the influence of interpretation in shaping historical narratives.
Question Explanation: Asks which statement does not weaken the passage’s claim about the nature of historical facts.
Correct Answer: Facts, like truth, can be relative: what is fact for person X may not be so for person Y.
Supports the passage’s view that facts require interpretation and are not absolute (“The facts speak only when the historian calls on them...”).
Incorrect Answers:
1. Objective and universal nature of facts: Contradicts the passage’s emphasis on interpretation.
2. Independent truth value of facts: Against the passage’s subjective view of historical interpretation.
4. Order of facts and meaning production: Suggests facts alone can convey meaning, opposing the passage’s view.
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which statement does not represent evidence of liberalism’s decline as discussed in the passage.
Correct Answer: “And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.”
While this statement discusses a negative aspect of modernity, it does not directly relate to the decline of liberalism, which is the central theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Democracy degraded: Indicates a failure of liberal democratic ideals.
3. Gap between liberalism’s claims and reality: Directly critiques the failure of liberalism to meet its promises.
4. Business aristocracy and vast companies: Suggests economic disparities arising under liberal policies, a sign of liberalism’s decline.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which statement does not represent evidence of liberalism’s decline as discussed in the passage.
Correct Answer: “And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.”
While this statement discusses a negative aspect of modernity, it does not directly relate to the decline of liberalism, which is the central theme of the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Democracy degraded: Indicates a failure of liberal democratic ideals.
3. Gap between liberalism’s claims and reality: Directly critiques the failure of liberalism to meet its promises.
4. Business aristocracy and vast companies: Suggests economic disparities arising under liberal policies, a sign of liberalism’s decline.
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Asks about the role of the “Davos elite” in illustrating the author’s views on liberalism.
Correct Answer: The hypocrisy of the liberal rich, who profess to subscribe to liberal values while cornering most of the wealth.
The passage uses “the Davos elite” as an example of the hypocrisy within liberal circles, where the wealthy, despite espousing liberal values, accumulate wealth and privileges, contradicting liberal ideals.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Rise in shared futures interest: Not supported by the passage.
2. Rich capturing debate: Doesn’t capture the irony and hypocrisy highlighted in the passage.
3. Unlikelihood of past liberalism return: Misinterprets the passage’s discussion on the Davos elite.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Asks about the role of the “Davos elite” in illustrating the author’s views on liberalism.
Correct Answer: The hypocrisy of the liberal rich, who profess to subscribe to liberal values while cornering most of the wealth.
The passage uses “the Davos elite” as an example of the hypocrisy within liberal circles, where the wealthy, despite espousing liberal values, accumulate wealth and privileges, contradicting liberal ideals.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Rise in shared futures interest: Not supported by the passage.
2. Rich capturing debate: Doesn’t capture the irony and hypocrisy highlighted in the passage.
3. Unlikelihood of past liberalism return: Misinterprets the passage’s discussion on the Davos elite.
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Identifies a statement that the author of the passage would likely agree with.
Correct Answer: Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so.
The passage acknowledges the historical adaptability of liberalism, showing how it has reformed in response to challenges.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Liberalism as a dying ideal: The passage does not suggest liberalism needs replacing but rather calls for its reform.
3. Essence of liberalism in freedoms: Oversimplifies liberalism, contrary to the passage’s broader view.
4. Claims of disintegration exaggerated: The passage does recognize the challenges faced by liberalism, not dismissing them as exaggerations.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Identifies a statement that the author of the passage would likely agree with.
Correct Answer: Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so.
The passage acknowledges the historical adaptability of liberalism, showing how it has reformed in response to challenges.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Liberalism as a dying ideal: The passage does not suggest liberalism needs replacing but rather calls for its reform.
3. Essence of liberalism in freedoms: Oversimplifies liberalism, contrary to the passage’s broader view.
4. Claims of disintegration exaggerated: The passage does recognize the challenges faced by liberalism, not dismissing them as exaggerations.
Solution:
For questions 5 to 8:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which criticism is not made by the author against Deneen’s conclusions on liberalism.
Correct Answer: Its repeated harking back to premodern notions of liberty.
The passage does not criticize Deneen for referring to pre modern notions of liberty. In fact, it acknowledges the value in revisiting these concepts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Extreme pessimism: The passage criticizes Deneen’s overly pessimistic view of liberalism’s future.
3. Failure to note historical reversals: The passage points out Deneen’s oversight of historical examples where liberalism has managed to reform.
4. Narrow definition of liberalism: The passage faults Deneen for focusing too narrowly on individual freedom in defining liberalism.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the success of liberalism over the past four centuries and its recent disintegration due to internal contradictions and hubris. It mentions the paradox of the meritocratic aristocracy and the degradation of democracy, along with the negative environmental impacts of the fashion industry.
Paragraph 2: Presents a critique of Patrick Deneen’s view that the failures of liberalism are comprehensive. It acknowledges the broad range of liberal intellectual traditions and the ability of liberalism to reform itself, citing historical examples of such reforms.
Paragraph 3: Argues against Deneen’s failure to recognize liberalism’s capacity for self-reform. It highlights the historical adaptability of liberalism in addressing internal problems and challenges.
Paragraph 4: Suggests that despite Deneen’s critique, liberalism has played a role in facilitating European integration, pointing out that American companies often aid this process.
Question Explanation: Seeks to identify which criticism is not made by the author against Deneen’s conclusions on liberalism.
Correct Answer: Its repeated harking back to premodern notions of liberty.
The passage does not criticize Deneen for referring to pre modern notions of liberty. In fact, it acknowledges the value in revisiting these concepts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Extreme pessimism: The passage criticizes Deneen’s overly pessimistic view of liberalism’s future.
3. Failure to note historical reversals: The passage points out Deneen’s oversight of historical examples where liberalism has managed to reform.
4. Narrow definition of liberalism: The passage faults Deneen for focusing too narrowly on individual freedom in defining liberalism.
Solution:
For questions 9 to 12:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Asks about the irony in the practice of “thrifting” as described in the passage.
Correct Answer: Has created environmental problems.
The passage notes that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution, which is ironic considering thrifting is promoted for environmental benefits.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Luxury clothing at low prices: Not mentioned as ironic in the passage.
2. Not cost-effective for retailers: Not discussed in the passage.
3. Anti-consumerist attitude: Not directly related to the irony mentioned in the passage.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Asks about the irony in the practice of “thrifting” as described in the passage.
Correct Answer: Has created environmental problems.
The passage notes that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution, which is ironic considering thrifting is promoted for environmental benefits.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Luxury clothing at low prices: Not mentioned as ironic in the passage.
2. Not cost-effective for retailers: Not discussed in the passage.
3. Anti-consumerist attitude: Not directly related to the irony mentioned in the passage.
Solution:
For questions 9 to 12:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Inquires about the likely characteristics of ‘slow fashion’ based on the passage.
Correct Answer: Are of high quality and long lasting.
The passage suggests that buying high-quality items that last longer could combat environmental issues, implying these are characteristics of ‘slow fashion.’
Incorrect Answers:
Sold by genuine vintage stores: Not specifically mentioned as a feature of ‘slow fashion.’
Do not shed microfibres: While desirable, not directly linked to the concept of ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Do not bleed toxins and dyes: Also desirable, but not directly tied to ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Introduces the “Second Hand September” campaign led by Oxfam, aimed at encouraging shopping at local organizations and charities as alternatives to fast fashion brands. It highlights the environmental impact of the fashion industry, including energy usage and waste contributing to greenhouse gas emissions and pollution.
Paragraph 2: Mentions the trend of second-hand shopping as a response to the environmental problems caused by fast fashion. It describes the rapid expansion of retailers selling consigned clothing and the potential environmental benefits of buying used items.
Paragraph 3: Addresses a potential issue with secondhand shopping, noting that older clothes might shed more microfibres, contributing to pollution. The paragraph points out the complexity of the issue, suggesting that buying high-quality items that last longer could be a solution.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the challenges faced by fashion resale marketplaces like ThredUP in the UK, particularly due to attitudes towards second-hand luxury goods and the preferences of luxury brands to maintain their brand image.
Question Explanation: Inquires about the likely characteristics of ‘slow fashion’ based on the passage.
Correct Answer: Are of high quality and long lasting.
The passage suggests that buying high-quality items that last longer could combat environmental issues, implying these are characteristics of ‘slow fashion.’
Incorrect Answers:
Sold by genuine vintage stores: Not specifically mentioned as a feature of ‘slow fashion.’
Do not shed microfibres: While desirable, not directly linked to the concept of ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Do not bleed toxins and dyes: Also desirable, but not directly tied to ‘slow fashion’ in the passage.
Solution:
For questions 13 to 16:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which research finding would weaken the author’s conclusion in the final paragraph.
Correct Answer: Research shows there is a wide variance in the popularity and viewing of Netflix shows across different EU countries.
If there’s wide variance in popularity across EU countries, it undermines the idea of shared cultural experiences fostering European integration.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Netflix hits popular in North America: Aligns with the passage’s mention of European shows’ global appeal.
2. Older women’s viewing preferences: Does not directly counter the passage’s conclusion about cultural integration.
4. Netflix losing market share: Doesn’t directly address the cultural impact or unifying role of Netflix content in Europe.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which research finding would weaken the author’s conclusion in the final paragraph.
Correct Answer: Research shows there is a wide variance in the popularity and viewing of Netflix shows across different EU countries.
If there’s wide variance in popularity across EU countries, it undermines the idea of shared cultural experiences fostering European integration.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Netflix hits popular in North America: Aligns with the passage’s mention of European shows’ global appeal.
2. Older women’s viewing preferences: Does not directly counter the passage’s conclusion about cultural integration.
4. Netflix losing market share: Doesn’t directly address the cultural impact or unifying role of Netflix content in Europe.
Solution:
For questions 13 to 16:
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which hypothetical Netflix show would be most successful across the EU based on the passage.
Correct Answer: A murder mystery drama set in North Africa and France.
The passage notes the universal appeal of certain genres like historical dramas and murder mysteries, making this option the most likely to succeed across different cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Italian comedy: Comedy struggles across borders, as mentioned in the passage.
2. Trans-Atlantic romantic drama: Not specifically aligned with the passage’s emphasis on universally appealing genres.
4. German TV science fiction: German television is noted as not always being built for export, except for notable exceptions.
Passage Explanation (Paragraph-wise):
Paragraph 1: Discusses the role of translation in Europe, comparing the European Union’s translation efforts to those of companies like Netflix. Netflix offers content in multiple languages through dubbing and subtitling, reflecting the linguistic diversity of Europe.
Paragraph 2: Explains the economics of European productions and their appeal to American audiences. There’s a shift from primarily American content to a more balanced offering, with Netflix investing heavily in European productions.
Paragraph 3: Addresses the challenges of content translation and cultural adaptability. Certain genres like comedy may struggle across borders, while others like historical dramas have universal appeal. The paragraph also touches on the dominance of national broadcasters in Europe.
Paragraph 4: Discusses the perception of Netflix as a cultural hegemon in Europe, highlighting concerns about cultural sovereignty and the homogenization of content. It notes Netflix’s shift from an imperial commissioning model to a more localized approach, though major decisions are still made by American executives.
Paragraph 5: Argues that American companies like Netflix and Google have facilitated European integration. The passage suggests that shared cultural experiences, such as watching the same series, can contribute to a sense of common identity among Europeans.
Question Explanation: Asks which hypothetical Netflix show would be most successful across the EU based on the passage.
Correct Answer: A murder mystery drama set in North Africa and France.
The passage notes the universal appeal of certain genres like historical dramas and murder mysteries, making this option the most likely to succeed across different cultures.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Italian comedy: Comedy struggles across borders, as mentioned in the passage.
2. Trans-Atlantic romantic drama: Not specifically aligned with the passage’s emphasis on universally appealing genres.
4. German TV science fiction: German television is noted as not always being built for export, except for notable exceptions.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: The question asks which statement is NOT supported by the passage. It requires identifying the option that either contradicts or is not mentioned in the passage’s content regarding romanticism and its characterization.
Correct Answer:
1. Recent studies on romanticism seek to refute the differences between national romanticisms.
This option is not supported by the passage. The passage actually suggests that recent studies do not overlook the differences among national romanticisms. Instead, they aim to characterize romanticism based on particular philosophical questions, acknowledging these differences.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Characterizing romantic aesthetics is both possible and desirable: This idea is directly stated in the passage, especially in the third paragraph, where the response to Lovejoy’s skepticism is discussed.
3. Many romantics rejected the idea of aesthetics as a separate domain: This concept is outlined in the second paragraph, where the paradox in romantic aesthetics is discussed.
4. Romantic aesthetics are primarily expressed through fragments, aphorisms, and poems: The passage, in the second paragraph, notes that the views of romantics are often found in non-theoretical forms such as fragments and poems, which aligns with this statement.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: The question asks which statement is NOT supported by the passage. It requires identifying the option that either contradicts or is not mentioned in the passage’s content regarding romanticism and its characterization.
Correct Answer:
1. Recent studies on romanticism seek to refute the differences between national romanticisms.
This option is not supported by the passage. The passage actually suggests that recent studies do not overlook the differences among national romanticisms. Instead, they aim to characterize romanticism based on particular philosophical questions, acknowledging these differences.
Incorrect Answers:
2. Characterizing romantic aesthetics is both possible and desirable: This idea is directly stated in the passage, especially in the third paragraph, where the response to Lovejoy’s skepticism is discussed.
3. Many romantics rejected the idea of aesthetics as a separate domain: This concept is outlined in the second paragraph, where the paradox in romantic aesthetics is discussed.
4. Romantic aesthetics are primarily expressed through fragments, aphorisms, and poems: The passage, in the second paragraph, notes that the views of romantics are often found in non-theoretical forms such as fragments and poems, which aligns with this statement.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 2 asks about the romantics’ perspective on aesthetics. It seeks to determine how the romantics viewed the role and scope of aesthetics in human life, based on the information provided in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. permeates all aspects of human life, philosophical and mundane.
The passage, particularly in its second paragraph, discusses the romantics’ view on aesthetics. It highlights that many romantics rejected the idea of confining aesthetics to a separate, circumscribed domain of human life, distinct from practical and theoretical aspects. Instead, they believed that aesthetics – the character of art and beauty and our engagement with them – should shape all aspects of human existence. This belief implies that aesthetics, according to the romantics, is not just a matter of philosophical or artistic concern but is fundamental and pervasive in everyday life as well.
Incorrect Answers:
1. should be confined to a specific domain separate from the practical and theoretical aspects of life: This option is directly contradicted by the passage, which states that the romantics rejected the confinement of aesthetics to a separate domain.
2. is primarily the concern of philosophers and artists, rather than of ordinary people: The passage argues against this, noting the romantics’ belief that beauty and art should be central in the lives of not only philosophers and artists but also ordinary people.
4. is widely considered to be irrelevant to human existence: This statement is the opposite of the romantics’ view as described in the passage. The romantics saw aesthetics as fundamental to human existence, not irrelevant.
The passage clearly communicates the romantics’ expansive view of aesthetics, seeing it as an integral and pervasive aspect of human life, influencing both philosophical thought and everyday experiences.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 2 asks about the romantics’ perspective on aesthetics. It seeks to determine how the romantics viewed the role and scope of aesthetics in human life, based on the information provided in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. permeates all aspects of human life, philosophical and mundane.
The passage, particularly in its second paragraph, discusses the romantics’ view on aesthetics. It highlights that many romantics rejected the idea of confining aesthetics to a separate, circumscribed domain of human life, distinct from practical and theoretical aspects. Instead, they believed that aesthetics – the character of art and beauty and our engagement with them – should shape all aspects of human existence. This belief implies that aesthetics, according to the romantics, is not just a matter of philosophical or artistic concern but is fundamental and pervasive in everyday life as well.
Incorrect Answers:
1. should be confined to a specific domain separate from the practical and theoretical aspects of life: This option is directly contradicted by the passage, which states that the romantics rejected the confinement of aesthetics to a separate domain.
2. is primarily the concern of philosophers and artists, rather than of ordinary people: The passage argues against this, noting the romantics’ belief that beauty and art should be central in the lives of not only philosophers and artists but also ordinary people.
4. is widely considered to be irrelevant to human existence: This statement is the opposite of the romantics’ view as described in the passage. The romantics saw aesthetics as fundamental to human existence, not irrelevant.
The passage clearly communicates the romantics’ expansive view of aesthetics, seeing it as an integral and pervasive aspect of human life, influencing both philosophical thought and everyday experiences.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 3 inquires about the approach recent studies on romanticism take to avoid defining the movement in terms of “a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place.” The question requires identifying the reason behind this approach as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
1. prefer to focus on the fundamental concerns of the romantics.
The correct answer aligns with the key point in the fourth paragraph of the passage. The passage explains that recent studies on romanticism do not attempt to define it narrowly by time, place, or a single definition. Instead, these studies aim to characterize romanticism based on “particular philosophical questions and concerns.” This approach suggests a focus on the fundamental and central ideas that the romantics grappled with, rather than confining the movement to specific historical or geographical contexts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. prefer to highlight the paradox of romantic aesthetics as a concept: While the passage does discuss the paradoxical nature of romantic aesthetics, it does not suggest that this is the reason why recent studies avoid a single definition or specific time/place.
3. understand that the variety of romanticisms renders a general analysis impossible: The passage actually counters this view by suggesting that, despite the variety, a general characterization focused on fundamental concerns is both possible and desirable.
4. seek to discredit Lovejoy’s scepticism regarding romanticism: Discrediting Lovejoy’s skepticism is not the stated goal of these studies. While they respond to his skepticism, they do so by focusing on the philosophical aspects of romanticism, not by seeking to discredit his views.
The passage underscores the idea that recent studies on romanticism aim to capture the essence of the movement through its core philosophical concerns, rather than limiting it to specific historical or geographical parameters. This approach acknowledges the diversity within romanticism while still striving for a meaningful characterization.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces the topic of romantic aesthetics, emphasizing its complexity. Renowned scholars like Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye, and Isaiah Berlin are mentioned for their commentary on the difficulty of defining romanticism. Lovejoy, in particular, is quoted as saying that romanticism is a complex and elusive concept in literary history and criticism. He highlights the challenge due to the absence of a single, clear definition for “romanticism,” suggesting that the term is so broad and varied in its usage that it risks losing its meaning.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves deeper into the challenges of characterizing romantic aesthetics. It starts by defining conventional aesthetics as a theory or philosophical study of beauty and art. The paragraph then notes a paradox in romantic aesthetics: many romantics themselves rejected the notion of confining aesthetics to a specific domain, separate from practical and theoretical life aspects. Instead, they viewed aesthetics as integral to all facets of human existence. This commitment of the romantics makes studying and characterizing their aesthetics more complex, especially given that their views are often expressed in non-theoretical forms like poetry, making them elusive and suggestive rather than conclusive.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the focus shifts to the feasibility and desirability of studying romantic aesthetics despite the challenges. It addresses Lovejoy’s skepticism about defining romanticism, with Isaiah Berlin countering Lovejoy by emphasizing the importance of understanding romanticism as a significant movement. The paragraph suggests that while a reductive definition should be avoided, a general characterization of romanticism is both possible and necessary.
Para 4: The final paragraph discusses recent attempts to characterize romanticism, noting that these don’t overlook the differences between national romanticisms as Lovejoy did, but instead try to define it in terms of specific philosophical questions and concerns. The emphasis is on German romantics, given their pivotal role and the philosophical depth of their contributions, particularly in the context of Kant’s philosophy.
Question Explanation: Question 3 inquires about the approach recent studies on romanticism take to avoid defining the movement in terms of “a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place.” The question requires identifying the reason behind this approach as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
1. prefer to focus on the fundamental concerns of the romantics.
The correct answer aligns with the key point in the fourth paragraph of the passage. The passage explains that recent studies on romanticism do not attempt to define it narrowly by time, place, or a single definition. Instead, these studies aim to characterize romanticism based on “particular philosophical questions and concerns.” This approach suggests a focus on the fundamental and central ideas that the romantics grappled with, rather than confining the movement to specific historical or geographical contexts.
Incorrect Answers:
2. prefer to highlight the paradox of romantic aesthetics as a concept: While the passage does discuss the paradoxical nature of romantic aesthetics, it does not suggest that this is the reason why recent studies avoid a single definition or specific time/place.
3. understand that the variety of romanticisms renders a general analysis impossible: The passage actually counters this view by suggesting that, despite the variety, a general characterization focused on fundamental concerns is both possible and desirable.
4. seek to discredit Lovejoy’s scepticism regarding romanticism: Discrediting Lovejoy’s skepticism is not the stated goal of these studies. While they respond to his skepticism, they do so by focusing on the philosophical aspects of romanticism, not by seeking to discredit his views.
The passage underscores the idea that recent studies on romanticism aim to capture the essence of the movement through its core philosophical concerns, rather than limiting it to specific historical or geographical parameters. This approach acknowledges the diversity within romanticism while still striving for a meaningful characterization.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 5 inquires about the author’s endorsement of Steven Pinker’s views on logical reasoning. The question aims to identify the specific aspect of logical reasoning that the author agrees with, as highlighted in Pinker’s book. It focuses on understanding which benefit of logical reasoning, as presented in the passage, the author supports.
Correct Answer:
1. equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems.
The author endorses Pinker’s views that logical reasoning equips individuals to effectively address real-world, practical problems. In the third paragraph of the passage, the author discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its direct application in various contexts like medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This alignment with Pinker’s argument highlights the author’s agreement that mastering rational tools, as Pinker outlines, can significantly improve how individuals navigate and solve complex, practical issues in different domains.
Incorrect Answers:
2. provides a moral compass for resolving important ethical dilemmas: The passage does not specifically indicate that the author believes logical reasoning provides a moral compass for ethical dilemmas. While Pinker acknowledges the moral aspect of rationality, the passage does not explicitly endorse this view.
3. focuses public attention on real issues like development rather than sensational events: Although the author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage focusing on sensational events, this agreement does not specifically relate to the endorsement of logical reasoning’s importance.
4. helps people to gain expertise in statistics and other scientific disciplines: While the author appreciates Pinker’s primer on statistics, the endorsement is more broadly about the application of rationality in practical problem-solving, rather than specifically gaining expertise in scientific disciplines.
The author’s endorsement of Pinker’s views is centered on the practical applicability and utility of logical reasoning in tackling real-world challenges, aligning with Pinker’s analysis of how rationality can improve decision-making across various life domains.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 5 inquires about the author’s endorsement of Steven Pinker’s views on logical reasoning. The question aims to identify the specific aspect of logical reasoning that the author agrees with, as highlighted in Pinker’s book. It focuses on understanding which benefit of logical reasoning, as presented in the passage, the author supports.
Correct Answer:
1. equips people with the ability to tackle challenging practical problems.
The author endorses Pinker’s views that logical reasoning equips individuals to effectively address real-world, practical problems. In the third paragraph of the passage, the author discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its direct application in various contexts like medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This alignment with Pinker’s argument highlights the author’s agreement that mastering rational tools, as Pinker outlines, can significantly improve how individuals navigate and solve complex, practical issues in different domains.
Incorrect Answers:
2. provides a moral compass for resolving important ethical dilemmas: The passage does not specifically indicate that the author believes logical reasoning provides a moral compass for ethical dilemmas. While Pinker acknowledges the moral aspect of rationality, the passage does not explicitly endorse this view.
3. focuses public attention on real issues like development rather than sensational events: Although the author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage focusing on sensational events, this agreement does not specifically relate to the endorsement of logical reasoning’s importance.
4. helps people to gain expertise in statistics and other scientific disciplines: While the author appreciates Pinker’s primer on statistics, the endorsement is more broadly about the application of rationality in practical problem-solving, rather than specifically gaining expertise in scientific disciplines.
The author’s endorsement of Pinker’s views is centered on the practical applicability and utility of logical reasoning in tackling real-world challenges, aligning with Pinker’s analysis of how rationality can improve decision-making across various life domains.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 6 focuses on the purpose behind the author’s reference to ancient Greek philosophers in the context of Pinker’s discussion on rational behavior. It aims to determine how these philosophers’ views are used to complement or critique Pinker’s arguments about rationality.
Correct Answer:
1. reveal gaps in Pinker’s discussion of the importance of ethical considerations in rational behavior.
The author uses the example of ancient Greek philosophers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, to highlight a significant aspect that is underexplored in Pinker’s discussion: the role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior. The fourth paragraph of the passage notes that while Pinker recognizes rationality as a moral virtue, he does not thoroughly develop this point. By referencing the ancient Greeks, who deeply explored the relationship between moral character and rationality, the author points out that understanding and utilizing rationality beneficially requires not just cognitive skills but also a well-formed moral character. This connection, richly investigated by the Greeks, is presented as a critical dimension missing in Pinker’s analysis.
Incorrect Answers:
2. highlight the influence of their thinking on the development of Pinker’s arguments: The passage does not suggest that Pinker’s arguments on rationality were directly influenced by the thoughts of ancient Greek philosophers.
3. indicate the various similarities between their thinking and Pinker’s conclusions: While there may be parallels, the passage specifically uses the Greek philosophers to point out what Pinker does not cover, rather than to draw similarities.
4. show how dreams and visions have for centuries influenced subconscious behavior and pathbreaking inventions: The passage mentions dreams and visions in the context of explaining that not all significant achievements stem from conscious reasoning. However, the reference to Greek philosophers is specifically linked to the ethical aspects of rational behavior, not to the role of subconscious processes in creativity.
The use of ancient Greek philosophers in the passage serves to underline a notable omission in Pinker’s treatment of rationality – the ethical and moral dimensions that are crucial for its beneficial application, a theme extensively explored by these philosophers but only briefly touched upon by Pinker.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 6 focuses on the purpose behind the author’s reference to ancient Greek philosophers in the context of Pinker’s discussion on rational behavior. It aims to determine how these philosophers’ views are used to complement or critique Pinker’s arguments about rationality.
Correct Answer:
1. reveal gaps in Pinker’s discussion of the importance of ethical considerations in rational behavior.
The author uses the example of ancient Greek philosophers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, to highlight a significant aspect that is underexplored in Pinker’s discussion: the role of moral and ethical education in promoting rational behavior. The fourth paragraph of the passage notes that while Pinker recognizes rationality as a moral virtue, he does not thoroughly develop this point. By referencing the ancient Greeks, who deeply explored the relationship between moral character and rationality, the author points out that understanding and utilizing rationality beneficially requires not just cognitive skills but also a well-formed moral character. This connection, richly investigated by the Greeks, is presented as a critical dimension missing in Pinker’s analysis.
Incorrect Answers:
2. highlight the influence of their thinking on the development of Pinker’s arguments: The passage does not suggest that Pinker’s arguments on rationality were directly influenced by the thoughts of ancient Greek philosophers.
3. indicate the various similarities between their thinking and Pinker’s conclusions: While there may be parallels, the passage specifically uses the Greek philosophers to point out what Pinker does not cover, rather than to draw similarities.
4. show how dreams and visions have for centuries influenced subconscious behavior and pathbreaking inventions: The passage mentions dreams and visions in the context of explaining that not all significant achievements stem from conscious reasoning. However, the reference to Greek philosophers is specifically linked to the ethical aspects of rational behavior, not to the role of subconscious processes in creativity.
The use of ancient Greek philosophers in the passage serves to underline a notable omission in Pinker’s treatment of rationality – the ethical and moral dimensions that are crucial for its beneficial application, a theme extensively explored by these philosophers but only briefly touched upon by Pinker.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 7 examines the reason behind the author’s mention of Kekulé’s discovery of benzene’s structure and Mozart’s symphonies. The question aims to identify what these examples illustrate about the nature of human achievement as discussed in Pinker’s book on rationality.
Correct Answer:
2. great innovations across various fields can stem from flashes of intuition and are not always propelled by logical thinking.
The author references Kekulé and Mozart to illustrate that extraordinary human achievements in science, music, and other fields often arise from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from conscious, sequential reasoning. In the third paragraph, the author contrasts Pinker’s emphasis on rational, deliberate thinking with the fact that many significant discoveries and creations occur as sudden insights. These examples serve to highlight the broader spectrum of human cognition and creativity, encompassing both the rational processes emphasized by Pinker and the intuitive, spontaneous bursts of inspiration that have led to major scientific and artistic breakthroughs.
Incorrect Answers:
1. unlike the sciences, human achievements in other fields are a mix of logical reasoning and spontaneous epiphanies: This option incorrectly implies a separation between sciences and other fields regarding the role of intuition. The passage suggests that intuition plays a significant role in both scientific and artistic achievements.
3. Pinker’s conclusions on sequential reasoning are belied by European achievements which, in the past, were more rooted in unconscious bursts of genius: The passage does not suggest that European achievements contradict Pinker’s conclusions; rather, it presents these achievements as additional aspects of human creativity.
4. it is not just the creative arts, but also scientific fields that have benefitted from flashes of creativity: While this statement is true, it does not capture the specific point the author is making about the contrast between Pinker’s focus on sequential reasoning and the broader nature of creativity and insight.
The passage uses the examples of Kekulé and Mozart to underscore the idea that significant achievements often originate from intuitive insights, adding a dimension to human creativity and problem-solving that extends beyond the deliberate, logical reasoning highlighted by Pinker.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 7 examines the reason behind the author’s mention of Kekulé’s discovery of benzene’s structure and Mozart’s symphonies. The question aims to identify what these examples illustrate about the nature of human achievement as discussed in Pinker’s book on rationality.
Correct Answer:
2. great innovations across various fields can stem from flashes of intuition and are not always propelled by logical thinking.
The author references Kekulé and Mozart to illustrate that extraordinary human achievements in science, music, and other fields often arise from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from conscious, sequential reasoning. In the third paragraph, the author contrasts Pinker’s emphasis on rational, deliberate thinking with the fact that many significant discoveries and creations occur as sudden insights. These examples serve to highlight the broader spectrum of human cognition and creativity, encompassing both the rational processes emphasized by Pinker and the intuitive, spontaneous bursts of inspiration that have led to major scientific and artistic breakthroughs.
Incorrect Answers:
1. unlike the sciences, human achievements in other fields are a mix of logical reasoning and spontaneous epiphanies: This option incorrectly implies a separation between sciences and other fields regarding the role of intuition. The passage suggests that intuition plays a significant role in both scientific and artistic achievements.
3. Pinker’s conclusions on sequential reasoning are belied by European achievements which, in the past, were more rooted in unconscious bursts of genius: The passage does not suggest that European achievements contradict Pinker’s conclusions; rather, it presents these achievements as additional aspects of human creativity.
4. it is not just the creative arts, but also scientific fields that have benefitted from flashes of creativity: While this statement is true, it does not capture the specific point the author is making about the contrast between Pinker’s focus on sequential reasoning and the broader nature of creativity and insight.
The passage uses the examples of Kekulé and Mozart to underscore the idea that significant achievements often originate from intuitive insights, adding a dimension to human creativity and problem-solving that extends beyond the deliberate, logical reasoning highlighted by Pinker.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 8 probes into the conceptualization of rational thinking as presented by Steven Pinker and the ancient Greek philosophers in the passage. It asks which aspect of rational thinking is not included in their views, as discussed in the book “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters.” The question tests the reader’s understanding of how Pinker and the Greek philosophers perceive rational thinking, particularly regarding its scope and application.
Correct Answer:
4. the primacy of conscious sequential reasoning as the basis for seminal human achievements.
The passage, especially in the third paragraph, discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its utility in various real-world situations. However, it contrasts this with the idea that many great scientific and artistic achievements come from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from deliberate, logical processes. Examples like Kekulé’s discovery and Mozart’s symphonies are cited to illustrate this point. Moreover, the reference to Socrates — a figure who predates Pinker by millennia and emphasized knowing one’s ignorance and examining premises in arguments — indicates that profound insights often come from beyond conscious reasoning. Thus, while both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value rational thought, they do not assert it as the sole or primary basis for all significant human achievements.
Incorrect Answers:
1. arriving at independent conclusions irrespective of who is presenting the argument: The passage implies that both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value the ability to think independently, without undue influence from authority figures or charismatic individuals. This aligns with a critical aspect of rational thinking.
2. an awareness of underlying assumptions in an argument and gaps in one’s own knowledge: Pinker’s focus on rationality, as well as the philosophical teachings of ancient Greeks like Socrates, encompass an understanding of one’s limitations and the importance of questioning assumptions, which is a fundamental part of rational thought.
3. the belief that the ability to reason logically encompasses an ethical and moral dimension: The passage acknowledges that Pinker sees rationality as a moral virtue, an idea that is also explored by Greek philosophers. This indicates that both view rational thinking as having ethical and moral implications.
The passage illustrates that while Pinker and the Greek philosophers recognize the importance of rational, logical reasoning, they also acknowledge the role of intuition and spontaneous insight in human achievements. This perspective suggests a more comprehensive understanding of rationality, extending beyond the confines of conscious, sequential reasoning.
Para 1: The first paragraph introduces Steven Pinker’s book, “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters,” framing it as a pragmatic and optimistic exploration of rationality. Pinker’s work is presented as an ambitious and welcome venture that could lead to a “return to sanity.” The author of the passage commends Pinker for making complex subjects like formal logic, game theory, statistics, and Bayesian reasoning engaging and relevant. This introduction sets the tone for a positive view of Pinker’s approach to rationality, highlighting its potential benefits in personal and civic life.
Para 2: The second paragraph continues the discussion of Pinker’s book, focusing on the practical applications of rational tools. It suggests that a wider application of these tools, as analyzed by Pinker, could significantly improve the world. The author specifically mentions Pinker’s timely primer on statistics and scientific uncertainty, especially relevant to understanding news about the COVID pandemic. There is an emphasis on how media coverage often focuses on rare, sensational events, leading to skewed public perceptions and resource misallocation. The author agrees with Pinker’s critique of media coverage but notes that an analysis of the political economy of journalism would have provided a more comprehensive understanding of why media coverage can be misguided.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author describes Pinker’s focus on conscious, sequential reasoning and its applicability in various real-world contexts, including medical, legal, and financial decision-making. This section underscores Pinker’s argument that mastering rationality can significantly enhance decision-making in contexts where actions are based on uncertain and shifting information. The author acknowledges Pinker’s insights while also pointing out that many great scientific, mathematical, musical, and artistic achievements have originated in moments of epiphany, not solely through conscious reasoning. This contrast suggests that while rationality is powerful, it does not encompass all forms of human creativity and insight.
Para 4: The final paragraph touches upon the moral and ethical dimensions of rationality, an aspect that Pinker recognizes but does not deeply explore. The author reflects on the idea that possessing the right moral character is crucial for using rationality effectively and beneficially. This point is connected to the philosophical explorations of ancient Greek philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, who delved into the interplay between moral character and rationality. The author suggests that a deeper exploration of this connection could have added value to Pinker’s discussion on rationality, indicating a missed opportunity for a more holistic treatment of the subject.
Question Explanation: Question 8 probes into the conceptualization of rational thinking as presented by Steven Pinker and the ancient Greek philosophers in the passage. It asks which aspect of rational thinking is not included in their views, as discussed in the book “Rationality: What It Is, Why It Seems Scarce, Why It Matters.” The question tests the reader’s understanding of how Pinker and the Greek philosophers perceive rational thinking, particularly regarding its scope and application.
Correct Answer:
4. the primacy of conscious sequential reasoning as the basis for seminal human achievements.
The passage, especially in the third paragraph, discusses Pinker’s emphasis on conscious, sequential reasoning and its utility in various real-world situations. However, it contrasts this with the idea that many great scientific and artistic achievements come from moments of epiphany or intuition, not solely from deliberate, logical processes. Examples like Kekulé’s discovery and Mozart’s symphonies are cited to illustrate this point. Moreover, the reference to Socrates — a figure who predates Pinker by millennia and emphasized knowing one’s ignorance and examining premises in arguments — indicates that profound insights often come from beyond conscious reasoning. Thus, while both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value rational thought, they do not assert it as the sole or primary basis for all significant human achievements.
Incorrect Answers:
1. arriving at independent conclusions irrespective of who is presenting the argument: The passage implies that both Pinker and the Greek philosophers value the ability to think independently, without undue influence from authority figures or charismatic individuals. This aligns with a critical aspect of rational thinking.
2. an awareness of underlying assumptions in an argument and gaps in one’s own knowledge: Pinker’s focus on rationality, as well as the philosophical teachings of ancient Greeks like Socrates, encompass an understanding of one’s limitations and the importance of questioning assumptions, which is a fundamental part of rational thought.
3. the belief that the ability to reason logically encompasses an ethical and moral dimension: The passage acknowledges that Pinker sees rationality as a moral virtue, an idea that is also explored by Greek philosophers. This indicates that both view rational thinking as having ethical and moral implications.
The passage illustrates that while Pinker and the Greek philosophers recognize the importance of rational, logical reasoning, they also acknowledge the role of intuition and spontaneous insight in human achievements. This perspective suggests a more comprehensive understanding of rationality, extending beyond the confines of conscious, sequential reasoning.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: Question 10 asks which statement cannot be inferred from the reviewer’s discussion of “The Nutmeg’s Curse.” This requires identifying an idea or notion that is not supported by, or is contradictory to, the content of the passage.
Correct Answer:
2. Academic discourses have always served the function of raising awareness about environmental preservation.
This statement cannot be inferred from the passage, as it does not discuss the historical role of academic discourses in environmental preservation. While the passage does mention the dominance of European perspectives in various academic fields, it does not explicitly state or imply that these discourses have consistently been focused on raising environmental awareness. Therefore, this option stands out as the one least supported by the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmental preservation policymakers can learn from non-European and/or pre-colonial societies: This is implied in the passage, which discusses the value of non-European perspectives on nature and the environment.
3. The contemporary dominant perception of nature and the environment was put in place by processes of colonialism: The passage explicitly discusses how European colonialism shaped perceptions and attitudes towards nature and the environment.
4. The history of climate change is deeply intertwined with the history of colonialism: Ghosh’s book, as described in the passage, traces the climate crisis back to the start of European colonialism, indicating a deep interconnection.
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: Question 10 asks which statement cannot be inferred from the reviewer’s discussion of “The Nutmeg’s Curse.” This requires identifying an idea or notion that is not supported by, or is contradictory to, the content of the passage.
Correct Answer:
2. Academic discourses have always served the function of raising awareness about environmental preservation.
This statement cannot be inferred from the passage, as it does not discuss the historical role of academic discourses in environmental preservation. While the passage does mention the dominance of European perspectives in various academic fields, it does not explicitly state or imply that these discourses have consistently been focused on raising environmental awareness. Therefore, this option stands out as the one least supported by the passage.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Environmental preservation policymakers can learn from non-European and/or pre-colonial societies: This is implied in the passage, which discusses the value of non-European perspectives on nature and the environment.
3. The contemporary dominant perception of nature and the environment was put in place by processes of colonialism: The passage explicitly discusses how European colonialism shaped perceptions and attitudes towards nature and the environment.
4. The history of climate change is deeply intertwined with the history of colonialism: Ghosh’s book, as described in the passage, traces the climate crisis back to the start of European colonialism, indicating a deep interconnection.
Solution:
Passage Explanation:
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: This question asks which statement, if true, would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" for Gaia inappropriate. In the passage, the reviewer uses "who" to refer to Gaia, implying that the Earth is being treated as a living entity. We need to find the option that would challenge or contradict this perception.
Correct Answer:
Option 2: Non-European societies have perceived the Earth as a non-living source of all resources.
• This is the correct answer because if non-European societies viewed the Earth as a non-living entity, it would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" (implying a living being) inappropriate. The passage emphasizes that many non-European societies, like those in Latin America (with their concept of Pachamama or Earth Mother), view the Earth as a living, sentient entity. If instead, they saw the Earth as non-living, the use of "who" would no longer make sense.
Incorrect Answer Explanations:
Option 1: There is a direct cause–effect relationship between human activities and global climate change.
• This is irrelevant to the use of the pronoun "who." Whether or not there is a direct cause-effect relationship between human activities and climate change doesn't impact the view of the Earth as a living or non-living entity.
Option 3: Modern western science discovers new evidence for the Earth being an inanimate object.
• While this might seem like it could make "who" inappropriate, the passage is focused on non-European perspectives and alternative worldviews, not modern Western science. The reviewer’s choice of “who” is based on Ghosh’s exploration of non-European beliefs, not Western scientific discoveries.
Option 4: Ghosh’s book has a different title: “The Nutmeg’s Revenge”.
• A different title for Ghosh’s book wouldn’t affect the appropriateness of the pronoun “who.” The reviewer’s choice of “who” relates to the concept of the Earth being viewed as a living entity, not the book’s title.
Para 1: “The Nutmeg’s Curse” by Amitav Ghosh challenges the commonly accepted timeline of the climate crisis, suggesting it began not with the Industrial Age in the 18th century, but three centuries earlier with European colonialism in the 15th century.
Para 2: Ghosh traces the origins of the climate crisis to the 15th century, starting with a 1621 massacre by the Dutch in the Banda Islands, Indonesia, to monopolize nutmeg cultivation. He argues that European colonialists not only decimated indigenous populations but also disregarded indigenous environmental knowledge, treating nature as a resource to exploit.
Para 3: Ghosh suggests that current environmental disasters—heatwaves, storms, floods, droughts, and wildfires—could be seen as Earth’s response to human terraforming activities. He challenges the view of Earth as an inert object, citing non-European perspectives on human-Earth relationships.
Para 4: The book highlights that opposition to the European colonialist worldview has always existed. However, this perspective, along with supporting economic, political, and scientific views, has dominated global discourse, overshadowing alternative viewpoints.
Para 5: Ghosh points out that alternative perspectives, like the Latin American view of Earth as Pachamama, exist but are often marginalized in global discussions, including climate negotiations. He discusses the vested interests in the oil economy and how they overpower and silence these alternative voices.
Question Explanation: This question asks which statement, if true, would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" for Gaia inappropriate. In the passage, the reviewer uses "who" to refer to Gaia, implying that the Earth is being treated as a living entity. We need to find the option that would challenge or contradict this perception.
Correct Answer:
Option 2: Non-European societies have perceived the Earth as a non-living source of all resources.
• This is the correct answer because if non-European societies viewed the Earth as a non-living entity, it would make the reviewer's choice of the pronoun "who" (implying a living being) inappropriate. The passage emphasizes that many non-European societies, like those in Latin America (with their concept of Pachamama or Earth Mother), view the Earth as a living, sentient entity. If instead, they saw the Earth as non-living, the use of "who" would no longer make sense.
Incorrect Answer Explanations:
Option 1: There is a direct cause–effect relationship between human activities and global climate change.
• This is irrelevant to the use of the pronoun "who." Whether or not there is a direct cause-effect relationship between human activities and climate change doesn't impact the view of the Earth as a living or non-living entity.
Option 3: Modern western science discovers new evidence for the Earth being an inanimate object.
• While this might seem like it could make "who" inappropriate, the passage is focused on non-European perspectives and alternative worldviews, not modern Western science. The reviewer’s choice of “who” is based on Ghosh’s exploration of non-European beliefs, not Western scientific discoveries.
Option 4: Ghosh’s book has a different title: “The Nutmeg’s Revenge”.
• A different title for Ghosh’s book wouldn’t affect the appropriateness of the pronoun “who.” The reviewer’s choice of “who” relates to the concept of the Earth being viewed as a living entity, not the book’s title.
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 13 asks which statement, if true, would undermine the central idea of the passage. This requires identifying a scenario that contradicts the main argument or findings presented in the passage regarding cultural property laws and archaeological discoveries.
Correct Answer:
4. UNESCO finances archaeological research in poor, but archaeologically-rich source countries.
If UNESCO actively finances archaeological research in poor countries, this could undermine the passage’s central idea that strict cultural property laws diminish incentives for archaeological discoveries. The passage argues that such laws reduce foreign investments in exploration, suggesting a need for funding and collaboration. However, if UNESCO provides significant funding, the negative impact of these laws on discoveries might be lessened or mitigated, challenging the passage’s argument.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Western countries apologizing: Apologies from Western countries for past looting wouldn’t necessarily undermine the idea that cultural property laws have reduced archaeological discoveries.
2. Affluent source countries affording excavations: The ability of affluent source countries to fund their excavations does not contradict the passage’s central idea regarding the impact of patrimony laws on poorer countries.
3. Museums in deprived countries displaying antiques: The establishment of local museums to display artifacts doesn’t directly challenge the passage’s argument about reduced archaeological discoveries due to patrimony laws.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 13 asks which statement, if true, would undermine the central idea of the passage. This requires identifying a scenario that contradicts the main argument or findings presented in the passage regarding cultural property laws and archaeological discoveries.
Correct Answer:
4. UNESCO finances archaeological research in poor, but archaeologically-rich source countries.
If UNESCO actively finances archaeological research in poor countries, this could undermine the passage’s central idea that strict cultural property laws diminish incentives for archaeological discoveries. The passage argues that such laws reduce foreign investments in exploration, suggesting a need for funding and collaboration. However, if UNESCO provides significant funding, the negative impact of these laws on discoveries might be lessened or mitigated, challenging the passage’s argument.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Western countries apologizing: Apologies from Western countries for past looting wouldn’t necessarily undermine the idea that cultural property laws have reduced archaeological discoveries.
2. Affluent source countries affording excavations: The ability of affluent source countries to fund their excavations does not contradict the passage’s central idea regarding the impact of patrimony laws on poorer countries.
3. Museums in deprived countries displaying antiques: The establishment of local museums to display artifacts doesn’t directly challenge the passage’s argument about reduced archaeological discoveries due to patrimony laws.
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 14 asks what the author is likely to advise poor but archaeologically-rich source countries to do, based on the content of the passage, except for one option that the author wouldn’t advise.
Correct Answer:
4. Fund institutes in other countries to undertake archaeological exploration in the source country, reaping the benefits of cutting-edge techniques.
This option is the least likely to be advised by the author, as the passage suggests that the author advocates for easing strict patrimony laws to encourage more archaeological discoveries through international collaboration. It doesn’t specifically suggest that source countries should fund institutions in other countries for exploration. The other options align more closely with the passage’s content, emphasizing collaborative efforts and modifications to cultural property laws.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Adopt China’s strategy: The passage cites China as a successful example of easing cultural property laws and embracing international research.
2. Allow foreign countries to analyze and exhibit finds: This aligns with the suggestion for more collaborative approaches in archaeology.
3. Motivate other countries to finance explorations: Encouraging foreign investments in archaeological projects is consistent with the passage’s argument.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 14 asks what the author is likely to advise poor but archaeologically-rich source countries to do, based on the content of the passage, except for one option that the author wouldn’t advise.
Correct Answer:
4. Fund institutes in other countries to undertake archaeological exploration in the source country, reaping the benefits of cutting-edge techniques.
This option is the least likely to be advised by the author, as the passage suggests that the author advocates for easing strict patrimony laws to encourage more archaeological discoveries through international collaboration. It doesn’t specifically suggest that source countries should fund institutions in other countries for exploration. The other options align more closely with the passage’s content, emphasizing collaborative efforts and modifications to cultural property laws.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Adopt China’s strategy: The passage cites China as a successful example of easing cultural property laws and embracing international research.
2. Allow foreign countries to analyze and exhibit finds: This aligns with the suggestion for more collaborative approaches in archaeology.
3. Motivate other countries to finance explorations: Encouraging foreign investments in archaeological projects is consistent with the passage’s argument.
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 15 seeks to identify the best statement that captures the paradox of patrimony laws as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. They were aimed at protecting cultural property, but instead reduced new archaeological discoveries.
This option directly reflects the paradox discussed in the passage: patrimony laws were intended to protect cultural heritage from exploitation, but the study cited in the passage shows that these laws have actually led to a sharp decrease in new archaeological discoveries. This unintended consequence forms the core of the paradox.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Withholding national treasure from museums: The paradox is not about withholding treasures but about the impact on discoveries.
2. Neglect of historical sites: The passage doesn’t suggest that patrimony laws resulted in site neglect.
4. Reduced business for auctioneers: The focus of the paradox is on archaeological discoveries, not auctioneers’ business.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 15 seeks to identify the best statement that captures the paradox of patrimony laws as presented in the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. They were aimed at protecting cultural property, but instead reduced new archaeological discoveries.
This option directly reflects the paradox discussed in the passage: patrimony laws were intended to protect cultural heritage from exploitation, but the study cited in the passage shows that these laws have actually led to a sharp decrease in new archaeological discoveries. This unintended consequence forms the core of the paradox.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Withholding national treasure from museums: The paradox is not about withholding treasures but about the impact on discoveries.
2. Neglect of historical sites: The passage doesn’t suggest that patrimony laws resulted in site neglect.
4. Reduced business for auctioneers: The focus of the paradox is on archaeological discoveries, not auctioneers’ business.
Solution:
Passage Explanation
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 16 asks what can be inferred about why some source countries consider archaeological sites important, based on the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. Give a boost to the tourism sector.
The passage suggests that archaeological sites are valued partly because of their potential to boost tourism. This is inferred from the discussion on the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically include increased tourism and enhanced cultural pride.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Generate funds for future discoveries: While plausible, the passage doesn’t explicitly link site importance to funding future discoveries.
2. Subject to strict patrimony laws: The importance of sites isn’t directly attributed to the existence of patrimony laws.
4. Symbol of Western imperialism: The passage discusses Western imperialism in the context of looting and exploitation, not as a reason for the importance of sites in source countries.
Para 1: The first paragraph highlights significant instances where major art institutions, like the Met and the Getty Museum, agreed to return culturally significant artifacts to their countries of origin. These examples include the Euphronios krater, a Greek urn returned by the Met, and several objects including a marble Aphrodite returned by the Getty Museum. Sotheby’s agreement to return an ancient Khmer statue to Cambodia is also mentioned. These instances set the stage for discussing the broader issue of cultural property (or patrimony) laws, which aim to limit the transfer of cultural property outside the source country’s territory. This introduction establishes the context for the following discussion on the implications of such laws.
Para 2: The second paragraph delves into the purpose and perceived benefits of cultural property laws. Most art historians, archaeologists, museum officials, and policymakers view these laws as essential tools for counteracting the legacy of Western cultural imperialism. The paragraph provides historical context, referring to the late 19th and early 20th centuries as “the age of piracy,” when American and European museums frequently acquired antiquities through questionable means from poorer but art-rich source countries. Patrimony laws emerged as protective measures against such practices, intended to safeguard future archaeological discoveries from similar exploitation.
Para 3: In the third paragraph, the author presents findings from a survey of 90 countries with archaeological sites listed by UNESCO. The survey indicates that the number of discovered sites significantly drops after the implementation of cultural property laws. Of the 222 listed sites, the vast majority were discovered before such laws were enacted. This data suggests that while these laws aim to protect cultural heritage, they may inadvertently hinder new archaeological discoveries by creating barriers to exploration and excavation.
Para 4: The fourth paragraph discusses the potential downside of strict cultural property laws, particularly how they might reduce incentives for foreign investment in archaeological exploration. While these laws are popular and aim to protect heritage, their strictness can discourage international collaboration and investment in uncovering new sites. The author suggests that countries, especially those in the developing world, should consider narrowing their cultural property laws to encourage new discoveries, which could lead to increased tourism and cultural pride. The paragraph concludes with the example of China, which revised its restrictive cultural property law in 2003, leading to an increase in international archaeological collaboration and the nomination of several new sites for UNESCO’s World Heritage list. This example is used to illustrate a more balanced approach to managing cultural heritage and archaeological exploration.
Question Explanation: Question 16 asks what can be inferred about why some source countries consider archaeological sites important, based on the passage.
Correct Answer:
3. Give a boost to the tourism sector.
The passage suggests that archaeological sites are valued partly because of their potential to boost tourism. This is inferred from the discussion on the benefits of new archaeological discoveries, which typically include increased tourism and enhanced cultural pride.
Incorrect Answers:
1. Generate funds for future discoveries: While plausible, the passage doesn’t explicitly link site importance to funding future discoveries.
2. Subject to strict patrimony laws: The importance of sites isn’t directly attributed to the existence of patrimony laws.
4. Symbol of Western imperialism: The passage discusses Western imperialism in the context of looting and exploitation, not as a reason for the importance of sites in source countries.
